TRENDS  OF  THOUGHT  AND 
CHRISTIAN  TRUTH 


JOHN  A.W.  HAAS 


LIBRARY  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT 

J 


TRENDS  OF  THOUGHT  AND 
CHRISTIAN  TRUTH 


TRENDS  OF  THOUGHT  AND 
CHRISTIAN  TRUTH 


JOHN  A.  W.  HAAS 

President  of  Muhlenberg  College,  Professor  of 
Religion  and  Philosophy. 


BOSTON:    RICHARD  G.   BADGER 
TORONTO:  THE  COPP  CLARK  CO.,  LIMITED 


Copyright,  1915,  by  Richard  G.  Badger 
All  rights  reserved 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A. 


To 

EDGAR  FAHS  SMITH 

Beloved  Provost  of  my  Alma  Mater 

who  combines  true  scientific  culture  with 

strong  Christian  convictions  and  vital  Christian  service 


PREFACE 

Several  years  ago  a  number  of  lectures  were  delivered 
by  me,  upon  request,  on  the  relation  of  Christianity  to 
modern  issues.  These  lectures  formed  the  starting  point 
for  this  volume.  Some  of  them  were  repeated  before  the 
students  of  Wittenberg  College  and  the  Hamma  Divinity 
School.  They  are  now  elaborated  and  put  into  a  form 
which  shall  correlate  them  as  a  text-book  with  the  logical 
and  philosophical  studies,  which  are  usually  found  in  cer- 
tain groups  and  courses  in  the  Senior  year  of  the  college 
course.  There  is  in  them  also  much  material  which  may 
serve  for  apologetic  courses  in  theological  seminaries. 

No  doubt  many  of  the  positions  taken  will  be  objected 
to  by  the  philosophers,  because  I  belong  to  no  philosophic 
school,  claim  the  independent  right  of  Christian  truth,  and 
am  frequently  reactionary.  The  advanced  theologian  will 
find  fault  because  not  enough  of  the  older  orthodoxy  has 
been  eliminated.  The  strict  adherent  of  the  older  position 
will  claim  that  undue  concessions  to  the  modern  spirit  have 
been  made.  The  whole  aim  has  been  to  aid  in  a  just  com- 
parison between  modern  attitudes  and  Christianity,  and 
to  find  a  proper  logical  basis  for  discriminating  apolo- 
getics. It  is  my  conviction  that  Christian  apologetics 
must  enter  into  the  study  of  modern  logical  positions.  At 
any  rate  such  is  the  endeavor  of  this  volume.  It  will  have 
answered  its  purpose  if  it  arouses  discussion,  particularly 
in  the  Church  to  which  I  belong  and  which  I  serve. 

J.  H. 

March,  1915. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction 9 

PART    ONE  LEADING    TRENDS    OF    THOUGHT 

CHAPTER 

I     The  Mathematical  Method 29 

II     The  Inductive  Claim 46 

III  The  Comparative  Idea 61 

IV  The  Conjectural  Scheme 77 

V  The  Mechanical  Demand 90 

VI     The  Biological  Supposition 104 

VII     The  Psychological  Solution 126 

VIII     The  Social  Trend 144 

PART  TWO THOUGHT  AND  TRUTH 

I     The  Finding  of  Truth 163 

II     The  Absolutist  Aim 167 

III     The  Mystic  Absorption 184 

IV     The  Pragmatic  Program 196 

V  The  Results  of  Pragmatism 216 

VI     The  Vitalist  View 242 

VII     The  Realist  Realm 299 

Index 217 


INTRODUCTION 

THERE  is  a  great  common  character  about  the 
thought  of  every  age.  It  may,  as  in  our  time,  ap- 
pear in  many  forms  and  be  expressed  in  contrary 
conceptions,  but  still  it  possesses  unifying  centres  and 
combining  ideals.  Thought  passes  around  the  world  and 
through  the  minds  of  men  like  a  great  current.  It  has 
common  trends  and  directions  even  when  an  age  is  one  of 
unrest,  search  and  doubt,  and  is  not  controlled  by  a  single, 
over-ruling  idea  or  by  one  mighty  passion.  To  suppose 
that  thought  is  merely  individual  is  to  fail  in  understand- 
ing its  force  and  influence  among  men.  A  great  thinker 
may  think  a  new  thought,  he  may  originate  an  idea  which 
is  actually  novel,  but  it  lives  only  as  it  appeals  to  other 
minds  and  becomes  a  part  of  general  thinking.  Mostly  the 
thoughts  and  ideals  of  the  leaders  of  thought  are  only  the 
crystallizing  centres  of  the  subconsciously  working  trends 
and  forces  of  thought.  With  such  a  conception  of  the 
movement  of  thought  we  are  led  to  analyze  its  elements, 
for  it  is  a  movement  of  a  number  of  trends. 

The  character  of  the  trends  of  thought  in  our  age  con- 
cerns us,  however,  not  purely  in  themselves  but  in  rela- 
tion to  the  truth  of  Christianity. 

We  cannot  escape  finding  a  real  contact  between  the 
claim  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  and  the  thought-trends 
of  an  age.  Christianity  must  influence  thought,  and 
thought  must  condition  the  intellectual  expression  of 
Christianity.  By  its  very  nature  as  a  great  world-re- 
ligion, and  in  agreement  with  its  universality  and  finality, 
Christianity  in  every  form  has  a  world-view.  There  lie 
back  of  it  not  merely  deep  religious  experiences,  strong 


10  Introduction 

spiritual  insight  and  a  mighty  treasure  of  individual  and 
social  feeling,  but  also  the  philosophies  and  ideals  of  the 
ages  which  it  has  used  to  express  and  defend  its  message. 
Because  of  the  message  of  Christianity  it  must  make  a 
demand  upon  the  thought  of  every  age,  to  ask  whether 
it  can  accept  and  employ,  or  whether  it  must  reject  the 
prevailing  modes  and  forms  of  thinking.  Its  action  and 
judgment  cannot  be  one  of  mere  sentiment,  deep  and  true 
as  sentiment  may  be,  but  it  calls  for  a  calm  deliberation. 
Deliberation  must  include  acquaintance  with  the  ruling 
thought,  comparison  of  this  thought  with  Christian  ideas, 
and  then  only  can  criticism  follow.  When  such  a  fair 
and  just  procedure  has  been  adopted  there  can  be  either 
adoption,  or  apology  and  polemic  of  Christianity  against 
the  thought  of  an  age.  As  an  introduction  to  fuller  com- 
parison and  an  incentive  to  more  intensive  study  of  modern 
thought  and  Christian  ideals  this  short  volume  attempts  a 
mere  general  outline  of  modern  positions  in  relation  to 
Christian  truth. 

The  trends  of  thought  that  shall  be  considered  are 
those  which  appear  in  the  scientific  and  philosophic  think- 
ing. To  these  our  examination  shall  be  limited.  A  com- 
plete survey  of  the  thought  of  the  age  would  demand  that 
in  addition  the  artistic  and  literary  ideals  should  be  consid- 
ered. Art,  in  its  production,  and  the  account  which  it 
renders  to  itself  by  exposition  of  its  ideals,  and  criticism 
of  its  results,  expresses  some  ruling  philosophy  and  gives 
voice  to  certain  trends  of  thought.  Views  of  life  and  some 
sort  of  philosophy  are  frequently  clothed  in  the  literary 
forms  of  the  novel  or  short  story,  the  poem  or  essay. 
Both  art  and  literature  are  closely  related  to  religion  in 
many  aspects.  To  literature  as  well  as  to  art  there  is 
applicable  what  Doctor  Galloway  says :  "  Art  makes 
worship  more  suggestive  and  impressive,  while  religion 
imparts  a  purifying  and  uplifting  motive  to   art.     The 


Introduction  11 

fact  that  the  two  should  help  each  other  in  this  fashion 
implies  something  common  in  their  methods  and  their 
aims,  something  akin  in  their  attitude  to  the  world  and 
life.  Art  and  religion  both  work  through  the  imagination, 
vivifying  experience  by  lending  to  it  a  significance  beyond 
that  of  the  moment.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  can 
live  in  the  region  of  pure  thought ;  the  aesthetic  mind  has  its 
sensuous  intuitions,  and  the  religious  mind  envisages  the 
things  of  the  spirit  in  an  imaginative  representation  drawn 
from  the  world  of  sense."  1  Back  of  both  art  and  religion 
lie  sympathetic  insight  and  a  feeling  for  unity  and  har- 
mony, and  both  art  and  religion  must  be  accepted  by  a 
peculiar  spiritual  mood.  But  while  such  a  relation  is 
true,  yet  the  connections  of  thought  with  Christianity 
do  not  appear  as  definitely  and  directly  in  art  as  in  science 
and  philosophy.  The  definite  intellectual  programs  of 
science  and  philosophy  allow  of  a  clearer  comparison  with 
the  claims  of  Christianity.  And  if  a  conflict  exists  be- 
tween thought  and  the  truth  of  Christianity,  it  must 
show  itself  more  markedly  between  the  philosophic  and 
scientific  thinking  and  religion,  because  their  methods  are 
more  diverse.  Even  where  religion  becomes  scientific  in 
theology  there  is  a  great  difference  between  it  and  the 
purely  scientific  and  philosophic  temper.  The  data  of 
science  are  the  things  of  sense  and  the  datum  of  philos- 
ophy is  experience,  while  the  facts  of  religion  are  not 
things  of  sense  nor  merely  natural  experience.  For 
science  and  philosophy  the  regulative  principle  is  the 
mind,  for  theology  revelation.  The  method  of  philosophy 
and  science  demands  consistency  of  thought;  theology, 
however  developed,  requires  consistency  with  the  religious 
sources  of  authority.  The  content  of  philosophy  and 
science  is  the  universe  in  its  being,  development  and  truth, 
the  content  of  theology  is  the  communion  between  God  and 
i "  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.  207. 


12  Introduction 

man.  For  the  sake,  therefore,  of  both  comparison  and 
contrast  it  is  more  to  the  purpose  to  correlate  the  philo- 
sophic and  scientific  ideas  of  an  age  with  Christian  truth. 
We  must,  consequently,  pass  by  the  aesthetic  expression  of 
thought,  delightful  and  stimulating  as  it  might  be  to  com- 
pare and  contrast  Christianity  with  the  classicists,  real- 
ists, impressionists  and  cubists  in  the  fine  arts,  with  the 
productions  and  speculations  of  Wagner  in  music,  and 
with  the  literature  of  various  countries  both  in  its  threat- 
ening decadence  and  shocking  naturalism. 

The  trends  of  thought  which  shall  occupy  us  are  first 
of  all  the  leading  modes  of  thinking,  and  then,  secondly, 
the  problem  of  truth  which  is  so  much  discussed  to-day. 
In  the  modes  of  thought  we  approach  the  formal  side  of 
truth  or  the  great  logical  ideas  and  ideals  which  cannot  be 
overlooked  in  any  outline  of  the  ways  of  thought  in  re- 
lation to  Christianity.  The  logical  ideas  do  not  become 
ruling  and  leading  ideals  of  thought  after  the  manner 
of  a  formal  analysis  of  thought,  which  any  mere  discussion 
of  logic  must  deal  with.  The  ways  or  trends  of  thought 
combine  content  with  form,  and  they  must  do  so.  The  ab- 
stractness  of  formal  logic  is  useful  as  an  analytic  reduc- 
tion of  thinking  to  its  ineradicable  ultimates,  but  the 
actual  thinking  in  any  science  or  art  is  never,  even  in  the 
use  of  principles  and  abstractions,  without  content.  And 
when  an  age  accepts  certain  ruling  trends  of  thought  and 
classifies  its  knowledge  according  to  them,  there  is  still 
more  concreteness  in  the  living  logic  than  in  the  scientific 
formulation  of  the  principles  which  dominate  its  think- 
ing. We  shall,  therefore,  select  those  prominent  and  out- 
standing concepts  that  enter  our  life  from  the  various 
sciences  and  mold  our  thinking  into  certain  shapes  and 
schemes.  Such  a  selection  will  not  be  exhaustive,  but  it 
aims  to  be  characteristic. 

There  are  four  centres  about  which  the  discussion  of  the 


Introduction  13 

leading  trends  cluster.  The  problem  of  quantitative 
thinking  and  the  exactness  of  mathematics  with  its  claim 
as  the  highest  and  most  certain  form  of  thought  are 
presented  first,  and  their  bearing  on  Christian  thought 
is  not  insignificant.  They  do  not,  however,  loom  up  so 
large  in  common  consciousness  and  thinking  as  does  the 
modern  emphasis  on  inductive  thinking  which  starts  from 
detail  and  particulars.  Out  of  it  grow  directly  the  ques- 
tions of  comparison  and  analogy  and  of  real  conjecture  or 
hypothesis.  These  together  with  induction  form  the  sec- 
ond centre  in  distinction  from  mathematics  as  the  first 
centre. 

The  problem  of  inductive  thinking  as  related  to  Chris- 
tianity is  the  question,  whether  we  must  begin  with  the 
universal  and  general,  or  whether  we  can  rise  from  the 
particular  to  the  type  of  thinking  which  Christianity 
favors.  The  question  of  comparison  is  the  application  of 
the  place  and  the  value  of  analogy  in  human  thinking, 
the  right  of  its  extension  from  instance  to  instance,  and 
from  sphere  to  sphere.  How  can  such  comparative  rea- 
soning be  employed  in  religion  and  what  does  it  mean  for 
or  against  Christianity,  is  the  resultant  problem. 

Comparison  is  only  one  of  the  great  methods ;  by  its  side 
stands  conjecture.  Conjecture  or  conjectural  thinking 
is  very  prevalent.  It  is  the  basis  of  all  critical  construc- 
tion, and  it  embraces  in  addition  the  arguments  from  prob- 
ability and  those  that  lead  to  hypothesis  and  theory.  The 
interrelation  of  positive  critical  construction  and  probabil- 
ity and  hypothesis  is  constant.  What  does  it  mean  over 
against  or  in  favor  of  Christianity?  How  can  Christian- 
ity use  or  how  must  it  modify  probability,  hypothesis 
and  criticism? 

The  third  centre  embraces  three  trends  which  largely 
influence  modern  thought ;  they  are  the  mechanical,  the 
biological  and  the  psychological  positions.     The  mechan- 


14  Introduction 

ical  conception,  resting  on  a  restricted  formulation  of 
cause  as  external  and  material,  attempts  to  form  a  unified 
view  of  the  universe  in  terms  no  higher  than  chemistry. 
What  Christianity  must  do  with  this  view  seems  very  clear 
and  evident  at  once  to  most  of  the  writers  and  thinkers 
who  take  the  Christian  attitude.  They  utterly  reject  and 
deny  it.  But  still  it  may  be  asked,  whether  it  is  not 
possible  to  modify  the  mechanical  view,  to  make  it  sup- 
plementary to  idealistic  conceptions  and  then  so  to  ad- 
just it  that  Christianity  may  employ  it  without  surrender- 
ing its  position. 

While  the  mechanical  point  of  view  has  sought  to  sub- 
sume all  phenomena  under  its  name  it  has  found  a  strong 
counter-claimant  in  the  biological  standpoint.  The  bio- 
logical supposition  seeks  to  interpret  the  connection  and 
relatedness  of  the  universe  from  the  idea  of  physical  life. 
It  appears  most  prominently  in  the  character  of  biologism, 
which  may  be  defined  as  that  point  of  view  that  seeks  to 
reduce  all  terms  in  the  universe  to  terms  and  processes 
of  natural  life.  For  it  the  thought  of  functioning,  which 
is  more  important  than  the  thought  of  being  or  substance, 
is  very  central.  The  seething,  seeking,  pushing  and  pro- 
gressing life  is  the  all-controlling  factor  in  this  trend  of 
thought. 

Out  of  biologism  and  in  close  affinity  with  it  there 
arises  the  modern  psychological  point  of  view.  From  the 
examination  of  the  phenomena  of  the  mind,  as  natural 
occurrences  physiologically  controlled,  many  of  the  higher 
human  interests  have  been  reconsidered.  Psychology 
has  offered  new  solutions  and  novel  points  of  view  in 
history  and  economics ;  it  has  claimed  to  give  a  right  idea 
of  society  and  communal  life  and  action ;  it  has  stimulated 
and  reformed  education ;  it  seeks  to  attack  morality,  and 
to  furnish  an  adequate  basis  for  the  explanation  of  the 
religious  life.     It  is  at  once  apparent  that  we  must  in- 


Introduction  15 

quire  how  the  psychological  point  of  view  will  affect 
Christianity  and  whether  Christianity  can  accept  it  as 
sufficient  and  adequate. 

The  fourth  centre  leads  us  to  a  summary  examination 
of  the  great  social  viewpoint  in  our  age.  It  is  expressed 
in  the  philosophy  of  history,  in  economics,  sociology, 
political  philosophy,  morality  and  religion.  The  problem 
it  offers  is,  how  shall  Christianity  deal  with  the  claim 
of  the  primal  importance  of  society  and  of  society's  need 
and  value  as  paramount  to  the  individual.  The  influence 
and  results  of  social  ideas  reach  very  far  and  are  re- 
making modern  life.  To  understand  them  and  to  dis- 
criminate between  what  is  valuable  and  what  is  defective 
is  one  of  the  greatest  tasks  put  before  the  Christianity  of 
our  day. 

After  the  attempt  to  indicate  the  relations  of  thought 
in  these  leading  modern  aspects  there  still  remains  the 
second  main  problem.  We  must  seek  to  determine  the  con- 
nection of  thought  with  truth  and  how  this  connection 
affects  Christianity.  The  results  which  may  be  attained 
in  the  discussion  of  the  mathematical  method;  of  the  in- 
ductive, comparative  and  conjectural  arguments;  of  the 
mechanical,  biological  and  psychological  claims;  and  of 
the  social  trend  naturally  lead  to  the  further  problem 
of  considering  the  whole  question  of  truth.  Thought 
and  truth  belong  together.  While  thought  may  deviate, 
err  and  be  incorrect,  and  while  thinking  does  not  cease 
as  a  fact  when  it  fails  to  reach  truth,  nevertheless  the 
aim  of  thought  is  to  attain  truth.  The  science  of  thought 
has  always  sought  to  give  the  principles  and  laws  of  cor- 
rect thinking  and  to  eliminate  the  fallacies.  Logic  has 
dealt  with  the  question  how  we  ought  to  think,  not  how  we 
do  think.  The  latter  has  generally  been  the  problem 
of  psychology. 

Not  only  does  thought  demand  truth  but  truth  must 


16  Introduction 

also  use  thought.  No  matter  how  we  determine  and  in- 
terpret truth,  whether  as  absolute  reality  or  simply  as 
satisfying  end,  whether  we  include  or  exclude  feeling  and 
will,  whether  we  believe  that  it  is  made  or  that  we  make 
it,  yet  it  always  includes  the  question  of  intellect.  The 
intellect  may  not  be  all  that  truth  needs  but  it  cannot 
be  absent.  In  fact  it  remains,  after  all,  the  dominant  fac- 
tor, if  not  in  the  actuality,  at  any  rate  in  the  demonstra- 
tion of  truth.  And  as  valuable  and  necessary  as  demon- 
stration, proof  and  verification  are  to  truth,  so  essential 
is  intellect  to  truth.  Even  the  satisfaction  which  it  may 
be  supposed  to  involve  for  the  feeling  can  only  be  tested 
and  approved  through  the  intellect. 

In  the  elaboration  of  the  problem  of  truth  we  must 
enter  upon  the  question  of  the  finding  or  possession  of 
truth.  Is  truth  a  finding  or  a  possession,  is  it  a  search 
or  a  revelation ;  and  how  shall  it  be  discovered  or  unveiled? 
Such  questions  as  these  enter  deeply  into  the  determina- 
tion of  truth  and  its  character  and  the  claim  of  truth 
which  Christianity  makes.  This  problem  of  the  quest 
of  truth  leads  us  directly  to  the  diverse  interpretations  of 
truth  which  to-day  occupy  the  minds  of  thinkers. 

Some  there  are  who  reassert  and  redefine  truth  as  the 
Absolute  and  as  Reality.  To  them  truth  is ;  and  with 
high  idealism  they  maintain  the  ultimate  harmony  and 
unity  of  truth  which  gives  the  final  meaning  to  all  things, 
even  though  it  be  unapproachable  in  its  eternally  existent 
universality.  How  shall  Christianity  deal  with  those  to 
whom  truth  is  the  absolute  whole  or  the  absolute  meaning 
of  the  universe?  Can  it  agree  with  this  logical  abstrac- 
tion of  unity?  Beside  the  absolutists  of  reflection  are 
the  absolutists  of  feeling.  They  do  not  find  truth  in  the 
harmony  of  logic  but  they  claim  to  touch  reality  in  the 
immediacy  of  the  intuition  to  which  feeling  leads.  These 
are  the  mystics  who  merge  thought  into  the  Infinite  by 


Introduction  17 

the  fusion  of  meditation.  In  meditation  the  power  of 
the  concentration  of  the  intellect  loses  itself  in  mere  ab- 
stract feeling.  What  sympathy  has  Christianity  with 
mysticism  either  in  its  full  or  partial  assertion?  Is  Chris- 
tianity fundamentally  mystical  and  does  it  find  truth  by 
such  intuition  of  feeling  as  the  mystic  lives  in?  These 
and  kindred  questions  arising  out  of  the  mystic  situation 
are  by  no  means  unimportant  to  Christian  truth. 

In  contrast  and  polemic  opposition  to  all  absolutism 
stands  pragmatism.  With  strong  emphasis  on  actuality 
and  direct  experience,  with  unabating  assertion  of  the 
vitality  and  progress  of  truth,  pragmatism  defines  the 
question  of  truth  as  that  of  verification,  satisfaction  and 
real  utility.  It  is  the  attempt  to  formulate  the  question 
of  truth  from  the  Darwinian  and  biological  point  of  view 
as  purely  and  solely  inductive.  What  can  Christianity 
do  with  this  peculiar  American  position,  for  pragmatism 
has  been  most  largely  developed  in  America?  Are  there 
in  it  elements  that  can  be  used  in  Christian  thought  or 
must  it  be  totally  rejected?  Is  it  the  best  method  for 
solving  the  theistic  attitude  of  Christianity,  and  does  it 
furnish  the  most  adaptable  philosophy  for  the  understand- 
ing of  Christian  experience?  Such  and  similar  problems 
are  agitating  men's  minds  to-day  and  they  cannot  be 
passed  by,  inasmuch  as  for  good  or  for  evil  pragmatism 
is  a  leading  way  of  thinking  of  thousands  to-day  for  whom 
the  philosopher  has  defined  the  ruling  attitude.  Pragma- 
tism is  not  really  new  in  itself ;  it  is  a  new  way  of  stating 
an  old  problem,  but  nevertheless  it  is  new  in  its  claim  and 
emphasis  at  the  present. 

Connected  with  the  pragmatic  claim  although  different 
in  many  features  is  the  new  philosophy  of  life  of  which 
Eucken  and  Bergson  are  the  main  exponents.  This  vital- 
istic  philosophy  seeks  to  find  truth  in  life  itself  and  in  a 
new  use  of  intuition  which   is   not   the  intuition   of  the 


18  Introduction 

mystic.  Its  intuition  is  that  of  life  in  its  fulness.  Life 
is  made  the  final  unity  which  is  to  be  accepted  without 
analysis,  for  intellectual  analysis  will  destroy  its  rich- 
ness and  concreteness.  The  philosophy  of  life  claims  to 
have  found  the  key  to  the  problem  of  truth.  Is  the  con- 
ception of  life  consonant  with  Christianity?  Will  the  new 
vitalistic  point  of  view  furnish  a  vessel  for  holding  ele- 
ments of  Christian  truth  which  have  hitherto  not  found 
an  adequate  philosophic  carrier,  or  will  it  lead  away  from 
clear  conceptions  of  the  faith  to  the  indefmiteness  of  un- 
analyzed  life?  Will  it  elevate  or  depress  Christian  truth? 
Can  the  views  of  Eucken  or  Bergson  be  adopted?  Such 
and  cognate  questions  at  once  rise  in  our  minds  and  de- 
mand some  adjustment. 

Not  totally  unrelated  to  vitalism  but  more  closely  con- 
nected with  pragmatism  is  the  new  realism  which  is  as- 
serting itself  strongly  at  the  present  through  a  number 
of  American  professors  of  philosophy.  It  claims  to  deal 
directly  with  the  facts  of  life  and  give  them  their  real 
par-value.  While  it  is  still  in  the  flux  it  has  begun  to 
define  reality  and  to  give  an  opinion  on  the  question  of 
truth.  Therefore  we  cannot  escape  the  question  how 
Christianity  shall  relate  itself  to  this  new  realism.  This 
opens  up  the  larger  question  whether  Christianity  is  more 
in  sympathy  with  the  realistic  or  the  idealistic  philosophy. 
Can  it  express  itself  equally  well  and  without  detriment 
through  either  a  realistic  or  idealistic  philosophy? 

In  adjusting  all  of  these  questions  which  arise  out  of 
the  discussion  of  the  leading  trends  of  thought  to  the 
truth  of  Christianity  we  cannot  allow  Christianity  to  be 
undefined.  It  is  necessary  to  show  that,  in  all  its  various 
forms  Christianity  must  come  into  relation  with  the  prob- 
lem of  thought  and  truth.  Among  all  the  varieties  of  the 
conception  of  Christianity  there  are  several  leading  types, 
and  it  is  to  them  that  attention  must  be  directed  if  the 


Introduction  19 

relation  of  Christianity  to  methods  of  thought  is  to 
be  determined.  It  will  appear  that  the  connection  of 
Christianity  with  thought  and  truth,  and  particularly 
with  the  thought  and  truth  of  modern  times,  is  not  acci- 
dental but  fundamental  and  far-reaching. 

The  type  of  interpreting  Christianity  which  immediately 
demands  and  is  concerned  with  thinking,  is  the  dogmatic 
ideal.  According  to  this  ideal  Christianity  is  in  essence 
constituted  by  a  number  of  truths.  These  are  formulated 
into  some  kind  of  a  Christian  philosophy  and  form  a  sys- 
tem. The  foundations  and  guarantees  of  the  Christian 
system  of  thought  may  differ;  they  may  rest  on  biblical 
authority  or  on  ecclesiastical  approval,  but  this  does  not 
affect  the  issue  at  hand.  Under  whatever  guarantee  the 
Christian  system  of  truth  appears,  it  is  evident  that 
its  content  will  not  merely  make  claims  upon  and  counter- 
claims to  systems  of  philosophy  and  hypotheses  of  science 
in  such  problems  as  God,  the  nature  of  man,  evil,  and 
many  like  and  related  questions,  but  that  also,  owing  to 
these  very  contents,  the  methods  of  approach  to  and  of 
the  discussion  of  these  problems  as  well  as  the  whole  sphere 
of  thinking  will  be  involved.  But  it  is  not  this  conception 
of  Christianity  alone  which  must  necessarily  define  itself 
over  against  the  trends  of  thought.  It  does  so  most  di- 
rectly, but  it  is  not  exclusively  determinative  of  the  whole 
discussion. 

Closely  related  to  the  dogmatic  ideal  is  the  mystic  con- 
ception. At  first  mysticism  may  appear  to  be  purely  anti- 
intellectual,  for  it  apprehends  Christianity  in  the  im- 
mediacy of  feeling;  but  what  does  feeling  lead  to?  Does 
it  ever  remain  purely  undefined  and  undefinable,  and  merely 
subjective?  In  its  highest  ranges  of  elevation  and  in  its 
deepest  expressions  of  dependence,  it  has  an  object  which 
is  universal,  and  which  is  at  least  in  part  intellectually 
conceived  and  expressed.     By  intuition  and  imagination 


20  Introduction 

a  religious  world  of  thought  is  constructed.  The  method 
is  not  the  reflective  and  systematic  thinking  of  dogmatic 
Christianity,  but  the  results  are  truths,  and  the  very  em- 
phasis of  the  immediacy  of  feeling  in  the  mystic  experi- 
ence as  a  source  of  truth  necessarily  affects  the  problem 
of  thinking.  The  advocates  of  mysticism  of  every  kind 
cannot  escape  defining  their  attitude  toward  thinking. 

As  little  as  the  mystic  can  the  voluntarist,  who  inter- 
prets religion  from  the  point  of  view  of  will,  escape  the 
problem  of  thought.  Will  and  action  in  religion  no  less 
than  feeling  cannot  remain  blind.  The  impulses  and  mo- 
tives of  the  will,  the  purpose  of  volition,  and  the  aim  of 
action  demand  thought.  A  scheme  of  thoughtful  willing 
and  acting  resting  on  some  great  principle  underlies  either 
consciously  or  unconsciously.  The  principles  of  action 
imply  some  theory  of  life  and  some  valuation  of  other 
values  than  their  own  by  exclusion  if  not  by  definition. 
When  truth  is  found  in  volition  the  relation  to  intellection 
is  and  cannot  be  evaded.  In  the  motive  and  desire  of  men 
as  they  lead  to  will,  there  must  be  a  union  with  thought. 
Professor  Cohen  rightly  says :  "  Motive  and  thought 
dare  not  remain  two  unlike  elements,  if  they  are  to  be  ca- 
pable of  being  combined  into  a  unity  in  will.  Without 
the  unity  will  would  not  be  will;  not  an  original  direction 
of  cultural  consciousness."  2 

In  our  age  the  voluntarist  ideal  generally  takes  on  a 
moralistic  or  philanthropic  coloring.  But  in  either  case 
it  must  be  related  to  thought.  The  emphasis  on  re- 
ligion, and  particularly  Christianity,  as  merely  ethical 
at  once  determines  what  we  estimate  in  Christianity  and 
how  we  think  either  from  principles  downward  or  from 
practice  by  generalization  upward.  The  philanthropic 
conception  which  so  frequently  boasts  that  it  has  escaped 
the  quarrel  of  truth  and  error  and  the  uncertainty  of 
2  "  Ethik  des  Reinen  Willens,"  r>.  166. 


Introduction  21 

theory  deceives  itself.  It  acts  on  a  great  principle  which 
shapes  its  thinking.  The  life  of  love  is  not  thoughtless, 
for  were  it  such  it  would  become  empty  sentimentalism. 
It  rests  on  definite  ideas  of  the  reality  and  value  of  human 
love.  All  thinking  even  of  a  theoretical  nature  is  more 
or  less  controlled  by  the  ruling  passion  of  life,  and  the 
ruling  passion  of  life  is  a  theory  of  life.  Consequently 
philanthropy  is  a  theory  and  ideal  of  life  as  well  as  a 
practice.  It  determines  values  and  the  modes  of  thinking 
constantly  from  its  peculiar  prejudice,  and  argues  deduc- 
tively from  the  impulse  of  a  helpful  will. 

A  very  large  emphasis  is  put  by  the  adherents  of  a 
mystic  or  voluntaristic  ideal  upon  experience.  But  not 
only  the  advocates  of  these  ideals,  but  many  also,  who 
interpret  Christianity  either  from  a  more  intellectual 
standpoint  or  from  the  conception  of  the  total  individual- 
ity, set  large  store  upon  experience.  Religion  like  phi- 
losophy is  traced  back  for  its  material  and  its  tests  to  ex- 
perience in  all  its  fullness  and  manifoldness.  But  the 
complexity  of  experience  cannot  remain  unanalyzed ;  there- 
fore, the  empiric  ideal  finds  some  tests  and  norms  which 
are  intellectual.  If  the  verities  of  religious  experience 
are  gathered  from  the  types  of  feeling  or  of  the  will  to 
believe,  it  is  still  true  that  the  "  twice-born  "  souls  are 
brought  into  connection  with  thought  and  truth  from 
their  new  fundamental  attitude.  The  new  life  remakes 
all  life,  and  men  in  consequence  of  a  great  experience 
argue  from  a  controlling  principle.  They  compare  and 
correlate  everything  with  the  new  ideal  of  their  life,  and 
from  the  psychology  of  their  religious  experience  they 
form  the  logic  of  their  religion.  This  result  is  the  more 
necessary  where  the  experience  is  more  directly  a  new 
birth  of  thought,  and  rests  upon  the  objective  truth  either 
of  the  Bible  or  of  the  Church.  When  religious  experience 
is,  however,  not  restricted,  but  allowed  to  remain  total  and 


2£  Introduction 

synthetic  in  a  concrete  interpretation  of  personality,  and 
what  it  may  experience,  nevertheless  experience  conceived 
even  thus  has  its  intellectual  implications;  and  the  logic 
of  religious  experience  shows  us  that  the  pure  mystic  or 
voluntaristic  ideal  are  as  inadequate  in  denying  thought, 
as  the  dogmatic  ideal  is  in  denying  the  other  elements  of 
the  psychic  life. 

The  experimental  type  of  personal  religion  arising  from 
the  theory  of  experience  marks  individualism  in  religion. 
Individualism  in  religion,  like  pluralism  in  philosophy,  im- 
plies an  intellectual  position  and  a  fundamental  logical 
attitude.  The  very  principle  of  the  many  individuals  in 
contrast  with  the  Absolute  One  demands  processes  of 
thought.  Christianity  shows  us  that  where  individual- 
ism makes  its  strongest  claim  it  cannot  remain  with- 
out some  intellectual  basis.  Some  of  the  different  small 
divisions  of  Christianity  which  frequently  appear  to  be 
distinct  because  of  tense  feelings,  nevertheless  make  their 
propaganda  by  the  appeal  to  some  peculiar  tenet  or  truth 
which  they  claim  to  have  rescued.  This  fact  appears 
equally  in  greater  movements  of  an  individualistic  char- 
acter like  the  rationalistic  theory  or  the  ideal  of  the  in- 
ner light.  Rationalism  made  the  claim  that  the  individual 
man  must  establish  his  religion  upon  the  plain  arguments 
of  thought  and  common  sense,  but  this  very  claim  shows 
that  the  validity  of  rationalism  is  based  on  the  idea  of  a 
common  human  sense  or  general  rationality.  The  in- 
dividualism of  rationalism  never  destroyed  its  logic.  The 
theory  of  the  inner  light  emphasizes  an  intuitional  prin- 
ciple, but  this  principle  has  an  intellectual  trend.  There- 
fore, it  was  entirely  natural  that  when  the  theory  of  the 
inner  light  was  put  into  practice  by  Fox,  the  founder  of 
the  Society  of  Friends,  that  its  development  brought  about 
a  freer,  liberal,  and  a  more  orthodox  form  of  belief.  It 
was  impossible,  in  the  effort  to  get  away  from  the  letter, 


Introduction  23 

to  avoid  returning  to  an  intellectual  attitude  and  to  cer- 
tain definite  doctrine  resting  upon  great  principles. 

The  communal  idea  of  Christianity,  either  in  its  his- 
torical form  of  the  Church  or  in  modern  attempts  of 
socialization,  is  more  strongly  intellectual  than  the  in- 
dividual attitude.  The  Church,  when  it  is  conceived,  not 
as  a  bond  of  unity  in  action,  but  as  an  eternal  organiza- 
tion, naturally  is  the  source  and  guarantor  of  truth  and 
the  framer  and  defender  of  dogma.  But  even  where  the 
Church  is  not  so  conceived,  but  only  as  a  spiritual  fellow- 
ship, it  could  never  live  without  some  intellectual  plat- 
form or  some  creed,  whether  expressed  or  unexpressed, 
whether  officially  adopted  or  loosely  acquiesced  in.  It  is 
equally  impossible  to  define  Christianity,  as  some  modern 
thinkers  would  define  it,  as  a  social  movement  without 
including  a  large  element  of  intellectualism.  There  can 
be  no  final  and  permanent  fusion  of  men  for  real  action 
by  mere  feeling  or  passion.  Great  waves  of  emotion  may 
pass  through  a  mass  of  men  but  they  can  only  do  so  where 
the  emotion  has  some  common  background  of  conviction. 
There  can  be  no  unity  of  common  willing  without  the 
communication  of  intellectual  elements  which  make  perma- 
nent the  ideals  of  the  community.  No  community  can  live 
without  loyalty  of  the  people  in  it  to  its  ideals  and  prin- 
ciples which  must  be  expressed  in  terms  of  thought. 
Wherever  the  individual  has  protested  against  the  com- 
munity, and  particularly  against  the  religious  community, 
it  has  been  against  what  the  individual  considers  to  be 
the  intellectual  bondage  or  the  error  of  the  community. 
Consequently  it  is  clear  that  in  the  communal  conception 
of  Christianity  also  we  cannot  escape  the  relation  to  a 
logic. 

All  the  types  of  interpreting  Christianity  which  have 
been  discussed  may  be  finally  reduced  to  another  funda- 
mental distinction,  namely   that  between   the   permanent 


24  Introduction 

and  the  changing,  the  eternal  and  the  temporal.  Un- 
fortunately this  distinction  instead  of  being  combined 
into  a  living  unity  has  been  made  a  line  of  cleavage.  On 
the  one  hand  have  stood  those  who  assert  that  Chris- 
tianity is  naught  else  but  a  spiritual  unchanging  reality 
and  truth.  They  have  not  allowed  for  its  historic  origin 
nor  its  development.  In  the  conception  of  its  doctrines, 
they  have  held  only  to  the  idea  that  the  doctrines  were 
revealed  truth,  and  they  have  disregarded  the  historical 
character  and  the  debated  formulation  of  doctrine.  Back 
of  mysticism  they  have  found  the  Absolute  One  whom  the 
mystic  has  grasped.  As  explanatory  of  all  voluntarism 
they  have  emphasized  the  eternal  impulse  or  the  ever- 
lasting purpose.  Experience  itself,  and  the  life  of  the  in- 
dividual and  the  community,  are  interpreted  as  founded 
on  the  adherence  to  unchanging  laws.  These  conserva- 
tives hold  that  there  is  no  true  change,  nor  real  history, 
but  that  there  is  only  maintenance  or  loss  of  the  essential 
truth,  which  ought  always  and  everywhere  be  believed 
by  all  reasonable  believers.  This  attitude  with  its  fixed- 
ness has  only  judgments  of  condemnation  for  changing 
forms  and  trends  of  thought.  Unmindful  of  the  fact  that 
the  conservatism  of  the  present  has  clothed  itself  in  the 
garments  of  the  logic  of  the  past,  there  are  still  those 
who  would  make  their  accepted  theory  eternal.  Every 
temporal  act  and  idea,  they  hold,  must  be  absorbed  into 
the  revealed  scheme  and  canonized  or  rejected  by  it.  This 
conservatism  of  a  Christianity  of  everlasting  rest  has  no 
real  place  for  progress,  for  even  the  progress  of  the 
assimilation  of  the  eternal  truth  is  in  fact  only  the  absorp- 
tion into  the  unchanging  realit}^. 

On  the  other  hand,  stand  the  defenders  of  change,  his- 
tory and  progress.  For  many  of  them  there  is  no  vestige 
of  eternal  unchangeable  spiritual  truth  in  Christianity. 
They  find  in  its  history  no  elements  of  vital  permanence. 


Introduction  25 

The  definition  of  Christianity  which  they  accept  is  that  of 
a  merely  human  religious  historical  movement  to  be  de- 
termined by,  and  measured  and  compared  with,  other  re- 
ligions. In  such  a  comparison  all  claims  of  universality 
and  finality  in  Christianity  and  every  trace  of  an  eternal 
value  must  be  eliminated  by  historical  critical  standards 
of  development.  According  to  the  men  of  this  type,  the 
claim  of  real  revelation,  real  prophecy,  and  of  real  mir- 
acles is  to  be  interpreted  as  a  fact  of  religious  history 
alone.  Consequently  we  would  possess  only  humanly 
created  values  but  not  existent  and  actual  eternal  realities. 
The  truth  of  this  kind  of  historical  emphasis  lies  in  its 
realization  of  actual  progress,  but  its  error  is  the  denial 
of  the  Christian  conviction  that  there  are  eternal  elements 
in  the  unfolding  history  of  Christianity. 

The  sane  attitude  appears  to  be  in  the  combination, 
and  not  in  the  separation  of  the  two  elements  of  eternity 
and  temporality.  Christianity  to  be  rightly  understood 
needs  such  a  union  as  much  as  it  is  needed  in  a  living  con- 
ception of  Christ.  An  eternal  Christ  without  the  problem 
of  the  historical  Jesus,  or  the  historical  Jesus  apart  from 
the  eternal  Christ,  are  two  conceptions  equally  defective 
and  inadequate.  Similarly  an  eternal  Christianity  with- 
out true  development,  or  a  historical  Christianity  without 
unchanging  principles  is  a  misconception.  When  we  have 
combined  both  elements  it  is  evident  that  from  this  point 
of  view  particularly  we  must  from  time  to  time  inquire 
how  the  historical  interpretation  of  eternal  truth  is  related 
to  the  thinking  of  an  age.  In  such  an  inquiry  it  is  not 
proper  either  absolutely  to  reject  or  unquestionably  to  ac- 
cept ruling  trends  of  thought  and  interpretations  of  truth. 
The  just  procedure  is  to  inquire,  weigh,  balance,  compare, 
criticise,  and  then  to  attempt  without  violence  to  what  we 
conceive  to  be  the  eternal  elements  in  Christianity,  to  re- 
affirm its  truths  and  to  indicate  how  they  agree  or  can 


^6  Introduction 

agree,  and  how  they  disagree  and  must  disagree  with  mod- 
ern conception  of  thought  and  truth.  The  Christian 
truth  which  will  be  compared  with  the  trends  of  thought, 
embraces  the  fundamental  and  essential  features  of  what 
constitutes  the  general,  prevalent  and  common  Christian- 
ity. 


PART  ONE 
LEADING  TRENDS  OF  THOUGHT 


TRENDS  OF  THOUGHT 
AND  CHRISTIAN  TRUTH 

CHAPTER  I 

THE    MATHEMATICAL   METHOD 

FIGURES  and  religion,  forms  and  faith,  have  ap- 
parently but  little  to  do  with  each  other.  But  the 
judgment  of  the  surface,  which  sees  no  connection 
between  the  thinking  of  mathematics  and  the  reasoning  of 
religion,  has  never  considered  the  deeper  relations.  If  the 
manner  in  which  we  think  in  arithmetic  and  geometry, 
trigonometry  and  calculus,  is  the  one  fundamental,  accu- 
rate and  ideal  form  of  thought,  then  as  far  as  we  reason 
in  religion  we  must  approach  the  mathematical  goal. 
Furthermore,  the  constructive  power  and  the  connected 
contents  of  mathematical  logic  can  never  be  passed  by  in 
any  consideration  of  thought.  They  make  and  form  the 
related  system  of  all  thinking  in  quantity.  If  this  sys- 
tem is  the  perfect  plan  for  the  intellect,  must  it  not 
determine  any  effort  to  formulate  the  convictions  and 
truths  of  religion  ?  Conversely,  if  our  faith  claims  any  in- 
tellectual element,  and  as  far  as  it  formulates  the  facts 
of  belief,  it  must  in  its  procedure  either  adopt  or  reject  or 
modify  the  mathematical  claim.  Even  if  religion  has 
independence  in  making  its  system,  the  parts  of  this 
system  must  follow  a  logic  or  create  a  logic.  What  is  the 
relation  of  this  method  of  thought  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  science  of  quantity  argues,  is  therefore  a  question  that 
cannot  be  evaded. 

29 


30  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

The  conception  of  the  cogency  of  mathematical  proof 
and  the  finality  of  its  axioms  was  the  regnant  one  ever 
since  the  great  German  philosopher  Kant  wrote  his 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason."  In  it  he  ascribed  to  mathe- 
matics the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  certainty  of 
thought.  He  held  that  no  really  new  and  certain  knowl- 
edge could  be  attained  through  an  analytic  judgment, 
in  which  the  predicate  simply  gave  one  of  the  attributes 
of  the  subject.  But  in  a  synthetic  judgment  it  was  pos- 
sible to  add  a  real  truth.  And  mathematics  was  the 
science  in  which  prior  to  all  actual  experience  it  was 
possible  "  by  means  of  a  chain  of  reasonings  always  guided 
by  intuition  to  establish  necessary  synthetic  judgments."  * 
By  these  judgments,  unchangeable,  fundamental  necessi- 
ties of  thought  were  expressed.  They  were  conceived  to 
be  imbedded  in  the  very  nature  of  reason.  Their  validity 
went  as  far  as  the  universe.  The  necessity  of  the  cer- 
tainty in  the  multiplication  table  was  firmer  than  the 
heavens.  What  Euclid  had  established  in  his  unfoldment 
of  geometry  was  the  real  and  final  formulation  of  the 
principles  of  space.  Since  space  was  prior  to  experience 
and  determined  the  manner  in  which  the  mind  must  ar- 
range its  sensations,  it  followed  that  the  form  of  all  sen- 
sations was  given  a  priori  in  ourselves,  and  that  no  ex- 
ternal phenomena  could  be  possible  in  any  other  way.  It 
was  necessary  to  hold  "  that  the  propositions  of  geometry 
are  not  the  results  of  a  mere  creation  of  our  poetic 
imagination,"  but  "  they  are  necessarily  valid  of  space, 
and  consequently  of  all  that  may  be  found  in  space,  be- 
cause space  is  nothing  else  than  the  form  of  all  external 
appearances,  and  it  is  this  form  alone  in  which  objects  of 
sense  can  be  given."  2  It  follows  from  this  that  nothing 
can  be  given  in  appearance  that  geometry  does  not  de- 

i  First  edition  of  Kant's  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  p.  716. 
2  Kant's  "Prolegomena,"  paragraph  13,  remark  1. 


The  Mathematical  Method  31 

scribe.  In  other  words,  the  mind  has  certain  definite 
forms  that  condition  all  experience.  Mathematics  is  the 
one  certain  constructive  side  of  the  mind. 

In  this  attitude  of  Kant  toward  the  foundation  of 
mathematics  he  had  returned  to  the  idealism  of  Plato. 
For  Plato  in  his  later  years  numbers  expressed  most 
definitely  and  certainly  the  great  existent  ideas.  He 
adopted  much  that  Pythagoras  and  his  school  had  de- 
veloped, but  he  did  not  follow  their  fanciful  interpretation 
of  numbers  to  symbolize  moral  and  religious  ideas.  Kant, 
however,  differed  from  these  ancients  inasmuch  as  he 
founded  the  certainty  of  quantity  on  the  human  mind 
and  not  on  objective  eternal  ideas.  He  was  also  influenced 
by  Descartes,  who  in  opposition  to  the  abuse  of  logic 
found  in  mathematics  the  certainty  of  self-evident  truth. 
Descartes'  "  Discourse  on  Method "  seeks,  like  mathe- 
matics, to  find  first  principles.  But  the  philosopher  who 
most  definitely  sought  to  demonstrate  the  fact  of  God  and 
the  world,  of  nature  and  truth,  in  a  mathematical  manner 
was  Spinoza.  It  was  his  endeavor  to  deduce  all  truth 
from  a  few  fundamental  definitions  which  he  developed  into 
axioms.  Upon  these  he  founded  propositions  and  from 
them  he  deduced  corollaries.  His  initial  definition  was 
that  of  substance,  but  this  led  directly  to  the  definition  of 
God,  and  thus  the  main  interest  of  Spinoza  was  religious. 

It  is  equally  true  of  Kant  that  his  purpose  was  also  to 
find  a  basis  for  religion  which  was  sound.  In  his  great 
construction  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  "  the  prob- 
lems of  the  soul,  the  world,  and  God  are  those  toward 
which  the  whole  investigation  tends.  Merz  rightly  says, 
"  Kant,  indeed,  had  at  heart  a  vindication  of  the  funda- 
mental verities  of  religion:  of  the  belief  in  the  existence 
of  God,  the  Immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will.  Was  the  human  intellect  able  to  reach  in  these 
matters  of  belief  something  like  that  certainty  which  be- 


32  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

longed,  according  to  his  view,  to  the  sciences  of  applied 
mathematics ;  and,  if  not,  on  what  foundation  had  this 
belief  to  rest?  Mere  experience  could  not  give  to  knowl- 
edge the  characteristics  of  universality  and  necessity  — 
it  could  not  make  it  generally  valid  or  convincing.  The 
question  then  presented  itself,  how  does  some  of  the  knowl- 
edge we  possess,  viz.,  mathematical  knowledge,  arrive  at 
this  generality  and  convincing  evidence?  "  3 

For  Kant  the  answer  which  mathematics  offers  gave 
the  answer  for  the  foundation  of  all  knowledge.  Knowl- 
edge to  be  certain  needed  the  mind  to  add  the  logical 
qualities  of  universality  and  certainty  through  fixed  cate- 
gories to  the  material  given  in  experience.  In  mathematics 
there  existed  a  science  the  procedure  of  which  was  to  give 
the  logical  clue  to  physics  and  metaphysics.  It  could, 
prior  to  all  experience,  add  to  knowledge;  in  other  words, 
it  had  real  synthetic  judgments.  And  as  far  as  knowledge 
and  its  logic  were  to  approach  to  sure  foundations,  it 
needed  reasoning  akin  to  mathematics.  All  logic,  there- 
fore, was  to  be  fundamentally  of  a  mathematical  nature. 
It  was  through  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  that  cer- 
tainty could  be  found.  There  must  be,  according  to  Kant, 
prior  to  all  that  we  may  know,  certain  categories  of 
thought  which  lead  to  ideas  and  determine  contents. 

When  the  conception  of  the  nature  of  thought  was  thus 
determined  mathematically,  the  problem  of  the  rational 
basis  of  religion  was  settled.  The  problem  of  the  ra- 
tional reality  of  religion  rested  upon  the  reality  and  ex- 
istence of  thought.  If  religion  was  to  be  rational,  God 
and  His  existence  had  to  be  established  by  certain  proofs. 
There  were  in  vogue  three  venerable  proofs  which  men  had 
used  to  establish  as  they  thought,  the  conception  of  God 
on   a  strong  intellectual  basis.     These  proofs  were:  the 

s  "  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,"  Vol. 
Ill,  p.  342. 


The  Mathematical  Method  33 

proof  from  a  plan  and  purpose  in  the  universe,  known 
as  the  teleological  or  physico-theological  proof ;  the  proof 
from  the  contingency  of  the  world  and  its  demand  of  a  first 
cause,  called  the  cosmological  proof ;  and  finally  the  proof 
from  the  inner  necessity  of  thought,  called  the  ontological 
proof.  In  this  last  proof  Kant  rightly  saw  the  basal 
argument,  for  causality  and  contingency,  plan  and  pur- 
pose, become  sign-posts  toward  God  when  the  necessity  of 
thought  demands  Him.  Kant  argues  that  the  ontological 
proof  cannot  be  maintained.  The  thought  of  an  abso- 
lutely perfect  being  may  exist,  but  the  existence  of  the 
thought  does  not  prove  the  external  existence  of  God. 
It  is  possible  to  say,  God  is  almighty,  or  omniscient,  but 
then  we  have  only  an  analytic  judgment.  In  such  a  judg- 
ment the  predicate  only  unfolds  what  has  already  been  in 
the  subject.  But  we  cannot  argue  synthetically  and  say 
that  God  is,  or  exists.  This  synthetic  procedure  which  is 
justified  in  mathematics  is  not  justified  in  rational  theol- 
ogy. The  idea  of  a  hundred  thalers,  thinks  Kant,  does 
not  imply  their  reality.  Consequently  we  can  neither  in 
thought  reach  the  conception  of  the  existence  of  God,  nor 
can  we  test  it  by  outward  experience.  Therefore,  no 
theology  could  be  constructed  theoretically  and  no  proof 
found  for  religion  on  a  basis  of  certainty  like  that  which 
holds  of  mathematics. 

Kant  believed  it  to  be  his  mission  to  destroy  the  unjust 
claim  of  reason  to  make  room  for  faith.  He  proved  that 
theoretically  we  cannot  establish  the  idea  of  God,  of  the 
soul,  or  of  human  freedom.  By  his  arguments  he  de- 
stroyed the  claim,  that  there  could  be  a  demonstration 
which  was  cogent  for  a  natural  religion  of  God,  immor- 
tality, and  the  soul.  The  arguments  which  would  alone 
lead  to  the  assumption  of  these  religious  verities,  Kant 
found  in  the  moral  demands  of  man's  practical  reason. 
The  necessity  for  adjudicating  the  moral  inequalities  in 


34  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

the  world,  the  desire  for  permanent  happiness,  and  the 
categorical  imperative  of  conscience  called  for  God  and 
eternity.  The  proofs,  therefore,  which  Kant  allowed  were 
of  a  moral  nature,  and  had  presumptive  worth.  They 
were  not  scientific  and  could  not  be  cogent,  as  they  were 
not  of  a  mathematical  nature.  They  were  rather  answers 
to  a  demand,  and  judgments  of  quality  and  value.  By 
the  acceptance  of  this  type  of  proof,  and  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  former  kind  of  proof,  Kant,  for  a  long  time, 
influenced  thinking.  He  had  found  a  true  distinction,  but 
at  the  same  time  he  destroyed  all  claim  of  religion  to  have  a 
basis  in  the  certainty  of  thought.  He  aided,  therefore,  an 
agnostic  attitude  in  reference  to  the  intellectual  founda- 
tions of  religion.  And  this  result  he  reached  through 
the  fundamental  assumption  that  thought  was  funda- 
mentally mathematical. 

Later  in  his  life,  Kant  after  all  attempted  to  construct 
a  reasonable  religion  in  his  book  on  "  Religion  Within 
the  Limits  of  Reason."  In  it  he  returned  to  the  attitude 
which  prevailed  prior  to  his  system.  Before  Kant,  WolflT, 
a  leading  German  philosopher,  who  was  influenced  by 
Leibniz,  gave  voice  to  the  conception,  that  certain  rational 
elements  of  Christianity  could  be  proven.  Kant,  in  re- 
stricting religion  to  the  limits  of  reason,  and  not  follow- 
ing out  his  suggestion  of  basing  religion  on  moral  de- 
mands, which  might  have  led  him  to  recognize  the  religious 
demands,  reverted  himself.  He  sought  to  deplete  Chris- 
tianity of  its  supernatural  elements  and  he  argued  again 
for  the  eternal  truths  of  reason,  which,  of  course,  had  to 
be  of  a  mathematical  nature.  He  was  thus  forced  to  the 
tacit  acceptance  of  Lessing's  conception,  that  the  acci- 
dental facts  of  history  cannot  be  eternal  truths  of  reason. 
The  historical  elements  of  Christianity  were  consequently 
as  valueless  as  the  supernatural  content.  Thus,  finally, 
the  deeper  philosophy,  founded  on  mathematical  reason- 


The  Mathematical  Method  35 

ing,  led  to  the  same  result  as  the  common  sense  reasoning 
of  the  rationalists  before  Kant.  The  only  Christianity 
which  could  remain  was  a  belief  in  reason,  the  soul,  God, 
and  immortality,  and  the  three  last  were  only  the  require- 
ments of  the  will. 

From  all  this  it  appears  clearly  that,  wherever  the  cer- 
tainty of  mathematics  is  accepted,  and  its  sure  proof  is 
supposed  to  be  the  most  certain,  there  only  such  knowledge 
can  approach  certainty,  which  is  capable  of  demonstra- 
tion similar  to  that  of  mathematics.  Consequently,  only 
problematic  value  can  be  assigned  to  religion,  which  can- 
not be  submitted  in  its  fullness  to  such  proof  unless  it  be 
emptied  of  all  emotion,  and  denied  all  reality  of  truth, 
which  is  not  of  a  mathematical  nature.  Whatever  other 
kinds  of  truths  there  may  be,  they  cannot  approach  in 
scientific  value  and  certainty  to  the  mathematical  truths. 
If  these,  therefore,  are  the  highest,  no  religion  can  have  a 
real  intellectual  certitude.  It  will  be  even  more  uncertain 
and  relative  than  all  the  relativities  of  science. 

The  disregard  of  this  fact  has  constituted  one  of  the 
mistakes  in  the  apologetic  literature  of  Christianity  since 
Kant.  It  lacks  the  understanding  of  its  relation  to  math- 
ematical methods  in  human  thought.  Strange  to  relate, 
it  did  not  abolish,  as  it  ought  to  have  done,  the  wrong 
assumption  of  a  natural  theology  which  could  be  employed 
as  the  foundation  of  revealed  truth.  It  was  still  supposed 
that  there  existed  unalterably  in  the  consciousness  of  man, 
and  in  his  innate  reason,  axiomatic  truths  of  religion. 
These  were  given  more  or  less  content  in  disregard  of  the 
contradictory  facts  of  history.  Despite  the  experience, 
that  rationalism  used  the  conception  of  natural  theology 
to  declare  revelation  unnecessary,  because  reason  could 
furnish  the  necessary  basis  and  information  for  religion, 
and  despite  the  effort  of  rationalism  to  limit  religion  to  its 
legitimate  rational  elements  ;  nevertheless,  natural  theology 


36  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

was  again  used,  although  in  a  secondary  place,  by  the 
advocates  of  a  positive  faith.  Kant's  destruction  of  nat- 
ural theology  in  his  great  "  Critique  "  did  not  affect  much 
of  later  apologetic  literature.  Even  when  finally  changes 
were  made  and  natural  theology  was  laid  aside,  many 
theological  teachers  still  argued  for  a  propaedeutic  of 
reason.  It  seemed  impossible  for  Christianity  to  separate 
itself  from  the  dangerous  alliance  between  reasoning,  which 
finally  rested  on  mathematical  argument,  and  direct  biblical 
truth.  Wherever  this  union  persisted  it  injured  positive 
Christian  truth.  There  could  be  no  escape  from  condemn- 
ing much  Christian  truth  intellectually,  as  long  as  the  very 
nature  of  reasoning  and  speculation  was  conceived  to  be 
essentially  mathematical. 

No  relief  was  given  in  the  rise  of  positivism.  It  claimed 
to  be  concerned  merely  with  direct  positive  facts,  but  it 
dealt  with  them  from  the  point  of  view  of  mathematical 
accuracy.  Of  it  Edouard  LeRoy  well  says :  "  The 
dream  of  that  time,  despite  all  verbal  palliations,  was  a 
universal  science  of  mathematics:  mathematics,  of  course, 
with  their  bare  and  brutal  rigor  softened  and  shaded  off, 
where  feasible;  if  possible,  supple  and  sensitive;  in  ideal, 
delicate,  buoyant,  and  judicious ;  but  mathematics  gov- 
erned from  end  to  end  by  an  equal  necessity.  Conceived 
as  the  sole  mistress  of  truth  this  science  was  expected  in 
days  to  come  to  fulfil  all  the  needs  of  man,  and  unre- 
servedly to  take  the  place  of  ancient  spiritual  discipline. 
Genuine  philosophy  had  had  its  day:  all  metaphysics 
seemed  deception  and  fantasy,  a  simple  play  of  empty 
formula  or  puerile  dream,  a  mythical  possession  of  ab- 
straction and  phantom:  religion  itself  paled  before  sci- 
ence, as  poetry  of  the  gray  morning  before  the  splendor 
of  the  rising  sun."  4  This  attitude  of  positivism  was  both 
a  result  and  a  new  influence,  but  it  became  an  influence 

4  "  The  New  Philosophy  of  Henri  Bergson,"  p.  129. 


The  Mathematical  Method  37 

rather  indirectly  than  directly.  It  helped  on  the  mathe- 
matical ideal  in  science.  Astronomy  had  always  been 
mathematical,  but  mathematics  now  began  to  press  most 
vigorously  into  the  domain  of  physics.  Psychology  so 
long  a  free  mental  science  was  to  be  submitted  to  mathe- 
matical proportion  in  the  calculation  of  the  impressions 
of  sensation  through  a  stimulus,  according  to  the  law  of 
Weber  and  the  formula  of  Fechner.  Until  this  day  the 
thought  that  science  becomes  more  accurate  as  it  takes 
on  the  measurements  of  mathematics  continues.  Biology 
is  much  interested  in  calculating  the  strains  of  heredity 
which  make  for  health  or  lead  to  defectiveness.  Eugenics 
bases  its  claims  on  an  effort  to  use  medical  tabulations. 
Sociology  is  aiming  at  exactitude  and  scientific  standing 
on  the  basis  of  statistics.  In  other  words,  the  aim  in 
every  group  of  data  that  claim  the  name  of  a  science  is 
to  approach  measurement,  in  order  that  scientific  accuracy 
may  be  reached  by  following  the  mathematical  ideal.  Con- 
sequently when  Christian  truth,  which  cannot  be  measured 
and  quantified,  is  pressing  forward  for  its  rights,  it  will 
always  be  disqualified  as  long  as  the  very  nature  of  think- 
ing at  its  best  is  held  to  be  quantitative. 

But  the  certainty  of  the  mathematical  argument  has 
been  very  much  attacked  by  the  later  theories  of  the  mathe- 
maticians themselves.  There  has  been  developed  a  non- 
Euclidean  geometry  which  seems  to  demonstrate  the  impos- 
sibility of  the  absoluteness  of  the  older  geometry.  It  is 
now  held  that  the  first  principles  of  geometry  are  not  fun- 
damentally the  only  possible  ones  and  the  only  logical 
ones.  Professor  H.  Poincare  succinctly  puts  the  issue 
thus :  "  Whence  are  the  first  principles  of  geometry  de- 
rived? Are  they  imposed  on  us  by  logic?  Lobatschew- 
sky,  by  inventing  non-Euclidean  geometries,  has  shown 
that  this  is  not  the  case."  5     And  in  greater  detail  Dr.  J. 

s  **  Science  and  Hypothesis,"  preface,  p.  xxv. 


38  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

M.  O'Sullivan  thus  states  the  situation :  "  Euclidean  ge- 
ometry has  operated  under  assumptions  which  have  always 
baffled  every  attempt  to  prove  them.  It  has,  for  example, 
been  forced  to  assume  either  that  the  angles  of  a  triangle 
are  together  equal  to  two  right  angles,  or  that  through 
the  same  point  one,  and  not  more  than  one,  parallel  can 
be  drawn  to  any  given  straight  line.  Now,  however,  it 
has  been  found  that  starting  from  assumptions  different 
from  those  of  Euclid,  we  can  develop  various  perfectly 
self-consistent  systems,  the  results  of  which  are  not  in  har- 
mony with  those  of  ordinary  geometry.  Thus  we  may 
regard  space  as  having  a  constant  curvature  instead  of 
being  homogeneous,  of  being  four  instead  of  three  dimen- 
sions, as  being  such  that  we  can  draw  (through  a  single 
point)  any  number  of  parallels  to  any  given  line,  and 
so  on.  We  find,  moreover,  that  these  assumptions  involve 
us  in  no  inherent  absurdity,  no  self-contradiction." 6 
Through  the  possibility  of  a  geometry  of  four  dimensions, 
equally  logical  as  that  of  three  dimensions,  the  old  idea 
of  the  eternity  and  unalterability  of  Euclidean  geometry 
suffered  a  dangerous  attack.  When,  in  addition,  it  was 
mathematically  proved  that  any  number  of  parallels  to  any 
given  line  could  be  drawn  through  a  single  point,  and  that 
one  of  the  axiomatic  presuppositions  of  Euclid  was  ca- 
pable of  being  disproved  by  the  very  sort  of  argument 
which  always  seemed  invulnerable,  the  faith  in  mathemati- 
cal certainty  was  still  further  shaken.  It  is  true  that  all 
of  these  systems  may  have  no  validity  for  our  present 
space.  In  other  words,  they  cannot  be  practically  dem- 
onstrated as  we  now  conceive  practicality,  but  they  are 
thinkable  and  systematically  certain.  It  is  only  sense  as 
generally  interpreted  that  contradicts  them,  but  not  rea- 
son. 

It    is    not    only    the   mathematical    foundations    which 

e  "Old  Criticism  and  New  Pragmatism,"  p.  Ill  ff. 


The  Mathematical  Method  39 

have  been  attacked,  but  mathematical  continuity  may  be 
questioned.  This  is  important,  because  logic  has  some- 
times been  believed  to  be  symbolic.  It  has  been  trans- 
lated into  figures  and  its  mathematical  nature  has  been 
demanded  by  the  investigations  of  the  Englishmen,  Boole 
and  Jevons.  Dr.  Shearman,  in  "  The  Scope  of  Formal 
Logic,"  has  largely  followed  this  same  symbolic  procedure. 
And  in  the  same  manner  Prof.  Louis  Couturat,  in  "  The 
Principles  of  Logic,"  a  sub-treatise  in  the  Encyclopedia 
of  Philosophical  Sciences,  Vol.  I,  also  works  out  the  prob- 
lems of  logic  mathematically.  But  can  all  thought  be  thus 
accurately  translated  into  mathematics?  Is  it  not  true 
in  thinking  that  an  apparent  law  not  failing  up  to  a  cer- 
tain point  may  suddenly  break  down  when  put  to  a  practi- 
cal test? 

A  machine  might  be  constructed  to  give  a  perfectly 
regular  series  of  numbers  through  a  vast  series  of  steps, 
and  yet  break  the  law  of  progression  suddenly  at  any 
required  time.  The  sudden  freezing  of  water  at  one  point 
without  a  gradual  approach  is  another  argument  against 
an  absolutely  continuing  mathematical  progression  in  real 
experiments.  The  law  of  the  minimal  changes  in  the  effect 
of  a  stimulus  upon  sensation  has  its  limits.  There  is 
thus  more  than  one  instance  where  the  continuity  of  mathe- 
matical thinking  loses  its  force  for  reality. 

These  and  similar  facts  led  the  thinkers  on  mathe- 
matical problems  to  new  theories  of  mathematics.  In 
strongest  contrast  to  the  reigning  conception  of  mathe- 
matical certainty  and  the  claim  of  its  priority  to  all  ex- 
perience, there  arose  the  hypothesis  that  mathematical 
thinking  rested  purely  upon  experience.  Its  axioms  were 
workable  generalizations  drawn  from  the  actual  experi- 
ence of  mankind.  While  for  a  time  the  defenders  of  the 
mathematical  ideal  still  claimed  that  the  mathematical 
concept  was  prior  to  and  determinative  of  every  percept, 


40  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

it  is  now  true  as  Professor  Pitkin  says,  that :  "  Ge- 
ometers pretty  generally  concede  that  they  get  their 
original  information  about  figures  and  their  relation  from 
perceived  forms.  The  primary  subject  of  inquiry  in  ge- 
ometry appears  in  its  very  name;  it  is  the  measuring  of 
the  earth.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  for  centu- 
ries geometers  had  no  thought  of  analyzing  anything  save 
the  observable  character  of  space  and  spatial  entities."  7 
In  arithmetic  as  in  geometry  the  actual  counting,  and  the 
growing  number  experience  of  mankind  was  the  basis  of 
the  abstraction  which  formed  the  science.  Where  this 
attitude  obtains,  there  can  be  no  absolute  category  of 
number  or  space  or  time  to  begin  with.  All  these  are 
supposed  to  be  drawn  from  experience.  Consequently 
there  is  no  fixed  nature  of  thinking  of  a  mathematical 
character;  it  is  simply  the  experience  that  creates  quan- 
tity and  makes  the  science  of  mathematics.  It  appears 
very  evident  that  on  such  a  basis  mathematics  cannot 
claim  to  dictate  to  religious  experience  or  thinking.  From 
its  method  it  cannot  question  religion,  but  must  humbly 
remain  in  its  restricted  sphere  and  within  the  limits  of 
experience  and  the  character  of  the  experience  which  makes 
it  possible.  Religion,  then,  has  full  right  to  its  peculiar 
experience  and  the  independence  of  the  character  of  this 
experience.  It  is  a  problem  of  clearly  distinguishing  sep- 
arate types  of  experience  with  their  legitimate  inferences. 
Another  point  of  view  does  not  permit  empiricism  as 
much  room  as  the  theory  just  discussed.  One  of  its  lead- 
ing advocates  is  Professor  Poincare,  who  holds  that  ex- 
perience does  not  make  mathematics,  but  that  the  mind 
formulates  certain  definitions  and  tries  them  out.  An 
axiom  is  nothing  but  an  assumption  or  a  definition  agreed 
upon.  He  says :  "  We  shall  also  see  that  there  are  sev- 
eral kinds  of  hypotheses ;   that   some   are  verifiable,   and 

7  Journal  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  X,  15,  p.  399. 


The  Mathematical  Method  41 

when  once  confirmed  by  experiment  become  truths  of  great 
fertility ;  that  others  may  be  useful  to  us  in  fixing  our 
ideas ;  and  finally,  that  others  are  hypotheses  only  in  ap- 
pearance, and  reduce  to  definitions  or  to  conventions  in 
disguise.  The  latter  are  to  be  met  with,  especially  in 
mathematics,  and  the  sciences  to  which  it  is  applied. 
From  them,  indeed,  the  sciences  derived  their  rigor;  such 
conventions  are  the  result  of  the  unrestricted  activity  of 
the  mind,  which  in  this  domain  recognizes  no  obstacle."  8 
The  conventions,  while  thus  imposed,  are  not  arbitrary, 
but  they  are  fertile  and  experience  helps  us  to  discern  the 
most  convenient  path  to  follow.  The  conventions  of  the 
mind  are,  therefore,  not  mere  postulates  from  experience, 
but  postulates  for  experience.  Mathematics  and  logic 
following  it  describe  the  nature  of  relation,  order,  dimen- 
sionality, number,  and  space.  All  their  postulates,  how- 
ever, for  experience  are  no  absolute  ideas  of  the  mind,  they 
are  merely  conventions  prior  to  experience,  and  the  scien- 
tist selects  the  postulates  that  experience  can  establish. 
In  a  somewhat  different  but  related  manner,  Professor 
Russell  holds  that  there  exist  in  the  world  certain  mathe- 
matical entities,  and  that  a  relation  is  to  be  established 
between  these  entities  or  terms.  The  terms  exist  and  are 
experienced,  and  the  mind  does  not  make  the  terms,  but 
it  discovers  the  relations.  Consequently  we  need  the  re- 
lating activity  of  the  mind,  for  the  mere  experience  of  the 
terms  cannot  create  quantitative  thought.  In  its  total 
effect,  therefore,  Professor  Russell's  idea  leads,  like  the 
theory  of  Professor  Poincare,  to  a  modified  empiricism. 

There  are  many  facts  in  favor  of  such  a  theory  of 
modified  empiricism.  Upon  it  there  is  a  possibility  of  the 
agreement  of  Christian  truth  with  mathematical  theory. 
Christianity  can,  from  one  point  of  view,  be  conceived 
as  an  experience,  but  the  experience  is  what  it  is,  and 

s  "  Science  and  Hypothesis,"  preface,  p.  xxii. 


42  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

becomes  what  it  becomes,  through  the  relations  established 
by  the  soul.  It  is  the  soul  which  makes  its  postulates  for 
experience,  but  it  does  not  create  the  facts  of  the  religious 
experience  which  exist  and  are  found.  In  such  a  hypothe- 
sis, there  is  a  balance  which  seems  to  hold  in  proper  poise 
what  life  offers  and  what  the  soul  adds.  The  balance  ap- 
pears far  better  sustained  than  in  the  efforts  of  Kant,  who, 
despite  every  attempt,  never  succeeded  in  doing  full  jus- 
tice to  the  value  of  experience. 

An  attempt  was  made  to  overcome  the  force  of  the 
mathematical  conception  of  Kant  by  Hegel.  He  believed 
that  the  content  of  thought  must  determine  the  method, 
and  for  him  the  mechanical  and  notionless  procedure  of 
mathematics  could  not  properly  express  the  living  move- 
ment of  thought.  He  opposed  Kant  in  the  contention 
that  each  branch  of  knowledge  has  only  as  much  strict 
science  as  it  contains  mathematics.  According  to  Kant 
the  category  of  quantity  becomes  all-controlling.  But 
Hegel  says :  "  Our  knowledge  would  be  in  a  very  awkward 
predicament  if  such  objects  as  freedom,  law,  morality,  or 
even  God  himself,  because  they  cannot  be  measured  or 
calculated,  or  expressed  in  a  mathematical  formula,  were 
to  be  reckoned  beyond  the  reach  of  exact  knowledge,  and 
had  to  put  up  with  a  vague  general  image  of  them,  leaving 
their  detail  or  particulars  to  the  pleasure  of  each  indi- 
vidual, to  make  out  of  them  what  he  will."  9  Hegel  be- 
lieved that  reason  could  establish  itself  through  arguments 
of  quality  rather  than  of  quantity.  Perhaps  he  ascribed 
too  much  force  and  accuracy  to  reason  in  its  movement, 
but  he  destroyed  the  over-emphasis  of  quantity.  There 
is  much  danger  in  using  quantity  as  the  sole  category  of 
the  mind.  Professor  Bosanquet  rightly  says :  "  This 
false  employment  arises,  or  would  arise,  supposing  the 
category  of  quantity  to  be  considered  not  merely  as  eo- 

»  Encyclopedia,  paragraph  99,  note. 


The  Mathematical  Method  43 

extensive  with  determinate  existence,  but  as,  in  its  ab- 
straction, the  ultimate  reality  of  all  determinate  exist- 
ence, and  consequently  as  furnishing  the  final  ideal  of 
science.  It  is  obvious  that  the  true  use  of  this  as  of  every 
category  slides  easily  into  the  false  one.  Every  science 
is  occupied  with  its  own  abstractions.  Every  individual 
mind  tends  to  magnify  that  with  which  it  is  occupied. 
The  category  of  quantity,  for  reasons  mentioned  above, 
lends  itself  to  universal  application.  It  seems  a  short  step 
from  universal  application  to  sole  application,  but  it  is 
the  step  from  truth  to  falsehood.  It  is  not  made  ex- 
clusively by  votaries  of  physical  science,  nor  perhaps  by 
them  chiefly.  It  meets  us  in  theology  and  in  philosophy 
under  the  form  of  the  quantitative  infinite  as  a  sublime 
attribute  of  the  Deity,  or  of  soul  life,  or  of  the  universe  as 
contrasted  with  the  '  finite  '  mind  of  man."  10 

A  real  danger  has  been  indicated  by  Professor  Bosan- 
quet  when  he  shows  how  the  quantitative  idea  has  cor- 
rupted theology.  He  is  entirely  right  when  he  assails  the 
manner  in  which  the  philosophical  and  mathematical  no- 
tion of  the  infinite  is  applied  to  God.  In  similar  manner 
the  error  of  a  mathematical  point  of  view  lurks  behind 
some  of  the  conceptions  of  divine  unity.  Unity  is  con- 
ceived of  as  a  mathematically  closed  quantity,  and  not 
as  a  quality  which  may  imply  a  rich  complexity.  The 
presence  of  God  has  sometimes  been  defined  to  meet  the 
conditions  of  space.  Such  a  spatial  idea  of  God  is  an  entire 
misapplication  of  the  idea  of  spiritual  presence,  because  it 
attempts  to  make  it  clear  through  a  material  medium; 
in  fact,  however,  it  confuses  the  notion.  In  the  idea  of 
the  soul,  as  present  in  every  part  of  the  body  and  in  no 
particular  part  of  the  body,  there  is  an  effort  to  describe 
a  spiritual  entity  by  material  and  spatial  paradoxes.  The 
effort,  however,  fails  and  there  is  indefiniteness  instead  of 

io  "  Logic,"  Vol.  I,  p.  193. 


44*  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

clearness.  Where  Christian  truth  uses  such  terms,  it  lays 
itself  open  to  the  objections  which  Mansel  made  and  which 
Spencer  repeated,11  when  they  show  the  contradiction  be- 
tween cause  and  absolute  and  infinite.  The  whole  char- 
acter of  the  argument  is  of  a  mathematical  character, 
and  arises  from  the  fact  that  incongruous  notions,  which 
are  in  essence  quantitative,  are  applied  to  religious  ideas. 
Religious  ideas,  however,  are  fundamentally  qualitative, 
and  have  value,  and,  therefore,  demand  not  judgments  of 
quantity,  but  judgments  of  value  and  quality. 

A  very  formidable  enemy  to  the  quantitative  way  of 
thinking  and  to  the  exclusive  sovereignty  of  the  mathe- 
matical method  has  arisen  in  the  French  philosopher 
Bergson.  He  denies  the  fundamentally  of  quantity  as  a 
part  of  living  thought.  The  real  primal  character  of 
thinking  is  to  him  not  the  reasoning  of  the  intellect,  but 
the  living  quality  of  intuition  with  its  large  range  of 
possibilities.  Quantity  is  a  result  of  separation  from  the 
stream  of  life;  it  is  a  reduction  of  vital  moving  duration 
and  impulse  to  static  space.  Space  has  been  demanded 
for  the  sake  of  matter,  and  the  intellect  is  instrumental 
to  the  demands  of  matter.  It  only  answers  to  the  external 
needs,  and  becomes  mathematical  because  of  matter  which 
life  has  sloughed  off.  Says  Bergson :  "  All  the  opera- 
tions of  our  intellect  tend  to  geometry,  as  to  the  goal 
where  they  find  their  perfect  fulfillment.  But,  as  ge- 
ometry is  necessarily  prior  to  them  (since  these  opera- 
tions have  not  as  their  end  to  construct  space  and  cannot 
do  otherwise  than  take  it  as  given)  it  is  evident  that  it 
is  a  latent  geometry,  immanent  in  our  idea  of  space,  which 
is  the  mainspring  of  our  intellect  and  the  pause  of  its 
workings."  12  It  is  because  intellect  and  spatiality  go  to- 
gether, believes  Bergson,  that  our  thinking  is  so  mathe- 

11 "  First  Principles,"  p.  38. 

12  "Creative  Evolution,"  p.  210. 


The  Mathematical  Method  45 

matical.  He  says :  "  When  we  consider  the  admirable 
order  of  mathematics,  the  perfect  agreement  of  the  objects 
it  deals  with,  the  immanent  logic  in  numbers  and  figures, 
our  certainty  of  always  getting  the  same  conclusion,  how- 
ever diverse  and  complex  our  reasonings  on  the  same  sub- 
ject, we  hesitate  to  see  in  properties  apparently  so  posi- 
tive a  system  of  negations,  the  absence  rather  than  the 
presence  of  a  true  reality.  But  we  must  not  forget  that 
our  intellect,  which  finds  this  order,  and  wonders  at  it, 
is  directed  in  the  same  line  of  movement  that  leads  to 
the  materiality  and  spatiality  of  its  object.  The  more 
complexity  the  intellect  puts  into  its  object  by  analyzing 
it,  the  more  complex  is  the  order  it  finds  there.  And  this 
order  and  this  complexity  necessarily  appear  to  the  intel- 
lect as  a  positive  reality,  since  reality  and  intellectuality 
are  turned  in  the  same  direction."  13  While  Bergson  in 
this  attitude  has  perhaps  been  unduly  severe  to  the  intel- 
lect of  man  14  as  a  whole,  he  has  laid  his  finger  on  a  real 
distinction  which  applies  to  mathematical  thinking  with 
its  abstractness  as  related  to  life.  True  reality  is  finally 
not  mathematical;  it  possesses  a  vital  quality.  When  we 
conceive  of  thought  as  a  living  movement,  then  at  once 
the  judgment  of  quality  is  more  important  than  that  of 
quantity.  With  this  new  ideal  of  thought  as  primarily 
inner  life,  Christianity  can  make  an  alliance,  for  its  knowl- 
edge is  fundamentally  vital.  Its  truth  is  the  direct,  fresh, 
gushing  water  of  life.  When  we  have  gained  this  point 
of  view,  and  when  knowledge  is  considered  in  this  way,  we 
are  delivered  from  the  tyranny  of  every  kind  of  dogmatic 
rationalism,  which  has  its  roots  in  the  mathematical  type 
of  thinking.  We  can  purify  Christian  thinking  from  the 
dross  of  past  quantitative  reasoning  and  restore  it  to  its 
living  quality. 

13  «  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  208. 
i*  Cf.  Part  II,  Chap.  6,  p.  259  if. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    INDUCTIVE    CLAIM 

NO  demand  is  more  insistent  in  the  present  than 
the  claim  for  facts.  Facts  are  believed  to  be  the 
unalloyed  realities,  from  which  alone  legitimate 
thinking  has  a  right  to  proceed.  It  is  considered  utterly 
futile  to  begin  with  an  idea  or  an  ideal ;  such  an  undertak- 
ing is  judged  as  an  unwarranted  disturbance  of  the  actual 
world.  Consequently  the  reasoning  which  classifies  and 
explains  things,  setting  out  from  great  principles,  is  put 
aside.  Deductive  argument  is  tabooed,  for  this  is  pre- 
eminently the  age  of  induction.  From  particulars  and 
not  from  principles  sciences  are  built  up,  and  out  of  the 
details  and  single  instances  in  experience  the  interpretation 
of  life  is  sought.  Generalizations  are  only  permitted  as 
summing  up  individual  experiences.  For  the  sake  of  econ- 
omy and  for  purposes  of  order  and  classification  universal 
laws  are  admitted.  But  it  is  held  that  every  explanation 
from  one  principle  must  have  back  of  it  some  cases  out  of 
which  it  is  developed ;  without  such  a  foundation,  all  argu- 
ment from  the  universal  is  considered  illegitimate. 

The  great  formulator  of  the  inductive  trend  of  thought 
in  its  working  details  is  John  Stuart  Mill.  It  is  true  that 
Socrates  in  his  day  began  to  gather  up  instances,  and  that 
Plato  used  illustrations.  Following  them  Aristotle  knew 
of  the  fact  of  collecting  particulars  and  called  this  pro- 
cedure induction.  Every  one  of  these  great  Greek  think- 
ers realized  the  value  of  particulars.  But  the  greater 
estimate  of  particular  cases  by  Socrates  and  his  arrival  at 
concepts  from  living  cases  and  situations,  and  the  allow- 
ance of  an  eternal  world  of  thought  with  its  many  ideas 
by   Plato,   were   crowded  back   in  human   thinking  when 

40 


The  Inductive  Claim  47 

Aristotle  thought  that  strict  proof  and  demonstration 
were  deductive.  For  him  induction  was  only  a  counting  of 
cases,  and  as  enumeration  it  was  a  secondary  and  weak 
substitute  where  and  when  the  accurate  reasoning  from 
foundational,  first  principles  could  not  be  employed.  The 
deduction  of  Aristotle  and  his  strong  formulation  of  the 
argument  of  the  syllogism,  which  always  begins  with 
the  major  premise,  ruled  down  to  the  modern  age. 

But  the  spell  of  Aristotle  was  broken  with  the  coming  of 
modern  times.  Many  were  the  thinkers  who  led  to  the 
inductive  ideal.  It  is  very  interesting  to  note  that,  while 
the  most  immediate  beginnings  of  the  new  science  were 
controlled  by  the  mathematical  notions  of  Leonardo  da 
Vinci,  Kepler,  and  Galileo,  the  new  impetus  to  inductive 
reasoning  was  made  by  Bacon.  Bacon,  however,  was  most 
fortunate  in  his  criticisms.  When  he  formulated  induc- 
tion he  saw  in  it  largely  the  gathering  of  material  and  the 
formation  of  preliminary  hypotheses  for  the  sake  of  orien- 
tation. His  induction  is  continued  with  the  aid  of  these 
hypotheses.  To  deduction  he  gave  a  very  secondary 
place,  and  he  believed  that  all  quantitative  considerations 
had  to  be  inferred  from  experiences.1  But  the  impulse 
which  Bacon  gave  to  induction  was  not  at  once  to  prevail. 
The  mathematical  ideals  of  Descartes,  and  the  influence  of 
Isaac  Newton,  did  not  allow  the  inductive  process  full  de- 
velopment and  lasting  triumph.  It  was  only  after  the 
days  of  Mill,  that  inductive  logic  began  to  exercise  its 
largest  sway  over  the  minds  of  men.  While  Mill  grad- 
ually revolutionized,  or  rather  aided  in  revolutionizing  the 
science  of  thought,  it  was  nevertheless  not  his  influence 
alone  which  brought  about  the  general  reign  of  induction. 
This  was  most  largely  effected  by  the  rise  of  biology  in  the 
researches  into  nature  of  which  Darwin  was  such  a  consum- 

i  Cf.  Dr.  H.  Hoeffding,  "  Geschichte  der  Neueren  Philosophic,"  Vol, 
I,  p.  217. 


48  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

mate  leader.  He  applied  most  effectively  the  logic  of  in- 
duction, but  it  grew  out  of  direct  practice  and  not  from  a 
formal  study  of  Mill  or  any  logician.  Along  with  the 
new  biology,  the  advances  of  geology,  as  represented  in 
such  a  thinker  as  Lyell,  also  furthered  the  inductive 
method.  In  addition  the  newer  chemical  researches  con- 
firmed it,  and  upon  its  principles  arose  a  new  period  of 
physics.  It  has  pressed  into  history,  economics  and 
sociology,  and  has  laid  its  claim  even  to  the  proper  study 
of  morals  and  to  the  history  of  religion.  Everywhere  its 
reign  is  paramount.  The  conviction  rules  that  we  are  an 
age  with  its  feet  on  the  ground,  touching  real  mother-earth 
in  all  that  we  do  and  think,  and  that  we  are  fortunately 
free  from  the  dreaming  which  has  its  head  in  the  clouds. 

But  the  claim  that  this  is  the  age  of  reasoning  from 
facts  and  from  facts  alone  is  deceptive.  Where  reasoning 
begins  there  are  no  longer  mere  facts.  The  very  ma- 
terials upon  which  it  draws  are  no  longer  the  mere  external 
facts.  Even  if  we  allow  the  contention  for  the  moment, 
that  all  the  material  of  thought  comes  from  sensation, 
psychology  shows  us  that  we  no  longer  possess  the  ex- 
ternal physical  fact.  Even  the  first  reports  of  sensation 
color  and  change  the  external  data.  Much  more  is  it  true 
that  the  argument  which  draws  from  memory,  which  is 
stimulated  by  interest,  which  must  consider  attention,  and 
employ  concepts,  is  not  a  mere  resultant  of  the  external  ex- 
istents.  The  argument  from  particulars  is  already  a 
complex  argument  and  must  be  analyzed  into  simpler 
terms.  The  purely  physical  facts  must  be  separated  from 
the  psychological  approach.  It  is  necessary  to  analyze 
the  mental  process  which  is  legitimately  true  scientific  in- 
duction, and  to  note  its  elements  and  its  parts. 

When,  however,  we  begin  the  analysis  of  induction  it  is 
found  that  we  must  consider  the  problem  of  the  causal 
chain.     We   cannot   study   particular   facts   scientifically 


The  Inductive  Claim  49 

in  any  real  way  without  noting  that  they  depend  upon 
each  other.  The  constant  sequence  that  we  notice  about 
all  phenomena,  which  we  study  and  begin  to  interpret 
scientifically,  we  divide  into  cause  and  effect.  Somehow 
we  can  never  get  away  from  this  conjunction.  Now,  the 
problem  in  induction  is  not  primarily  to  study  the  idea 
of  causality,  but  only  the  direct  causes  and  effects.  It  is 
true,  that  from  them  we  may  be  led  to  the  deeper  question, 
whether  we  would  ever  find  in  temporal  succession  causes 
and  effects  without  the  idea  of  cause.  When  it  is  neces- 
sary to  study  the  manner  in  which  we  are  able  in  observa- 
tion or  through  experiment  to  find  causes,  we  are  naturally 
led  to  certain  methods.  These  methods  have  been  first 
analyzed  in  a  most  direct  and  thorough  manner  by  Mill, 
although  they  may  have  been  used  previously.  The  value 
of  the  logic  of  Mill  largely  consists  in  calling  attention  to 
and  describing  the  methods,  according  to  which  we  find 
causes  in  the  inductive  process. 

It  will  be  necessary  briefly  to  indicate  these  methods  in 
order  that  we  may  show  what  is  after  all  the  main  problem 
lying  back  of  all  of  the  methods.  The  method  of  agreement 
posits  a  causal  relation,  when  in  a  number  of  instances  and 
different  settings  it  is  found,  that  the  supposed  cause  is  al- 
ways followed  by  a  certain  phenomenon  as  corresponding 
effect.  In  the  method  of  difference,  an  instance,  in  which 
the  supposed  cause  is  present,  followed  by  the  correspond- 
ing effect,  is  compared  with  an  instance  of  the  same  general 
setting,  but  where  the  supposed  cause  being  removed,  the 
effect  also  disappears.  These  two  methods  are  sometimes 
combined  into  a  joint  method  in  which  the  comparison  of 
instances  where  the  supposed  cause  is  present  is  made  with 
like  instances  where  it  is  not  present.  If  the  correspond- 
ing effect  is  found  in  the  former,  and  absent  in  the  latter 
collection  of  instances,  a  causal  connection  may  rightly  be 
assumed.     The  method  of  concomitant  variation  so  modi- 


50  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

fies  any  given  datum,  that  the  supposed  cause  will  vary 
in  intensity;  if  then,  there  is  a  like  variation  in  the  re- 
sultant, a  causal  relation  exists.  The  method  of  residues 
is  the  analysis  of  a  complex  phenomenon,  in  which  all  ele- 
ments are  related  severally  to  all  others  in  a  causal  way, 
except  one  residual  element  in  the  antecedent  and  one  in 
the  consequent.  The  latter  may  be  considered  the  effect 
of  the  former. 

These  different  methods  and  varieties  of  analyzing  the 
causal  chain  are  sometimes  alone,  but  mostly  they  are 
combined.  Among  them  agreement  will  be  discussed  fur- 
ther on  because  it  leads  to  the  modern  comparative 
proof,  the  argument  of  analogy.  The  proof  from  dif- 
ference is  only  the  negative  side  of  the  proof  from  agree- 
ment, and  consequently  only  a  confirmatory  proof  that 
leads  to  similarity  and  merges  into  it.  And  when  both  are 
combined  in  the  joint  method  of  agreement  and  difference, 
it  appears  all  the  more  clearly  that  the  common  element 
is  likeness,  and  that  even  in  the  unlike  element  it  is  the 
similarity  of  the  unlikeness  which  establishes  it.  Con- 
comitant variation  is  fundamentally  the  finding  of  a  con- 
stant in  quantity  amid  the  change  of  variables.  It  is  the 
reduction  of  cause  and  effect  to  a  mathematical  equation 
or  proportion.  The  value  of  the  proof  from  residual 
elements  is  really  the  emphasis  of  the  exception  that  may 
lead  to  new  facts  or  revision  of  old  views.  It  is  largely 
accessory  to  the  main  method  and  in  its  nature,  after  all, 
rests  on  similarity.  It  appears,  therefore,  that  the  con- 
stant pressure  in  all  of  these  arguments  when  summed 
up  is  toward  similarity  in  variation.  The  whole  question 
reduces  itself  to  the  problem  of  variation  according  to  a 
constant.  The  constant  may  be  not  only  quantitative, 
and  this  has  been  frequently  the  defect  of  the  method  of 
concomitant  variation  in  its  statement  and  use.  When 
this  method  is  rightly  combined  with  agreement  and  varia- 


The  Inductive  Claim  51 

tion,  and  residues,  it  will  lead  in  actual  experience,  first 
of  all,  to  a  qualitative  constant.  It  is  only  the  mathe- 
matical ideal  which  adds  the  quantitative  interpretation. 
The  question  now  arises,  is  this  qualitative  constant, 
around  which  all  the  methods  of  Mill  are  actually  grouped, 
in  the  things  themselves  ?  Is  it  true  that  the  mere  experi- 
ence of  the  senses  and  their  data  carries  within  it  the  un- 
varying constant?  While  our  consciousness  reveals  a 
mighty  continuum  constantly  passing  through  it,  yet  so 
changeable  and  shifting  are  the  things  within  it,  and  so 
complex  and  heterogeneous  the  flow  of  experience  through 
our  consciousness,  that  a  fundamental  constant  does  not 
reveal  itself.  We  are  after  all  driven  to  the  assumption 
that  the  mind  adds  the  fixed  constant,  and  groups  to- 
gether the  received  impressions,  and  draws  inferences  from 
them.  Of  course,  experience  confirms  the  mind  and  we 
must  consequently  accept,  as  a  matter  of  intellectual  belief, 
the  external  existence  of  a  great  constant.  But  this 
constant  is  not  a  reality  of  brute  fact  but  rather  an  in- 
ference of  associating  mind.  Consequently  the  necessary 
presupposition  of  all  induction  is  the  arrangement  of  ex- 
perience as  it  comes  to  us  in  the  rough,  and  the  selection 
of  impressions,  and  the  grouping  of  them  into  classes  which 
finally  constitute  the  data  of  various  sciences.  As  history 
proceeded  the  mind  has  more  and  more  separated  new 
groups  out  of  old  ones,  and  thus  constituted  new  sciences. 
Observation  and  experiment  which  are  the  two  methods  of 
the  practical  working  out  of  induction  are  not  possible 
without  grouping  and  classifying.  How  can  we  rightly 
observe  or  experiment  unless  we  fix  our  attention  on 
specific  objects,  which  we  study  for  certain  definite  pur- 
poses, and  to  answer  certain  questions  arising  out  of  the 
co-relation  of  the  grouping.  What  we  really  are  inquir- 
ing for  is  the  constant.  We  arrange  phenomena  to  com- 
pel them  to  answer  our  inquiries  with  the  constant  in  mind 


52  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  with  faith  in  its  existence. 

There  is  nothing  in  religion  which  does  not  allow  of 
the  arranging  of  its  phenomena  by  a  constant.  This 
constant  within  man  is  the  religious  consciousness,  and 
the  external  constant  believed  in  is  a  real  revelation.  But 
Christianity  has  an  additional  claim.  It  demands  the 
examination  not  merely  of  a  distinct  group  of  historical 
facts  and  of  specific  and  peculiar  religious  truths,  but  also 
of  a  special  and  peculiar  consciousness.  This  Christian 
consciousness  is  the  center  of  any  system  of  experiences 
that  can  be  combined  into  a  unity.  It  crystallizes  what  is 
borne  in  upon  it  through  the  religious  data  that  occur  in  a 
man's  education  or  surroundings.  But  it  at  once  seeks  an 
object  and  claims  that  it  is  guided  by  the  Holy  Spirit, 
who  interprets  Christ,  whether  He  be  mediated  by  the 
Bible  or  the  Church.  Thus  the  constant  of  revelation  is 
joined  to  the  constant  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
In  this  procedure  Christianity  finds  a  center  for  the  group- 
ing of  Christian  experience,  and  it  is  really  in  this  respect 
inductive.  Consequently  Christianity  uses  induction  and 
induction  can  bring  no  charge  against  Christianity. 

It  has  happened,  nevertheless,  that  some  types  of  mod- 
ern induction  allowed  themselves  to  be  combined  with  a 
materialistic  interpretation  of  evolution  and  life.  These, 
then,  claimed  that  the  constant  must  be  of  a  material 
order,  and  that  it  must  be  found  in  the  lowest  stratum  of 
things.  But  this  is  unjust,  for  in  passing  from  constants 
to  constants  they  must  answer  in  their  character  to  their 
own  group  of  facts.  The  careful  induction  cannot  apply 
the  inductive  constant  of  mechanics  to  biology,  or  the 
constant  of  chemistry  to  sociology.  Of  course,  finally, 
induction  desires  to  unite  the  separate  constants  into  a 
great  unity ;  but  the  question  remains  whether  this  unity 
must  be  physical.  In  the  course  of  its  operation  induction 
has  no  right  to  adopt  a  metaphysic.     Each  group  of  facts 


The  Inductive  Claim  53 

which  shall  constitute  a  science  or  art  or  any  separate 
domain  of  life  can  not  suffer  violence  by  introducing  any 
constant  untrue  to  it.  Although  the  mind  finds  the  con- 
stant, it  must  be  of  the  nature  of  the  facts  that  are 
crystallized  about  it  and  serve  it.  Strange  to  say,  induc- 
tion with  its  claim  of  realism  and  respect  for  facts  has  been 
employed  by  some  scientists  in  the  service  of  a  material- 
istic metaphysic.  By  this  attitude,  induction  has  really 
been  perverted  into  a  deduction,  and  without  the  exercise 
of  the  proper  care  and  a  just  estimation  a  wrong  pre- 
supposition has  been  forced  upon  the  facts.  Where  such 
abuse  of  induction  has  obtained,  it  is  perfectly  explicable 
that  Christianity  has  suffered  from  the  deductive  assump- 
tion of  a  mere  metaphysic  of  nature,  which  denied  spirit  in 
its  very  formulation  and  initial  definition,  and  under  the 
cloak  of  induction  and  its  facts  really  assailed  Christian 
truth  from  an  opposite  deductive  supposition.  But  in  an 
equal  manner  Christianity  must  be  careful  to  allow  for  the 
facts  and  the  groupings  of  science  and  not  attempt  any 
deductive  interference  with  the  sphere  of  science.  It  must 
not  take  its  religious  value  of  man  and  the  world,  and 
through  them  attempt  to  deny  either  the  fact  or  assail 
the  constant  that  science  may  find  in  an  examination,  which 
must  naturally  overlook  or  abstract  from  the  religious 
point  of  view. 

When  the  various  constants  have  been  found  the  prob- 
lem of  uniting  them  into  some  great  fundamental  constant 
remains.  There  never  can  be  any  fully  carried  out  induc- 
tion without  a  great  presupposition.  This  presupposi- 
tion of  induction  in  all  science  is  usually  termed,  the  uni- 
formity of  nature.  This  uniformity  of  nature  is  applied 
to  the  whole  chain  of  causes  with  the  additional  assump- 
tion of  the  real  continuity  of  nature.  Such  an  assump- 
tion of  a  real  whole  is  essential,  if  any  worth  is  to  be 
attached  to  particular  facts.     Particulars  must  be  thought 


54  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

of  as  parts  of  a  great  whole.  Their  action  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  illustrative  of  what  can  be  found  everywhere. 
If  particulars  are  the  mere  counting  of  single  instances, 
they  can  create  only  a  probability,  and  this  probability 
will  be  only  as  high  as  the  number  of  counted  cases  is  in 
relation  to  the  whole  range  of  existent  facts.  Mr.  Venn, 
in  his  Empirical  Logic,  believes  that  this  probability  is  all 
that  induction  can  reach.  But  most  thinkers  hold  that 
few  cases  are  conclusive  and  that  even  one  experiment 
can  be  crucial  and  pivotal.  Now  such  an  attitude  is  only 
possible  if  we  contend  that  nature  has  uniform  laws 
throughout,  and  that  everywhere  and  without  break  these 
laws  hold  good.  In  other  words,  a  certainty  is  ascribed  to 
individual  cases  out  of  all  relation  to  their  proportion- 
ateness  because  of  the  belief  in  the  uniformity  of  the  uni- 
verse. It  seems  impossible  for  the  human  mind  to  hold  to 
a  changeable  universe.  Even  if  with  some  thinkers  we 
should  deny  a  universe  and  simply  argue  for  a  multiverse, 
nevertheless  the  many  individual  factors  are  still  con- 
ceived of  as  constant,  and  in  some  respects  uniform. 
We  may,  like  Bergson,  become  convinced  that  creation  as 
evolution  is  constantly  new,  but  as  we  look  back  upon  its 
course  we  must  note  that  it  has  proceeded  along  certain 
unified  lines.  We  cannot  in  any  view  of  the  universe 
disregard  its  continuity  in  our  thinking,  and,  therefore, 
we  must  believe  in  its  existence. 

There  still  remains,  of  course,  the  problem  of  defining 
the  continuity  which  appears  in  a  uniform  universe.  Too 
often  it  has  been  described  in  the  terms  of  the  lowest 
facts  of  life,  and  then  from  these  low  origins  the  higher 
facts  have  been  injured.  If  continuity  be  reduced  to 
mechanical  connection  and  to  mechanical  movement  in  a 
line  of  conjunction  from  the  atom  to  man,  then  such  a 
physical  visualization  of  continuity  must  be  disputed. 
But  if,  allowing  for  new  departures  at  the  point  of  the  ori- 


The  Inductive  Claim  55 

gin  of  life  and  of  the  origin  of  spirit,  we  do  not  depress  the 
facts  of  the  sphere  of  life  and  soul  to  the  laws  of  mechanics 
we  are  engaged  in  a  true  process.  It  will  then  be  neces- 
sary to  subsume  the  continued  action  of  mechanics,  and 
somewhat  higher  up  of  chemistry,  as  contributory  and 
secondary  to  the  laws  of  life  and  of  the  spirit.  Continuity 
thus  becomes  the  widening  of  a  great  stream  into  which 
new,  stronger  tributaries  pour  in  their  waters,  and  with 
their  mightier  currents  carry  on  the  currents  of  the  first 
simpler  sources.  At  present  this  is  the  only  justifiable 
conception  of  continuity ;  any  other  idea  is  a  hope.  Even 
should  the  bridge  between  matter  and  life  be  actually 
constructed,  this  would,  nevertheless,  only  raise  the  prob- 
lem whether  we  have  not  unduly  limited  life. 

When  we  assume  such  a  constant  as  universal  continuity 
and  uniformity,  we  are  easily  led  to  the  foundations  of  re- 
ligion. It  has  as  an  implication  the  idea  of  a  universe 
as  a  unity  back  of  phenomena.  In  addition  it  involves 
the  thought  of  regularity  in  this  universe.  These  ideas 
are  correlative  to  its  conception  of  God.  It  is  true  that 
all  religion,  and  Christianity  also,  believes  in  special  inter- 
ventions and  miracles.  But  these  evidences  for  a  specific 
need  have  never  destroyed  the  idea  of  a  uniform  character 
of  God,  and  have  never  made  Him  arbitrary.  Conse- 
quently in  its  deepest  beliefs  Christianity  assumes  a  regu- 
lar universe.  The  conception  of  a  universe  as  a  mental 
ultimate,  and  the  idea  of  law  as  uniform,  constant  and 
reliable  procedure  of  phenomena,  leads  to  trustworthi- 
ness as  a  mental  assumption.  When  we  ascribe  trust- 
worthiness to  a  universe  we  are  led  to  the  very  threshold 
of  the  theistic  idea  by  the  underlying  supposition  of  induc- 
tion. As  far  as  Christianity  is  a  theistic  faith  it  is  a 
further  unfoldment  and  completion  of  the  primal  postulate 
of  uniformity.  This  it  applies  to  the  higher  moral  and 
religious  spheres  of  life,  whose  uniform  constant  it  finds 


56  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

in  human  and  divine  love. 

The  idea  of  continuity,  as  it  was  defined  above,  also 
lends  itself  readily  to  religious  faith,  which  demands  mind 
back  of  the  universe,  and  centers  it  in  a  personal  God. 
When  new  elements  enter  into  the  progressive  stream  of 
being  and  life  and  absorb,  though  they  do  not  destroy, 
the  previously  existent  elements,  there  must  be  in  this  re- 
sultant unity  more  than  accidentalism  or  chance.  The 
assumption  of  these  would  prove  inadequate,  for  the  unity 
and  uniformity  and  continuity  are  the  summing  up  of  the 
complex  into  a  oneness  which  is  not  thinkable  without 
mind.  Of  course,  it  may  be  supposed  that  this  mind  is 
nowhere  else  but  in  the  process  itself.  Such  an  idea, 
however,  materializes  mind,  or  it  idealizes  matter. 
Either  result  is  full  of  difficulties.  Consequently,  is  it 
not  better  to  see  in  the  continuity  the  effect  of  the  mind 
but  not  its  actual  presence?  If  this  be  our  conception, 
we  are  led  from  the  finding  of  purpose  and  of  mind  in  the 
uniformity  and  continuity  of  the  world  to  the  supposition 
of  its  separate  existence  in  a  purposing  spirit. 

Another  problem  is  opened  up  by  the  discussion  of  the 
relation  of  induction  and  Christianity.  Can  Christianity, 
as  a  religion,  argue  in  its  truths  inductively  upward,  or 
is  this  a  defect  and  must  the  argument  be  only  deductive? 
It  has  generally  been  believed  that  religion  must  argue, 
to  argue  successfully,  from  a  universal  downward,  and, 
therefore,  deductively.  The  very  idea  of  God  is  always 
a  universal,  and  a  first  principle.  Now  out  of  this  idea  of 
God  its  implications  are  deduced,  and  certain  attributes 
are  ascribed  to  God,  as  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the 
idea  of  God.  Wherever  thus,  by  a  systematic  procedure, 
the  idea  of  God  is  developed,  He  is  not  defined  as  the  sum 
of  experiences  in  communion  with  Him,  and  mediated  by 
His  revelation.  His  nature  and  attributes  have  been  fixed 
by  thought  itself  through  a  logical  analysis  of  what  the 


The  Inductive  Claim  57 

idea  of  God  was  supposed  necessarily  to  contain.  In  the 
same  manner  the  idea  of  the  soul  and  other  truths  were 
unfolded,  deductions  were  made,  and  all  of  these  brought 
into  relation  with  each  other.  Now  is  this  procedure 
necessarily  native  to  religion,  and  native,  therefore,  to 
Christianity?  Does  it  lie  in  the  spiritual  order  itself  that 
it  must  deduct?  Professor  Hobhouse  says  of  religion: 
"  Essentially  a  matter  of  insight  rather  than  of  reason- 
ing, its  truths  are  partial,  rather  than  complete,  and 
where  it  seeks  to  cover  the  whole  field  of  knowledge  and 
action,  it  does  so  rather  by  deduction  from  conceived 
positions  than  by  the  patient  reconstruction  of  reality 
through  the  piece-meal  interpretation  of  experience."  2 

In  this  attitude  it  has  been  forgotten  that  no  deduction 
can  be  made  apart  from  the  communication  of  actual 
facts  and  truths.  The  fulness  of  the  conception  of  God 
grew  out  of  experiences,  and  many  deductions  were  really 
inductions.  It  is  not  necessary  nor  native  to  Christianity 
to  employ  only  deductions,  and  a  legitimate  Christian  sys- 
tem cannot  fill  in  its  gap  by  unjustified  inferences.  It 
is  true,  of  course,  that  the  great  universal  notions  of 
Christianity  are  rich  in  their  implications.  The  very 
experiences  of  Christianity  are  full  of  universal  meaning. 
But  in  the  interpretation  of  such  meaning  a  real  Chris- 
tianity ought  to  rest  on  constant  historical  facts  and 
guaranteed  truth.  For  it  is  not  the  aim  of  Christianity  to 
be  a  consistent  logical  system  and  to  keep  on  drawing 
conclusions,  but  to  answer  the  practical  needs  of  the  soul. 
It  has  also  been  overlooked  by  many  systematizers  of 
Christian  truth,  that  what  they  deemed  to  be  inherent 
in  its  character  was  only  the  influence  of  past  tradition 
and  past  philosophic  interpretations  of  Christian  truth. 
Among  all  the  philosophers  who  have  held  sway  over  the 
minds  of  the  teachers  of  systematic  truth  in  the  Christian 

2  "  Development  and  Purpose,"  p.  189. 


58  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

Church,  no  one  was  and  is  more  powerful  and  has  had  a 
longer  rule  than  Aristotle.  In  the  movement  of  the  Ref- 
ormation there  was  a  reaction  against  Aristotle.  This 
was  largely  fostered  by  the  realistic  spirit  of  the  later 
scholastic  period.  The  Reformers  were  nominalists  in 
philosophy,  and  the  essence  of  nominalism  is  really  the  em- 
phasis of  the  individuals.  It  is,  therefore,  a  close  ap- 
proach to  the  inductive  idea.  Despite,  however,  this  re- 
action, many  truths,  in  the  dogmatic  systems  which  fol- 
lowed the  first  outburst  of  the  Reformation,  were  simply 
a  restatement  of  truth  according  to  the  old  Aristotelian 
method  of  deduction.  Only  the  great  direct  experiences 
of  salvation  and  the  truths  which  these  immediately  imply 
were  freshly  formulated.  At  the  very  beginning,  it  is 
true,  the  various  Reformers  inductively  collected  the  bib- 
lical truths,  but  they  did  not  at  once  formulate  complete 
systems.  The  one  great  exception  was  Calvin.  But  very 
soon  both  in  the  ethics  and  dogmatics  of  Christianity 
Aristotle  gained  a  new  entrance.  Even  to-day  many 
Christian  systems  of  truth  and  many  doctrinal  differences 
and  disputes  show  his  influence.  It  is  this  long  historic 
rule  of  Aristotle  which  has  made  many  believe  that  deduc- 
tion was  the  essential  way  of  arguing  about  Christian 
truth.  Even  the  establishment  of  a  discipline  like  biblical 
theology  has  not  altogether  removed  Aristotelianism  in 
Christian  thinking. 

The  influence  of  the  deductive  idea  in  the  formulation 
of  Christian  truths  and  experiences,  is  seen  in  the  accept- 
ance of  a  single  controlling  principle.  In  the  Middle  Ages 
the  doctrine  of  the  Church  was  all-controlling,  and  it 
colored  all  other  truth.  Mediaeval  thinking  was  under  the 
thraldom  of  a  single  principle  in  theory  and  in  practice. 
When  the  Reformation  assailed  the  supremacy  of  the 
Church  by  its  emphasis  of  Christ  it  endeavored  to  reach 
a  living  center  and  to  escape  from  the  overbalance  of  an 


The  Inductive  Claim  59 

insufficient  single  principle.  There  was  a  return  to  Chris- 
tian experience  in  which  the  dominating  subjective  factor 
was  faith,  and  the  ruling  objective  element,  Christ.  The 
first  doctrinal  expression  of  this  experience  was  founded  on 
the  Pauline  formulation  of  justification  by  faith.  This 
became  a  practical  principle  and  a  test  for  truth.  It 
never  attained,  however,  the  place  of  a  deductive  principle, 
and  it  never  created  systems.  Consequently  it  was  not 
really  of  a  deductive  nature.  It  is  true  that  the  accept- 
ance of  Christ  was  held  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  Scriptures. 
Gradually  the  Christ,  the  living  interpreter  of  revelation, 
was  made  the  Christ  who  guaranteed  a  set  of  books.  Thus 
the  canon  became  a  ruling  principle  and  some  of  the  life  of 
the  Reformation  was  hemmed  in  by  the  principle  of  the 
Book  and  its  law.  Some  life  kept  its  freshness  because 
it  conceived  of  the  Book  as  the  living  Word.  But  even 
where  this  idea  ruled  a  mechanical  doctrine  of  inspiration 
finally  obtained  sway,  and  again  a  single  external  prin- 
ciple ruled. 

But  the  rule  of  this  principle  still  left  open  the  inductive 
gathering  of  the  many  revealed  truths  in  the  practical  life 
of  Christianity.  More  dangerous  in  its  final  influence  was 
the  assumption  of  the  great  principle  of  divine  sovereignty. 
This  became  far  more  powerful  and  led  not  only  to  a  de- 
termined life,  but  to  an  absolute  rule  of  the  deductive 
method.  Christian  experience  was  forced  into  the  mold 
of  divine  absoluteness,  and  the  universal  crowded  out  the 
particular.  The  results  of  this  dogmatism  crowded  back 
many  of  the  best  ideals  of  Christian  experience.  It 
robbed  it  of  its  freedom  and  joy.  In  thinking  it  opened 
up  the  way  to  the  control  of  Christian  thought  by  con- 
sistent philosophy. 

There  started  somewhat  later  movements  which  laid  em- 
phasis on  vital  Christian  experience.  The  direct  touch 
of  divine  power  in  human  lives  was  demanded,  and  the 


60  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

regenerating  life  of  the  Holy  Spirit  was  to  be  made  the 
new  principle.  It  is  true  that  the  experiences  were  more 
discursive  and  inductive,  and  the  principle  was  not  sub- 
versive of  individual  data.  But  these  movements  of  piety 
were  rather  of  the  feeling  than  of  the  intellect,  and,  be- 
cause they  dwelt  more  on  the  psychology  of  Christian  ex- 
perience than  on  its  logic,  they  possessed  no  standard  and 
principle  to  overcome  the  regnant  power  of  deductive  dog- 
matics in  the  sphere  of  thought.  The  subjectivism  of 
piety  did  not  offer  an  adequate  and  sufficient  objective 
foundation  to  guarantee  and  test  the  soundness  of  the 
religious  experiences.  There  were  in  these  experiences,  and 
there  still  exist  in  them  where  they  are  emphasized  to-day, 
disjointed  and  atomistic  Christian  conceptions.  There  is 
a  lack  of  the  knowledge  of  the  valuable  traditions  of  the 
past,  and  a  failure  to  interpret  the  whole  of  Christian 
experience,  to  see  it  in  its  totality  and  to  find  its  proper 
objective  standard.  History  shows  that  after  the  sub- 
jectivism of  pietism  there  followed  the  individualism  of 
rationalism.  The  brief  sketching  of  the  rule  of  single 
principles  in  Christian  thinking  has  shown  us  their  danger. 
While  it  cannot  be  concluded  that  the  inductive  procedure 
is  the  only  one  favorable  to  Christianity,  nevertheless  it 
offers  large  opportunity,  and,  guarded  by  the  proper  ob- 
jective presupposition  of  the  unity  of  revelation,  can  be 
made  most  serviceable  to  express  the  truths  of  Christianity, 
and  to  formulate  the  many  and  manifold  Christian  experi- 
ences. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    COMPARATIVE    IDEA 

WHEN  the  inductive  argument  uses  instances 
that  agree  it  is  really  employing  the  logical 
law  of  identity.  Truly  interpreted  identity 
does  not  mean  tautology,  and  its  expression  is  not  A  —  A, 
but  it  does  formulate  the  fact  of  constancy  and  close  cor- 
respondence amidst  elements  of  difference.  One  grade 
lower  than  identity  and  agreement  is  logical  similarity. 
Its  unity  is  not  as  strong  as  that  in  agreement,  but  it  is 
more  than  mere  likeness.  The  bond  of  connection  in 
similarity  is  constantly  approaching  identity,  and  yet 
the  highest  member  in  the  rise  of  its  serial  approach  to 
identity  is  below  the  lowest  factor  in  identity  of  clear  cor- 
respondence. Because  of  this  fact  similarity,  which  is 
generally  known  in  logic  as  analogy,  and  which  forms  the 
basis  of  the  comparative  idea,  has  often  been  severely 
criticised.  The  analogical  proof  received  a  low  estimate 
and  a  mean  value.  But  such  a  discouraging  appreciation 
has  disregarded  the  real  use  and  application  of  analogy  in 
scientific  advance.  And  it  has  been  untrue  to  a  large 
number  of  cases  that  show  how  analogy  and  comparison 
have  been  used  in  real  scientific  discovery. 

It  was  analogy  and  comparison  which  moved  Darwin 
to  hit  upon  the  conception  of  natural  selection.  The 
opening  chapter  of  his  "  Origin  of  Species  "  shows  that  it 
was  the  artificial  selection  in  the  breeding  of  pigeons,  from 
which  he  started  out  and  found  selection  going  on  in 
nature  itself  without  human  intervention.  In  the  same 
manner  Darwin  also  was  led  to  the  term  "  struggle  for  ex- 
istence "  which  had  such  a  large  corroborating  meaning 

61 


62  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

for  his  theory.  He  could  find  no  explanation,  for  a  time, 
to  account  for  the  fact  of  the  elimination  and  the  break  in 
the  serial  development  of  the  species  through  variation. 
After  he  had  come  into  contact  with  Malthus'  great  treat- 
ise, which  emphasized  the  terrible  importance  of  the  strug- 
gle for  existence  in  mankind,  and  which  gave  economics 
such  a  dismal  direction,  he  applied  this  conception  with 
advantage  from  the  economic  sphere  to  the  processes 
of  nature.  The  argument  of  comparison,  therefore,  en- 
tered into  the  very  discovery  of  the  Darwinian  hypothesis. 
It  was,  furthermore,  found  exceedingly  useful  in  biology 
in  the  comparison  from  plant  to  plant,  from  species  of 
animal  to  animal,  from  structure  and  function  to  like 
structure  and  function.  Out  of  it  grew  comparative 
anatomy,  comparative  physiology,  and  comparative  psy- 
chology. One  of  the  most  important  and  fundamental  dis- 
coveries in  physics,  viz.,  the  principle  of  a  single  energy 
into  which  heat  and  light  and  electricity  might  be  trans- 
ferred, was  due  to  an  observation  in  which  comparison 
played  a  large  part.  A  German  physician,  Robert  Mayer, 
found  in  Java  that  the  blood  of  the  veins  of  Europeans 
who  had  but  lately  come  to  Java  was  very  bright  red. 
He  explained  this  remarkable  phenomenon  through  the 
fact,  that  in  the  tropics  with  their  heat  there  was  less 
oxidation  of  the  blood,  and,  therefore,  it  was  brighter. 
From  this  biological  fact  Mayer  was  led  by  careful  reason- 
ing to  the  conjecture  of  the  transference  of  energy.1 

The  comparative  method  has  also  been  very  useful  in  de- 
ciphering lost  languages.  Through  it,  it  was  possible  to 
argue  from  the  Greek  writing  on  the  "  Rosetta  Stone  " 
to  the  undeciphered  hieroglyphic  and  to  the  cursive  script. 
The  starting  point  of  Egyptology  was,  therefore,  based  on 
comparison.     In  a  similar  manner  it  was  found  possible 

i  For  full  account  of  this,  cf.,  Alois  Riehl,  "  Philosophic  der 
Gegenwart,"  p.  140  ff. 


The  Comparative  Idea  63 

to  understand  the  Assyrian  language  and  to  found  the 
study  of  Assyriology  when  the  great  tri-lingual  inscrip- 
tion of  Darius  was  found  by  Sir  Rawlinson  on  the  high 
rock  at  Behistun.  The  case  was  parallel  to  that  of  the 
"  Rosetta  Stone,"  and  again  the  comparative  method  was 
the  starting  point.  In  the  discovery  of  these  lost  lan- 
guages it  was  necessary  to  begin  with  the  mere  parallel- 
ism of  word  with  word,  but  out  of  such  comparison  there 
grew  consistent  meaning  when  the  discovered  words  were 
applied  in  other  connections,  and  finally  similarity  of 
grammatical  structure  made  the  comparison  very  force- 
ful. Thus  it  was  that  the  ancient  languages  of  the  East, 
which  had  been  lost,  were  added  to  our  knowledge  and 
placed  into  that  family  group  of  languages  to  which  they 
belonged.  In  linguistic  study  it  is  found  that  etymology 
is  not  only  historically  derivative,  but  also  comparative. 
A  similar  fact  appears  in  the  phonetic  laws  of  languages. 
Grimm's  great  "  Law  of  Lautverschiebung  "  is  in  its  es- 
sence analogical.  Thus  we  possess  comparative  phonetics, 
comparative  etymology,  comparative  grammar,  and 
through  them  all  comparative  philology.  In  view  of  facts 
like  these  we  cannot  pass  by  a  serious  consideration  of 
comparison  and  analysis. 

If  the  use  of  analogy  is  to  be  just,  it  is  exceedingly 
important  to  find  the  essential  condition  of  comparison. 
It  dare  not  remain  a  mere  supposition  of  likeness,  some 
times  successful,  and  sometimes  and  perhaps  more  often 
a  failure.  To  escape  this  uncertainty  analogy  or  com- 
parison must  be  analyzed.  It  must  appear  in  the  analysis 
that  there  is  a  fundamental  unity  of  character  in  the 
phenomena  which  are  compared.  There  ought  to  occur 
no  great  dissimilar  feature  and  no  disturbing  essential 
characteristic.  Thus  there  can  justly  be  comparative 
anatomy  and  it  can  be  strongly  approved  within  its  limits, 
because  the   similarities  are  all  traced  within  the  unity 


64  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

of  morphological  character.  It  is  far  more  difficult  to  es- 
tablish firmly  the  science  of  comparative  psychology. 
There  are  in  man  and  his  mind  great  conceptual  unities 
which  cannot  be  found  below  him,  as  the  latest  researches 
in  animal  psychology  in  distinction  from  the  conjectures 
of  Romanes  seem  to  show.  Nevertheless,  in  the  realm  of 
sensations  and  perceptions  there  can  be  a  real  compara- 
tive psychology;  in  them  there  is  a  unity  of  function. 
When  comparison  passes  from  the  sphere  of  one  science  to 
another,  or  from  science  to  art,  or  from  science  to  religion 
and  vice  versa,  it  is  often  very  problematic  whether  the 
analogy  is  legitimate.  The  main  problem  then  is,  whether 
new  and  diverse  elements  do  not  destroy  the  force  of 
similarity. 

The  caution  necessary  when  passing  from  one  sphere 
to  a  different  sphere  needs  consideration  in  our  study, 
particularly  as  applied  to  science  and  religion.  Butler 
in  his  famous,  "  Analogy  of  Religion,  National  and  Re- 
vealed, to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature,"  was 
true  to  analogical  reasoning  and  gave  it  a  very  careful 
logical  foundation.  He  met  the  Deism  of  the  eighteenth 
century  and  many  of  his  applications  are  just  and  care- 
fully guarded.  When,  however,  in  our  own  day  Drum- 
mond,  in  his  book  on  "  Natural  Law  in  the  Spiritual 
World,"  attempted  a  comparison  between  nature  and  its 
laws,  and  faith  and  its  principles,  he  was  by  no  means  as 
successful  as  Butler.  He  failed  because  the  phenomena 
which  he  cites  as  a  basis  of  comparison  have  a  great  dis- 
parity in  religion  and  nature  as  to  their  inner  value,  worth 
and  place.  An  apparently  similar  fact  to  science  in  relig- 
ion, as  e.  g.,  the  atrophy  of  organs  that  are  not  used,  is  not 
really  similar.  Atrophy  in  nature  is  the  result  of  environ- 
ment and  necessity,  in  religion  responsibility  and  choice 
enter  in.  There  is  a  failure  in  the  total  comparison  of 
Drummond  because  of  his  neglect  of  the  ethical  element 


The  Comparative  Idea  65 

and  of  freedom  in  faith.  His  comparisons  are  largely 
illustrations  for  the  preacher,  but  they  are  not  scientifi- 
cally tenable  arguments. 

The  failure  of  Drummond  in  finding  in  analogy  a  real 
constructive  argument  to  unite  nature  and  religion  ought 
to  be  a  warning  to  those  who,  from  the  scientific  point  of 
view,  attempt  to  use  comparison  destructively  against  re- 
ligion. When  necessity,  indestructibility  of  matter,  and 
conservation  of  energy,  or  natural  selection,  adaptation, 
and  survival  of  the  fittest  are  transferred  to  religion  as 
essential  conditions  and  as  basal  laws  a  great  logical  error 
has  been  committed.  There  has  been  no  examination  into 
the  specific  phenomena  and  into  the  differences  of  their 
character.  The  laws  of  one  sphere  have  been  unjustly 
forced  upon  another.  It  is  true  in  science  that  the  laws 
of  no  one  science  can  form  the  essential  conditions  of  an- 
other science.  Still  less  can  the  formulations  of  any 
science  be  introduced  as  demands  into  the  sphere  of  faith, 
which  is  radically  diverse.  If  they  are  forced  upon  re- 
ligion, its  nature  and  character  will  be  distorted.  Valu- 
able facts  of  religion  will  be  eliminated,  and  minor  facts 
because  of  an  apparent  analogy,  will  be  stressed  out  of  all 
relation  to  their  real  worth  in  the  totality  of  religion.  It 
is  very  strange  to  note  how  some  scientists  so  strongly 
resent  the  interference  of  religion  through  comparison 
with  nature,  but,  seeing  the  world  from  their  small  angle, 
they  would  apply  their  generalizations  to  religion. 

But  the  converse  is  also  true.  Religion  dare  not  carry 
its  comparisons  or  analogies  into  science  as  demonstrations 
or  arguments.  It  would  be  entirely  wrong  to  use  the  great 
convictions  of  faith  and  to  strain  the  facts  of  nature 
to  fit  into  them.  Because  of  the  goodness  of  God  it  is 
not  possible  to  deny  the  "  red  tooth  and  claw  "  in  nature. 
We  dare  not  be  oblivious  to  the  facts  of  nature  and  slight 
them  from  the  desire  to  find  the  goodness  of  God,  which 


66  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

is  a  religious  experience,  in  nature  itself.  The  many  in- 
equalities of  nature,  and  its  brute  forces  cannot  be  covered 
over  or  slightly  passed  by  because  of  a  belief  in  divine 
providence.  The  meaning  of  disasters  and  calamities  in 
nature  dare  not  be  suppressed.  It  will  always  be  an  error 
to  smuggle  in  the  God  of  moral  purpose  on  the  basis  of  the 
mere  evidences  of  nature.  Because  salvation  and  service 
are  such  fundamental  conceptions  in  Christianity  the 
healing  processes  of  nature  and  the  common  life  of 
the  species,  with  its  mother-love,  must  not  be  over-valued 
to  establish  the  presence  of  grace  and  love  in  the  realm 
of  nature.  In  the  projection  of  our  adoration  we  can 
unify  the  world  in  faith,  but  we  dare  not  argue  and  claim 
cogency  for  the  unification  from  the  faith  of  freedom  to 
the  law  of  necessity.  The  religious  convictions  of  provi- 
dence and  predestination,  in  which  man  regards  himself  as 
divinely  determined,  would  be  very  much  misapplied  if  they 
were  used  as  vital  counterparts  of  necessity  in  nature. 
The  responses  of  natural  forms  to  environment  never  per- 
mit the  intervention  of  conscience,  which  Christianity  de- 
mands in  all  responses  to  the  religious  environment.  It  U 
true  that  predestination  has  sometimes  been  thus  formu- 
lated as  to  empty  it  of  its  religious  character,  and  to  make 
it  really  fatalistic.  Then  it  approached  the  necessity  of 
nature.  But  it  is  increasingly  realized  to-day  that  such 
a  religious  interpretation  of  predestination  makes  it  really 
irreligious  and  fundamentally  unethical. 

Like  predestination  the  fact  of  the  spiritual  unity  of  the 
race  and  its  common  sin  is  fundamentally  different  from 
the  natural  unity  of  the  race  and  natural  heredity.  The 
spiritual  unity  of  the  race  is  mediated  by  Christ,  the  sec- 
ond Adam.  Men  enter  into  this  unity  through  the  de- 
cision of  faith,  even  though  faith  be  divinely  wrought. 
They  are  not  in  the  unity  by  necessity,  as  they  are  in  the 
unity  of  nature.     Common  and  original  sin  after  all  im- 


The  Comparative  Idea  67 

plies  guilt.  It  always  leads  to  and  implies  individual 
responsibility  and  guilt.  Nature  in  its  working  of  hered- 
ity knows  nothing  of  such  guilt.  Thus  whatever  compari- 
sons we  make  of  this  type  must  fundamentally  fail  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  correct  logic. 

The  same  problem,  which  appeared  in  the  question  of 
unity  and  sin,  is  also  evident  when  religion  attempts  to 
argue  from  divine  will  to  force  and  energy  in  nature.  The 
attempt  to  unify  them  from  the  religious  standpoint  is 
very  questionable.  This  whole  problem  of  the  relation  of 
will  and  energy  is  fundamentally  a  philosophical  question. 
Idealism  generally  claims  that  the  action  of  the  will  is  the 
interpretation  of  energy  in  nature.  In  nature  itself  only 
sequence  of  phenomena  can  be  discovered,  and  direct  and 
diverse  forces.  The  unifying  of  all  of  these  phenomena 
and  forces  into  the  idea  of  energy  can  only  receive  its  full 
interpretation,  idealism  argues,  if  we  suppose  energy  as 
an  idea  to  be  derived  from  the  experience  of  human  willing. 
This  contention  is  one  which  deserves  fair  consideration, 
but  when  frequently,  in  the  interests  of  defense,  Christian 
thinkers  pass  from  the  conviction  of  the  divine  will  to  the 
fact  of  energy,  they  endanger  just  logical  procedure  in 
comparison.  The  difficulty  with  this  comparison  is,  that 
the  more  the  similarity  is  pressed,  the  more  the  divine 
will  is  emptied  of  its  moral  character  and  freedom,  and  re- 
duced to  the  category  of  necessity.  It  may  also  lead  to 
the  inclusion  of  God  as  a  willing  God  in  the  world,  or  of 
the  abolition  of  a  real  world  in  a  willing  God.  Specula- 
tively it  is  more  to  the  point  to  pass  from  the  energy 
of  the  universe  to  the  complementary  notion  of  a  universal 
will  of  which  energy  is  the  result.2  But  this  will  must  re- 
ceive its  fuller  definition  from  history  and  the  demands 
of  man's  moral  nature. 

Analogy  plays  a  large  part  as  man  passes  from  the 

2  But  cf.  Chapt.  V,  p.  95, 


68  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

elements  of  his  nature  to  the  conception  of  the  character 
of  God.  There  has  been  much  severe  criticism  of  this 
comparison,  and  it  has  been  disapproved  through  the 
historically  tabooed  term  of  anthropomorphism.  But  if 
no  elements  of  human  character  and  no  intimations  of 
human  personality  dare  be  used  in  the  effort  to  formulate 
the  idea  of  God,  it  is  necessary  to  reduce  this  idea  to  im- 
personalism.  Of  course  there  are  those  who  have  coined 
the  designation  superpersonalism ;  but  when  we  examine 
its  meaning,  it  is,  after  all,  nothing  but  a  ver}'  nebulous 
impersonalism  and  denies  some  of  the  highest  elements 
in  our  human  life.  Are  not  the  moral  demands  of  re- 
sponsibility and  obligation,  the  belief  in  freedom,  and  the 
triumph  of  the  good,  elements  closely  bound  up  with  per- 
sonality? If  we  deny  personality  must  not  these  consid- 
erations fall  to  the  ground?  Consequently  will  not  a 
truer  result  be  reached,  and  one  in  accord  with  our  deep- 
est religious  and  moral  desires  and  demands,  if  we  conceive 
of  God  in  analogy  with  human  personality?  When  per- 
sonality is  defined  as  limitation,  confused  with  mere  indi- 
viduality, and  connected  with  subjectivism,  then,  of  course, 
the  personal  determination  is  a  limitation.  But  if  we 
remove  restricted  human  individualism,  and  accent  in  God 
purely  His  determinative  self-possession  and  His  freely 
self-willed  relation,  there  is  an  ideal  which  the  development 
of  the  human  personality  through  ethical  and  religious 
life  adumbrates.  In  such  foreshadowing  there  is  an  ele- 
ment of  true  comparison.  The  comparison  is  the  more 
just  because  it  takes  place  within  the  limits  of  religious 
experience  and  religious  thinking  itself.  It  is,  of  course, 
speculative  and  approaches  the  hypothetical,  but  it  is  more 
justly  comparative  and  analogical  than  the  argument 
from  impersonal  nature  or  the  deification  of  nature. 
Christianity  not  only  allows  the  analogy  from  man  to  God, 
but  requires  it.     For  its   acceptance  of  the  idea  of  the 


The  Comparative  Idea  69 

divine  image  of  man,  and  its  fundamental  tenet  of  the  in- 
carnation of  God  in  Christ,  rest  on  the  presupposition  of 
the  real  likeness  and  similarity  of  God  and  man.  Chris- 
tianity is  theomorphic  in  man,  and  consequently  anthro- 
pomorphic, within  the  religious  and  ethical  side  of  man, 
in  God. 

The  employment  of  the  comparative  argument  must 
necessarily  lead  us  to  the  consideration  of  one  of  the 
main  elements  involved  in  its  analysis,  viz.,  the  relation 
of  purpose  to  comparison.  As  important  as  the  close 
analysis,  restriction  and  balance  of  analogy  may  be,  it 
cannot  be  complete  without  the  understanding  of  the  re- 
lation of  analogy  to  purpose  or  teleology.  Many  logi- 
cians have  avoided  stressing  aim  and  purpose  in  compari- 
son, because  they  feared  that  it  might  lead  them  to  the 
position  of  Hegel.  When,  after  the  manner  of  Hegel, 
the  world  is  considered  a  whole  in  the  Absolute,  and  when 
every  part  is  held  to  be  inexplicable  without  the  whole, 
and  is  supposed  to  be  intimately  and  internally  related 
to  the  whole,  every  comparison  is  of  necessity  an  in- 
terpretation of  the  purpose  fulfilled  in  the  whole.  But  it 
is  not  necessary  to  adhere  to  the  metaphysics  of  the 
whole  and  absolute,  in  order  to  find  in  analogy  the  impli- 
cation of  purpose.  It  is  possible  on  the  basis  of  the  in- 
ductive assumption  of  uniformity  to  hold  to  an  inter- 
relation. This  inter-relation,  however,  can  not  be  merely 
accidental,  as  little  as  the  uniformity.  The  common  na- 
ture of  uniformity  and  continuity  in  the  world  implies 
equal  functioning.  Where  there  is  equal  functioning, 
there  are  equal  results.  Equal  results  reach  equal  aims. 
Therefore,  comparison,  or  analogy,  involves  postulates  of 
purpose.  The  purpose  may  appear  only  at  the  end,  and 
may  not  be  seen  at  its  beginning.  But  is  it  illegitimate 
to  argue  back  from  the  resultant  aim  to  the  original  pur- 
pose?    In  the  sphere  of  the  organic  and  upward  from  it 


70  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

into  the  historical,  the  moral  and  the  religious,  we  begin 
to  deal  more  definitely  with  the  conception  of  a  whole 
of  parts  serving  a  specific  end;  or  in  other  words,  where 
organism  begins,  purpose  cannot  be  excluded.  It  is  due 
to  the  reasoning  of  Kant,  in  his  "  Critique  of  Pure  Judg- 
ment," to  have  clearly  stated  the  necessity  of  purpose 
where  the  organic  begins.  But  Kant  has  perhaps  limited 
teleology  too  much  in  restricting  it  only  to  the  organic, 
and  allowing  necessity  to  rule  belowr  the  organic.  After 
all,  if  the  organic  does  show  a  direct  and  immediate  pur- 
pose in  the  parts  and  organs  of  a  single  organism,  this 
internal  purpose  in  single  structures  leads  to  the  consid- 
eration of  purpose  in  wider  spheres.  A  careful  consid- 
eration does  not  permit  a  complete  exclusion  of  purpose 
below  the  organic.  Mechanism  and  finality  are  really  re- 
lated, and  the  mechanical  inter-relation  of  the  universe 
shows  ends  reached  on  a  large  scale.3  But  even  those  who 
dispute  this  application  cannot  deny  the  application  of 
purpose  in  comparison  from  biology  upward.  The  prob- 
lem, then,  only  is,  where  does  purpose  begin?  No  fair 
consideration  of  the  universe  can  exclude  purpose  as  ap- 
parent in  it,  at  least  in  parts  of  it.  This  is  sufficient 
to  permit  the  hypothesis  of  teleology,  which  makes  anal- 
ogy cogent,  and  it  allows  for  an  ideal  element  in  the 
universe,  and  for  a  presumptive  argument  for  theism. 

But  the  sphere  in  which  the  connection  of  purpose  with 
comparison  or  analogy  first  touches  Christianity  most 
evidently  is  in  history.  There  arises  a  real  problem  out 
of  the  comparison  between  the  ideals  and  purposes  of 
general  history,  and  the  specific  history  of  Christianity. 
The  special  character  of  the  history  of  Christianity  has 
been  largely  doubted.  Because  it  is  interwoven  with  gen- 
eral history,  and  because  particularly  in  the  Middle  Ages 
the  history  of  Europe  is  largely  the  history  of  the  Church, 

s  Cf.  Chapter  V,  p.  96. 


The  Comparative  Idea  71 

and  vice  versa,  therefore,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to 
absorb  the  history  of  Christianity  into  general  history. 
Upon  this  claim  the  history  of  the  Church  and  of  Chris- 
tianity is  only  a  division  of  convenience  in  general  his- 
tory, and  is  not  justified  by  its  separate  and  distinct 
character  and  life.  The  similarity  of  the  history  of 
Christianity  to  general  history  has  been  pressed  to  the 
point  of  identity.  Therefore,  the  critical  principles  of 
general  history,  which  allow  for  no  supernatural  element 
and  eliminate  everything  inexplicable  and  extraordinary, 
and  deny  everything  miraculous,  have  been  applied  to  the 
history  of  Christianity,  and  to  the  history  of  Israel,  which 
Christianity  claims  as  preparatory  to  its  origin.  It  is 
true  that  there  has  arisen  a  treatment  of  the  problems  of 
Christianity  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  history  of  re- 
ligions. In  this  history,  miracles,  prophecies,  revelations, 
are  found  everywhere,  and  they  are  allowed  to  stand  as 
psychological  facts.  But  this  admission  does  not  settle 
the  question  of  the  real  existence  in  Christianity  of  super- 
natural elements.  It  still  allows  for  a  theory  of  a  purely 
natural  historical  evolution.  With  the  philosophy  of  a 
purely  human,  natural  development,  controlled  by  noting 
the  historic  process  in  many  nations  in  mind,  many  think- 
ers have  reconstructed,  first  of  all,  the  preparatory  his- 
tory leading  to  the  New  Testament  in  the  Old  Testament, 
which  at  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  Church  was  largely 
the  religious  book  of  Christianity.  Its  documents  have 
been  critically  severed,  and  human  purpose,  corrupting 
the  purer  ideals  of  the  prophets  by  a  narrow  legalism, 
has  been  made  the  controlling  factor.  Though  the  earlier 
conjectures  of  reconstruction  in  the  Old  Testament  are 
losing  their  hold,  nevertheless  the  main  idea  of  a  natural 
development  has  not  been  abandoned.  In  the  same  spirit, 
the  uniqueness  of  Christ  has  been  questioned.  He  has 
been  reduced  either  to  a  religious  genius,  whose  life  the 


72  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

Church  embellished  by  legends,  or  He  has  been  explained 
as  a  myth  which  attached  itself  to  a  person.  The  history 
of  the  Church  has  also  been  re-edited  into  a  real  history  by 
such  a  critical  handling  of  the  naive  accounts  of  the  New 
Testament  as  shall  make  them  really,  as  it  is  supposed,  his- 
torical. This  whole  point  of  view  which  has  determined 
the  historical  criticism  of  Christianity  and  its  documents, 
rests  on  the  idea  of  the  entire  similarity  of  the  history 
of  Christianity  to  all  other  history.  Similar  purposes, 
similar  motives,  and,  therefore,  real  likeness  are  found. 
Now  is  this  attitude  correct,  or  must  Christianity  claim 
an  exceptional  treatment?  If  we  are  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion, the  problem  must  be  traced  further  back.  Our  de- 
fense of  taking  the  historical  documents  as  they  stand, 
and  our  refusal  to  reconstruct  them  as  they  are  recon- 
structed by  many  historians,  must  rest  on  the  fact  of  a 
specific  nature  of  Christianity.  The  claim  of  the  special 
character  of  Christianity  in  all  history  is  due  to  the 
conviction  of  a  unique  revelation ;  and,  therefore,  the  prob- 
lem, whether  it  is  justifiable  to  treat  Christianity  on  the 
same  assumption  as  other  history,  must  be  settled  by 
answering  the  question,  whether  Christianity  is  merely 
a  religion  among  other  religions. 

The  difficulty  of  a  real  analogy  between  the  history 
of  Christianity  and  general  history  will  thus  lead  us  to 
the  consideration  of  comparative  religion.  The  reason 
why  the  history  of  Christianity  is  given  no  special  privi- 
lege and  place,  is  because  it  is  denied  that  Christianity 
is  the  unique  and  final  religion.  It  was  Schleiermacher, 
who  held  that  other  forms  of  religion  than  Christianity 
were  on  the  same  basis  of  development;  Christianity  was 
more  complete,  but  it  was  not  the  only  true  religion.4 

This  attitude  is  explicable  from  the  fundamentally  pan- 

4Cf.   Schleiermacher,   "  Der   Christliche  Glaube,"    Introduction   II, 
paragraph  7,  3. 


The  Comparative  Idea  73 

theistic  philosophy  of  Schleiermacher.  Since  his  day  there 
has  arisen  on  the  basis  of  general  evolutionary  principles 
the  science  of  comparative  religion.  The  naturalism  of 
this  general  evolution,  like  the  pantheism  of  Schleier- 
macher, finds  a  common  process  in  all  religions.  With 
Schleiermacher  the  process  was  an  ideal  development,  with 
many  to-day  the  process  is  a  natural,  psychological  one. 
By  speculations  of  a  psychological  and  anthropological 
sort,  the  origin  of  all  religion  is  found  either  in  animism,5 
or  magic,6  or  in  ancestor  worship,  according  to  Spencer, 
or  in  an  impersonal  power.7  The  religion  of  the  lower 
tribes  is  investigated,  their  religious  beliefs  and  practices 
are  analyzed,  classified,  and  traced  upward  until  the  period 
of  historic  religions  approaches.  Common  features  are 
found  in  all  faiths.  In  prayer,  sacrifice,  sacrament,  the 
idea  of  God,  of  sin,  etc.,  the  mass  of  men  are  found  to  have 
comparable,  common  notions.  Christianity  is  included  in 
this  process  and  elements  of  similarity  to  other  religions 
are  found  in  it.  Is  this  inclusion  really  logically  just? 
To  accomplish  it  the  minor  elements  of  Christianity  have 
frequently  been  emphasized,  and  passing  errors  as  well  as 
degenerations  in  its  history  have  been  used.  The  difference 
of  meaning  and  claim  in  apparently  like  acts,  as  in  prayer 
and  sacrifice,  and  in  apparently  like  occurrences,  as  in 
the  Virgin  Birth,  is  not  maintained.  What  on  the  surface 
appears  the  same  has  a  totally  different  import  in  Chris- 
tian truth  and  history.  This  import  is  neglected,  the 
original  documents  are  wrongly  reconstructed  upon  the 
basis  of  a  merely  human  development,  and  then,  of  course, 
Christianity  can  be  fitted  into  the  plan  of  comparative 
religions.  After  the  documents  have  been  reconstructed 
upon  the  initial  assumption  of  a  natural  development,  they 

s  Cf.  Tylor,  "  Primitive  Culture." 

e  Frazer,  "  The  Golden  Bough." 

7  Leuba,  "  A  Psychological  Study  of  Religion." 


74  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

are  again  used  to  support  in  this  reconstructed  form  the 
theory  of  a  common  human  religious  history.  Thus  the 
argument  in  the  circle  works  itself  out.  But  now  there 
remains  a  larger  question.  Even  after  this  process  has 
accomplished  all  that  it  can,  does  Christianity  appear 
more  like,  or  more  unlike,  other  religions?  Does  it  pos- 
sess ineradicable,  peculiar  features  which,  from  the  ex- 
amination of  facts,  discredit  the  comparative  procedure? 
Is  Christianity  not  only  superior,  but  does  it  possess 
truth  of  such  a  nature  as  bears  finality  within  it? 

It  is  not  possible  within  the  range  of  a  short  chapter 
to  answer  this  fundamental  question  of  Christian  apologet- 
ics. It  must  be  answered  upon  the  basis  of  careful  his- 
torical procedure.  A  few  lines  of  claim  can,  however, 
be  indicated.  The  Christian  conception  of  God,  combin- 
ing the  fullest  and  largest  indications  of  nature  with  the 
highest  moral  and  religious  demands,  in  the  ideal  of  God 
as  Father  is  one  great  line  of  difference.8  The  other  re- 
ligions have  claimed  its  possession,  since  the  spread  of 
Christianity,  but  they  have  made  it  prominent  out  of  all 
relation  to  their  own  past  history  and  teaching,  and  have 
secretly  changed  their  defective  conception  of  God  into  the 
Christian  idea.  This  appears  very  clearly  if  any  one  will 
study  the  documents  of  the  World's  Congress  of  Religions 
at  Chicago,  and  compare  it  with  the  teaching  and  history 
of  these  religions.  Another  claim  of  Christianity  is  the 
ideal  of  Christ  and  the  interpretation  of  humanity  in  Him. 
There  is  no  approach  to  the  breadth  of  humanity  in  Jesus 
either  in  Zoroaster,  or  Buddha  or  Mohammed.  None  of 
these  possess  the  complete  and  perfect  personality  of 
Jesus,  which  supports  His  divine  claim.  In  similar  man- 
ner, prayer  and  sacrifice  have  received  a  different  valua- 
tion, which  is  always  overlooked  by  those  who  include 
Christianity  within  the  compass  of  other  faiths. 

8  Cf.  Orr,  "  The  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World." 


The  Comparative  Idea  75 

One  of  the  most  permanent  and  valuable  differences 
between  Christianity  and  other  faiths,  is  the  nature  of  its 
ethical  demands  with  their  unlimited  possibility  of  develop- 
ment in  the  world.  Ethical  developments  have  wrecked 
other  religions.  They  overcame  the  ancient  Greek  faith ; 
they  are  severely  injuring  Confucianism  and  Buddhism 
to-day.  Christianity  has  been  the  constant  inspirer  of 
larger  ethical  progress.  Even  when  ethical  advances  have 
sought  to  cut  loose  from  Christian  history  they  have  finally 
needed  the  inspiration  of  some  of  its  ideals.  It  is  true 
that  the  organized  form  of  the  Church  may  not  always 
readily  respond  to  a  new  ethical  ideal,  and  may  be  ignorant 
of  the  fact  that  secretly  the  force  of  Christian  truth  has 
wrought  the  very  change  which  is  opposed.  But  the  other 
organized  forms  of  society  in  family  or  state  have  also  not 
adapted  themselves  quickly  and  readily  to  great  changes. 
The  force  of  conservatism  in  fixed  forms  and  customs  of  so- 
ciety is  always  strong.  Frequently  the  resistance  of  the 
state  and  of  government  has  been  mightier  than  that  of  re- 
ligion. Despite  some  hesitancy,  Christianity  has  been  able 
to  adopt  the  most  ambitious  program  of  modern  progress. 
It  has  adopted,  inspired  through  Christian  personali- 
ties, if  not  through  direct  organizations  of  the  Church, 
the  peace  movement,  the  child  labor  question,  and  many 
similar  problems  sufficient  to  wreck  any  other  faith.  Some 
of  its  ideals,  as  that  of  non-resistance,  are  not  yet  realized. 
They  are  called  impracticable  in  an  age  of  competition. 
The  larger  growth  of  co-operation  will  help  to  justify  the 
neglected  truth,  that  Christianity  is  opposed  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  an  eye  for  an  eye,  and  a  tooth  for  a  tooth.  In 
this,  one  of  its  oldest  truths,  is  the  possibility  of  a  moral 
progress  and  expansion  which  is  not  yet  realized.  When 
such  and  similar  facts  carefully  gathered  from  the  Bible 
and  Christian  history  are  combined,  it  will  in  the  end 
appear   that   there   is   a  difference   between   Christianity 


76  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  other  faiths  larger  than  the  modern  comparative  ar- 
gument allows.  The  burden  upon  the  present  apologetic 
of  Christianity  is  the  full  and  clear  elaboration  of  this 
ethical  claim  by  a  careful  and  critical  use  of  facts. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    CONJECTURAL    SCHEME 

IN  all  thinking  conjecture  plays  a  large  part.  Many 
results  are  not  fully  demonstrated,  they  are  simply 
accepted  because  they  are  highly  probable.  Prob- 
ability and  not  necessity  enters  into  most  of  our  intel- 
lectual possessions.  When  the  question  of  probability  is 
approached,  the  first  effort  is  to  make  probability  more 
definite  by  calculation,  which  seeks  to  determine  chances 
as  they  approach  reality.  Mathematically  probability 
is  expressed  in  a  fraction,  whose  denominator  gives  the 
total  number  of  possible  cases,  and  whose  numerator  shows 
the  actual  number  that  have  occurred.  The  relation  of  the 
numerator  to  the  denominator  shows  the  amount  of  ap- 
proach to  certainty.  If  a  quantitative  series  should  be 
arranged,  the  movement  of  the  numerator  toward  the 
denominator  would  show  how  closely  probability  can  ap- 
proach certainty.  The  mathematical  form  and  the  calcu- 
lation of  chances  and  probabilities  is  an  effort  to  improve 
on  the  old  enumerative  induction  of  Aristotle.  Most  cases 
of  probability,  however,  are  not  calculable  mathematically. 
They  are  not  such  simple  cases  as  the  average  of  births 
and  the  rate  of  death,  but  they  fall  under  a  qualitative 
probability  which  is  less  exact  than  the  mathematical  doc- 
trine of  chances.  Much  of  our  practical  life  and  many 
of  our  choices  are  determined  by  such  general  considera- 
tions of  probability.  There  is  incalculable  chance  in  a 
large  part  of  our  experience,  no  matter  how  definite  its 
outcome  may  be.  The  present  and  the  hope  of  the  future 
is  subject  to  chance,  which  is  our  admission  of  ignorance. 
Experience  is  not  in  its  formative  stage  definite,  but  shift- 

77 


78  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

ing,  changing,  multiform,  heterogeneous,  leading  to  nov- 
elty amidst  all  similarity. 

Much  of  human  evidence,  whether  in  a  trial  at  court, 
or  in  historical  sources,  is  subject  to  the  calculation  of 
probability.  Circumstantial  evidence  is  more  so  than 
direct  human  evidence.  But  even  the  most  direct  human 
evidence  with  no  desire  to  be  untruthful  has  its  contradic- 
tions, and,  therefore,  is  never  absolutely  unified  and  con- 
sistent. If  this  experience  of  human  evidence  is  rightly 
valued,  it  must  affect  the  problems  of  evidence  in  historical 
documents.  We  can  never  expect  to  have  completely  ac- 
cordant accounts ;  minor  difficulties  will  always  remain. 
It  is  all  the  more  remarkable  in  view  of  this  fact,  to  find 
that  the  accounts  of  the  gospels,  which  bear  no  marks  of 
having  been  tampered  with,  are  in  such  large  agreement. 
There  are,  naturally,  minor  difficulties,  particularly  if  the 
effort  is  made  to  bring  into  unity  in  a  chronological  way 
the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  of  Christ's  resurrection.  But 
all  accounts  have  no  larger  problems  than  are  naturally 
found  in  evidence.  A  careful  consideration  of  what  prob- 
ability means  in  evidence  is  favorable,  and  more  than  fav- 
orable to  the  New  Testament  accounts. 

Probability  in  human  experience  is  very  illuminating 
when  applied  to  Christian  experience.  In  our  day,  when 
in  our  Christian  thinking  we  so  frequently  return  in  proof 
of  a  Christian  truth  or  conviction  to  experience,  it  must 
be  remembered  that  from  experience  as  a  source  we  can 
obtain  only  probable  results.  The  assurance  of  the  truths 
in  Christian  experience,  and  the  belief  in  their  real  eter- 
nal existence,  are  certain.  But  the  appropriation  of  the 
truths  and  their  working  out  in  Christian  experience  is  sub- 
ject to  the  approximations  toward  pureness  in  experience. 
This  consideration  is  necessary  for  the  defenders  of  the 
faith,  so  that  they  may  not  ascribe  to  Christian  experi- 
ence undue  certainty.     The  authority  of  the  original  ac- 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  79 

counts  of  Christian  experience  and  their  normative  value 
is  due  to  the  conception  of  revelation  and  not  to  the  char- 
acter of  experience.  Experience,  as  experience,  can  never 
attain  full  certainty.  It  is  equally  important  for  those 
who  doubt  or  oppose  Christian  truth,  to  note  that  they 
have  no  right  to  demand  a  superior  certainty  in  Christian 
experience.  The  same  probability  which  rules  in  other 
spheres,  and  upon  which  science  builds  up  its  conjectures, 
must  in  all  fairness  be  allowed  to  Christianity. 

Another  question  which  arises  out  of  the  fact  of  prob- 
ability and  chance,  is  their  relation  to  the  Christian  con- 
ception of  Providence.  What  chance,  which  lies  back  of 
probability,  means,  is  fundamentally  our  impossibility  to 
determine,  in  full  detail,  the  course  of  our  life.  Chance 
expresses  the  fact  of  our  uncertainty  and  of  our  impotence 
to  control  occurrences  of  our  life.  There  are  chances 
and  probabilities  in  science,  but  despite  these  thinking 
still  holds  to  the  ideal  of  uniform  and  inviolable  law  in 
nature.  It  cannot  abandon  this  supposition  without  de- 
stroying itself.  If  everything  were  chance  and  chance 
were  final,  ignorance  and  helplessness  would  be  final ;  and 
there  could  be  no  order  even  on  the  basis  of  probability. 
We  cannot  deny  chance  but  we  look  rather  to  its  deter- 
mined elements  than  to  its  undetermined  remnant.  Con- 
sequently, we  formulate  laws  even  on  the  foundation  of  the 
similarities  in  chance.  If  science  operates  on  this  basis, 
is  it  not  possible  and  equally  just  for  faith  to  assume 
a  Providence  and  to  select  the  orderly  elements  of  life  in 
its  favor?  The  dwelling  on  the  facts  favorable  to  Provi- 
dence is  no  more  a  distortion,  than  the  selection  of  classi- 
fiable facts  from  the  whole  realm  of  the  unclassified,  prob- 
able, and  doubtful  data  in  establishing  a  scientific  law. 

Of  more  value  in  the  conjectural  way  of  arguing  than 
probability,  is  hypothesis.  There  can  be  no  scientific  prog- 
ress without  the  use  of  hypothesis,  which  is  created  by 


80  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

sound  imagination.     Such  imagination  before  all  verifica- 
tion   projects    a    possible    and    a    probable    explanation. 
When  this  projection  is  made,  the  hypothesis  is  one  that 
seeks  to  find,  and  is  rightly  called  a  finding  hypothesis. 
Its   character  is  not  that   of  a  mere  guess,  but  it  pre- 
supposes   facts    and    experiences,    knowledge    and    scien- 
tific   training.     It    cannot    be    made    without    postulates, 
which  are  conditions  in  a  given  set  of  appearances  that 
call  for  a  certain  solution.     The  hypothesis,  then,  which 
answers  to  these  postulates  and  demands,  seeks  to  reply 
to  their  request.     When  it  seems  to  make  possible  a  fair 
arrangement  and  to  give  a  plausible  demonstration  it  is 
adopted  and  becomes   a  working  hypothesis,  in  which   a 
number  of  agents  make  clear  a  law  or  principle.      Such  a 
hypothesis  is  imaginative,  but  it  is  not  a  fiction.     In  a 
fiction   we   would    refer    a    consequent    to    an    antecedent, 
which  we  know  cannot  produce  it.     In  hypothesis  we  some- 
times find  that  we  cannot  discover  the  real  agent,  which 
must  always  remain  an  assumption,  but  not  a  real  fiction. 
Even  when  scientific  men  appear  to  make  the  wildest  trials, 
they    are   only   actively    theorizing.     Their   theorizing   is 
successful  when  the  hypotheses  work   out.     A  large  set 
of  accordant   hypotheses,   or   hypotheses   becoming  more 
confirmed,  may  be  called  a  theory.     The  whole  situation 
of  accordance  of  phenomena  in  testing  them  out  is  well 
described  by  Professor  Hobhouse :     "  But  it  is  admitted, 
that  while  there  are  some  first  principles  which  are  true 
axioms,  needing  no  proof,  there  are  others  which  at  the 
outset  are  mere  assumptions,  taken  up  for  the  purpose  of 
seeing  what  flows  from  them.     These  conclusions  can  be 
tested  by  experience,  and  if  there  is  agreement,  the  as- 
sumption  on   which  they   depend   stands   uncontradicted. 
It  may  be  true.      If  further  results  are  elicited,  and  the 
agreement  with  experience  continues,  it  becomes  difficult 
to  believe  that  an  assumption  which  works  so  well  can  be 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  81 

false."  *  It  is  in  this  manner  that  many  of  the  results  of 
science  have  been  reached,  as  a  body  of  judgments  whose 
strength  lies  in  their  common  support  of  each  other.  It 
was  thus  that  Darwin  was  led  on  in  his  work.2  Professor 
Tyndale  has  defended  this  proper  use  of  imagination  in 
science.  He  says :  "  We  are  gifted  with  the  power  of 
imagination, —  combining  what  the  Germans  call  Anschau- 
ungsgabe  and  Einbildungskraft, —  and  by  this  power  we 
can  lighten  the  darkness  which  surrounds  the  world  of  the 
senses.  There  are  Tories  in  science  who  regard  Imagina- 
tion as  a  faculty  to  be  feared  and  avoided  rather  than 
employed.  They  have  observed  its  actions  in  weak  vessels 
and  were  unduly  impressed  by  its  disasters.  But  they  might 
with  equal  justice  point  to  exploded  boilers  as  an  argument 
against  the  use  of  steam.  Bounded  and  conditioned  by 
co-operative  Reason,  Imagination  becomes  the  mightiest 
instrument  of  the  scientific  discoverer.  Newton's  passage 
from  a  falling  apple  to  a  falling  moon  was,  at  the  outset, 
a  leap  of  imagination.  When  William  Thomson  tries  to 
place  the  ultimate  particles  of  matter  between  his  compass 
points,  and  to  apply  to  them  a  scale  of  millimeters,  he  is 
powerfully  aided  by  this  faculty.  And  in  much  that  has 
been  recently  said  about  protoplasm  and  life,  we  have  the 
outgoings  of  the  Imagination  guided  and  controlled  by  the 
known  analogies  of  science.  In  fact,  without  this  power, 
our  knowledge  would  be  a  mere  tabulation  of  co-existences 
and  sequences.  We  should  still  believe  in  the  succession 
of  day  and  night,  of  summer  and  winter;  but  the  soul  of 
Force  would  be  dislodged  from  our  universe;  causal  rela- 
tions would  disappear  and  with  them  that  science  which 
is  now  binding  the  parts  of  nature  to  an  organic  whole."  3 

i  "  Development  and  Purpose,"  p.  252. 

2  Cf .  Francis  Darwin,  "  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,"  Vol. 
I,  p.  126. 

3  "  Use  and  Limit  of  Imagination  in  Science,"  p.  16. 


82  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  hypothesis  and  the  imagination 
which  creates  it  are  fundamental  in  inductive  reasoning. 

It  has  generally  been  thought  unworthy  of  religion,  and 
specially  of  Christianity,  to  employ  such  a  speculative 
process  of  imagination  as  hypothesis  implies.  The  cer- 
tainty of  faith  seems  to  demand  a  sure  foundation.  Nev- 
ertheless it  is  true  that,  beyond  the  knowledge  immediately 
given  in  Christian  truth,  Christianity  in  its  intellectual 
formulations  has  been  compelled  to  enter  the  hypothetical 
sphere.  Many  of  the  efforts  to  formulate  a  system  of 
doctrines  show  the  same  speculative  and  imaginative  pro- 
cedure in  giving  a  probable  account  of  the  mysteries 
of  God,  man,  sin,  salvation,  as  does  science.  Outside 
of  biblical  theology,  there  is  a  real  chance  for  hypothesis 
and  philosophical  speculation.  This,  however,  must  not 
be  permitted  to  determine  the  data  of  Christian  faith,  or 
to  modify  its  character.  But  as  in  science,  such  imagina- 
tive framing  of  hypotheses  has  and  can  lead  Christian 
thinking  to  new  possibilities  and  fresh  vistas. 

One  of  the  applications  of  hypothesis  to  Christianity 
is  the  use  of  criticism,  particularly  of  a  historical  nature. 
There  can  be  no  inherent  objection  to  such  criticism,  when 
it  is  applied  to  the  documents  and  history  of  Christianity. 
These  can  be  rightly  examined  both  in  the  form  of  the 
texts  and  in  their  contents.  Such  examination  is  really 
a  development  of  true  induction  when  it  rests  upon  ex- 
amined, criticised  and  tested  observations.  The  difficul- 
ties, that  arise  and  seem  to  injure  the  very  content  of 
Christian  truth,  are  not  the  result  of  a  just  hypothesis, 
but  are  derived  from  a  wrong  naturalistic  presupposition. 
It  is,  therefore,  not  the  proper  application,  but  the  abuse 
of  conjectural  imagination  in  the  hypothesis  through 
which  criticism  has  injured  Christian  truth.  If  the  value 
of  religious  experience  is  conserved  in  the  criticism  of  the 
origins  of  Christianity,  and  if  revelation  is  given  its  legiti- 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  83 

mate  worth,  then  only  advantages  can  accrue  from  using 
proper  hypotheses.  These,  in  fact,  have  led  to  the  rule 
of  biblical  theology,  upon  a  careful  historical  basis. 
Through  it  Christian  thought  has  been  clarified,  new  life 
has  been  brought  into  Christian  thinking,  and  the  founda- 
tions have  been  furnished,  upon  which  we  can  place  the 
instances  of  Christian  experience.  But  not  only  biblical 
theology  has  gained  through  historical  hypotheses,  they 
have  also  supplied  material  for  the  formulation  of  mod- 
ern dogmatic  systems.  Frequently,  however,  the  mod- 
ern dogmatic  systems  have  been  philosophically  colored 
rather  than  biblically  controlled.  They  have  failed  to 
understand  that  the  imagination  in  theological  hypothesis 
dare  not  injure  the  primal  facts  and  experiences  of  Chris- 
tian truth.  No  requirement  of  the  unity  of  a  system  can 
pass  by  contrary  facts  if  they  are  properly  attested.  The 
problem  must  be  to  arrive  at  the  best  fundamental  theory 
for  all  facts. 

In  any  usable  hypothesis  a  prime  requirement  is  that 
it  be  simple  and  plausible.  Too  complex  a  conjecture 
does  not  reduce  the  multiform  data  to  the  simplicity  which 
ought  to  characterize  a  real  explanation.  A  very  apt 
case  illustrating  this  was  the  employment  in  astronomy 
of  the  hypothesis  of  epicycles.  It  required  cycle  upon 
cycle,  and  really  destroyed  itself  by  the  very  complexities 
to  which  it  led.  This  demand  of  simplicity  has  been  too 
largely  disregarded  in  the  conjectural  analysis  of  biblical 
documents.  The  manner  in  which  the  hypothesis  of  sources 
was  worked  out  led  to  continuous  disintegration.  Small 
fragments  were  all  that  was  left  after  a  complete  analysis. 
The  seams  which  were  to  unite  the  many  patches  were 
also  of  the  minutest  kind.  There  was  a  process  of  dissolu- 
tion evident  which  had  no  right  limits.  Frequently  the 
analysis  was  based  upon  a  few  words,  and  a  fictitious 
editor  was  introduced,  who  formed  a  new  document  in  the 


84  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

most  arbitrary  manner.  The  artificiality  of  the  whole 
procedure,  unknown  in  other  literature,  made  it  fall  short 
of  plausibility,  and  was  the  result  of  complex  character 
in  the  hypothesis.  This  same  mistake  was  committed 
when  Judaism  and  Christianity  were  thought  to  be  derived 
from  combinations  of  other  religion.  The  resultant  his- 
tory was  a  complex  combination  in  which  the  unity  and  sim- 
plicity of  both  of  these  faiths  suffered.  The  difficulty  was 
not  simply  the  historical  problems  arising  from  tracing 
elements  in  these  religions  to  other  religions,  without  suf- 
ficient evidence  of  dependence,  but  the  total  explanation 
described  a  complex  situation  out  of  all  accord  with  the 
simplicity  of  a  religious  faith. 

Another  great  necessity  in  any  hypothesis  is  the  de- 
mand of  its  sufficiency.  A  hypothesis  must  include  all 
data  to  be  explained,  and  must  give  a  fairly  adequate  con- 
jecture to  embrace  all  elements.  This  demand,  so  cogent 
in  science,  has  been  very  much  violated  in  treating  Chris- 
tianity. In  the  great  body  of  critical  work,  the  aim  has 
been  to  satisfy  sometimes  merely  the  facts  of  literature, 
and  sometimes  merely  the  facts  of  history.  There  have 
been  saner  critics,  who  have  combined  both  properly.  But 
even  when  the  hypotheses  of  literature  and  history  were 
just,  there  has  often  been  a  real  failure,  because  critics 
forgot  that  it  was  religion  which  they  dealt  with.  The 
inner  facts  of  faith  were  disregarded,  Christian  truth  and 
experience  were  overlooked,  and,  consequently,  the  total 
hypothesis  was  inadequate.  It  was  like  explaining  poetry 
merely  as  meter  and  rhythm  and  neglecting  its  soul.  It 
was  like  analyzing  the  grammar  of  oratory  and  forgetting 
the  motive  of  the  orator.  The  fundamental  difficulty  with 
the  critical  efforts  has  been  the  neglect  or  denial  of  the 
vitally  religious  facts  as  most  necessary  to  an  adequate 
critical  hypothesis. 

Different  hypotheses  have  different  value  as  they  can 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  85 

be  arranged  in  their  approach  to  certainty.  Some  hy- 
potheses are  fully  demonstrable  by  discoveries.  One  of 
the  great  instances  of  this  was  the  finding  of  the  new 
planet,  Neptune,  by  Leverrier  and  Adams.  But  most 
hypotheses  do  not  allow  for  facts  that  shall  be  discovered 
to  confirm  or  disprove  them.  It  is  impossible  by  the  very 
nature  of  some  hypotheses  to  absolutely  prove  or  disprove 
them.  They  must  be  accepted  as  probable  if  they  are 
thinkable  and  useful,  and  are  capable  of  explaining  con- 
nected appearances.  They  become  strong  in  proportion 
as  they  increasingly  fit  new  discoveries.  To  this  class  of 
hypotheses  belongs  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  Its  very 
character  excludes  real  demonstrability.  The  utility  of 
such  a  hypothesis  can  become  very  high,  but  it  can  never 
reach  the  place  of  a  fully  assured  and  confirmed  theory. 
The  effort  has  been  made  constantly  to  extend  evolution 
beyond  its  biological  limits  and  to  try  it  out  as  a  universal 
theory.  Of  course,  mankind  in  the  discovery  of  any  new 
hypothesis  attempts,  especially  if  this  hypothesis  gains 
large  ground,  to  unify  its  knowledge.  Consequently,  when 
a  great  hypothesis  helps  masses  of  facts,  it  is  liable  to 
become  controlling  and  to  press  into  every  science.  Thus 
it  assumes  a  place  of  certainty  not  guaranteed  by  its 
nature.  Accurate  thinking  cannot  allow  such  extension. 
When  this  limitation  is  kept  in  mind,  there  can  be  no 
difficulty  as  long  as  evolution  as  a  naturalistic  hypothesis 
does  not  claim  to  explain  spiritual  facts. 

The  proper  rating  of  hypothesis  in  science  will  also  lead 
us  to  give  it  a  right  place  in  religion.  When  we  deal 
in  so  much  of  our  thinking  with  the  hypothetical,  we  have 
no  right  in  the  far  more  difficult  and  universal  problems 
of  religion  to  demand  certainty  in  the  intellectual  and 
speculative  features.  As  a  direct  experience  of  life  re- 
ligion will  always  have  its  own  immediate  evidence,  but 
when  we  come  to  the  proofs  of  its  assertions,  if  such  as- 


86  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

sertions  are  to  be  proved  intellectually,  we  can  only  reach 
hypothetical  assurance.  Consequently,  science  must  not 
demand  of  religion  greater  certainty  than  it  reaches.  It 
has  no  right  to  dispute  the  value  of  the  religious  hypotheses 
in  theology,  because  they  are  hypotheses ;  nor  can  it  dis- 
pute the  privilege  of  religion  to  make  its  own  conjectures 
in  consonance  with  its  nature  and  character.  Science 
cannot  disqualify  religious  facts  by  hypotheses  of  science. 
Similarly,  in  the  scientific  formulation  of  facts,  and  in  the 
framing  of  scientific  philosophy,  faith,  through  the  evidence 
of  things  not  seen,  cannot  as  faith,  when  it  steps  into  the 
realm  of  logical  proof,  demand  that  its  hypotheses  shall 
control  science.  It  cannot  demand  an  exceptional  logic. 
Consequently,  religion  cannot  give  higher  and  more  certain 
logical  valuation  to  its  speculations  as  far  as  they  are 
speculations  and  not  experiences.  This  just  limitation 
will  be  exceedingly  helpful  to  a  true  apologetic.  Its  viola- 
tion has  caused  much  difficulty,  and  has  done  much  harm 
to  Christianity. 

A  remarkable  fact  about  all  hypotheses  is  their  mental 
character.  All  the  great  suppositions  of  science  have 
tended  toward  the  invisible.  In  every  science  and  in  all 
life,  there  seems  a  pressure  backward  to  the  unseen.  The 
reality  of  the  unseen  appears  in  all  final  thinking.  It 
is  a  remarkable  thing,  that,  when  the  scientific  student 
of  nature  seeks  explanation  of  phenomena,  he  presses  be- 
yond the  visible  facts.  Explanation  has  as  its  purpose  to 
make  real  to  the  mind  the  questions  and  problems  put  by 
observation  and  experiment.  We  ask  and  must  ask  why 
are  things  as  they  are.  From  what  we  see  we  are  led  to 
argue  back  to  the  causes  from  which  at  last  all  visible 
effects  come. 

Thus  the  physicist  finds  the  cause  of  light  and  sound  in 
minute  waves,  that  are  only  demonstrated  by  certain  vis- 
ible  effects.     In   themselves   they   are   unseen.     Similarly 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  87 

wireless  telegraphy  and  the  passing  of  electricity  through 
the  universe  are  explained  best  by  assuming  an  invisible 
ether  everywhere  present.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
from  the  acceptance  of  such  ether  the  physical  phenomena 
gain  a  connected  value  and  ground.  The  chemist  no  less 
than  the  physicist,  when  he  asks  for  reasons  and  arranges 
his  scientific  results  goes  back  to  atoms.  To-day  it  is  even 
held  by  some  chemists  that  the  atom  must  be  explained  by 
corpuscles  which  are  thought  to  be  minute  lines  of  force. 
Here  again  it  is  the  smallest  divisible  particle  beyond 
vision  that  is  the  basis  of  explanation.  Does  not  chem- 
istry, therefore,  strengthen  the  right  of  the  invisible? 

When  we  pass  from  chemistry  to  biology  we  find  the 
biologist  dealing  not  merely  with  the  movement  and  the 
chemical  qualities  of  the  cell.  In  order  to  explain  heredity 
he  assumes  certain  minute  elements  which  carry  in  them 
the  permanent  possibilities  of  transmission.  The  invisible 
parts  of  the  cell  are  called  into  the  account  for  a  full 
solution  of  the  problems.  If  this  natural,  bodily  life 
demands  an  invisible,  can  there  be  any  objection  in  the 
spiritual  life  to  pass  from  experienced  invisible  facts  to 
other  invisibles  in  order  to  explain  the  lower  and  directly- 
felt  invisibles? 

Psychology  adds  its  emphasis  to  the  trend  towards  the 
unseen.  It  shows  us  that  we  do  not  see  the  third  dimen- 
sion directly,  whether  we  project  it  by  vision  or  thought 
alone.  Psychology  rests  on  physiology.  But  physiology 
when  it  studies  nerve-structure  passes  finally  beyond  itself. 
Then  begins  psychology.  Its  reality  is  consciousness,  but 
consciousness  fringes  out  into  subconsciousness.  Now 
subconsciousness  is  the  realm  where  the  mysterious  presses 
in  and. demands  the  undiscovered  invisibles  beyond.  Have 
we  a  right  to  stop  if  religion  unfolds  those  invisibles  ? 

The  forces  of  the  mind  play  also  through  humanity. 
Society  is  not  explained  ultimately  by  its  industries,  its 


88  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

economics,  its  wealth.  These  rest  on  invisible  forces  and 
beliefs.  If  we  mention  but  the  part  which  credit  plays  in 
all  economic  progress,  and  realize  that  credit  is  belief, 
guaranteed  it  is  true,  but  resting  largely  on  confidence,  an 
unseen  force  that  holds  men  together,  we  must  admit  that 
even  in  its  material  pursuits  society  needs  invisible  founda- 
tions. It  cannot  live  by  bread  alone.  And  thus  also 
history  seeks  the  explanation  of  the  unseen.  When  our 
country  was  in  the  throes  of  birth  it  had  no  strong  army, 
it  possessed  no  great  treasury.  Finally  the  battles  were 
fought  on  faith.  There  was  unswerving  faith  in  liberty 
and  a  strong  conviction  that  democracy  was  real  and  could 
be  realized,  before  it  ever  became  a  fact.  If  faith  made 
America,  what  can  it  not  do  in  things  spiritual? 

If  then  everywhere,  in  science,  in  sociology,  in  history 
we  must  seek  the  invisible  factors  as  the  ultimate  explana- 
tion, have  we  a  right  consistently  and  logically  to  refuse 
the  claims  of  the  invisible  given  in  personality?  What 
are  the  ultimates  for  personality?  In  our  ethical  concep- 
tion what  is  implied  in  obligation,  right  and  conscience? 
As  far  as  personality  seeks  moral  aims,  and  this  it  must 
do,  for  personality  demands  character,  can  it  stop  short 
of  the  demand  that  its  longings  of  mind  and  heart  be  sat- 
isfied in  the  belief  in  a  personality  still  further  in  the  in- 
visible than  phenomenal  facts  urge  us  to?  Is  this  demand 
and  belief  not  universal?  Is  it  less  cogent  in  the  moral 
sphere  than  other  arguments  in  the  sphere  of  natural 
science?  The  conviction  of  the  moral  demand  rests  again 
on  the  religious  longing,  on  the  desire  for  God  in  worship 
both  for  the  race  and  the  individual. 

Is  it  not  just  for  faith  to  claim  its  right  to  the  posit- 
ing of  things  not  seen,  if  science  must  go  beyond  things 
visible,  even  though  it  pictures  them  as  they  might  be  if 
they  were  visible?  Can  we  not  approach  thus  by  a  just 
hypothesis   to   a  universe  which  is   in  part  by  the  very 


The  Conjectural  Scheme  89 

pressure  of  science  and  life,  ruled  by  the  Unseen  in  a 
manner  approaching  to  Plato's  speculation  of  eternal 
ideas?  But  the  Unseen  must  not  absorb  the  seen  or  we 
shall  have  an  uncertain  world;  it  lies  back  of  the  seen 
as  its  ultimate  cause  and  explanation  but  not  as  a  Total 
which  swallows  up  all  the  world  of  seen  things,  men  and 
facts.  There  seems  no  reason  why  we  cannot  thus  frame 
on  the  foundation  of  the  last  assumptions  of  science,  a 
view  of  the  world  which  leads  up  very  fairly  and  con- 
tinuously to  the  postulates  and  hypotheses  of  faith. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE    MECHANICAL    DEMAND 


THE  demand  of  the  mechanical  point  of  view  is  to 
conceive  of  the  whole  world  in  the  picture  and 
according  to  the  method  of  a  machine.  It  is  not 
a  new  conception,  and  at  present  is  very  hard  pressed. 
Nevertheless  it  has  not  been  eliminated  from  a  great  deal 
of  thinking  in  science.  The  idea  which  mechanism  pre- 
sents as  the  solution  is  that  of  millions  of  ultimate  particles 
which  move  on  and  on,  and  constitute  the  real  causal  chain 
of  all  events.  This  actually  connected  chain  of  events  and 
happenings  must,  according  to  the  mechanical  ideal,  be 
traced  back  to  the  final  moving  particles  of  matter.  From 
the  lowest  to  the  highest  phenomena  in  the  world  the  rule 
of  mechanical  force  is  assumed.  In  many  quarters  the 
mechanical  connection  of  the  world  is  not  interpreted,  as 
it  occurs  in  causes  and  effects,  in  an  altogether  grossly 
material  manner;  but  even  if  the  grosser  conceptions  of 
matter  in  mechanism  are  not  maintained,  nevertheless,  its 
whole  trend  is  strongly  anti-ideal.  In  its  origins  the  me- 
chanical view  of  the  world  is  strictly  due  to  the  notions 
prevalent  in  mechanics  and  physics,  but  it  has  not  re- 
mained within  the  narrow  limits  of  its  beginnings.  The 
mechanical  view  has  grown  to  be  the  chemical  view,  and 
this  is  all  the  more  powerful  since  the  modern  combination 
of  the  science  of  chemistry  and  physics  into  physical  chem- 
istry. Now  apparently  the  chemical  view  is  not  mechani- 
cal, and  yet  the  explanation  of  chemistry  through  ultimate 
material  particles,  even  though  they  be  made  electrical,  is 
mechanistic.  The  mechanical  conception  finds  in  the  chemi- 
cal elements  an  addition  through  which  it  seeks  to  explain 

90 


The  Mechanical  Demand  91 

life,  and  it  also  attempts  to  find  the  basis  of  thought 
through  the  chemistry  of  the  brain.  But  despite  the  effort 
to  save  the  contentions  in  the  main  of  the  older  grosser 
material  mechanism,  through  the  refinement  of  the  chemical 
conception,  many  of  the  objections  to  a  merely  physical 
mechanism  still  remain  valid. 

Mechanism  deceives  itself  in  the  idea  that  it  has  en- 
compassed fully  the  thought  of  cause,  for  it  actually  deals 
only  with  individual  cases  of  sequence  and  material  suc- 
cession. It  may  name  these  causes,  but  from  none  of 
these  successions  can  it  derive  their  uniformity,  cogency 
and  necessity.  Because  it  cannot  find  these  elements  in 
its  causal  chain  it  cannot  really  find  cause.  When  mech- 
anism deals  with  the  lower  elements  of  the  universe  as  the 
ultimate  particles  it  cannot  explain  the  rational  relations 
in  the  causal  chain.  The  laws  of  the  motion  of  matter,  the 
proportionate  inter-relations  of  molecules,  the  mathemati- 
cal formula  of  mass,  the  law  of  chemical  equivalence,  and 
many  similar  mechanical  facts  will  not  allow  for  a  mere 
material  sequence.  Unconsciously  there  is  introduced  the 
idea  of  rationalized  matter  or  mind-matter,  which  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms.  Mechanism  is  even  more  helpless 
when  it  comes  to  the  explanation  of  living  organisms.  It 
is  true  that  there  are  those  who  believe  that  plants  and  ani- 
mals are  mere  mechanisms,  arranged  with  greater  or  less 
responsiveness  to  environment.  These  mechanisms  are 
supposed  to  have  grown  up  through  the  modification  of 
original  living  tissue  in  the  form  of  mechanical  combina- 
tions. But  such  an  explanation  does  not  satisfy  really 
and  adequately  any  theory  of  organic  structures.  Hob- 
house  rightly  says :  "  Whatever  the  cause  or  origin  of 
the  organism,  it  is  in  itself  not  a  purely  mechanical  ar- 
rangement of  parts.  It  is  neither  a  machine  created  by 
intelligence  ab  extra,  nor  one  built  up  by  unintelligent 
processes.     It  is  not  a  pure  machine  at  all,  but  a  whole  in 


92  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

which  an  organic,  and  that  is  a  teleological,  principle  is  at 
work  within,  operating  on  and  modifying  what  are  other- 
wise physical,  mechanically  determined  elements,  and  so 
fashioning  the  growth  and  functioning  of  the  parts  to  the 
requirements  of  the  whole."  1  In  this  statement  Hobhouse 
has  clearly  expressed  a  real  principle.  It  is  not  possible  to 
have  results,  and  relevant  means  toward  an  end,  without 
the  conception  of  purposive  cause.  Merely  mechanical 
structures  can  be  explained  by  mechanical  principles,  but 
this  does  not  prove  that  mechanism  explains  the  universe. 
Hobhouse  again  and  properly  says :  "  The  denial  of 
purposive  causation,  therefore,  is  not  suggested,  but  re- 
pelled by  general  experience,  and  owes  its  existence  only  to 
the  theory  that  everything  must  act  by  mechanical  laws. 
But  this  theory  is  a  pure  assumption,  which  derives  its 
apparent  cogency  from  confusion  with  the  quite  different 
principle  that  everything  must  act  in  accordance  with 
some  law."  2 

A  peculiarity  of  the  mechanical  view,  when  it  is  rightly 
understood,  is  its  static  character.  It  can  never  make 
really  clear  to  us  causal  progress.  At  the  beginning  the 
whole  mass  of  matter  is  given.  The  given  matter  remains 
fundamentally  indestructible.  There  can  be  no  room  for 
any  real  loss  or  any  real  addition.  Therefore,  whatever 
happens  is  only  a  change  of  combination  of  the  ultimate 
particles  of  matter,  and  there  is  no  real  creative  evolution. 
At  the  start  there  must  be  homogeneity,  but  it  has  never 
been  shown  on  a  mechanical  basis  how  homogeneity  can 
become  heterogeneity.  It  is  true  that  the  homogeneity  is 
supposed  to  be  unstable,  but  the  thought  of  such  insta- 
bility is  itself  a  heterogeneity  in  the  homogeneity.  The 
assumption  of  mechanism  with  its  fixed  mass  of  matter 
is  in  absolute  opposition  to  all  real  progress.     This  ap- 

i  "  Development  and  Purpose,"  p.  324. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  326. 


The  Mechanical  Demand  93 

pears  equally  when  the  problem  of  energy  or  force  is 
considered.  It  is  impossible  for  energy  in  its  transfer- 
ence to  remain  whole;  still  less  is  there  progress.  Nor- 
mally the  motion  of  bodies  is  interfered  with  and  rest  en- 
sues. The  kinetic  energy  is  re-translated  into  the  po- 
tential energy,  but  there  is  never  the  same  full  amount. 
Some  portion  of  molar  motion  is  always  lost  in  its  reduc- 
tion to  heat.  Heat  as  a  whole  cannot,  according  to 
thinkers  in  physical  science,  be  collected  again  to  make 
the  sum  of  original  energy.  Therefore,  energy  which  can 
do  mechanical  work  is  diminishing.  "  There  is  a  steady 
dissipation  of  available  energy  measured  by  the  increase 
of  '  entropy.'  Thus  the  mechanical  view  of  the  universe, 
in  strange  contrast  with  that  of  biology,  psychology,  and 
as  we  may  now  add,  of  astronomy,  chemistry  and  the 
physical  theories  of  matter  contemplates  a  process  of 
steady  degradation  or  dissolution  rather  than  a  process 
of  evolution  or  development."  3  Consequently  the  only 
ideal  left  to  save  a  mechanical  universe  is  to  demand  a 
rejuvenation  in  some  kind  of  a  cyclical  manner.  Such  a 
cyclical  universe  was  argued  for  by  Nietzsche.  He  was 
really  adding  the  religious  possibility  to  the  view  of  a 
mechanical  universe.  The  religions  which  favor  a  universe 
of  cycles  are  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism  with  their  births 
and  re-births.  Christianity,  however,  does  not  funda- 
mentally agree  with  a  slowly  degrading  or  static  universe. 
It  is  true  that  its  acceptance  of  the  creation  thinks  of 
a  certain  ideally  originated,  and  therefore  ideally  fixed 
universe.  The  degradation  of  evil  in  the  world  as  a  moral 
fact  in  human  life  and  society  is  also  emphasized  by  Chris- 
tianity. But,  despite  these  facts,  Christianity  embraces 
the  thought  of  a  real  progress  and  growth  of  man  con- 
ditioned by  his  being  and  living  in  Christ.  It  has  hopes 
of  a  new  world.  Therefore,  Christianity  is  not  actually 
3  Hobhouse,  "  Development  and  Purpose,"  p.  355. 


94*  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

a  static  religion,  and  even  could  mechanism  be  freed  of 
its  materialism,  the  thought  of  a  fixed  balance  is  after  all 
contrary  to  the  creative  and  historical  ideal  of  the  faith 
of  Christ. 

Another  difficulty  which  grows  out  of  mechanism  is  that 
it  begins  in  its  assumption  of  first  cause  with  a  complex 
notion  and  not  a  simple  idea  of  matter.  Matter  is  never 
alone.  It  is  always  combined  with  the  thought  of  force 
or  energy.  Atomism  can  arrive  nowhere  without  the 
thought  of  energy,  and  energy  is,  therefore,  indispensable 
to  the  mechanical  point  of  view.  In  its  development  and 
history,  the  mechanical  point  of  view  has  tended  toward 
the  dynamical.  Newton  began  with  believing  that  the 
mechanical  actions  required  a  medium,  and  that  gravita- 
tion demanded  contact.  He  assumed  force  to  be  innate,  in- 
herent, and  essential  to  matter.  But  Newton's  idea  was 
reverted  by  Boscovich,  who  held  that  matter  is  a  congeries 
of  mathematical  points  with  the  power  of  attracting  or 
repelling  according  to  fixed  laws.  The  solid  particles  of 
Newton's  assumption  were  rejected  and  inherent  forces 
were  supposed  to  act  through  a  vacuum.  The  finite  mole- 
cules of  matter  were  reduced  to  infinitesimal  mass  points. 
The  idea  of  Boscovich  was  developed  by  Lord  Kelvin  into 
the  theory  of  a  circling  fluid.  Later  men  have  returned 
to  the  conception  of  ether  and  have  not  conceived  action 
to  take  place  through  a  vacuum ;  but  the  pressure  of 
thought  has  been  toward  the  emphasis  of  force  and  not  of 
matter.  Consequently,  mechanism  is  almost  compelled  to 
conceive  of  energy  as  explanatory,  rather  than  of  matter. 
Such  a  physicist  as  Ostwald  strongly  argues  on  behalf  of 
energy.  But  the  problem  of  energy  at  once  leads  us 
away  from  the  attitude  of  a  successful  mechanism  and 
destroys  it.  The  complexity  in  the  original  conception 
of  matter  and  force  has  worked  against  matter.  The 
increasing  emphasis  on  force  has  brought  physical  theories 


The  Mechumcal  Demand  95 

within  the  range  of  ideal  interpretations. 

Because  energy  can  be  idealized  into  will,  its  existence 
has  been  supposed  to  offer  a  favorable  medium  for  Chris- 
tianity. But  if  will  be  made  into  energy,  violence  is  done 
to  will.  And  if  energy  be  conceived  of  as  will,  its  con- 
ception has  been  changed.  In  such  a  procedure  the  will 
is  made  more  natural  and  unmoral  than  it  should  be,  and 
energy  is  made  more  ideal  and  moral  than  it  can  be.  Con- 
sequently some  Christian  thinkers  have  been  deceived  in 
their  supposition  that  the  conception  of  energy  is  most 
usable  in  Christianity.  The  fact,  however,  that  the  Ger- 
man philosopher,  Schopenhauer,  could  use  the  conception 
of  will  as  impersonal  and  non-moral,  that  in  the  same  man- 
ner von  Hartmann  could  translate  energy  into  the  un- 
conscious, and  that  Nietzsche  made  will  to  power  brute 
force,  demonstrates  the  danger  of  this  combination  of  will 
and  energy.  The  approach  to  divine  will  suggested  by 
energy  is  very  questionable.  It  can  deflect  the  concept 
of  God  into  mere  activity,  but  any  such  emphasis  in  the 
idea  of  God  necessarily  leads  away  from  the  moral  char- 
acter of  God  and  injures  the  thought  of  His  personality. 
An  equal  injury  is  done  to  the  inclusion  of  wisdom  in  the 
conception  of  God.  Even  the  Christian  ideal  of  God  as 
love  cannot  be  real  if  God  be  thought  of  as  energy  of 
spirit  apart  from  wisdom.  The  very  value  of  will  as 
moral,  as  wise,  as  just,  is  lost  when  we  press  the  view  of 
energy.  Only  as  God  is  more  than  will,  and  His  will  is 
wise,  just  and  loving  purpose,  can  His  will  be  sustained  as 
really  a  will  of  purpose,  and  not  of  impersonal  force. 
Consequently,  Christianity  must  be  very  cautious  how  it 
employs  energy  as  descriptive  of  God.  It  is  in  danger  of 
depersonalizing  God  and  absorbing  Him  in  nature  if  it 
stresses  energy  too  much.  Even  will  as  will  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  guarantee  a  personal  God,  and  where  will  is  ap- 
proached as  energy,  it  is  still  less  able  to  keep  the  idea  of 


96  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

a  personal  God  and  Father  pure  and  intact. 

It  is  impossible  in  the  discussion  of  mechanism  to  avoid 
the  question  of  its  relation  to  purpose.  It  has  some- 
times been  argued  that  the  idea  of  the  universe  upon  a 
mechanical  basis,  which  makes  it  a  machine,  does  not  per- 
mit the  thought  of  purpose  or  final  cause.  It  may  be 
true  that  mechanism  in  itself  can  be  considered  as  indif- 
ferent to  purpose.  It  may  follow  along  its  own  peculiar 
lines  no  matter  what  the  attendant  circumstances  or  values 
may  be.  But  while  the  mechanical  explanation  may  an- 
swer the  question  of  how,  for  example,  wheel  may  move 
within  wheel,  nevertheless,  the  problem  of  the  specific 
function  always  leads  to  the  further  question  of  purpose. 
No  mechanism  is  really  explained  merely  as  a  succession 
of  efficient  causes.  There  is  an  inter-relation  and  general 
arrangement,  which  takes  up  the  units  of  mechanical  ac- 
tions, and  gives  them  their  full  setting.  Mechanism  always 
tends  toward  plan.  The  more  perfect  the  arrangement  of 
the  mechanical  is,  the  more  it  argues  for  predetermina- 
tion, the  larger  is  its  purposive  character.  It  gradually 
passes  over  into  the  organic.  From  the  purpose  which  is 
merely  evident  without  there  is  a  progress  toward  the 
purpose  which  appears  within.  We  may  begin  in  the  uni- 
verse by  explaining  a  collocation  of  acts  and  occurrences 
merely  by  referring  them  to  an  antecedent  collocation,  but 
gradually  these  collocations  require  an  answer  of  the  rela- 
tion of  function  to  effect.  When  this  answer  is  given 
we  have  arrived  at  the  thought  of  purpose.  And  purpose 
implies  not  merely  the  action  of  force  upon  force,  it  is  not 
merely  forward  motion,  but  it  is  also  looking  forward. 
There  is  in  purpose  a  consciousness  of  plan,  and  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  plan  there  is  the  evidence  of  mind.  Suc- 
cessions of  phenomena  are  not  fully  explanatory  of  the 
universe.  It  needs  the  rational  relation  and  the  adaptive 
adjustment.     These    are    real   elements    of   purpose    and 


The  Mechanical  Demand  97 

mind.  The  mechanical,  therefore,  is  not  in  itself  com- 
plete. It  must  lead  forward.  Its  answer  to  the  ques- 
tion, why,  is  only  half  an  answer,  but  its  half  requires 
the  other  half.     Mechanism  calls  for  final  purpose. 

The  fact  that  mechanism  cannot  escape  finality  shows 
that  when  properly  limited  and  rightly  completed  it  is 
usable  by  Christianity.  The  question  that  remains  is 
whether,  as  we  approach  finality  from  mechanism,  we  can 
really  find  an  answer  to  the  demand  of  purpose  by  mak- 
ing the  evidence  of  mind  immanent  in  the  course  of  the 
universe  all  there  is  of  mind,  or  whether,  to  maintain 
the  integrity  of  the  thought  of  purpose,  we  must  make 
mind  transcendent.  It  is  true  that  the  evidences  of  pur- 
pose are  found  in  things  and  processes;  but  is  it  not 
mythological  to  ascribe  to  things,  when  they  are  seen  in 
a  rational  and  purposive  whole,  the  strength  to  make  that 
purpose  ?  If  it  be  maintained  that  the  real  explanation  of 
purpose  lies  in  the  parts  and  that  they  are  purposive  in 
themselves,  then  the  parts  are  the  whole  in  their  aim,  which 
is  contradictory.  If  the  whole  is  needed  even  in  any  single 
collocation  of  particles  or  in  any  organism  to  explain  the 
parts,  then  there  is  a  departure  from  the  strictly  mechan- 
ical view,  which  maintains  the  ultimate  value  of  separate 
particles  and  derives  the  whole  from  them.  If  the  ex- 
planation of  purpose,  therefore,  remains  within  things,  it 
is  either  illogical,  or  degenerates  again  into  the  mechanical. 
Purpose  conceived  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  whole  is 
ideal.  It  is  only  as  we  maintain  an  ideal  angle  that 
purpose  can  be  spoken  of.  The  difficulty  in  the  mechanical 
ideal  is  that  it  constantly  levels  down  the  facts  of  the 
universe  to  the  possibility  of  a  mechanical  explanation. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  mechanics,  life  can  have  no 
spontaneity,  mind  no  freedom,  morals  no  real  choice,  and 
religion  no  spiritual  value.  Mechanism  cannot  answer  the 
highest  demands  and  it  cannot  do  this  because  it  is  in- 


98  Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

capable  of  explaining  purpose.  In  the  loss  of  the  idea 
of  purpose  all  else  in  the  higher  realms  of  life  is  lost. 
It  is  true  that  mechanism  may  be  portrayed  in  a  very 
attractive  form,  and  it  may  be  used  for  a  very  refined 
materialism;  but  does  this  allow  it  to  be  conceived  of  as 
adequate  to  purpose,  mind  and  soul?  John  Burroughs, 
who  has  sympathy  with  a  mechanical  and  naturalistic 
view,  is  compelled  to  write  thus :  "  When  we  have  fol- 
lowed matter  from  mass  to  molecule,  from  molecule  to 
atom,  from  atom  to  electron,  and  seen  it  in  effect  de- 
materialized  —  seen  it  in  its  fourth  or  ethereal,  I  had  al- 
most said,  spiritual  state, —  when  we  have  grasped  the 
wonder  of  radio-activity,  and  the  atomic  transformations 
that  attend  it,  we  shall  have  a  conception  of  the  potencies 
and  possibilities  of  matter  that  robs  scientific  material- 
ism of  most  of  its  ugliness.  Of  course,  no  deductions  of 
science  can  satisfy  our  longings  for  something  kindred  to 
our  own  spirits  in  the  universe.  But  neither  our  telescopes 
nor  our  microscopes  reveal  such  a  reality.  Is  this  long- 
ing only  the  result  of  our  inevitable  anthropomorphism, 
or  is  it  the  evidence  of  things  unseen,  the  substance  of 
things  hoped  for,  the  prophecy  of  our  kinship  with  the  far- 
thest star?  Can  soul  arise  out  of  a  soulless  universe?  "  4 
While  we  cannot  accede,  therefore,  to  the  tendency  of 
mechanism,  of  leveling  the  world  down,  is  it  an  advantage 
to  level  the  world  up  in  such  a  manner  as  to  eliminate 
mechanism?  There  seems  a  need  from  a  religious  point 
of  view  to  maintain  that  a  part  of  the  universe  is  me- 
chanical, even  though  the  whole  universe  cannot  be  ex- 
plained on  a  purely  mechanical  ideal.  When  we  admit 
mechanism  in  the  world  we  feel  that  we  have  allowed  for 
real  things.  Now  it  is  only  in  the  conception  of  the 
reality  of  things,  and  their  inter-relation  as  a  part  of 
the   world,   that   Christianity   can   find   a   guarantee    for 

*  "  Life  as  the  Scientist  Sees  It,"  Yale  Review,  October,  1914,  p.  48. 


The  Mechmdcal  Demand  99 

the  purity  of  its  theism.  While  absolute  mechanism  de- 
nies God,  partial  mechanism  allows  for  the  conception  of 
a  transcendent  and  personal  God.  It  is  quite  possible  to 
combine  God's  transcendence  with  mechanism,  if  mechan- 
ism be  not  all  that  exists.  A  transcendent  and  personal 
God  is  necessary  in  Christianity,  and  He  must  be  above  the 
universe;  consequently,  His  immanence  must  be  in  effects 
and  results,  His  presence  personal  and  moral,  and  His 
power  in  nature  not  an  imprisonment  in  the  universe.  Only 
the  supposition  of  a  secondary  mechanism  and  of  things 
apart  from,  though  influenced  by,  divine  mind  and  power 
can  furnish  the  proper  explanation  of  a  world  that  leaves 
room  for  a  real,  personal,  transcendent  God.  If  this 
be  so,  then  a  modified  mechanism,  but  not  an  absolute 
naturalism,  is  more  useful  to  Christianity  than  any  theory 
of  pure  idealism. 

It  has  often  been  supposed  that  because  complete  mech- 
anism was  in  opposition  to  Christianity,  therefore,  it  had 
to  appeal  to  idealism  as  its  ally.  But  a  passing  review 
of  some  great  idealistic  systems  shows  this  to  be  a  miscon- 
ception. When  Platonism  began  to  influence  Christianity 
through  Neo-Platonism,  it  introduced  a  pantheistic  cur- 
rent. The  high  ideality  of  Platonism  was  cognate  to 
the  spirituality  of  Christianity.  It  was  this  inwardness 
of  Platonism  which  helped  Augustine  toward  Christianity. 
But  in  its  fullness  and  details  Platonism,  in  denying 
material  things,  injured  the  realistic  side  of  Christianity. 
This  appears  very  clearly  in  the  difference  of  emphasis 
which  Platonism  and  Christianity  give  to  the  body.  Chris- 
tianity maintains  the  vital  connection  of  body  and  soul 
and  believes  in  the  resurrection  of  the  body.  It  cannot 
conceive  of  a  complete  soul  without  a  body,  even  though 
this  body  be  called  spiritual.  For  Platonism  the  body 
is  the  prison-house  of  the  soul,  and  the  important  thing 
is    the    old   Orphic    tradition    of    the   immortality    of   the 


100        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

soul.  It  was,  therefore,  not  accidental  when  the  greater 
influence  was  exerted  upon  Christianity  by  Aristotle,  whose 
idealism  was  tempered  with  the  sense  for  the  reality  of 
things. 

When  we  enter  modern  idealism,  we  find  similar  difficul- 
ties. None  of  the  idealistic  systems  fuse  with  Christianity 
without  detriment  to  Christian  belief.  It  seemed  a  great 
discovery  when  Descartes  was  able  to  discover  the  thinking 
self  as  the  foundation  of  certainty.  But  when  he  intro- 
duced God  to  guarantee  the  world,  and  when  he  employed 
the  old  argument  of  Anselm,  he  did  not  strengthen  his 
position.  His  effort  to  prove  God  from  the  necessity  of 
the  idea  of  God,  and  from  the  contention  that  the  thought 
of  an  Infinite  in  us  could  only  be  created  by  a  real  Infinite, 
was  inefficient.  This  idealism,  on  the  one  hand  made  the 
world  dreamlike;  on  the  other  hand,  it  necessitated  a 
theory  of  mechanism  which  Descartes  extended  upward 
even  in  the  animal  world.  The  influence  of  the  mechanical 
side  of  Descartes'  theory  aided  mechanism,  and  his  ideal- 
ism failed  in  unifying  the  conception  of  the  world  with 
the  idea  of  God.  Apparently  greater  success  awaited 
Spinoza,  when  he  identified  substance  and  God,  but  among 
the  attributes  of  God  the  two  most  vital  were  thought  and 
extension.  Spinoza  thus  became  the  father  of  parallelism. 
His  realistic  idealism,  after  all,  could  find  no  real  union. 
The  result  of  parallelism  has  generally  favored  not  so  much 
mind  as  matter. 

When  Berkeley,  in  the  interest  of  theism,  began  to  found 
his  psychological  idealism  a  solution  seemed  to  be  at  hand. 
But  God  became  only  the  guarantor  of  ideas.  He  guar- 
anteed phenomena,  mere  appearances  made  of  the  stuff  of 
sensations,  and  not  things.  Berkeley's  idealism  in  at- 
tempting to  give  the  death-blow  to  matter  denied  the  im- 
pression of  the  realism  of  things.  This  dissolution  of 
things  into  mere  ideas  paved  the  way  for  Hume's  analysis 


The  Mechanical  Demand  101 

of  mind  into  mere  impressions  and  sensations.  The  way 
in  which  Berkeley  idealized  things,  with  a  sincere  purpose 
to  make  them  real  in  God,  nevertheless  introduced  a 
sceptical  element  into  the  reality  of  outward  experience. 
Hume  applied  this  scepticism  to  the  inward  life  of  the 
mind.  There  was  in  Berkeley  an  illusory  undercurrent 
which  finally  made  mind  and  God  illusory  to  Hume.  The 
denial  of  things  as  real  by  consequence  made  ideas  unreal. 
It  appeared  as  though  Kant  had  rescued  idealism  by  his 
effort  to  balance  things  in  themselves,  appearances,  and  the 
categories  of  the  mind.  But  so  unknowable  were  the 
things  in  themselves,  that  the  final  effect  of  Kant  was  a  new 
wave  of  idealism.  The  manner  in  which  Kant  endeavored 
to  give  unity  to  experience  in  the  apperception  of  the  ego 
determined  the  future.  It  was  stronger  in  its  after-effects 
than  Kant's  emphasis  on  things.  Out  of  the  apperception 
of  the  ego  rose  the  idealism  of  Fichte.  For  him  the  ego 
is  central  as  activity,  will,  vitality ;  but  all  data  are  com- 
bined in  a  great  intellectual  unity.  The  ego  became  abso- 
lute. Through  it  God  was  interpreted  as  the  universal 
moral  process,  and  as  the  ethical  world  order.  The  per- 
sonal God  was  lost,  and  Fichte  was  accused  of  atheism. 
As  little  as  Fichte  could  produce  a  system  congruent  with 
Christianity,  so  little  was  Schelling  successful.  It  is  true 
that  in  his  system  of  identity  he  limited  nature  by  the 
ego,  but  he  also  limited  mind.  Finally  he  fused  the  two 
into  an  identity  which  was  indifference.  But  this  indif- 
ference was  absolute  undetermined  reason.  It  gravitated 
back  to  Spinoza.  When  Schelling  began  to  speculate  on 
religious  philosophy  he  was  led  to  an  aesthetic  idea.  Re- 
ligion was  made  a  pious  feeling  of  dependence,  and  God 
became  a  series  of  potencies  in  the  imitation  of  Neo-Plato- 
nism.  Schelling's  speculations  did  not  favor  theism.  Hegel 
completed  the  great  idealistic  movement  in  Germany.  He 
conceived  the  whole  world  in  terms   of  consciousness,  in 


102        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

which  contradictions  were  resolved  into  unity.  Thus  he 
approached  a  monism  of  reason.  To  him  all  being  is 
thought  realized,  and  all  becoming  is  a  development  of 
thought.  In  this  development  the  absolute  reality  is  God ; 
He  is  the  only  individual.  This  individuality  of  God  is, 
however,  not  personality.  Hegel's  religion  is  a  passing 
phase,  for  it  is  the  Absolute  in  personal  relation  to  man. 
Religion  must  give  way  to  philosophy  wThere  the  Absolute 
finds  himself  as  cosmic  consciousness,  as  complete  being, 
as  absolute  whole.  The  idealism  of  Hegel  in  the  philoso- 
phy of  religion  reinterpreted  Christian  truths  from  this 
angle  of  rationalistic  pantheism.  The  whole  history, 
therefore,  of  idealism,  shows  its  danger  and  prevents  us, 
in  the  effort  to  escape  from  mechanism,  from  throwing 
ourselves  into  its  arms.  No  idealistic  theory,  especially 
the  most  pure  theory,  is  compatible  with  the  theism  of 
Christianity,  its  appreciation  of  things,  its  valuation  of  the 
body,  and  its  conception  of  evil. 

A  real  danger  has  entered  modern  theology  in  conse- 
quence of  its  bowing  to  idealistic  schemes.  It  supposed 
that  it  could  escape  the  materialistic  danger  in  mechanism 
by  making  God  immanent  in  the  world.  But  this  imma- 
nence cannot  be  maintained  without  finally  injuring  the 
idea  of  a  personal  God.  It  may  lift  up  the  grosser  as- 
pects of  nature,  but  in  doing  this  it  must  overlook  the 
cruelties  of  nature,  and  the  evil  and  sin  of  the  world. 
Now  Christianity,  as  a  religion  of  redemption,  will  always 
be  lowered  when  evil  and  sin  are  depreciated.  If  the 
thought  of  immanence  is  just  to  nature  and  man,  it  cannot 
deny  their  inequalities  and  wrongs ;  and  then  its  immanent 
God  becomes  very  imperfect.  We  are  only  safe  when 
we  maintain  a  transcendent  God,  not  a  Deistic  God  abso- 
lutely apart  from  the  world,  but  a  transcendent  God,  im- 
manent by  presence  and  effects,  but  not  in  essence  and  be- 
ing.    Christianity    cannot    surrender    a    personal    God. 


The  Mechanical  Demand  103 

Therefore,  it  cannot  adopt  idealistic  systems,  for  it  is 
ideal  in  purpose,  but  not  in  metaphysics.  Its  metaphy- 
sical implications  for  the  world  are  of  a  realistic  nature. 
It  wants  a  spiritual  God  and  in  the  lower  ranges  a  me- 
chanical world.  A  world  merely  of  ideas  is  not  the  world 
of  Christianity.  Therefore,  a  modified  mechanism  is  far 
more  compatible  with  Christianity  than  a  thoroughgoing 
idealism.  We  must,  however,  not  deny  the  ideal  elements. 
The  final  values  of  righteousness  and  God  must  remain 
preeminent. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    BIOLOGICAL    SUPPOSITION 

OURS  is  peculiarly  the  age  of  biology.  There 
had  been  interest  in  nature  and  study  of  nature 
for  many  a  century,  but  only  since  the  time  of 
Darwin  and  with  the  establishment  of  the  hypothesis  of 
material  evolution  in  nature  did  the  modern  science  of  biol- 
ogy take  its  real  rise.  From  the  second  half  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  until  the  present  biological  science  has 
constantly  advanced ;  it  has  reconstituted  some  of  the  for- 
mer natural  sciences,  opened  up  new  avenues  of  investi- 
gation, and  annexed  in  its  claims  many  other  phases  of 
thought.  Its  new  points  of  view  not  only  re-made  botany, 
zoology,  anatomy,  physiology,  and  kindred  sciences  and 
sub-sciences,  but  it  entered  psychology  and  made  its  meth- 
ods biological.  It  claims  to  give  in  the  new  explanation 
of  mind,  from  the  natural  basis  of  man's  past  development 
and  from  the  study  of  his  nervous  system  and  brain,  a  new 
solution  of  man's  history,  a  new  theory  of  economics  and  of 
society,  of  morals  and  of  religion.  In  fact,  it  is  pressing 
into  every  sphere.  The  successes  of  biology  are,  however, 
not  complete.  The  biologists  themselves  are  re-examining 
and  doubting  some  of  the  older  assumptions,  and  are 
particularly  assailing  Darwinism.1  The  absolute  rule  of 
the  biological  point  of  view  is  also  opposed  by  logicians, 
who  deny  that  all  science  is  natural.  They  argue  for  a 
group  of  distinctly  non-natural  or  spiritual  sciences,  which 
the  Germans  well  designate  as  "  Geisteswissenschaften." 
We  are  also  passing,  in  our  general  thinking,  from  the 

iCf.   Kellogg,  "Darwinism  To-day." 

104 


The  Biological  Supposition  105 

large  influence  of  the  older  mechanico-causal  idea  of  life 
and  evolution  to  a  more  ideal  conception.  This  ideal  con- 
ception is  claimed  in  the  philosophy  of  Bergson  and  Eucken 
to  be  the  solvent  of  true  science  and  life.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  still  necessary  to  examine  the  purely  naturalistic 
biological  ideas,  because  they  still  rule  and  determine  much 
of  the  thinking  in  both  scientific  and  popular  presentation 
of  the  world  of  nature. 

The  first  result,  which  followed  from  reducing  life  as  a 
mysterious  secret  to  an  idea,  that  can  be  described  in  the 
terms  of  the  chain  of  secondary  causes,  was  to  take  life 
out  of  the  long  prevalent  scheme  of  purpose.  Since  the 
day  of  Aristotle  the  teleological  point  of  view  had  ruled 
in  the  studies  of  nature,  but  now  the  effort  was  made  to 
find  out  its  actual  phenomena  as  efficient  causes  in  direct 
material  contact.  Darwin  repudiated  the  older  idea  of 
purpose  and  opposed  the  argument  from  design  as  it 
had  been  stated  by  Paley.  He  writes  to  Asa  Gray,  in 
1860 :  "  But  I  grieve  to  say  that  I  cannot  honestly  go 
as  far  as  you  do  about  Design.  I  am  conscious  that  I  am 
in  an  utterly  hopeless  muddle.  I  cannot  think  that  the 
world,  as  we  see  it  is  the  result  of  chance ;  and  yet  I  can- 
not look  at  each  separate  thing  as  the  result  of  Design."  2 
In  1861  Darwin  writes  to  Miss  Wedgwood:  "  The  mind 
refuses  to  look  at  this  universe,  being  what  it  is,  without 
having  been  designed;  yet,  where  one  would  most  expect 
design,  viz.,  in  the  structure  of  a  sentient  being,  the  more 
I  think  on  the  subject,  the  less  I  can  see  proof  of  design."  3 
As  Darwin  grew  older,  he  became  more  determinately  op- 
posed to  design.  In  1876  he  states  in  reference  to  the 
gospels  and  their  evidence :  "  Thus  disbelief  crept  over  me 
at  a  very  slow  rate,  but  was  at  last  complete.     The  rate 

2  "  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,"  by  Francis  Darwin, 
II,  p.  146. 

3  Ibid.,  I,  p.  283. 


106        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

was  so  slow  that  I  felt  no  distress."  4  And  then  he  con- 
tinues :  "  Although  I  did  not  think  much  about  the  ex- 
istence of  a  personal  God  until  a  considerably  later  period 
of  my  life,  I  will  here  give  the  vague  conclusions  to  which 
I  have  been  driven.  The  old  argument  from  design  in 
Nature,  as  given  by  Paley,  which  formerly  seemed  to  me 
so  conclusive,  fails,  now  that  the  law  of  natural  selection 
has  been  discovered.  We  can  no  longer  argue  that,  for 
instance,  the  beautiful  hinge  of  a  bivalve  shell  must  have 
been  made  by  an  intelligent  being,  like  the  hinge  of  a  door 
by  man.  There  seems  to  be  no  more  design  in  the  variabil- 
ity of  organic  beings,  and  in  the  action  of  natural  selection, 
than  in  the  course  which  the  wind  blows.''  5  This  negative 
attitude  of  Darwin  gradually  became  the  ruling  one, 
although  Huxley  attempted  to  adjust  the  newer  bio- 
logical results  to  a  reformulated  idea  of  final  cause  and 
purpose.  On  the  whole,  biology  excluded  any  considera- 
tion of  first  and  final  cause  as  Darwin  had  done.  It  be- 
came in  some  of  its  advocates,  not  merely  non-religious 
and  non-committal  on  Christianity ;  it  not  only  seemed  to 
further  the  loss  of  the  spiritual  sense  as  in  Spencer;  but 
it  was  actually  taken  up  by  a  group  of  decided  anti- 
religious  and  anti-Christian  thinkers  like  the  Germans 
Moleschott,  Vogt,  Buechner,  and  Haeckel.  They  added 
■strong  philosophic  materialism  to  biological  research. 
Consequently  the  taboo  on  an}'  question  of  purpose  became 
more  severe. 

It  may  have  been  of  great  use  in  the  furtherance  of 
biology  to  examine  phenomena  directly  and  to  avoid  any 
interference  from  the  question  of  purpose.  A  wrong  tele- 
ology had  injured  careful  observation  from  a  deductive 
application  of  what  ought  to  be  in  the  face  of  facts.  But 
has  evolution  been  able  to  show  that  all  purpose  in  the 

4  Ibid.,  I,  p.  278. 
8  Ibid.,  I,  p.  278. 


The  Biological  Supposition  107 

interpretation  of  nature  is  finally  impossible?  If  so,  it 
must,  of  course,  forever  oppose  a  religious  explanation 
of  the  world.  The  fear  of  biology  at  the  beginning  of  its 
modern  period,  that  religion  would  becloud  and  deny  its 
facts,  a  fear  partly  justified  by  the  manner  of  the  attack 
of  Bishop  Wilberforce,  was  too  great.  Because  of  its 
fear  of  the  influence  of  religion,  biology  also  attempted  to 
avoid,  as  it  supposed,  all  philosophical  questions  and 
theories,  that  might  prejudice  its  investigations.  But 
many  biologists  failed  to  see  that  they  had  taken  a  philo- 
sophical attitude  when  they  conceived  of  evolution  as  causal 
in  the  mechanical  sense.  They  began,  before  life  had  ex- 
perimentally been  reduced  to  mechanical  terms,  to  favor  a 
mechanical  conception  of  the  universe.  In  so  doing  they 
took  upon  themselves  all  the  burdens  and  difficulties  of  this 
point  of  view.  In  addition  they  gave  a  definite  coloring  to 
the  idea  of  cause.  Cause  in  the  Darwinian  theory  must 
be,  if  rightly  construed,  phenomenal  succession.  But  this 
succession  was  made  at  the  same  time  to  be  both  causal 
and  phenomenal.  The  ignorance  of  philosophy  misled  the 
biologists.  They  did  not  apparently  know  that  Hume 
had  defined  causes  to  be  mere  successions,  and  yet  found  it 
essential  to  make  the  succession  necessary.  Mill  was  put 
under  the  same  constraint.  Necessity  must  belong  to  the 
causal  chain,  if  it  is  to  be  causal.  If  this  be  so,  how  can  we 
have  accidental  variation  and  progress,  and  a  causal  chain? 
But  there  is  still  another  contradiction  in  the  causal  idea 
of  Darwinism.  While  apparently  it  does  not  place 
causes  in  things,  nevertheless,  by  its  mechanical  concep- 
tion it  mythologizes  cause,  and  must  believe  that  the  ante- 
cedents are  the  full  raison  d'etre  of  the  consequents.  The 
development  of  higher  inductive  logic,  whether  in  Sigwart 
or  Erdmann,  who  follow  Kant,  has  led  the  best  thinkers  to 
put  the  foundation  of  causality  into  mind.  The  only  es- 
cape is  ascribing  mind  to  all  matter,  and  this  position  of 


108        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

panpsychism  has  actually  been  taken  by  Haeckel. 

Because  the  reigning  view  of  evolution  was  influenced 
by  a  causal  notion  that  necessarily  excluded  purpose  it 
could  not  be  favorable  to  any  indications  that  made  for  a 
real  teleology.  The  increasing  indications  of  purpose 
in  the  ascending  scale  of  beings  were  passed  by.  There 
was  no  comparison  of  lower  or  higher  forms  from  the  point 
of  view  of  complexity  of  plan.  While  such  examination 
in  reference  to  plan  may  have  been  outside  of  the  immediate 
aim  of  evolution,  its  legitimacy  ought  not  to  have  been 
denied.  Despite  the  denial,  it  remains  true,  as  Professor 
Ward  says :  "  Comparing  the  lower  forms  of  life  with 
the  higher,  it  is  at  once  obvious  that  the  non-teleological 
factors  seem  more  exclusively  the  efficient  ones  the  lower 
down  the  scale  we  go,  while  the  teleological  factors  come 
more  clearly  into  play  the  higher  we  ascend."  6  It  is  the 
disregard  of  purpose  which  also  largely  influenced  the 
attitude  toward  the  arguments  of  Paley.  It  is  true  that 
Paley  in  his  Natural  Theology  approaches  the  idea  of  pur- 
pose from  the  older  scientific  notion  of  a  species.  He 
frequently  speaks  of  contrivance.  But  it  has  been  over- 
looked that  in  the  face  of  his  limitations  he  approaches 
the  conception  of  growth  in  the  idea  of  the  watch  which 
can  produce  another  watch.  There  is  a  real  valuation  of 
the  relation  of  mechanism  to  organism.  When  Hobhouse 
in  his  modern  discussion  of  development  and  purpose  un- 
dertakes to  argue  for  purpose,  he  also  begins  with  the 
idea  of  a  machine.  There  is  a  real  parallel  between  the 
argument  of  Hobhouse  and  Paley.  Perhaps  Paley's  use 
of  design  as  it  was  interpreted  by  the  early  evolutionists 
created  an  unjust  prejudice  against  the  actual  value  of  his 
argument.  It  must  be  evident  to  the  student,  that  though 
we  have  shifted  our  viewpoint  from  contrivance  to  or- 
ganism, and  from  design  to  purpose,  nevertheless,  Paley 

e  "  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,"  Vol.  I,  p.  281. 


The  Biological  Supposition  109 

does  not  deserve  the  criticisms  which  have  been  heaped 
upon  him. 

One  of  the  great  difficulties  with  the  philosophic  side  of 
evolution  is,  that  the  biologists  have  not  seen  the  implica- 
tions of  the  very  terms  which  they  have  employed,  and  have 
not  noted  the  impossibility  of  eliminating  plan  and  purpose 
from  the  evidences  of  nature.  In  the  very  term  evolution  it- 
self there  lies  hidden  the  thought  of  advance  or  progress. 
We  cannot  conceive  of  an  evolution  which  stands  still.  It 
cannot  move  in  a  circle  or  return  upon  itself.  There  may 
be  intervals  of  apparent  rest  or  of  decline,  but  the  total 
movement  must  be  upward.  Evolution  without  progress  is 
contradictory.  Progress  means  going  somewhere;  it  is  a 
term  which  includes  aims  and  ends.  It  may  not  be  possible 
to  discover  purpose  at  once  in  things,  but  purpose  cer- 
tainly appears  in  evolution.  Hobhouse  says :  "  The  evo- 
lutionary process  can  be  best  understood  as  the  effect 
of  a  purpose  slowly  working  itself  out  under  limiting 
conditions  which  it  brings  successively  under  control."  7 
Evolution  receives  its  value  from  the  idea  implied  in  pur- 
pose as  a  necessary  element  in  evolution.  Bergson  may  be 
correct  in  part  when  he  denies  that  purpose  appears  in  the 
onward  flow  of  life.  Nevertheless,  he  must  admit  that,  as 
we  look  back,  we  find  purpose.  But  if  we  find  purpose 
in  looking  backward,  evolution  cannot  be  "  we're  going  but 
we  know  not  where."  The  fact  that  in  looking  backward 
we  seem  to  have  arrived  somewhere  shows  that  we  were 
going  somewhere.  Mere  impulse  as  impulse  is  not  evolu- 
tion, not  progress.  Hobhouse  has  made  a  real  point  when 
he  says :  "  A  mere  vital  impulse  may  blow  like  the  wind 
where  it  listeth,  so  that  none  can  tell  whence  it  cometh 
or  whither  it  goeth.  But  creative  or  rather  plastic  mind 
is  that  which  moves  towards  ends  which  are  worth  reach- 

i "  Development  and  Purpose,"  Intro.,  xxvi. 


110        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

ing,  and  because  they  are  worth  reaching."  8  Can  we  have 
real  evolution  with  its  idea  of  advance  without  assuming 
creative  mind?  9 

There  has  been  a  disregard  on  the  part  of  evolutionists 
when  they  discussed  the  problem  of  natural  selection  to 
note  what  it  ought  to  mean  and  what  the  difficulties  in  its 
way  were.  The  term  natural  selection  was  originally  a 
generalization.  It  maintained  that  certain  forms  remained 
after  the  struggle  for  existence  had  broken  the  continuous 
line  of  development  and  made  it  discontinuous.  Darwin 
sometimes  used  the  term  to  denote  the  result  and  not  the 
process.  It  never  was  to  be  conceived  of  as  a  force,  but 
only  as  the  description  of  a  process  or  a  result.  But  the 
problem  is,  whether  this  process  can  be  called  and  actually 
is  a  selection  as  long  as  the  variations  through  which  it 
appears  are  merely  of  the  nature  of  chance.  The  Dar- 
winian conception  holds  that  the  variations  proceed  along 
fortuitous  lines.  In  opposition  to  this  assumption  of  for- 
tuitousness there  stand  not  only  the  implied  notion  of 
selection,  but  also  the  difficulties  of  a  mathematical  nature, 
which  arise  from  the  doctrine  of  chances.  According  to 
the  formula  of  chances,  which  is  involved  in  fortuitous 
variation,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  for  the  variations  to 
arise  and  to  be  perpetuated  in  the  manner  in  which  evolu- 
tionism assumes.  Not  only  in  the  first  appearance  of  an 
advantageous  variation  is  fortuity  over-strained,  but  also 
in  the  transmission.10  The  doctrine  of  chances  will  also 
not  allow  for  the  fact  of  the  highest  forms.  Numerically 
the  average  ought  to  live.  Furthermore,  Galton  has 
worked  out  a  calculation  of  regression,  which  opposes  the 
strong  assumption  of  the  accidental  variation  which  gen- 
eral orthodox  Darwinism  made.     Therefore,  there  is  great 

8  Ibid.,  Intro.,  p.  xxviii. 

»  Cf.  Part  II,  Chapter  VI,  p.  244  ff. 

io  Cf.  Martineau,  "  A  Study  of  Religion,"  Vol.  I,  p.  263  ff. 


The  Biological  Supposition  111 

difficulty  in  the  assumption  of  slow  insensible  and  acci- 
dental variation.  There  are  also  difficulties  in  the  actual 
examination  of  facts  of  nature  when  we  suppose  changes 
of  a  purely  accidental  and  slight  character  to  take  place. 
If  every  organic  structure  is  the  result  of  slow  and  gradual 
accumulation  of  very  small  differences,  then  such  a  com- 
plex structure  as  the  human  eye  compared  with  the  eye 
of  a  mollusk,  like  the  common  pecten,  is  not  really  expli- 
cable. As  Bergson  lx  has  shown,  it  is  impossible,  when  we 
compare  not  function  to  organ,  but  two  terms  of  the  same 
nature,  as  organ  with  organ,  to  maintain  accidentalism. 
While  mollusks  and  vertebrates  may  be  traced  back  to  a 
common  beginning,  yet  they  developed  before  there  was  any 
eye.  How  can  we  explain  on  the  basis  of  slight  accidental 
changes  the  same  essential  parts  in  the  eyes  of  both  the 
mollusks  and  the  vertebrates?  It  is  only  possible,  if  in 
such  a  structure  as  the  eye  we  have  two  forms  changing 
point  by  point  in  essentially  the  same  way.  Professor 
Watson  on  this  subject  rightly  concludes  thus:  "We 
have,  therefore,  to  suppose  that  every  part  of  the  organ 
simultaneously  develops  correlated  variations ;  so  that,  not 
only  does  variation  arise  accidentally,  but  equally  acci- 
dentally there  emerge  a  number  of  correlated  variations ; 
and  these  on  the  hypothesis  must  arise  accidentally  in  two 
entirely  independent  lines  of  evolution."  12 

There  is  another  manner  in  which  by  variations  natural 
selection  is  supposed  to  have  happened.  In  contrast  to 
Darwin's  theory  of  slow  and  slight  variations  the  assump- 
tion has  been  made  that  the  variations  occur  suddenly 
and  simultaneously.  Darwin  considered  sudden  variations 
"  sports,"  or  monstrosities  that  could  not  perpetuate  them- 
selves. But  the  Englishman  Bateson  claimed  quick 
changes.     His  claim  acquired  great  importance  after  the 

11  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  60. 

12  "  The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience,"  Part  II,  p.  164, 


112        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

experiment  of  the  botanist  De  Vries,  who  working  on  the 
Oenothera  Lamarckiana,  a  species  of  primrose,  obtained 
new  species  by  mutations  in  a  few  generations.  He  claimed 
that  in  the  period  of  mutation  many  changes  in  different 
directions  take  place.  While  this  doctrine  attempts  to 
unify  the  organism  it  is  still  a  doctrine  of  accidentalism. 
It  cannot  be  used  in  face  of  the  fact  of  apparently  dis- 
coverable slow  variations  in  the  animal  world.  At  the 
same  time  it  does  not  account  for  the  variation  of  a  similar 
nature,  such  as  we  find  in  the  eye  of  the  mollusk  and  the 
vertebrate.  In  reference  to  the  difficulties  which  acci- 
dental variation  has,  even  on  the  supposition  of  the  theory 
of  mutation,  Bergson  rightly  argues :  "  But  here  there 
arises  another  problem,  no  less  formidable,  viz.,  how  do 
all  the  parts  of  the  visual  apparatus,  suddenly  changed, 
remain  so  well  co-ordinated  that  the  eye  continues  to 
exercise  its  function?  For  the  change  of  one  part  alone 
will  make  vision  impossible,  unless  this  change  is  absolutely 
infinitesimal.  The  parts  must  then  all  change  at  once, 
each  consulting  the  other.  I  agree  that  a  great  number 
of  un-co-ordinated  variations  may  indeed  have  arisen  in 
less  fortunate  individuals,  that  natural  selection  may  have 
eliminated  these,  and  that  only  the  combination  fit  to 
endure,  capable  of  preserving  and  improving  vision,  has 
survived.  Still,  this  combination  had  to  be  produced. 
And,  supposing  chance  to  have  granted  this  favor  once, 
can  we  admit  that  it  repeats  the  self-same  favor  in  the 
course  of  the  history  of  a  species,  so  as  to  give  rise, 
every  time,  all  at  once,  to  new  complications  marvelously 
regulated  with  reference  to  each  other,  and  so  related  to 
former  complications  as  to  go  further  on  in  the  same  di- 
rection? "  13 

The  difficulty  in  both  the  sudden  and  slight  theory  of 
accidental    variation   has    arisen    from    the    disregard    of 

is  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  65. 


The  Biological  Supposition  113 

organic  structures.  The  long  line  of  continuity  in  me- 
chanical causes  to  create  new  species  by  variation  has 
been  emphasized  to  the  detriment  of  the  value  of  individual 
organisms.  It  is  true  that  Darwin  realized  the  fact  of  co- 
ordination in  organic  structures,  nevertheless  he  did  not 
give  it  adequate  place  in  his  whole  theory.  The  co-or- 
dination and  inter-relation  in  the  whole  and  in  the  parts  of 
single  organisms  is  very  difficult  to  maintain  in  the  light 
of  accidental  changes.  The  different  organs  are  all  con- 
nected to  function  for  a  common  end.  Where  organs  are 
lost  they  are  replaced  for  the  same  purpose  as  the  lost 
organs.  Where  parts  of  the  tissue  can  not  be  replaced 
in  the  form  of  the  same  organs  the  tissue  of  other  organs 
can  adapt  itself  to  function  toward  the  same  end.  The 
life,  therefore,  of  single  organisms,  if  studied  minutely, 
does  not  favor  chance  and  accident.  In  a  similar  manner, 
when  we  compare  the  anatomical  structures  of  different 
beings  it  is  impossible  to  explain  the  similarity  simply 
as  mechanical  continuity.  The  very  likeness  implies  simi- 
larity of  function,  and  as  an  argument  in  analogy  it  has 
elements  of  purpose.14  When  we  approach  the  study  of 
embryology,  it  may  on  the  one  hand  show  us  in  higher 
structures  the  repetition  of  the  antecedent  lower  structures 
in  the  early  stages  of  the  embryo;  but  on  the  other  hand, 
the  embryo  is,  after  all  its  development,  an  embryo  of  a 
definite  kind  and  comes  to  a  definite  completion.  In  view 
of  this  difficulty  arising  from  the  study  of  co-ordination, 
and  of  the  contradictions  involved  in  the  assumption  of 
slow  or  sudden  accidental  changes,  it  is  very  inconsequent 
and  illogical  to  maintain  an  accidental  natural  selection. 
There  are  two  additional  facts  which  also  create  a 
probability  on  behalf  of  a  selection  which  is  more  than 
accidental.  The  one  important  fact  is  the  occurrence  in 
nature  of  mimicry.     Certain  forms  are  imitations  of  other 

14  Cf.  Chapter  III,  p.  69  ff. 


114        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

forms  for  their  self-protection.  A  typical  instance  is  that 
of  the  two  types  of  moth  called  Anosia  and  Basilarchia. 
The  former  is  avoided  by  birds  because  it  is  unpalatable  to 
them,  and  the  latter,  which  is  palatable,  escapes  the  birds 
because  its  coloring  mimics  that  of  the  Anosia.  Similar 
instances  of  color  protection  frequently  occur  in  the  ani- 
mal world.  They  certainly  argue  in  favor  of  protective 
plan,  and  are  not  explicable  as  mere  accidents.  The  other 
notable  fact  is  the  occurrence  of  instinct.  It  is  of  course 
a  fact,  that  no  animal  has  any  notion  of  self-preservation 
or  of  its  service  to  its  species  in  its  instinctive  acts.  They 
are  done  automatically.  The  nervous  system  seems  pre- 
organized  to  certain  reactions.  Nevertheless  it  is  still 
true  that  instinct  reaches  certain  ends  and  purposes,  even 
though  they  are  not  consciously  known  by  the  animal. 
Their  occurrence  cannot  be  explained  as  accidental. 

The  insufficiency  of  accident  as  a  part  in  variation  has 
led  to  the  theory  that  variation  followed  along  definite 
lines.  It  was  the  work  of  the  German  biologist  Eimer  to 
show  that  transformation  is  brought  about  by  influences 
continuously  exerted  in  the  same  direction.  Over  against 
the  Darwinian  view  of  fortuitous  variation,  he  apparently 
demonstrated  the  theory  of  orthogenesis,  or  variation  along 
definite  lines.  It  may  not  be  possible  to  discover  at  all 
times  the  definiteness  in  the  process,  and  there  may  be  more 
accident  apparent  than  orthogenesis  allows.  It  cannot, 
however,  be  disputed  that  the  result  of  the  process  is 
definite  species  and  definite  forms.  Not  only  is  every  or- 
ganism a  correlated  whole  of  inter-working  parts  for  a 
certain  end,  but  organism  fits  to  organism  as  we  examine 
the  result  of  the  process.  Consequently  in  the  examina- 
tion of  the  whole  organic  world  purpose  cannot  be  denied. 
Therefore,  natural  selection,  insufficient  to  explain  facts 
when  it  is  accidental,  has  led  some  Germans  to  suppose 
a  vital  force,  which  expressed  itself  in  certain  controlling 


The  Biological  Supposition  115 

and  dominant  ways.  The  dominant  was  supposed  to  be  an 
ideal  shaping  power  in  the  organism.  It  has  not  been 
considered  possible  to  prove  this  theory  of  dominants 
or  living  entelechies.  Nevertheless,  its  value  has  been  to 
show  the  purposive  nature  of  organisms.  The  whole  trend 
in  the  problem  of  natural  selection  has  been  toward  pur- 
pose, and  consequently  natural  selection  has  increasingly 
gained  a  teleological  meaning.  With  the  teleological  im- 
port assured  there  can  be  no  quarrel  between  the  hypoth- 
esis of  natural  selection  and  the  Christian  ideal  of  a  plan 
in  nature. 

In  passing  from  the  meaning  of  natural  selection  to  an- 
other great  term,  viz.,  environment,  it  is  necessary  in  pass- 
ing to  notice  two  minor  terms  employed  in  the  biological 
theory  of  evolution.  The  first  is  survival  of  the  fittest. 
Forms  may  survive  after  natural  selection  has  done  its 
work,  or  perhaps  after  environment  has  produced  the 
forms.  But  in  whatever  way  survival  of  the  fittest  may  be 
used,  we  cannot  eliminate  the  teleological  character  of 
"  fittest."  The  second  term  is  adaptation.  This  term  is 
far  more  congruent  to  the  conception  of  environment,  but 
its  coloring  is  as  purposive  as  survival  of  the  fittest. 
Both  terms,  however,  are  secondary  in  importance  to  the 
conception  of  environment.  The  theory  of  environment, 
like  the  theory  of  natural  selection,  is  also  a  mechanical 
theory.  It  attempts  to  derive  forms  from  external  in- 
fluences. Not  the  inner  changes  of  an  organism,  but  the 
influences  of  outer  circumstances  are  to  determine  it.  If 
we  take  the  case  of  the  human  eye,  referred  to  above,  the 
theory  of  environment  maintains  that  the  eye  is  developed 
by  the  direct  action  of  the  light  itself.  It  is  supposed 
that  the  light  made  the  first  pigment  spot  and  then  brought 
about  gradually  the  complex  eye.  This  theory  of  environ- 
ment, however,  is  not  adequate  without  some  added  prin- 
ciple.    It  was  Lamarck  who  believed  that  living  beings  dis- 


116        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

played  a  certain  selective  activity,  and  made  an  effort 
to  adapt  themselves  to  their  environment.  They  thus 
modified  their  structure,  and  through  the  use  or  disuse  of 
organs,  transmitted  their  character  to  their  descendants. 
But  it  has  been  disputed  whether  acquired  character  can  be 
handed  down.  The  transmission  seems  more  or  less  excep- 
tional. While  the  theory  of  environment  is  important 
and  played  a  part  in  Darwin's  original  speculations,  his 
followers,  the  neo-Darwinians,  have  almost  exclusively  em- 
phasized natural  selection.  Their  opponents,  the  follow- 
ers of  Lamarck,  or  neo-Lamarckians,  have  disputed  the 
reign  of  the  almightiness  of  natural  selection.  In  opposi- 
tion they  have  emphasized  functional  use  and  environment. 
Now  environment  may  be  interpreted  in  its  manifoldness 
and  indeterminateness  as  working  accidentally.  The  re- 
sults, however,  have  not  been  brought  about  in  life-forms 
by  the  shifting  and  indeterminate  character  of  the  environ- 
ment, but  rather  by  certain  definite  influences  which  pro- 
duced results  of  a  definite  kind.  The  fact  that  Lamarck 
had  to  add  to  environment  selective  adaptation  and  the 
functional  use  of  organs  does  not  disprove  this  contention. 
Lamarck,  moreover,  can  be  only  understood  rightly  on  the 
supposition  that  his  theory  must  inevitably  lead  to  pur- 
pose. 

Whenever  the  idea  of  purpose  has  become  larger,  there 
has  also  been  more  room  for  the  conception  of  order 
which  allows  for  freedom.  The  accidental  point  of  view  at 
all  times  is  more  fatalistic.  This  is  the  fact  because  the 
purposive  view  implies  mind.  There  has  been  too  much 
limitation  in  evolution  to  the  lower  terms  and  not  sufficient 
allowance  for  the  higher  terms.  Had  these  been  consid- 
ered as  a  part  in  evolution,  it  would  have  been  juster  in 
its  earlier  attempts  to  solve  purpose.  There  could  have 
been  no  absolutism  of  natural  selection  or  environment. 
It    must   be    remembered    as    Howison    says,    that    "  The 


The  Biological  Supposition  117 

whole  question,  so  far  as  anything  more  than  conjectural 
evidence  is  concerned,  is  man's  question:  he  is  the  witness 
to  himself  for  evolution;  in  his  consciousness,  directly, 
and  only  there,  does  the  demand  arise  for  an  explanation 
of  it ;  in  himself  he  comes  upon  a  nature  of  mind  as  di- 
rectly causal  of  the  form  in  Nature  —  of  the  ideally  ge- 
netic connexion  holding  from  part  to  part  in  it  —  and  of 
the  reality  of  progress  there  as  measured  by  his  ideal 
of  the  True,  the  Beautiful,  and  the  Good."  15 

It  is  the  maintenance  of  these  higher  elements,  of  mind 
and  its  ideals,  which  must  be  included  if  environment  is  not 
to  be  over-emphasized.  The  abuse  of  environment  has 
been  due,  however,  not  altogether  to  the  students  of  nature. 
The  popularizers  of  natural  facts  and  theories  have  done 
much  to  over-state  the  place  of  environment.  The  influ- 
ences of  biological  theory,  particularly  in  reference  to  en- 
vironment, have  controlled  some  sociologists.  In  describ- 
ing society  they  were  not  determined  by  its  psychological 
aspect,  and  they  did  not  study  it  in  correlation  to  the  ideals 
of  mind,  but  rather  in  relation  to  the  pressure  of  nature. 
Environment  was  then  made  a  very  large  cause  in  shaping 
life.  The  physical  surroundings  and  the  economic  condi- 
tions were  described  as  the  real  sources  of  progress  or  de- 
cay, of  virtue  or  vice.  In  such  a  description  the  spiritual 
and  ideal  environment  was  frequently  neglected.  The 
whole  account  tended  to  portray  man  in  society  as  the 
creature  of  conditions.  In  opposition  to  such  naturalis- 
tic determinism,  Christianity,  without  denying  the  reality 
of  existing  conditions,  proclaims  the  message  of  faith. 
This  message  appeals  to  the  power  of  personality  to  over- 
come conditions,  to  bear  burdens,  to  conquer  temptations 
and  to  change  the  world.  Freedom  of  life  through  a  divine 
impetus,  and  the  power  of  divine  environment  to  stimulate 
and  make  free  personalities,  is  fundamental  to  Christian- 
is  "  The  Limits  of  Evolution,"  p.  42. 


118        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

ity,  and  it  cannot  admit  the  usual  material  conception 
of  environment.  Environment  is  a  problem  for  man  to 
solve,  and  not  a  slavery  to  accept.  It  must  be  man's  pur- 
pose, according  to  Christianity,  to  understand  and  change 
the  environment  that  might  unmake  him,  and  guided  by 
the  higher  purposes  of  life,  to  conquer  nature,  and  to 
abstract  from  her  laws  the  chance  of  his  spiritual  growth. 
Another  of  the  great  terms  of  evolution  is  the  term 
heredity.  Heredity  is  emphasized  by  some  men  over 
against  mere  environment.  It  has  found  its  advocates 
among  the  neo-Darwinians.  In  the  explanation  of  what 
the  elements  are  which  are  handed  on  from  generation 
to  generation,  Weismann  studied  the  constitution  of  the 
living  cells.  He  finds  that  we  must  maintain  a  distinction 
among  cells.  There  is,  according  to  him,  a  germinal  cell 
through  which  the  character  of  forms  is  determined.  This 
he  regards  independent  of  the  somatic  cell  by  which  no 
characters  can  be  handed  on.  There  have  been  as  strong 
advocates  of  the  absolute  power  of  heredity  as  of  en- 
vironment. Heredity  has  been  frequently  pressed  to  the 
extreme,  and  conceived  of  as  a  mighty  non-personal  force 
dominating  individual  lives  and  casting  them  into  the  molds 
of  necessity.  It  is  true,  that  the  investigations  of  the 
Austrian  priest  Mendel  in  plant-life  have  demonstrated  the 
existence  and  influence  of  strains  of  heredity  in  nature. 
The  extension  of  Mendel's  law  has  shown  itself  practicable 
in  the  pathology  of  cases  of  insanity.  Certain  definite 
deviations  have  been  traced  back  to  ancestry.  But  there 
has  not  at  all  times  been  an  allowance  for  the  separate  fact 
of  the  psychology  of  insanity.  It  has  largely  been  made 
material  and  physical.  Never,  however,  has  heredity  been 
able  to  deny  the  element  of  purpose.  Its  very  analysis 
makes  it  purposive.  The  more  heredity  attempts  to  re- 
move novelty  and  original  individuality,  the  more  it  has 
in  mind  a  definitely  calculable  result,  even  though  this  re- 


The  Biological  Supposition  119 

suit  and  its  cause  is  made  purely  material.  The  difficulty 
with  heredity  is  its  underlying  assumption  of  necessity. 
It  may  be  conceived  in  an  accidental  way,  but  the  calcula- 
tions of  Mendel  make  it  purposive. 

The  material  idea  of  heredity  has  found  a  strong  philo- 
sophical expression  in  Nietzsche.  It  is  his  dream  of  the 
future  that  the  physically  unfit  shall  be  removed  and  the 
proper  conditions  for  creating  the  super-man  shall  be 
established.  By  proper  heredity  physical  strength  is  to 
be  handed  down  and  to  show  itself  in  the  will  toward  power. 
The  great  problem  of  mankind  is,  therefore,  the  problem 
of  physical  betterment.  Nietzsche  finds  no  place  in  his 
speculations  for  Christianity.  This  he  believes  to  be  the 
result  of  a  period  of  decadent  weakness.  Its  ideal  of 
helping  the  weak  and  sustaining  the  suppressed  is  to  him 
the  hinderance  of  real  progress.  Real  progress  depends 
upon  breeding  the  real  type  of  man.  Christianity  must 
be  hated  and  warred  against.  Says  Neitzsche :  "  Chris- 
tianity has  taken  the  part  of  everything  that  is  weak,  low, 
unsuccessful,  it  has  made  an  ideal  out  of  the  contradiction 
against  the  instincts  of  the  preservation  of  the  strong  life ; 
it  has  spoiled  the  reason  of  the  spiritually  strongest  na- 
tures, inasmuch  as  it  taught  them  to  feel  the  highest  worth 
of  spiritualness  16  as  sinful,  as  leading  astray,  as  tempta- 
tion." 17  In  other  words,  Nietzsche  declares  war  on  Chris- 
tianity from  the  point  of  view  of  physical  heredity.  His 
controlling  ideal  is  the  physically  perfect  man.  This  same 
ideal  is  the  motive  of  the  rising  science  of  eugenics.  It 
may  not,  like  Neitzsche,  reject  all  goodness  which  is  not 
physical  soundness ;  it  may  allow  for  the  moral  and  re- 
ligious beyond  it.  Nevertheless,  the  manner  in  which  it 
stresses  physical  heredity  aids  materialism  and  determin- 
es Nietzsche  opposes  humility,  but  his  idea  of  spiritualness  is 
physical  prowess,  and  thus  mental  strength. 
17  "  Der  Antichrist,"  Erstes  Buch,  Par.  5. 


120        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

ism.  It  has  certain  facts  in  its  favor,  but  it  uses  them 
without  proper  limitation.  Its  dream  of  a  new  humanity 
is  through  better  physical  parentage.  Spiritual  factors 
do  not  count  in  its  program. 

With  all  such  purely  physical  definitions  of  heredity, 
Christianity  is  in  conflict.  It  does  believe  in  spiritual 
heredity,  for  it  has  not  rejected  the  solidarity  of  the  race 
and  the  unity  of  man.  Through  Christ  it  conceives  a  new 
humanity  to  be  possible.  But  the  heredity  of  the  spirit  is 
conditioned  by  faith.  In  faith  the  spirit  conquers  the  flesh. 
While  Christianity  allows  for  original  sin,  it  does  not  be- 
lieve in  the  almightiness  of  ancestry.  The  problem  of  sin 
for  it  is  spiritual.  There  can  be  no  lasting  sympathy  be- 
tween the  attempt  of  Professor  Burton  18  in  his  effort  to  ex- 
plain sin  on  the  basis  of  natural  evolution,  and  the  truth 
of  Christianity.  Any  such  effort  must  make  sin  to  be  of 
animal  nature  and  give  it  a  physical  character.  To  do 
this  means  either  that  to  be  perfect  man  must  finally  elim- 
inate his  physical  nature,  or,  if  this  be  impossible,  he  must 
of  necessity  remain  sinful.  The  first  alternative  destroys 
the  valuation  which  Christianity  puts  on  the  body  and  the 
right  of  the  physical  life;  the  second  is  a  theory  of  de- 
spair, for,  according  to  it,  sin  cannot  be  removed.  The 
only  escape  is  to  depreciate  sin  and  its  guilt.  To  depreci- 
ate sin  is  to  depreciate  the  redemption.  Consequently  the 
effect  of  interpreting  original  sin  from  the  angle  of  animal 
nature  is  to  deny  its  seriousness.  Only  where  the  spiritual 
nature  of  sin  is  maintained,  is  there  room  for  the  purpose 
of  Christianity  with  its  message  of  the  redemption  of  the 
soul  through  Christ. 

But  the  misinterpretation  of  heredity  must  not  deter- 
mine our  whole  attitude  toward  evolution.  If  evolution 
as  a  biological  theory  remains  within  its  limits  and  knows 
its  sphere,  it  will  not  contradict  the  claims  of  Christianity. 

is  «f  The  Problem  of  Evil." 


The  Biological  Supposition  121 

If  we  avoid  a  materialistic  philosophy  in  biology,  and  if  we 
do  not  make  nature  all-controlling,  we  can  accept  evolution 
as  not  in  disagreement  with  Christianity.  A  conflict  can 
be  avoided,  if  biological  science  remains  sober  in  its  own 
sphere,  and  does  not  antagonize  Christianity  within  its 
sphere.  The  only  difficulty  occurs  when  evolution  de- 
mands a  control  over  all  existence.  If  it  begins  with  an 
originally  assumed  matter  and  energy,  and  passes  up- 
ward mechanically,  claiming  the  mechanical  ultimates  as 
sufficient,  it  will,  of  course,  contradict  a  spiritual  religion. 
If  the  problem  of  all  life  is  a  question  of  chemistry,  conflict 
must  also  ensue.  In  the  same  manner,  if  biology  has  an- 
nexed these  lower  origins  and  uses  them  to  explain  the 
highest  elements,  there  must  certainly  be  constant  opposi- 
tion between  it  and  the  Christian  religion.  It  is  neces- 
sary that  there  should  be  a  proper  limitation  of  evolution. 
The  whole  question  as  to  the  incompatibility  of  Christian- 
ity and  evolution  depends,  as  Howison  well  says,  "  on  the 
stretch  that  evolution  has  over  existence,  especially  over 
human  nature."  19  But,  on  the  other  hand,  Christianity 
must  be  careful  not  to  demand  as  biblical  facts  old  hypo- 
theses of  species.  It  must  differentiate  between  biblical 
statement  in  popular,  religious  language  and  the  interpre- 
tation which  tradition  has  put  upon  the  biblical  statement. 
In  this  tradition  there  are  elements  of  past  science,  which 
have  unconsciously  colored  the  biblical  account.  Chris- 
tianity must  also  treat  its  documents  historically  and  not 
be  disturbed  if  the  temporal  vessels  of  its  religious  truths 
are  not  shaped  scientifically.  Were  they  thus  shaped  they 
would  fail  in  their  very  purpose.  It  is  general,  popular, 
descriptive,  child-like  language  which  is  universal  and  last- 
ing. But  Christianity  must  make  certain  great  reserva- 
tions over  against  any  theory  of  evolution.  It  must  de- 
mand that  the  doctrines  of  a  personal  God,  of  the  final 

is  "  Limits  of  Evolution,"  p.  51. 


122       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

spiritual  character  of  life  and  its  origin,  and  of  the  divine 
nature  of  man's  spirit,  be  not  violated. 

Although  Christianity  can  allow  an  evolution  as  the  con- 
tinuation of  creation,  it  cannot,  because  of  the  concep- 
tion of  a  personal  God,  deny  a  real  creation.  There  can 
be  no  toleration  on  the  part  of  Christianity  of  any  evo- 
lution which  is  its  own  beginning  and  continuation,  and  of 
any  creation  which  has  its  origin  in  a  process  but  not 
in  God.  The  explanation  of  creation  as  purely  within 
evolution,  and  of  evolution  as  all  of  creation,  is  the  elimina- 
tion of  the  transcendent  God  as  spirit  and  person.  While 
the  development  still  going  on  is  the  unfoldment  and  con- 
tinuation of  creation,  it  cannot  be  identified  with  the  orig- 
inal creation,  unless  creation  be  conceived  to  be  nature 
making  itself.  But  Christianity  can  believe  in  no  world 
without  the  God  that  makes  it.  A  world  that  is  self-mak- 
ing is  also  man-making  and  God-making.  The  spiritual 
results  of  the  world  are  then  only  an  after-effect  of  the 
material  results.  Even  a  cosmic  consciousness  is  not 
sufficient.  "  An  immanent  Cosmic  Consciousness  is  not  a 
personal  God.  For  the  very  quality  of  personality  is, 
that  a  person  is  a  being  who  recognises  others  as  having 
a  reality  as  unquestionable  as  his  own,  and  who  thus  sees 
himself  as  a  member  of  a  moral  republic,  standing  to  other 
persons  in  an  immutable  relationship  of  reciprocal  duties 
and  rights,  himself  endowed  with  dignity,  and  acknowledg- 
ing the  dignity  of  all  the  rest.  The  doctrine  of  a  Cosmic 
Consciousness,  on  the  contrary,  reduces  all  created  minds 
either  to  mere  phenomena,  or  at  best,  to  mere  modes  of 
the  Sole  Divine  Life."  20  This  sole  divine  life  can  not 
itself  be  personal,  and  allows  no  personality  to  others. 

As  little  as  Christianity  can  surrender  a  personal  God 
for  the  sake  of  both  religion  and  morals,  so  little  can  it 
surrender  the  claim  that  life  is  also  spiritual,  and  that  its 
20  Howison,  Ibid.,  p.  7. 


The  Biological  Supposition  123 

origin  is  spiritual.  When  life  is  defined  as  purely  a  mat- 
ter of  chemistry,  or  of  the  resolution  of  the  cell  to  lower 
elements,  Christianity  must  demur.  The  material  concep- 
tion of  life  has  endeavored  to  annex  the  problem  of  the 
origin  of  all  life.  While  up  to  this  time  every  effort  has 
finally  failed,  nevertheless  science  is  hopeful  of  solving  the 
question  of  the  beginning  of  life  in  a  chemical  and  continu- 
ously material  manner.  Should  science  succeed  in  produc- 
ing life  in  the  laboratory,  should  the  present  efforts  of 
keeping  tissue  of  apparently  dead  bodies  alive  lead  to 
further  results,  these  would  of  necessity  need  to  be  con- 
sidered in  their  limitation.  It  would  be  necessary  to  prove 
not  only  the  continuance  of  life  from  organic  structure, 
but  living  tissue  would  also  have  to  be  created,  and  or- 
ganic structures  found  through  organization  of  such  tis- 
sue. Even  should  this  proof  be  given,  it  would  not  demon- 
strate absolutely  that  life  is  self-generating.  The  germs 
of  life  would  only  be  discovered  further  down  in  the  scale 
of  beings.  The  solving  of  the  problem  of  physical  life 
would  demand  a  rearrangement  of  our  conceptions.  What 
we  call  non-organic  matter  would  be  found  to  be  living,  the 
conception  of  life  would  be  extended,  and  its  origin  would 
be  found  to  be  possible  below  cellular  form.  At  present, 
however,  there  is  no  such  necessity.  The  reduction  of  life 
to  its  first  occurrence  cannot  define  all  life.  If  the  higher 
ranges  of  moral  and  religious  life  are  the  mere  consequents 
of  the  physical  life  they  lose  their  worth.  However  much 
Christianity  can  permit  science  to  search  for  the  traces  of 
physical  life,  it  cannot  agree  with  any  materialization  of 
all  life.  Were  all  life  material,  and  were  its  last  origins 
not  in  God,  its  ends  could  also  not  be  in  God.  The  denial 
that  God  is  the  author  of  life  removes  the  underpinning 
of  faith.  It  injures  the  place  of  Christ.  Christ  cannot 
have  life  in  Himself,  He  cannot  be  life  and  resurrection, 
He   cannot  be   the  Word  through  whom  all  things   are 


124?        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

made  and  sustained,  He  cannot  save  from  death,  if  all  life 
is  primarily  non-spiritual  and  material.  Christianity  must 
maintain  the  spiritual  origin  and  the  final  spiritual  aim 
of  life,  because  its  God  is  life,  and  its  Saviour  is  life. 

The  third  great  reservation  which  Christianity  must 
make  is  the  divine  origin  and  nature  of  man's  spirit.  It 
cannot  allow  that  man  is  merely  a  creature  of  the  earth. 
He  is  dust  and  to  dust  he  shall  return.  To  the  earth  he 
is  linked,  but  also  to  heaven.  If  his  highest  life  as  well 
as  his  physical  basis  is  merely  animal,  he  cannot  be  truly 
God's  child.  His  ancestry  lies  in  nature  alone,  unless  God 
has  given  him  of  His  own  life.  The  denial  of  this  truth 
makes  man's  psychic  life  a  material  result.  It  does  not 
allow  for  the  separateness  of  his  mind.  But  even  if  man's 
separateness  of  mind  be  conceded,  and  this  mind  is  the 
result  of  cosmic  mind,  there  cannot  be  a  genuine  individual 
soul  with  moral  responsibility  and  religious  freedom.  No 
matter  how  limited  may  be  the  attainments  of  a  psychology 
that  observes  merely  phenomena,  the  Christian  religion 
must  still  demand  a  real  personality,  a  living  soul,  and  a 
spirit  coming  from  God  and  destined  to  return  to  Him. 
It  cannot  permit  the  mere  scientific  analysis  of  observable 
elements  of  mind  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  belief  that 
man  is  in  God's  image,  and  has  in  him  God's  life. 

A  tendency  has  appeared  in  philosophy  which  idealizes 
life.  Its  representatives  are  Bergson  and  Eucken.  The 
ideals  of  Bergson  find  their  center  in  the  conception  of  a 
living  impulse  which  causes  life  to  course  through  the  uni- 
verse. Life  is  the  one  great  essential  moving  reality. 
Matter  has  been  thrown  aside  by  life  and  is  its  remnant. 
All  action  partakes  of  life.  May  there  not  be  life  in 
chemical  reaction?  May  not  the  geologic  deposits  speak 
of  life?  The  soul  of  all  energy  is  life;  the  one  all-absorb- 
ing reality  is  the  stream  of  life.  Alongside  of  Bergson 
stands  Eucken  with  his  idealization  of  life  and  his  faith 


The  Biological  Supposition  125 

in  life.  He  sees  life  as  a  spiritual  stream.  Above  all 
economic  life,  above  all  cultural,  moral,  and  religious  life, 
there  is  the  one  real  divine  actuality  which  can  make  hu- 
manit}'.  Into  this  divine,  eternal,  peaceful  and  joyful  life, 
humanity  must  be  lifted  up.  Through  it  alone  arises  all 
productivity.21 

If  this  new  philosophic  tendency  is  rightly  limited,  and 
if  the  ideal  of  life  is  spiritually  conceived,  Christianity  can 
employ  them.  If  life  is  not  merely  an  intuitive  abstrac- 
tion, or  a  pantheistic  continuity,  but  if  behind  and  above 
the  conception  of  life  maintained  by  this  new  vitalistic 
philosophy  the  real  ground  of  life  is  sought,  then  we 
can  approach  the  religious  affirmation.  Perhaps  Chris- 
tianity can  employ  the  new  terminology  and  ideal  of  life 
for  an  expression  of  the  message  of  John.  Up  to  the 
present  time  the  ideals  of  St.  Paul  have  largely  dominated 
historical  Christianity.  Its  future  may  demand  a  fuller 
statement  of  the  idea  of  life,  which  can  be  found  in  the 
conception  of  the  Word  in  St.  John.  His  wonderful 
gospel,  that  deals  with  great  and  fundamental  thoughts, 
readily  lends  itself  to  an  interpretation  of  Christianity 
around  the  central  fact  of  life.  A  new  synthesis  is  pos- 
sible and  within  reach  of  the  Christian  faith,  if  it  can 
employ  the  new  philosophy  of  life,  purged  of  its  difficulties, 
as  an  earthen  vessel  into  which  it  pours  its  eternal  message 
of  life  and  salvation.  Should  this  synthesis  be  made,  then 
the  best  biological  thought  will  be  absorbed  into  Christ; 
nature  will  receive  the  sanctification  of  the  Spirit ;  and  the 
human  spirit  will  rejoice  to  find  in  all  life  the  earnest  and 
promise  of  its  own  reality  in  the  Christ  who  is  and  has 
life  eternal. 

21  For  further  discussion  of  this  vitalism,  see  Part  II,  Chapter  VI. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL    SOLUTION 

THE  rise  of  the  new  psychology  has  given  large 
results  to  modern  thinking.  When  the  old  psy- 
chology, which  divided  up  the  mind  into  faculties 
and  rested  purely  on  introspection,  was  displaced  by  the 
new  method  of  observing  the  functions  of  the  mind  through 
the  correlation  of  physiological  and  psychological  data 
biology  had  conquered  psychology.  It  sought  to  bring 
about  the  removal  of  psychology  from  its  former  alliance 
with  philosophy.  The  first  impetus  in  investigation  was 
given  through  the  effort  of  Weber  to  state  the  law  of  the 
relation  of  the  external  stimulus  to  sensation  in  a  mathe- 
matical proportion.  It  was  the  philosopher  Fechner  who 
further  quantified  Weber's  law,  and  thought  that  he  could 
find  in  it  a  solution  of  the  relation  of  body  and  mind.  It 
is  true  that  in  the  English  philosopher,  Hume,  we  already 
observe  the  indications  of  the  functional  psychology, 
which  so  largely  stresses  sensations  and  impressions. 
There  is  quite  a  parallel  between  him  and  some  of  the 
latest  psychological  work  in  its  mere  phenomenalism. 
Says  Prof.  James  Orr:  "When  even  so  good  a  psychol- 
ogist as  Prof.  William  James  is  found  commencing 
with  a  '  sensation  '  which,  even  as  we  look  at  it,  becomes 
transformed  into  an  '  object,'  and  ere  long  is  part  of  a 
'  world '  of  such  objects,  which  by  and  by  are  themselves 
posited  as  the  *  causes  '  of  the  sensations  we  began  with, 
—  when  such  a  writer  can  satisfy  himself  with  '  cognitive 
sensations '  and  the  treatment  of  self  as  *  a  stream  of 
mental  states,'  and  conclude  that  *  the  states  of  conscious- 

126 


The  Psychological  Solution  127 

ness  are  all  that  psychology  needs  to  do  her  work  with,' 
and  that  *  metaphysics  or  theology  may  prove  the  soul 
to  exist,  but  for  psychology  the  hypothesis  of  such  a  sub- 
stantial principle  of  unity  is  superfluous  ' —  it  may  be  felt 
how  far  Hume  is  from  being  obsolete,  and  how  imperative 
is  the  need  of  recurrence  to  his  drastic,  but  at  least  con- 
sistent, logic."  1  It  was  not,  however,  the  psychology  of 
Hume  and  the  just  inferences  of  a  philosophic  nature 
which  he  drew  that  made  the  new  psychology ;  but  the 
German  thinkers,  stimulated  by  the  researches  of  Wundt, 
brought  about  a  change.  The  greatest  influence,  however, 
has  been  exerted,  not  by  the  German  formulations,  but 
by  the  more  materialistic  efforts  of  Bain ;  and  finally  it  was 
the  subtler  work  of  William  James  which  largely  fixed  the 
view-point  of  modern  psychology,  and  introduced  the 
psychological  ideal. 

The  careful  examination  of  the  senses,  the  classification 
of  associations,  the  observation  of  reaction  time,  the  testing 
of  memory  and  imagination,  the  analysis  of  consciousness 
as  a  stream,  the  study  of  nervous  structure  and  of  the 
brain  —  all  these  and  many  similar  investigations  not 
merely  produced  a  new  psychology,  but  also  aroused  the 
mind  to  push  forward  the  province  of  psychology,  and 
thus  led  to  the  largeness  of  its  application.  There  arose 
a  pedagogy  on  a  psychological  basis,  which  differed  from 
the  psychology  which  Herbart  had  combined  with  his 
philosophy.  The  new  psychology  was  not  philosophical; 
it  was  physiological.  The  physiological  psychology  stud- 
ied the  child  and  its  mind.  It  noted  the  growth  of  child- 
mind  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  functioning  of  nerv- 
ous system  and  brain,  and  finally  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  whole  physical  nature  of  the  child.  By  compari- 
son psychology  reached  down  into  the  animal  mind,  and 
sought  to  analyze  it.     In  the  beginnings  of  such  study, 

i  "  David  Hume,"  p.  12.    Cf .  also  pp.  148,  159. 


128        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  in  the  type  of  work  which  Romanes  did,  the  ani- 
mal mind  became  very  human;  but  the  later  researches 
have  fixed  a  larger  gulf  between  man  and  animal  in  their 
mental  possibilities.  The  new  psychology  studied  abnor- 
mal conditions,  and  annexed  psychiatry.  It  sought  new 
methods  for  detecting  criminals.  But  its  application  was 
not  restricted  to  these  spheres ;  it  was  applied  to  the 
testing  of  men  in  their  fitness  for  a  vocation,  to  the  ex- 
amination of  scientific  management,  to  the  increase  of  eco- 
nomic efficiency,  and  to  the  development  of  good  sales- 
men.2 The  social  life  was  also  annexed;  the  relations  of 
men  to  each  other  in  common  consciousness  and  mob-mind, 
the  value  of  social  instincts,  and  the  extent  of  social  will, 
were  examined.3  In  a  most  extended  manner  Wilhelm 
Wundt  planned  his  "  Voelkerps3rchologie,"  and  included 
in  it  the  study  of  language,  of  art,  and  also  of  myth  and 
religion.  But  the  bearing  of  psychology  upon  religion, 
particularly  in  America,  was  not  so  much  influenced  by 
Wundt  as  by  investigations  in  America  itself.  About 
ten  years  ago  there  arose  a  specific  psychology  of  reli- 
gion. The  treatise  which  did  more  than  any  other  work 
to  found  this  new  department  of  psychology  was  "  The 
Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  by  William  James.  A 
smaller  essay  by  James  on  "  The  Will  to  Believe  "  made 
an  equally  strong  impression.  The  name  of  the  new  de- 
partment of  psychology  of  religion  was  coined  by  Profes- 
sor Coe.  An  authority  of  equal  importance  with  Pro- 
fessor Coe  is  Professor  Starbuck.  But  these  two  leaders 
have  quite  a  following;  and  the  number  of  treatises  and 
articles  on  psychology  or  religion  are  very  many.  They 
include  not  only  such  English  books  as  those  by  Leuba  4 
and  Ames,5  but  also  a  discussion  of  the  whole  method  by 

2  Cf.  Hugo  Muensterberg,  "  Psychology  and  Industrial  Efficiency." 
sCf.  William  McDougall,  "Social  Psychology." 

4  "  A  Psychological  Study  of  Religion." 

5  "  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience." 


The  Psychological  Solution  129 

the  German  Professor  Wobbermin,6  and  the  publication  in 
Clark  University  of  "  The  American  Journal  of  Religious 
Psychology  and  Education."  Thus  the  new  psychological 
point  of  view  has  fully  entered  into  the  sphere  of  religion. 
The  former  history  of  religion,  and  the  previous  philosophy 
of  religion,  though  not  neglected,  have  been  less  stressed 
than  the  psychology  of  religion.  The  psychological  point 
of  view  has  claimed  to  be  the  first  and  foundational  need. 

In  many  ways  the  psychology  of  religion  has  been  of 
service  to  religious  faith.  It  has  established  the  fact  that 
religion  was  a  real  experience  of  the  individual  and  of  the 
race.  By  its  analysis  it  has  aided  the  history  of  religion. 
By  tracing  religious  ideas  and  attitudes,  ceremonies  and 
cults,  back  to  the  mind  of  man  it  proved  that  religious 
experiences  were  humanly  real.  There  has  been  no  effort 
to  interpret  the  psychological  existence  of  religious  data 
as  illusions.  Modern  psychology  of  religion  has  not  fa- 
vored in  its  direct  statements  the  older  charge  of  the  self- 
deception  of  man  in  his  religious  experiences.  What  the 
study  of  mind  has  discovered  as  illusions  does  not  include 
the  usual,  normal  facts  of  religion.  Therefore,  prayer, 
conversion,  sacrifice,  worship,  and  faith  have  been  ex- 
amined for  their  real  mental  elements.  In  the  earlier 
treatises  of  James  the  feeling  and  will  were  made  central. 
Starbuck  also  emphasizes  feeling,  and  this  is  equally  the 
attitude  of  Stanley  Hall  as  far  as  he  touches  religious 
experience  in  the  study  of  adolescence.  The  general 
emphasis  in  much  of  American  religion  on  conversion,  and 
the  importance  ascribed  to  evangelism,  favor  the  examina- 
tion of  religious  experience  from  the  emotional  standpoint. 
There  was  a  disregard  of  other  elements  in  the  religious 
life.  But  in  the  latest  work  of  Leuba  and  Ames,  there 
is  an  emphasis  upon  religion  as  including  the  entire  psychi- 
cal life.     Ames  states :     "  The  clear  apprehension  of  the 

e  "  Die  Religionspsychologische  Methode." 


130        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

concrete  relation  of  religion  to  the  total  life  process  fur- 
nishes a  corrective  for  the  erroneous  view  that  within  the 
individual  religion  is  due  to  some  unique  faculty  or  in- 
stinct." 7  It  is  true  that  this  attitude  is  directed  rather 
against  an  older  claim,  but  it  equally  furnishes  a  departure 
from  the  narrower  attitude  of  previous  discussions.  It 
is  necessary,  as  students  now  realize,  to  study  the  whole 
psychical  nature  of  man  in  its  relation  to  religion.8  The 
psychology  of  religion  must  claim  the  total  individual  and 
society.  If  a  specific  center  is  to  be  found  a  truer  ap- 
proach may  be  possible  from  the  point  of  view  of  religious 
belief,  which  is  so  central  a  phenomenon  in  faith.  This 
attitude  has  been  taken  by  Professor  Pratt  9  and  Pro- 
fessor Lindsay.10  But  even  these  investigations  into  be- 
lief ought  not  to  be  taken  from  a  smaller  angle  than  that 
of  the  total  mental  equipment  of  man.  Mere  will  and 
mere  feeling  as  well  as  ideas  in  themselves  are  inadequate 
for  the  description  and  explanation  of  the  reality  of  re- 
ligion in  the  soul  and  in  society.  Religion  is  connected 
with  the  very  essence  of  individual  need,  want  and  aspira- 
tion, and  with  the  leading  forces  in  the  life  of  society. 

The  psychological  point  of  view  has  been  of  service  in 
emphasizing  that  there  is  not  only  a  circle  of  the  directly 
conscious  life,  but  that  it  fades  out  into  the  subconscious. 
One  of  the  most  remarkable  facts  in  the  later  stages  of 
modern  psychology  is  the  general  acceptance  of  the  sub- 
conscious. On  the  one  side,  subconscious  facts  are  those 
which  show  the  fading  away  of  consciousness  into  the 
reflexive  and  automatic  elements  of  human  life.  The  con- 
scious fringes  out  into  the  subconscious,  in  which  there  are 
the  psychical  traces  of  memory,  the  processes  involved  in 
the  action  of  instincts,  the  residues  of  great  feelings  and 

t  "  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  289. 
s  Cf.  Galloway,  "  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.  54  ff. 
s  "  Psychology  of  Religious  Belief." 
io  "  The  Psychology  of  Belief." 


The  Psychological  Solution  131 

emotions,  and  the  total  of  human  personality  and  experi- 
ence not  immediately  in  use.  On  the  other  side,  it  has  been 
supposed  that  subconsciousness  has  not  only  a  lower  mar- 
gin, and  an  outer  human  margin,  but  an  upper  margin, 
through  which  remarkable  psychic  experiences  can  enter 
consciousness.  Many  undeniable  experiences  gathered  by 
The  Society  of  Psychic  Research,  even  after  a  just  criti- 
cism has  eliminated  much  material,  create  a  high  proba- 
bility in  favor  of  direct  transference  of  thought,  of  telep- 
athy, and  of  second  sight.  These  phenomena,  in  which  di- 
rect appearances  of  others  are  included  in  the  form  of 
visions  and  phantasms,  do  not  seem  capable  of  a  merely  sub- 
jective explanation.  It  is  this  peculiarity  which  has  moved 
some  psychologists  to  believe  that  transmundane  forces 
operate  upon  the  mind  within  our  general  world.11 
Through  subconsciousness  it  has  been  supposed  that  we 
could  not  only  better  understand  the  continuity  of  a  man's 
religious  life  through  the  influence  of  memories,  past  emo- 
tions, and  his  total  character,  but  also  to  find  a  founda- 
tion for  the  great  mystic  experiences  in  religion,  for  the 
fact  of  divine  inspiration  and  for  the  instreaming  of  God 
into  human  life. 

There  is,  however,  a  very  great  danger  in  founding  the 
religious  life  on  the  subconscious  experience.  To  set  the 
subconscious  over  against  the  conscious  elements  creates 
a  division  in  the  human  mind.  The  total  result  of  this 
division  is  liable  to  reduce  religion  to  blind  forces  rising 
up  in  man's  mind.12  It  may  lead  to  a  mere  philosophy  of 
the  unconscious.  When  it  escapes  making  religion  a  result 
of  personal  projection  it  may  fall  into  the  error  of  con- 
sidering it  the  effect  of  mere  natural  force  or  energy.  If 
the  instincts  and  memories  are  too  largely  stressed  we 

n  Cf.  James,  "  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  524. 
12  Cf.  Hocking,  "The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,"  p. 
527  ff ;  Watson,  "  The  Philosophical  Basis  of  Religion,"  p.  150  ff. 


132        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

cannot  understand  how  they  develop  into  religious  motives. 
The  mind  must  first  have  direct  religious  truth  before  it 
can  interpret  the  blind  strivings  of  the  subconscious  in 
the  direction  of  faith.13  There  has  as  yet  been  no  ade- 
quate proof  of  any  spiritual  communication  except  be- 
tween living  men.  The  few  extraordinary  cases  reported 
have  not  demonstrated  any  objective,  personal  or  non- 
personal  reality  back  of  the  subconscious  experiences.  In 
fact  the  phenomena  of  spirit  communication  have  gener- 
ally been  unveiled  as  deceptions.  No  true  mediumistic  in- 
formation has  been  guaranteed.14  Consequently  any  as- 
sumption of  the  possibility  of  direct  communication  be- 
tween living  men  and  disembodied  spirits  is  unfounded. 
In  the  same  way,  there  is  no  psychological  demonstration 
through  the  subconscious  that  the  divine  eternal  Spirit 
has  reached  man's  spirit.  No  matter  how  strongly  we 
believe  out  of  our  own  religious  experiences  in  the  com- 
munication of  God  with  man,  we  cannot  prove  it  with  any 
satisfaction  through  the  study  of  the  subconscious.  The 
real  source  of  religion  cannot  justly  be  discovered  in  sub- 
consciousness ;  but  direct  conscious  convictions,  conscious 
feelings,  conscious  impulses  and  forces,  and  external  his- 
torical occurrences,  the  influence  of  our  surroundings  and 
education  make  the  religious  life  of  most  men.  Not  even 
the  great  founders  of  religion  and  its  great  prophets  can 
be  explained  apart  from  history.  Their  new  revelations, 
even  though  they  be  in  the  form  of  dreams  and  visions,  are 
not  of  such  a  nature  as  to  justify  subconsciousness  as  the 
real  source  or  medium.  It  is,  therefore,  not  fair  to  con- 
fuse directness  of  religious  conviction  and  knowledge,  and 
the  intuitive  acknowledgment  by  conscience  of  religious 
truths,  with  the  phenomena  of  subconsciousness.  The  fact 
that  logical  argument   and   reflective  speculation   cannot 

is  Cf.  Galloway,  "  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.  61. 

I*  Cf.  Report  of  Seybert  Commission,  University  of  Pennsylvania. 


The  Psychological  Solution  133 

find  religious  truths  does  not  imply  that  the  only  alter- 
native is  to  assign  religious  truths  to  the  sphere  of  the  sub- 
conscious functioning  of  the  human  mind.  Professor 
Ames  properly  remarks :  "  In  any  case  no  scientific  in- 
quiries into  this  marginal  field  of  our  experience  support 
the  claim  that  the  subconscious  self  is  in  any  way  the  pe- 
culiar organ  of  religion.  It  is  the  massive  encircling 
milieu  of  custom,  tradition,  sympathies  and  tastes  within 
which  any  kind  of  clear  consciousness  exists."  15  But  while 
we  must  finally  admit  that  there  are  no  proofs  strongly  in 
favor  of  the  subconscious  as  the  only  medium  for  religion, 
nevertheless  the  failure  to  find  scientific  reasons  for  assum- 
ing the  incoming  of  the  divine  above  the  limit  of  our  con- 
sciousness does  not  do  away  with  the  fact  that  we  do  ex- 
perience the  divine.  It  is  still  possible  that  the  future  may 
disclose  what  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  establish. 

While  the  psychology  of  religion  has  brought  some  real 
advantages  to  the  study  of  religion,  and  while  it  has  moved 
men  and  will  continue  to  influence  them  on  behalf  of  a 
careful  and  valuable  scrutiny  of  the  mind  in  its  relation 
to  religious  experiences,  yet  Christianity,  using  what  is 
good  but  also  noting  what  is  deficient,  has  certain  great 
reservations  to  make  and  certain  objections  to  urge.  The 
first  of  these  is  directed  against  the  new  effort  of  the 
psychology  of  religion  to  aid  in  settling  the  long  debated 
question  of  the  origin  of  religion.  The  settlement  is  sup- 
posed to  be  possible  within  the  range  of  the  mind  and  its 
subjective  limits.  The  psychology  of  religion  has  at- 
tempted to  justify  some  of  the  speculations  of  the  anthro- 
pologists. It  has  strengthened  the  claim  that  religion 
began  with  a  condition  of  spiritism  or  animism.  Some 
there  are  who  agree  with  the  old  idea  of  Petronius  that 
fear  made  the  gods,  while  others  allow  for  reverence.  It 
is  in  magic  with  its  appeal  to  the  extraordinary  and  un- 

15  "  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  294. 


134        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

usual  that  Frazer  finds  the  solution.  Professor  Ames  at- 
tempts to  discover  it  in  social  needs  mentally  apprehended. 
Now  it  is  always  assumed  in  all  these  investigations,  that 
the  lowest  impulses  and  desires  in  savage  tribes  are  the 
most  primitive.  Without  a  due  investigation  of  his- 
torical religions  and  their  course,  which  is  generally  from 
a  primitive  purity  to  degeneration,  the  development  is 
conceived  of  as  an  advance  along  a  stright  line.  Such 
a  procedure  is  due  to  the  influence  of  Darwinism,  which 
has  subtly  affected  psychology.  This  appears  in  the  man- 
ner in  which  psychology  seeks  to  explain  too  much  through 
instinctive  endowments.  The  Darwinian  interpretation 
overstresses  the  problem  of  origin,  and,  therefore,  when 
psychology  is  affected  by  it,  it  does  not  seek  primarily 
the  real  analysis  of  what  is  central  in  religious  experience 
and  what  is  common  to  all  forms  of  faith.  On  the  con- 
trary it  operates  on  the  presupposition  that  the  physically 
and  religiously  lowest  tribes  show  the  clearest  traces  of 
primitive  faith.  In  the  examination  of  the  religion  of  the 
lowest  tribes  and  of  the  savages  there  is  no  just  reckon- 
ing with  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  great  gods.  In 
many  wild  tribes  there  are  thoughts  of  great  gods,  which 
seem  to  be  too  early  to  be  explained  as  later  additions,  and 
which  seem  to  be  too  little  in  the  foreground  to  be  reckoned 
with  as  later  developments.  The  idea  of  these  gods  is 
not  congruous  with  the  conjectures  of  the  low  motives  and 
ideas  of  primitive  belief.16  As  far  as  psychology  has  en- 
tered into  these  problems  of  origin  it  has  not  pursued  them 
purely  on  a  psychological  basis ;  but  it  has  aimed  to  help 
anthropology  by  first  accepting  the  anthropological  hy- 
potheses as  to  the  best  sources  for  primitive  religion. 

In  addition  to  this  error  of  method  it  can  also  be  justly 
objected,  that  the  very  attempt  to  determine  the  origin  of 
religion  on  a  psychological  basis  is  defective.     It  empha- 

ie  Cf.  Andrew  Lang,  "  The  Making  of  Religion,"  Chapters  X  to  XV. 


The  Psychological  Solution  135 

sizes  the  merely  subjective,  but  Christianity  claims  an  ob- 
jective revelation  and  communication  of  God  to  man.  It 
cannot  allow  that  religion  is  merely  a  subjective  creation 
of  the  mind.  The  universal  psychological  fact  of  religion 
must  be  traced  back  to  historical  origins.  The  psycho- 
logical character  of  religion  is  a  result  which  demands  a 
prior  explanation,  but  it  is  no  cause  which  truly  creates  an 
effect.  When  religion  is  made  real  merely  as  a  mental 
fact  a  corresponding  loss  is  sustained  in  the  exclusiveness 
of  the  emphasis  of  the  psychological  point  of  view.  With 
this  emphasis  the  purely  descriptive  and  phenomenal  side 
of  religious  life  is  put  before  us ;  but  there  exists  no  guar- 
antee that  there  is  more  to  be  looked  after  and  sought  after 
than  phenomenal  reality.  Psychology  is  after  all  largely 
descriptive,  and  description  is  not  real  explanation.  Con- 
sequently, if  religion  cannot  proceed  beyond  psychology  it 
must  remain  a  description  of  mental  phenomena,  and  must 
dwell  within  the  realm  of  appearance.  The  only  escape 
would  be  to  accept  the  philosophic  position  that  phenomena 
are  the  only  reality.  In  any  event,  there  would  be  created 
an  element  of  doubt  and  scepticism.  This  cannot  help 
being  the  outcome  when  the  total  problem  of  faith  is  re- 
stricted to  psychology.  If  religion  is  no  more  than  a 
fact  of  the  human  mind,  its  real  problems  are  not  an- 
swered. To  restrict  faith  to  the  mind  is  to  assume  that 
religious  realities  beyond  the  mind  are  either  unnecessary 
or  unknowable.  The  former  cannot  be  maintained  with- 
out the  unfounded  and  unproved  assumption,  that  mere 
mental  assurance  without  objective  fact  is  adequate.  The 
latter  lands  us  in  the  agnosticism  of  Spencer.  Conse- 
quently, psychology  by  its  very  limitation,  if  this  limitation 
is  made  essential  to  the  study  of  religion,  must  lead  us  into 
uncertainty  and  doubt. 

To  make  religion  mentally  real  is  a  vital  necessity,  but 
to  make  it  solely  real  through  mind  is  to  lead  us  into  ideal- 


136        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

ism.  If  we  identify  the  religious  problem  with  the  psycho- 
logical we  may  be  logically  brought  to  an  idealistic  point 
of  view.  But  this  point  of  view  may  become  very  dam- 
aging to  faith.  With  all  the  glamor  of  idealism,  with  all 
its  beauty  of  appeal,  it  can  never  overcome  the  human 
feeling,  that  it  lives  in  an  illusory  world.  The  strongly 
idealistic  faiths,  like  Buddhism,  must  make  the  world  Maya 
or  unreality.  Everything  is  at  last  Maya  but  mind. 
Should  we  draw  the  one  conclusion  from  psychologism  it 
would  end  in  the  illusionism  of  mind  and  nothing  but 
mind.17  But  modern  psychology  has  not  drawn  this  con- 
clusion, but  in  its  connection  with  the  physiological  side  of 
mental  functioning  it  has  chosen  the  alternative  against 
idealism.  It  is  true  that  no  science  can  completely  draw 
all  the  consequences  of  its  position.  Psychology,  how- 
ever, has  chosen  the  metaphysical  alternative  to  idealism. 
The  physiological  point  of  view  has  actually  tended  to 
make  psychology  materialistic.  It  is,  of  course,  true  that 
no  psychologist  to-day  clearly  states  that  the  mental  life 
is  an  after-effect,  or  epiphenomenon  of  material  move- 
ments. There  has  been  no  effort  at  an  open  materialism 
since  Mr.  Huxley  said :  "  Let  us  suppose  the  process 
of  physical  analysis  pushed  so  far  that  one  could  view 
the  last  link  of  the  chain  of  molecules,  watch  their  move- 
ments as  if  they  were  billiard-balls,  weigh  them,  measure 
them,  and  know  all  that  is  physically  knowable  about 
them ;  ...  we  should  be  as  far  from  being  able  to  include 
the  resulting  phenomena  of  consciousness,  the  feeling  of 
redness,  within  the  bounds  of  the  physical  science  as  we  are 
now.  It  would  remain  as  unlike  the  phenomena  we  know 
under  the  names  of  matter  and  motion  as  it  is  now."  18 

17  Cf.  also  Chapter  V,  p.  99  ff. 

is  "Science  and  Morals,"  Fortnightly  Review,  December,  1886. 
Quoted  by  Baldwin,  "  Handbook  of  Psychology,  Senses  and  Intellect," 
p.  2. 


The  Psychological  Solution  137 

Nevertheless  in  the  escape  from  such  a  theory  that  mind 
is  the  result  of  matter,  modern  psychology  has  not  freed 
itself  from  a  materialistic  incubus. 

If  we  look  at  and  compare  a  number  of  modern  psy- 
chologists we  shall  see  whither  they  lead.  According  to 
their  accepted  theory  they  are  parallelistic ;  in  other  words 
they  accept  parallel  lines  of  mind  and  matter  which  never 
meet.  Practically  the  largest  space  is  given  to  the  phys- 
ical explanation  and  the  physiological  hypotheses.  There 
is  much  detailed  description  of  the  nervous  system.  The 
human  brain  is  carefully  studied  and  the  fact  that  men- 
tal actions  are  localized  in  the  brain  is  made  much  of. 
On  the  contrary,  there  is  no  report  of  facts  adverse 
to  localization,  and  no  estimate  of  the  fact  that  the 
brain  is  shaped  by  a  man's  mind,  his  character  and  ex- 
perience.19 Human  consciousness  is  reduced  to  the  ter- 
minology of  human  behaviour  and  action.  There  is  a 
detailed  investigation  from  a  physiological  point  of  view 
of  the  senses.  These  are  studied  far  more  carefully  than 
the  higher  elements  of  the  mind.  They  are  diagram- 
atically  examined,  classified  and  mapped  out.  Much  space 
is  also  given  to  the  instincts  which  are  studied  com- 
paratively and  in  relation  to  the  animal  world.  Hu- 
man habits  are  explained  through  the  tracts  which  are 
formed  in  the  nervous  system  and  the  permanent  modifica- 
tion of  the  brain  structure,  but  there  is  no  allowance  for 
mental  dispositions.  Association  is  viewed  from  the  angle 
of  the  brain  connections.  Feelings,  according  to  the 
prevalent  theory  of  Lange  and  James,  are  primarily  due 
to  physiological  functioning.  We  first  cry  then  feel  sorry ; 
we  first  laugh  and  then  feel  glad.  All  our  emotions  are 
described  as  taking  their  rise  from  bodily  conditions.  The 
will  is  built  up  out  of  reflex  motions  ;  its  choices  are  ascribed 
to  motives.     Desires  are  not  placed  before  us  so  much  as 

is  Cf.  W.  H.  Thomson,  "  Brain  and  Personality." 


138        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

mental  wants  as  they  are  portrayed  as  nervous  tensions. 
Concepts  and  ideas  take  up  small  space  in  the  average 
psychology.  And  finally  when  it  comes  to  the  treatment 
of  the  self,  this  is  not  the  approach  to  the  continuity  and 
determination  of  the  mind,  but  it  is  rather  a  mere  stream 
of  experiences,  a  connection  between  mental  phenomena, 
and  a  bundle  of  sensations,  feelings,  emotions,  volitions, 
ideations,  which  may  split  up  into  various  centers. 

Thus  the  total  impression  created  by  the  average  modern 
psychology  is  not  ideal,  but  on  the  contrary  material. 
Practically  parallelism  in  the  science  of  psychology  has  not 
really  kept  matter  and  mind  truly  parallel.  Parallelism, 
if  it  were  to  be  real,  would  have  to  stand  for  a  correspond- 
ence not  only  in  general,  but  also  point  for  point.  It  can- 
not mean  absolute  disparateness.  But  an  actual  corre- 
spondence has  never  been  really  proved.  All  parallelism 
has  after  all  led  to  a  connection.  The  assertion  of  a  real 
causal  independence  of  matter  and  mind  has  been  an  as- 
sumption which  has  usually  led  either  to  the  dropping  of 
one  or  the  other  term,  or  to  the  positing  of  some  larger 
unity  as  the  foundation  of  both.  In  general,  this  larger 
unity  has  not  been  the  absolute  substance  of  Spinoza  which 
had  an  ideal  character.  The  final  outcome  has  been  to 
revert  to  materialism  and  a  material  series.  Huxley,  who 
was  quoted  above,  in  a  clear  statement  of  parallelism,  must 
after  all  admit :  "  The  feeling  we  call  volition  is  not  the 
cause  of  a  voluntary  act,  but  the  symbol  of  that  state  of 
the  brain  which  is  the  immediate  cause  of  that  act."  20 
Similar  attitudes  have  been  taken  more  or  less  clearly  since 
Huxley.  We  are  still  under  the  rule  of  a  psychology  whose 
total  effect  does  not  make  for  the  real  independence  of 
mind.21 

20  «  Collected  Essays,"  Vol.  I,  p.  244. 

21  Cf.  Ward,  "  Naturalism  and  Agnosticism,"  Lectures  XI  and  XII; 
and  for  a  very  full  and  thorough  treatment  cf.  Ludwig  Busse,  "  Geist 
und  Koerper,  Seele  und  Leib." 


The  Psychological  Solution  139 

The  reigning  conceptions  of  what  is  central  in  the  re- 
ligious experience  are  dominated  by  the  parallelistic 
psychology.  Among  many  students  of  the  religious  phe- 
nomena in  the  mind  feeling  is  made  central.  The  classic 
expression  of  religion  as  feeling  is  that  by  Schleiermacher, 
who  defined  religion  as  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence. 
But  with  Schleiermacher  feeling  as  a  psychical  condition 
was  regarded  from  the  ideal  point  of  view.  But  the 
modern  psychologist  must  always  base  his  description  of 
feeling  on  nervous  and  physical  conditions.  He  may  with 
Hume  believe  that  the  ideas  of  religion  arose  from  fear, 
and  with  Ribot  he  may  hold,22  that  religion  is  "  fear  in 
its  different  degrees,  from  profound  terror  to  vague  un- 
easiness, due  to  faith  in  an  unknown,  mysterious,  impalpa- 
ble Power."  He  may  say  with  Hermann  Ebbinghaus, 
"  Fear  and  misery  are  the  parents  of  religion ;  and,  al- 
though it  is  propagated  in  the  main  through  authority, 
it  would  long  ago  have  become  extinct,  if  it  were  not  born 
anew  out  of  them  all  the  time."  23  It  is  true  that  the 
psychologist  may  add  the  tenderer  emotions  and  include 
awe  as  well  as  other  feelings,24  but  the  question  always  re- 
mains what  will  be  the  psychological  nature  of  the  feeling. 
Even  if  we  follow  Hoeffding  and  make  feeling  a  condition 
determined  by  the  fate  of  values  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, or  with  Tiele  conclude  that  the  essence  of  religion  is 
adoration,  the  nature  of  the  religious  emotion  is  not  de- 
termined. It  has,  however,  been  determined  by  the  more 
direct  studies  of  psychologists  like  James  and  Starbuck. 
We  cannot  forget  in  James'  discussion  of  the  varieties  of 
religion,  that  all  his  ideal  terms  rest  on  his  peculiar  theory 
of  emotions  which  is  not  ideal.  Starbuck  clearly  holds 
that  religion  is  a  feeling  adjustment  to  the  deeper  things 

22  Ribot,  "  The  Psychology  of  the  Emotions,"  p.  309. 

23  "  Psychology,"  translated  and  edited  by  Max  Meyer,  p.  191. 

24  Cf.  Leuba,  "  A  Psychological  Study  of  Religion,"  p.  129. 


140        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

of  life  and  has  a  specific  nervous  mechanism.  In  his 
psychology  of  religion  he  lays  large  stress  on  conversion 
with  its  nervous  accompaniments,  and  on  adolescence  with 
its  sex  coloring  to  explain  religious  growth.  He  fre- 
quently refers  to  the  large  place  of  sexual  feeling  in  re- 
ligious differences.  This  same  material  side  of  the  mind 
as  explanatory  of  faith,  this  same  emphasis  on  food  and 
sex  in  the  social  development  of  religion,  is  also  found  in 
Ames.25  He  after  all  reduces  all  ideas,  even  the  highest, 
to  biological  considerations ;  for  he  says,26  "  In  the  idea 
of  opening  a  certain  door,  analysis  shows  that  the  idea  is 
the  awakening  of  definite  sensations  of  muscular  strain, 
the  partial  reinstatement  of  actual  movement,  or  of  activ- 
ities in  vision,  hearing,  pressure,  or  the  like.  In  more 
complex  ideas  or  concepts,  such  as  justice,  truth,  evil, 
eternity,  similar  content  always  exists.  There  is  therefore 
no  sharp  break  between  mental  and  physical  activity,  be- 
tween idea  and  deed.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  the  idea- 
tional process  from  the  bodily  factors.  There  is  conse- 
quently a  pronounced  tendency  for  descriptions  of  mental 
process  to  eventuate  in  physiological  or  biological  con- 
siderations." The  gist  of  this  statement  is  to  reduce 
ethics  and  religion,  and  ethical  and  religious  ideas  to  mus- 
cular antecedents,  and  eventually,  therefore,  to  biology. 
Religion  would  then  be  a  consequence  from  material  ante- 
cedents and  causes,  both  in  the  individual  and  in  the  race. 
The  impression  cannot  be  escaped  that  this  is  the  end  to 
which  we  are  brought  by  drawing  the  last  conclusions  of 
the  new  psychology  of  parallelism.  Christianity  is  then 
the  child  finally  of  certain  food  and  sex  notions,  and  these 
in  turn  are  brought  about  by  specific  physiological  struc- 
ture. Biology  is  thus  the  key  to  Christianity,  and  we 
are  not  free  but  again  subject  under  a  new  guise  to  the  old 

25  "  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  33. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  19. 


The  Psychological  Solution  141 

materialism. 

It  may  appear  that  we  escape  this  conclusion  if  we 
follow  the  emphasis  of  James  upon  the  will  to  believe.  Is 
it  not  true  that  convictions  and  belief  grow  out  of  a  liv- 
ing will?  Have  we  not  the  guarantee  of  freedom  of  the 
mind  in  this  conception  of  the  will?  But  let  us  not  be 
deceived.  Were  we  dealing  with  Kant,  we  would  be  in  the 
realm  of  freedom,  when  we  deal  with  the  will.  For  Kant 
there  is  nothing  finally  good  but  the  good  will.  In  it  man 
fulfills  the  demands  of  the  categorical  imperative.  The 
will  is  strong  and  a  revelation  of  real  reality.  Stoic  as 
Kant's  conception  of  the  will  may  be  it  is  ideal  and  free. 
But  James  needs  the  will,  because  he  holds  that  our  pas- 
sional nature  influences  us  in  our  opinions,  and  that  there 
are  "  some  options  between  opinions  in  which  this  influence 
must  be  regarded  both  as  inevitable  and  as  a  lawful  de- 
terminant of  our  choice."  27  In  other  words,  elements  of 
feeling  lie  back  of  the  will.  We  cannot  wait,  thinks 
James,  in  moral  and  religious  questions  till  all  the  evidence 
is  in.  Consequently,  as  moral  and  religious  doubt  is  un- 
satisfactory, the  will  must  throw  itself  into  the  balance. 
Where  it  exists  it  can  help  to  create  the  fact.  The  de- 
cision is  of  course  always  a  chance  but  it  is  more  satisfac- 
tory, according  to  James,  to  take  the  risk  on  behalf  of 
religion.  "  We  cannot  escape  the  issue  by  remaining 
sceptical  and  waiting  for  more  light,  because,  although  we 
do  avoid  error  in  that  way  if  religion  be  untrue,  we  lose 
the  good,  if  it  be  true,  just  as  certainly  as  if  we  positively 
chose  to  disbelieve."  28  Religion  then  is  a  gambling  of 
faith,  brought  about  by  desire  and  will,  and  based  upon 
satisfactions.  It  works  and  gives  certain  satisfying  re- 
sults ;    therefore   it    is    accepted.29     A   similar    theory    of 

2T  "  The  Will  to  Believe,"  p.  19. 

28  Ibid.,  p.  26. 

29  Cf.  The  pragmatic  basis  of  this  view,  Part  II,  Chapters  IV  and  V. 


142       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

will  is  maintained  in  the  apologetic  treatise  of  Prof. 
Eleanor  H.  Rowland,30  in  which  faith  is  argued  for  as  the 
safer  risk  to  take.  There  is  no  deliverance  in  any  such 
theory  of  will,  which  after  all  rests  on  the  biological 
assumption  of  proper  functioning,  even  though  it  has 
lost  its  material  terminology. 

The  psychological  emphasis  must  finally  disallow  all 
ethical  concepts  their  own  value.  It  reduces  them  to 
genetic  products  of  the  mind,  and  the  genetic  concept  over- 
powers the  valuation.  But  if  there  can  be  no  independent 
worth  in  moral  ideas,  there  can  also  be  no  separate  value 
and  no  independent  worth  of  religious  ideas  and  ideals. 
Struggle  as  we  may,  we  can  obtain  no  vital  independence 
and  no  freedom  for  faith.  Christianity  is  hemmed  in  to 
the  charmed  circle  of  movements,  reactions,  reflexes,  in- 
stincts, associations,  and  habits.  These  are  first,  and, 
therefore,  no  strong  and  lasting  meaning  can  be  attached 
to  religious  thought.  It  will  be  under  the  thraldom  of 
psychology  and  of  psychological  phenomenalism. 

The  new  psychology  also  desires  to  absorb  logic.  It 
regards  ideas  only  as  important  in  their  concrete  con- 
nection. Their  function,  it  claims,  is  to  mediate ;  and  they 
cannot  be  considered  formally.  Their  true  worth  is  only 
found  as  they  are  described  in  psychology.  With  the 
elimination  of  logical  normativeness,  and  through  its  ab- 
sorption into  the  merely  descriptive  process,  all  standard- 
ization of  truth  falls  to  the  ground.  Whatever  is,  is  so. 
This  is  the  watchword  of  psychological  realism.  When 
such  an  implied  or  expressed  abolition  of  logic  is  applied 
to  religion,  it  must  eventuate  in  denying  that  any  standard 
of  truth  can  exist  except  a  flowing,  changing  measure  of 
probability.  Consequently  no  religion  can  make  any  real 
claim  to  permanent  and  final  truth,  for  there  is  no  valid 
logical  standard.     Laws  of  thought  are  only  laws  of  mov- 

30  "  The  Right  to  Believe." 


The  Psychological  Solution  143 

ing  mind.  It  is  true  that  the  logic  of  religion  is  not  the 
formal  logic  of  science ;  it  is  the  living  logic  of  the  soul. 
Nevertheless  it  has  its  standards,  and  the  doubt  as  to  all 
standards  affects  it  very  much.  Another  result  which  will 
come  to  religion  through  psychologism  must  be  that  there 
can  be  no  theology  which  is  not  the  outcome  of  psychology. 
Religious  psychology  claims  to  furnish  the  real  data  for  all 
theological  science.  There  can  then  be  no  religious  truth 
and  experience  with  its  own  validity.  No  biblical  theology 
can  have  any  standard  meaning,  it  only  describes  the  mind 
of  the  author  or  the  religious  aspiration  of  the  time  in 
which  the  biblical  books  were  written.  Neither  norm  nor 
authority  remain.  There  are  no  fundamental  biblical 
doctrines.  Consequently  there  is  no  foundation  for  any 
dogma.  Dogma  is  deceptive,  for  it  is  merely  descriptive 
of  the  mind  of  the  Church  at  a  certain  age.  Finally  re- 
ligious truth  is  neither  altogether  true  nor  altogether  false. 
Eventually  along  this  line  of  thinking  Christianity  is 
merely  probable.  The  standards  have  fallen ;  authority  is 
gone;  all  is  process  and  practice.  In  these  alone  are  to 
be  found  the  remnants  of  the  faith  to  which  the  soul  can 
hold. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE    SOCIAL    TREND 

IT  is  quite  noticeable  in  some  of  the  later  treatises 
on  the  psychology  of  religion,  that  we  find  a  large 
emphasis  on  the  social  factor.  The  introduction  of 
this  element  is  indicative  of  a  marked  peculiarity  of  our 
age.  We  are  living  in  a  social  age.  The  latter  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century  has  led  to  a  constantly  increasing 
conception  of  human  life  as  social.  A  number  of  factors 
have  contributed  their  quota  to  this  result.  In  order  to 
understand  the  present  social  view  it  may  be  well  to  con- 
trast it  with  the  attitude  of  the  eighteenth  century.  The 
attitude  of  the  eighteenth  century,  which  in  some  of  its 
results  reached  into  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, was  that  of  individualism.  It  made  possible  such 
a  figure  as  Robinson  Crusoe,  who  when  stranded  on  a  desert 
island  could  construct  all  his  life  about  him,  and  reach 
a  civilized  basis  without  a  history  back  of  him  and  with- 
out a  social  tradition.  The  characteristics  of  the  fiction 
of  Robinson  Crusoe  appear  in  other  forms  of  thought  of 
the  eighteenth  century.  The  voice  of  Rousseau  called  the 
individual  man  to  return  to  nature.  His  message  was  not 
social  but  individual.  Voltaire  attacked  the  corrupt  so- 
ciety through  the  brilliant  wit  of  his  individual  point  of 
view.  The  French  Revolution,  which  we  recognize  as  a 
class  movement,  was  thought  to  be  the  revolt  of  the  in- 
dividual against  the  decadent  conditions  of  society.  Its 
doctrines  had  an  individualistic  trend  and  its  doctrinaires 
were  individualistic  in  character.  If  we  turn  to  the  Ger- 
man enlightenment  we  find  the  same  characteristic.    Lessing 

144 


The  Social  Trend  145 

appeals  to  individual  reason  and  its  rights.  The  great 
German  philosopher  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Leibniz, 
bases  all  his  thinking  on  individual  centers.  Look  where 
we  will  the  outstanding  elements  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury are  individualistic.  Society,  as  Rousseau  thought, 
was  the  result  of  a  contract  which  started  with  the  rights 
of  the  individual. 

The  nineteenth  century,  particularly  beginning  with  its 
second  half,  developed  the  sense  of  solidarity  and  the  con- 
ception of  the  community.  The  opposition  to  consider- 
ing man  as  the  center  of  the  universe,  which  we  find  earlier 
than  the  nineteenth  century,  and  which  Montaigne  so  bril- 
liantly satirizes,1  received  new  impulse  through  the  dis- 
coveries of  physical  sciences.  The  geocentric  idea  and  the 
anthropomorphic  idea  were  more  and  more  set  aside  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  universe.  When  the  universe  be- 
came the  controlling  notion  the  value  of  man  in  his  indi- 
vidual capacity,  power  and  importance  was  lowered.  With 
the  coming  of  Darwinism  and  with  the  increasing  accept- 
ance and  growth  of  its  hypothesis,  a  very  strong  additional 
influence  was  added  to  advancing  physical  science.  This 
influence  helped  to  push  aside  still  more  the  conception  of 
man  as  a  separate,  spiritual  entity.  He  was  incorporated 
into  the  total  scheme  of  nature  and  was  studied  in  con- 
nection with  all  the  species.  His  descent  was  not  the  de- 
scent of  the  individual,  but  the  descent  of  man  as  a  part 
of  nature.  Therefore,  the  type  became  dominant  and  the 
individual  was  more  or  less  forgotten.  Spontaneity  was 
overlooked  and  generic  forces  and  conditions  were  made 
all-powerful. 

While  the  study  of  nature  was  thus  dethroning  man 
from  his  place  of  eminence,  as  a  little  lower  than  the  angels 
by  asserting  that  he  was  only  a  little  higher  than  the 
animals,  there  arose  a  new  study  of  history.     The  great 

i  "  Essays,"  II,  XII. 


146       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

historians,  Niebuhr,  Ranke,  Curtius,  Momsen,  Freeman 
and  others,  wrote  history  from  a  more  or  less  conscious 
philosophy  of  history.  None  of  the  great  historians 
viewed  history  as  the  story  of  the  lives  of  great  men. 
They  did  not  find  its  essence  in  hero-worship,  and  the  con- 
ception of  Carlyle  as  to  history  was  not  seriously  con- 
sidered. History  was  made  the  resultant  of  great  forces. 
Ranke  found  in  the  development  of  mankind  divine  ideas ; 
it  was  thus  that  he  changed  Hegel's  great  conception  of 
the  philosophy  of  history  as  a  movement  of  reason.  Later 
historians  have,  however,  interpreted  the  impulses  of  his- 
tory as  psychological  forces.  But  the  latest  conceptions 
regard  all  history  as  explicable  on  economic  grounds. 
They  attempt  to  show  how  in  the  very  dawn  of  history 
the  problems  of  food  and  clothing,  and  the  manner  of  the 
occupation  and  vocation  of  men  shaped  their  history. 
Economic  considerations,  economic  difficulties  and  pres- 
sures are  made  the  elements  which  explain  great  nations, 
mighty  empires,  and  devastating  wars.  While  in  Ger- 
many under  Professor  Lamprecht's  leadership  the  economic 
ideal  is  interpreted  in  a  cultural  and,  therefore,  at  least 
semi-ideal  manner,  in  America  and  England  history  is  re- 
garded as  the  development  of  man  driven  merely  by  ma- 
terial economic  desires  and  thoughts.  These,  together 
with  racial  elements,  constitute,  it  is  held,  the  final  forces 
of  human  history.  Out  of  them  grow  every  aspiration  and 
every  thought  of  man.  Man  is  considered  fundamentally 
to  be  economic. 

The  regnancy  of  the  economic  conception  in  history 
followed  the  growth  of  the  great  economic  treatises.  Al- 
though England  had  its  Adam  Smith  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, it  had  its  Malthus  and  its  Mill  in  the  nineteenth 
century.  Germany  had  its  great  economist  Roscher,  who 
was  followed  by  many  brilliant  intellects.  America  con- 
tributed its  Carey.     Everywhere  the  study  of  economics 


The  Social  Trend  147 

took  a  hold  upon  men,  and  to-day  it  is  perhaps  one  of  the 
most  widely  studied  and  eagerly  desired  subjects  of  study. 
In  addition  there  gradually  grew  out  of  economics  the  new 
science  of  sociology.  It  is  true  that  the  French  philoso- 
pher, Comte,  had  suggested  the  study  of  human  society, 
and  had  coined  the  name  of  the  science.  Nevertheless  the 
real  impetus  to  modern  sociology  was  the  study  of  man  in 
his  economic  group  relation.  It  was  the  science  of 
economics,  therefore,  which  led  beyond  itself  to  sociol- 
ogy- 

There  are,  however,  other  forces  than  the  merely  in- 
tellectual consideration  of  economics  which  brought  about 
the  rapid  rise  and  universal  interest  in  sociology.  There 
came  about  a  number  of  conditions  in  society  which  ne- 
cessitated a  study  of  its  problems.  Among  these  may  be 
noted,  the  great  industrial  revolution,  by  which  the  home 
ceased  to  be  the  center  of  industry  and  manufacture ;  the 
rise  of  the  factory  system  through  the  invention  of  ma- 
chinery and  the  large  differentiation  of  manual  labor ;  the 
growth  of  great  cities,  the  changes  of  commerce,  the  found- 
ing of  ever  new  industries,  the  development  of  combina- 
tions and  trusts,  the  organization  of  labor  unions.  Such 
and  other  elements  began  to  change  human  society  and 
made  it  increasingly  an  industrial  society.  Agricultural 
conditions  rapidly  gave  way  to  industrial  conditions  and 
surroundings.  Consequently  the  isolation  and  separate- 
ness  of  agricultural  life  became  displaced  by  the  combina- 
tion and  union  of  men,  and  their  aggregation  and  massing 
in  great  centers.  Thus  man  became  socialized  in  his  life. 
But  the  changes  of  the  mode  of  life  produced  new  and 
unexpected  evils.  The  congestion  of  city  life,  the  char- 
acter of  association  in  industries,  the  detriment  to  the 
home,  the  pressure  which  machinery  with  its  rapidity  ex- 
erted against  the  older  virtues  of  stability  and  steadiness, 
the  increase  of  the  nervous  strain  which  demanded  more 


148       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

exciting  relaxation  and  pleasure  —  such  and  similar  in- 
fluences produced  great  difficulties  in  society.  It  was  the 
growing  consciousness  of  these  difficulties  and  evils  which 
led  to  the  great  development  of  sociology  and  to  the  de- 
mands for  social  reform. 

While  this  socialization  of  man  was  going  on  there 
arose  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  theory 
of  socialism.  It  was  the  brilliant  intellect  of  Marx  in 
his  great  treatise,  "  Das  Kapital,"  which  traced  all  evils 
to  capitalism.  The  rescue  was  supposed  to  be  found  when 
labor,  which  alone  was  supposed  to  produce  value,  would 
be  freed  from  the  incubus  of  capitalism.  This  liberation 
was  held  to  be  possible  only  through  society.  It  was 
supposed  to  be  the  duty  of  society  to  own  and  control  the 
great  means  of  production.  While  it  is  true  that  French 
speculators  like  Saint  Simon  and  Fourier  also  advocated 
socialistic  theories,  the  real  rise  of  modern  socialism,  after 
all,  begins  with  Marx.  The  socialistic  parties  have  grown 
in  every  country  and  have  found  able  exponents.  The 
growth  of  socialism  is  explicable  only  through  our  indus- 
trial age.  Whether  it  be  conceived  of  as  a  great  move- 
ment of  society  leading  by  slow  stages  of  evolution  to 
larger  economic  adjustment  and  truer  social  justice,  or 
whether  it  be  demanded  as  a  revolutionary  force  in  the  un- 
rest and  ferment  produced  by  the  new  conditions  of  so- 
ciety, at  all  events  it  is  both  a  result  of  a  social  age  and 
also  an  influence  toward  greater  socialization. 

Over  against  the  socialism  of  a  theoretical  and  practical 
kind,  and  in  contrast  with  the  claims  for  social  justice  and 
reform  we  find  a  very  decided  individualism  advocated 
by  certain  great  thinkers.  The  strong  and  pessimistic 
individualism  of  Ibsen,  the  consistent  call  of  Nietzsche  for 
the  great  individual,  the  mighty  super-man,  the  half- 
cynical  and  half-realistic  demands  of  Bernard  Shaw,  and 
the  unbridled  egoism  of  Stirner, —  all  of  these  have  not 


The  Social  Trend  149 

overcome  the  regnant  social  tendency.  Despite  the  de- 
mand for  a  great  intellectual  liberty  and  for  the  unlimited 
right  of  individualistic  hypothesis  in  science,  art,  morals, 
and  life,  the  trend  of  all  this  modern  individualism  is 
toward  naturalism.  The  one  common  feature  of  the  pro- 
testing individualism,  is  that  it  seeks  mere  will  for  power's 
sake  and  desires  to  live  out  its  own  impulses.  Conse- 
quently it  battles  in  vain  against  the  social  tendencies, 
and  is  enslaved  by  its  own  naturalism.  The  modern  wild 
individualism  with  its  vagaries  has  no  love  for  society. 
And  because  it  lacks  a  true  foundation  for  its  individual- 
ism, it  cannot  but  succumb.  Its  desire  is  not  the  desire  of 
a  Goethe,  who  sought  freedom  for  his  own  development. 
The  self-emphasis  and  egotism  of  Goethe  with  all  its  weak- 
nesses was  cultural,  but  the  latest  egoism  is  that  of  animal 
desire.2  Consequently  it  cannot  deliver  man,  but  with  all 
its  hopes  of  liberty  leads  him  to  naturalism  with  a  bondage 
greater  than  that  of  human  society.  Its  protests  against 
society  are  not  only  against  its  evils,  but  also  against  its 
morals.  The  freedom  it  seeks  is  the  freedom  of  animal 
passion.  Therefore,  it  is  no  real  counterbalance  to  the 
social  trend  of  the  present,  and  it  cannot  overcome  the 
economic  and  social  enslavement  because  it  has  no  solid 
leverage  for  its  claims. 

The  social  point  of  view  has  also  entered  religion.  It 
is  made  the  basis  for  an  explanation  of  great  religious 
movements.  In  part  the  psychologists  of  religion  have 
like  Ames  endeavored  to  find  its  origin  in  social  conditions 
and  the  common  need;  and  the  advance  of  religion  is  also 
supposed  to  be  the  result  of  social  forces.  There  are  two 
characteristic  efforts  which  are  indicative  of  the  present. 
The  first  is  the  attempt  of  Professor  Royce  to  solve  Chris- 
tianity from  the  ideal  of  the  community,  the  second  is  the 
endeavor  of  Professor  Patten  to  put  religion  on  an  eco- 

2  This  is  well  illustrated  in  Wells'  "  The  New  Machiavelli." 


150       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

nomic  basis.  Professor  Rojce  sets  out  to  explain  the 
foundation  of  both  morals  and  religion  from  the  viewpoint 
of  loyalty.  Loyalty  he  conceives  to  be  the  attachment  to 
a  cause;  and  it  is  the  fidelity,  genuineness  and  consistenc}' 
of  the  attachment  which  is  most  vital.  Out  of  this  effort 
to  describe  the  spirit  of  loyalty  as  adequate  to  give  us  a 
philosophy  of  life,  and  a  religion  free  from  superstition, 
there  was  developed  not  only  the  idea  of  a  specific  religion 
of  loyalty,  but  also  the  conception  of  the  real  problem  in 
Christianity.  Professor  Royce  believes  that  it  is  necessary 
to  find  out  what  Christianity  most  essentially  is  and  means 
and  what  are  its  permanent  and  indispensable  features.3 
The  first  central  idea,  in  Professor  Royce's  opinion,  is 
not  Christ,  the  Master,  but  the  spiritual  community. 
Christianity,  which  is  one  result  of  mankind  to  find  the  way 
of  salvation,  rests  fundamentally  on  a  social  idea.  Says 
Royce :  "  And  we  may  here  state  this  first  Christian  idea 
in  our  own  words  thus,  namely,  as  the  doctrine  that  '  The 
salvation  of  the  individual  man  is  determined  by  some  sort 
of  membership  in  a  certain  spiritual  community, —  a  re- 
ligious community  and,  in  its  inmost  nature,  a  divine  com- 
munity, in  whose  life  the  Christian  virtues  are  to  reach  their 
highest  expression  and  the  spirit  of  the  Master  is  to  ob- 
tain its  earthly  fulfillment.'  In  other  words:  There  is 
a  certain  universal  and  divine  spiritual  community.  Mem- 
bership in  that  community  is  necessary  to  the  salvation  of 
man."  4  The  second  great  notion,  sharply  contrasted  with 
the  first,  is  the  overwhelming  moral  burden  of  the  individual. 
This  "  includes  the  doctrine  that  of  himself,  and  apart  from 
the  spiritual  community  which  the  divine  plan  provides 
for  his  relief,  the  individual  is  powerless  to  escape  from  his 
innate  and  acquired  character,  the  character  of  a  lost 
soul."  5     In  the  discussion  of  this  second  idea,  the  funda- 

3  "  The  Problem  of  Christianity,"  Vol.  I,  p.  20. 
*  Ibid.,  p.  39. 
b  Ibid.,  p.  42. 


The  Social  Trend  151 

mental  conception  is  that  of  treason  to  the  common  cause 
and  to  the  community.  To  save  the  individual  from  this 
burden  and  to  grant  him  escape,  the  divine  plan  of  redemp- 
tion and  atonement  is  necessary.  This  atonement  cannot 
consist  in  mere  forgiveness.  Treason  must  be  triumphed 
over  through  the  community  or  "  through  some  steadfast 
loyal  servant  who  acts,  so  to  speak,  as  the  incarnation  of 
the  very  spirit  of  the  community  itself.  This  faithful  and 
suffering  servant  of  the  community  may  answer  and  con- 
found treason  by  a  work  whose  type  I  shall  next  venture 
to  describe,  in  my  own  way,  thus:  First,  this  creative 
work  shall  include  a  deed,  or  various  deeds,  for  which  only 
just  this  treason  furnishes  the  opportunity.  Not  treason 
in  general,  but  just  this  individual  treason  shall  give  the 
occasion,  and  supply  the  condition  of  the  creative  deed 
which  I  am  in  ideal  describing.  Without  just  that  treason, 
this  new  deed  (so  I  am  supposing)  could  not  have  been  done 
at  all.  And  hereupon  the  new  deed,  as  I  suppose,  is  so  in- 
geniously devised,  so  concretely  practical  in  the  good  which 
it  accomplishes,  that,  when  you  look  down  upon  the  human 
world  after  the  new  creative  deed  had  been  done  in  it,  you 
say,  first,  '  This  deed  was  made  possible  by  that  treason ; 
and,  secondly,  The  world,  as  transformed  by  this  creative 
deed,  is  better  than  it  would  have  been  had  all  else  remained 
the  same,  but  had  that  deed  of  treason  not  been  done  at  all.' 
That  is,  the  new  creative  deed  has  made  the  new  world  bet- 
ter than  it  was  before  the  blow  of  treason  fell."  6  By  such 
a  deed  of  creative  love  on  behalf  of  the  community  the  rec- 
onciling will  of  the  servant  of  the  community  has  brought 
about  the  elimination  of  the  treason  and  made  the  new  di- 
vine community.  In  this  construction  of  Royce  it  is  of 
course  noticeable  that  he  has  been  under  the  influence  of 
Hegel.  The  three  ideas  in  their  relation  remind  very 
forcibly  of  Hegel's  conception  of  the  movement  of  reason, 

e  Ibid.,  p.  307  ff. 


152       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

in  the  thesis,  the  antithesis  and  the  reconciliation.  The 
positive  and  the  negative  are  resolved  into  unity.  The 
influence  of  Hegel  is  also  noticeable  in  the  minimizing  of 
evil.  The  world  seems  to  be  the  better  for  the  treason, 
because  it  is  the  occasion  for  the  exercise  of  the  reconciling 
love  which  makes  the  community  better.  There  is,  how- 
ever, this  difference  between  Hegel  and  Royce,  that  for 
Hegel  the  ideal  is  the  state,  for  Royce  society.  But  if  we 
eliminate  the  peculiar  Hegelian  coloring  of  Royce's  idea  of 
Christianity,  it  is  expressive  of  the  trend  of  the  age  and 
meets  the  demands  of  much  of  the  thinking  of  the  age  be- 
cause it  is  social.  It  stands  broadly  for  a  whole  group  of 
men  who  would  interpret  Christianity  as  valuable  only 
when  it  serves  the  community.  The  fundamental  notion 
of  Christianity  would  then  be  that  of  a  new  humanity  and 
a  great  brotherhood.  Its  activities  would  be  philanthropic 
and  creative  of  larger  human  life.  Its  program  would 
include  the  overcoming  of  the  individual  or  the  groups 
of  individuals  who  treasonably  oppose  humanity.  Its 
service  would  be  in  the  end  social  and  political  betterment, 
civic  virtue  and  righteousness.  Consequently  the  whole 
value  of  Christianity  would  be  in  the  creating  of  a  new 
society. 

Distinct  from  this  idealistic  conception  of  Christianity 
as  fundamentally  social,  is  the  economic  point  of  view 
of  Professor  Patten.  For  him  the  aim  of  Christianity  is  to 
bring  about  the  age  of  co-operation  and  love.  Rut  it  is  to 
affect  its  aims  on  an  economic  basis.  As  far  as  Christian- 
ity serves  the  best  interests  of  a  just  economic  development, 
so  far  is  it  valuable.  Professor  Patten  has  expressed  his 
fundamental  principle  in  this  striking  way :  "  Sin  is  mis- 
ery ;  misery  is  poverty ;  and  the  antidote  to  poverty  is  in- 
come." 7  Allowing  for  the  effort  in  this  statement  to  at- 
tract attention  and  to  arouse  discussion,  it  nevertheless 

7  "  The  Social  Basis  of  Religion,"  p.  xviii. 


The  Social  Trend  153 

makes  sin  dependent  upon  unjust  economic  conditions. 
Adequate  economic  opportunity  and  proper  economic  sur- 
roundings would  overcome  the  evil.  If  every  one  had  a 
sufficient  income  as  indicative  of  his  opportunity  to  earn 
and  to  live,  temptation  and  sin  would  be  overcome.  Pro- 
fessor Patten  here  speaks  for  all  those  who  believe  that 
the  difficulty  of  surroundings  are  creative  of  wrong.  He  is 
at  one  with  the  sociologists  who  desire  to  save  mankind 
through  improved  surroundings,  and  with  the  socialists  who 
find  that  capitalism  is  the  root  of  all  evil.  The  neces- 
sity then  of  religion  would  be  to  create  the  spirit  of  solidar- 
ity in  human  goods  and  possessions,  in  human  opportunities 
for  earthly  comfort  and  ease.  Whenever  Christianity  is 
interpreted  as  finding  its  completion  merely  in  the  better- 
ment of  external  conditions,  it  receives  such  an  economic 
interpretation.  Christ  is  the  representative  of  a  purely 
social  religion.8  If  the  end  of  Christianity  is  to  help  in 
the  abolition  of  child  labor,  in  the  solution  of  the  problem 
of  better  housing,  in  the  elimination  of  tuberculosis,  and  in 
the  creation  of  a  better  physical  race,  its  purpose  must  be 
merely  economic.  There  are  those  who  endeavor  to  uphold 
this  viewpoint  of  Christianity  by  claiming  that  Chris- 
tianity was  the  historical  result  of  a  decadent  age,  and  that 
it  answered  to  the  great  cry  of  the  socially  depressed.  It 
became  the  religion  of  salvation,  it  is  claimed,  through  its 
emphasis  of  brotherhood.  A  pure  Christianity,  if  this  be 
its  origin,  must,  therefore,  serve  the  social  and  economic 
interest.  The  welfare  of  society  must  be  the  fundamental 
conditioning  factor.9 

The  advocates  of  socialism,  as  far  as  they  make  any 
claim  to  be  religious  and  do  not  follow  the  atheism  of  their 
great  leader,  Marx,  endeavor  to  find  in  Jesus  a  social  re- 

s  Cf.  Patten,  "  The  Social  Basis  of  Religion,"  p.  193  ff. 
9  For  a  sober  opposite  view,  cf .  Peabody,  "  Christ  and  the  Social 
Question." 


154       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

former.  His  advice  to  the  rich  young  man  to  sell  all 
things  which  he  had;  His  sad  comment,  that  it  is  easier 
for  a  camel  to  pass  through  a  needle's  eye  than  for  a  rich 
man  to  enter  the  kingdom  of  God,  are  emphasized  as  op- 
posing the  possession  of  capital.  We  are  asked  whether 
it  is  not  true,  that  Lazarus,  the  poor  man,  is  the  saint, 
and  Dives,  the  rich  man,  the  sinner.  Does  not  Jesus  say, 
according  to  the  real  original  and  genuine  account  of  St. 
Luke:  "Blessed  be  ye  poor:  for  yours  is  the  kingdom 
of  God"?  10  Labor  is  exalted  and  Jesus  Himself  is  the 
carpenter.  Was  not  the  early  Church  socialistic,  as  it  ap- 
pears in  the  communism  of  the  congregation  at  Jerusalem  ? 
Was  not  Paul  a  tentmaker  and  laborer?  What  was  the 
message  of  the  earliest  letter  of  the  New  Testament,  if  not 
the  message  of  the  choice  of  the  poor?  u  The  whole  trend 
of  early  Christianity  is,  therefore,  held  to  be  social.  Its 
spirit  of  love  is  interpreted  as  true  co-operation  and  help- 
fulness in  external  poverty  and  depression.  The  modern 
application  of  Christianity  ought  to  seek  a  return,  we  are 
informed,  to  its  early  principles,  and  it  ought  to  sym- 
pathize with  the  laborers  who  are  oppressed.  Its  func- 
tion ought  to  be  to  create  a  new  society  in  which  there  is  no 
competition,  and  in  which  labor  receives  its  due  reward. 

With  influences  like  these  all  about  Christianity,  re- 
inforced by  the  desire  of  a  large  group  within  the  Church 
that  Christianity  should  enter  the  field  of  social  reform, 
and  by  the  demand  that  the  Church  ought  to  become  a 
mighty  philanthropic  agency,  it  is  necessary  to  obtain  a 
clear  conception  of  the  function  of  Christianity  in  refer- 
ence to  the  strong  social  tendency  of  the  present.  It  is 
true  that  Christianity  at  its  inception  had  deep  sympathy 
with  the  poor  and  oppressed  and  found  among  them  many 
of   its   adherents.     Its   comforts   appeal   strongly   to   the 

io  Luke,  6:20. 
ii  James,  2:1  ff. 


The  Social  Trend  155 

downtrodden  of  every  type.  The  central  teaching  of 
Jesus  makes  much  use  of  the  idea  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 
In  the  parables  which  portray  the  kingdom  there  is  a  con- 
stant background  of  a  social  nature.  The  kingdom  is  a 
vineyard  of  labor,  a  feast  of  joy,  a  large  wheatfield,  and  a 
net  in  which  many  fish  are  caught.  These  and  similar 
pictures  certainly  portray  the  common  social  side  of  Chris- 
tianity. It  can  also  not  be  gainsaid  that  the  early  Church 
was  seen  to  be,  by  those  that  observed  its  gatherings  and 
life,  a  new  society  in  which  love  and  brotherhood  reigned. 
When  St.  Paul  sees  the  Church  in  its  greatness,  into  which 
the  fullness  of  God  is  to  enter,  he  pictures  it  as  a  great 
spiritual  temple  of  living  men  and  women,  as  an  organic 
living  body,  in  which  all  differences  of  class,  race  and  sex 
are  obliterated,  and  in  which  mankind  is  unified  through 
the  cross  of  Christ.12  It  cannot  be  denied  that  early 
Christianity  contemplated  an  early  return  of  Jesus  for  the 
judgment  of  the  world.  Then  there  would  be  a  new  heaven 
and  a  new  earth.  Then  the  meek  would  inherit  the  earth 
and  the  saints  rule.  Despite  the  fact  that  Christ  claimed 
His  kingdom  to  be  not  of  this  world,  the  hope  of  His 
return  presaged  His  reign  as  King  of  kings  and  Lord  of 
lords.  Social  injustice  and  wrong  would  cease,  for  there 
would  be  no  sin  nor  anything  unclean  in  the  new  Jerusalem. 
The  hope  of  Isaiah  as  to  the  glorious  reign  of  peace,  when 
the  swords  would  be  beaten  into  ploughshares  and  the 
spears  into  pruning-hooks,  would  then  be  realized.  We 
cannot  read  and  combine  pictures  and  teachings  like  these 
without  admitting  that  there  is  a  strong  social  element 
and  a  deep  social  undercurrent  in  Christianity. 

But  with  all  due  allowance  for  this  fact,  it  is  well  to 
realize  that  Christianity,  even  as  far  as  it  is  social,  is  not 
moved  by  economic  interests.  While  John  the  Baptist 
directly  named  social  wrongs  and  demanded  their  change 

12  Cf.  Ephesians,  2:11  ff ;  Ephesians,  3:6;  Galatians,  3:28. 


156       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

when  he  spoke  to  the  Pharisees  and  the  soldiers,13  Jesus 
promulgated  no  social  program.  He  was  no  divider  of 
goods,  and  in  His  view  capital  was  only  Mammon  because 
of  its  spiritual  danger.  Nicodemus  and  Joseph  of  Arima- 
thea  were  not  rejected  by  Him,  nor  were  Matthew  and  Zac- 
cheus  thrown  aside.  Christ  opposed  the  love  of  money  but 
not  its  mere  possession.  He  attacked  the  insincerity  of  the 
ruling  classes,  but  not  their  goods.  Dives  was  finally  lost 
because  of  his  unbelief  and  not  because  of  his  wealth.  The 
early  Christian  Church  had  among  its  members  people  of 
standing  and  wealth.  The  communistic  experiment  of  the 
congregation  at  Jerusalem  was  purely  voluntary  and  not 
a  law ;  it  failed  and  proved  that  the  quick  economic  applica- 
tion of  spiritual  love  was  unsuccessful.  A  very  clear  evi- 
dence of  the  relation  of  early  Christianity  to  social  condi- 
tions and  evils  is  found  in  the  attitude  of  St.  Paul  when  he 
returned  the  fugitive  slave  Onesimus  to  Philemon.  The 
slave  was  returned  as  a  Christian  to  be  treated  by  his 
master  as  a  brother.  In  this  way  through  spiritual  broth- 
erhood the  social  evil  of  slavery  was  inwardly  overcome, 
but  St.  Paul  had  no  social  program  for  the  external  change 
of  society  through  the  doing  away  of  slavery.  This  was 
not  the  function  of  Christianity;  it  might  follow  as  an 
effect  but  it  was  not  the  immediate  aim.  It  is  only  by 
misinterpretation  that  Christianity  can  be  made  a  social 
or  economic  movement  against  the  social  order  of  its  day. 
It  had  social  effects  but  it  was  not  a  social  propaganda. 
Its  social  results  are  due  to  its  religious  claims.  It  is  social 
as  far  as  religion  is  social,  but  it  is  not  economic.  It 
does  not  announce  a  new  world  of  bread,  but  a  new  faith 
and  life  through  the  Word  of  God.  The  interests  of  its 
life  are  not  to  feed  the  thousands  with  bodily  bread,  but 
to  provide  men  with  the  spiritual  Bread  from  Heaven. 
The  ideals  and  aims  of  Christianity  are  not  earthly  satis- 

13  Luke,  3:7  ff. 


The  Social  Trend  157 

factions  ;  it  does  not  deal  with  new  surroundings,  but  with  a 
new  soul.  It  seeks  to  eliminate  sin  and  then  to  reform 
society,  but  not  to  change  society  as  a  means  for  the  re- 
moval of  sin.  There  is  in  Christianity  no  acquiescence  in 
the  idealization  of  mere  material  comfort;  and  it  has  no 
sympathy  with  an  ideal  economic  state  as  the  solution 
of  man's  deepest  problem  of  happiness,  righteousness,  and 
peace.  Its  kingdom  is  within,  its  ideals  are  altogether 
spiritual.  The  hope  which  it  cherishes  is  not  a  new  eco- 
nomic condition  and,  therefore,  a  new  mankind,  but  a  new 
spiritually  redeemed  mankind  and,  therefore,  a  new  society 
of  a  spiritual  order. 

Christianity  cannot  sympathize  with  the  suppression  of 
the  individual  in  any  strongly  social  scheme.  The  society 
which  Christianity  found  in  the  old  world  was  one  of 
classes.  In  it  were  the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  free  men 
and  the  slaves,  the  Jew  and  the  Greek.  The  Greek  and 
the  Roman  States  were  also  marked  by  classes  and  castes. 
One  of  the  mightiest  problems  in  the  later  Roman  Empire 
was  the  problem  of  the  slave.  But  Christianity  began, 
over  against  all  class-calculation,  and  as  against  all  mass- 
ing of  men,  with  the  declaration  of  the  infinite  value  of  the 
soul.14  One  soul  outweighed  the  whole  world  in  worth. 
One  sinner  to  be  saved  meant  more  than  all  the  rest  of 
men.15  Even  the  parables  which  portray  the  Kingdom 
with  a  social  background  add  the  necessity  of  individual 
selection.  The  common  vineyard  of  the  Kingdom  was  the 
opportunity  for  dealing  with  the  individual  laborer.  At 
the  marriage  feast  man  after  man  was  scrutinized,  and  the 
unworthy  individual  was  removed.  The  Kingdom  was  the 
infinitely  valuable  treasure  obtained  by  the  purchaser  of 
the  field;  it  was  the  priceless  pearl  sought  and  found  by 
the    single,    seeking    merchant.     The    highest    valuation, 

14  Cf.  Mark,  8:35,  36. 
is  Cf.  Luke,  15. 


158       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

therefore,  of  the  Kingdom  was  obtained  through  the  in- 
dividual. In  the  net  which  caught  the  fish  of  the  Kingdom 
there  was  to  be  a  separation  by  individuals.  From  the 
great  field  of  the  Kingdom  the  tares  were  not  to  be  pre- 
maturely removed  out  of  consideration  for  the  wheat.  The 
fear  that  any  wheat  might  be  destroyed  was  stronger  than 
the  benefit  to  be  derived  from  an  immediate  and  sweeping 
elimination  of  the  tares.  There  was  to  be  no  social  purifi- 
cation which  might  damage  the  individual.  Jesus  every- 
where deals  with  individuals.  Of  course,  His  individual- 
ism is  not  the  naturalistic  individualism  of  the  present, 
nor  the  philosophic  individualism  of  our  time.16  He  seeks 
the  individual  to  make  the  individual  a  saved  personality. 
Christ  has  no  hope  of  the  masses  as  masses.  They  do 
not  grasp  Him  and  understand  His  message.  He  must 
hide  from  them  His  deepest  truth  through  the  parables. 
It  is  only  the  few  seeking  disciples  who  are  ready  to 
receive  the  mystery  of  the  Kingdom.  Christ's  hope  is 
not  in  the  many  and  in  society  but  in  the  select  and 
chosen  few,  singly  found,  singly  saved  and  trained. 
Christ  holds  that  many  are  called  and  few  are  chosen. 
The  whole  Magna  Charta  of  the  spiritual  freedom  of 
faith  rests  upon  this  valuation  of  the  individual  which 
Jesus  established.  Any  loss  of  it  for  the  sake  of 
a  social  scheme  would  be  subversive  of  Christianity.  While 
Christianity  is  not  the  faith  of  self-centered  individualism, 
it  is  the  faith  of  the  true  individual,  who  is  to  be  developed 
into  a  holy  personality,  and  of  true  society  through  the 
saved  and  sanctified  individual.  To  remove  the  soul  and  its 
salvation  from  Christianity  would  be  to  remove  its  heart. 
Christianity  has  no  quarrel  with  a  historical  point  of 
view  if  its  philosophy  does  not  eliminate  the  individual. 
Historical  deeds,  when  man  is  involved,  can  not  be  justly 
described  without  the  personal  factor.  The  personal  fac- 
ie Cf.  Warner  Fite,  "  Individualism." 


The  Social  Trend  159 

tor  need  not  mean  that  history  is  simply  the  action  of  its 
great  leaders  and  heroes.  We  have  come  to  realize  that 
there  is  a  large  place  for  the  common  people.  But  if  his- 
tory does  regard  the  many  it  cannot  reduce  their  develop- 
ment to  a  mere  biological,  economic  or  social  evolution, 
without  destroying  the  soul  of  history  and  emptying  it  of 
its  moral  import  and  its  divine  guidance.  History  to  re- 
main real  and  fully  concrete  must  include  the  highest 
aspects  and  strivings  of  man  and  cannot  see  in  these  merely 
resultants  of  the  struggle  for  existence,  the  selection  of  sex 
and  the  fondness  of  food.  History  must  allow  for  the  de- 
velopment of  true  personality.  When  history  is  thus  con- 
ceived as  finally  a  vital  development  in  time,  in  which  man's 
personality  grows  and  expresses  itself  in  manifold  deeds 
and  acts,  then  it  is  possible  to  speak  truly  of  the  historical 
point  of  view  in  religion.  Without  the  personal  factor 
man  could  have  no  history  of  religion;  without  it  there 
could  be  no  growth  in  faith  or  life.  It  is  the  personal 
man  who  makes  possible  the  conception  of  the  personal 
God  who  speaks  to  man  and  deals  with  him.  The  prob- 
lem of  the  personal  man  as  it  leads  to  the  personal  God 
opens  up  the  whole  question  of  the  historical  attitude  in  re- 
ligion. It  opens  it  up  but  does  not  complete  it ;  for  other- 
wise it  would  mean,  that  the  divine  is  merely  a  temporal 
growth  in  the  history  of  man.  When  the  historical  enters 
religion  it  is  yoked  to  a  mystery.  The  temporal  cannot 
originate  the  divine,  the  historical  cannot  beget  the  eternal. 
But  —  and  here  the  mystery  enters  —  will  the  historical 
cease  if  the  divine  enters  the  human,  and  the  eternal  the 
temporal?  Christianity  answers,  no.  It  emphasizes  the 
idea  that  the  eternal  God  has  entered  into  time,  that  the 
complete  has  come  into  human  incompleteness,  the  perfect 
into  the  imperfect,  the  being  into  the  becoming,  the  un- 
changing rest  into  development.  Thus  the  historical  point 
of  view  in  Christian  truth  grows  out  of  the  incarnation. 


160       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

Its  reality  must  determine  the  philosophy  of  the  history 
of  Christianity.  Consequently  no  other  ideals  or  prin- 
ciples can  rule.  It  is  the  Word  made  flesh  who  forms  the 
spiritual  starting-point  for  the  history  of  Christianity. 


PART  TWO 
THOUGHT  AND  TRUTH 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    FINDING    OF    TRUTH 

THE  leading  aspects  of  thought  open  up  to  us  a 
further  problem.  When  the  modern  attitudes  of 
thought  are  correlated  to  Christianity  another 
question  still  remains.  It  is  the  problem  of  testing 
thought.  The  logical  procedure  of  the  present  and  the 
ruling  ideals  have  been  discussed.  Are  these  adequate  to 
the  truth  of  thought,  or  do  we  need  a  fundamental  exami- 
nation of  the  character  of  truth  and  of  its  deepest  nature? 
The  present  philosophical  trend  is  inclined  to  answer  that 
we  need  a  special  examination  of  the  formal  character  of 
truth.  The  general  determination  of  the  methods  of 
thinking  are  not  sufficient,  but  they  must  be  seen  from  a 
specific  angle.  Their  inner  validity  must  be  considered. 
It  is  through  validity  that  thought  and  truth  are  united, 
and  we  realize  how  they  belong  together.  Thought  may 
err  and  be  incorrect,  and  the  logic  and  reasoning  of 
thought  may  be  misapplied.  In  fact,  corrective  points  of 
view  have  been  emphasized  in  the  whole  discussion  of  the 
first  part.  But  the  whole  problem  of  truth  and  thought 
must  be  more  definitely  centered.  The  aim  of  thought  is 
to  attain  truth.  Now  how  is  this  truth  attained  and 
found  ? 

Mankind  has  always  been  engaged,  though  through 
many  a  path  of  error,  in  seeking  truth.  It  is,  however, 
not  the  actual  quest  of  truth  which  interests  us.  The 
discussion   of   the   last  decades,   brought   about   through 

pragmatism,   turns    about   the   character   of   the   search. 

163 


164       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

This  more  formal  question  as  to  how  truth  is  found  and 
established  has  led  to  the  alignment  of  men  into  two  great 
parties. 

On  the  one  side  there  have  gathered  those  who  believe 
in  the  existence  and  absoluteness  of  truth  before  all  search- 
ing and  finding.  They  identify  truth  and  reality.  For 
them  the  logical  quest  is  only  an  appearance  and  a  shadow. 
Their  first  assumption  is,  that  what  is,  is.  The  idea  and 
ideal  of  truth,  which  is  all-embracing,  exists  prior  to  all  ex- 
perience, and  eternally  above  and  beyond  all  human  search. 
In  this  attitude  the  absolute  pantheist  and  the  absolute 
idealist  in  substance  join  hands  with  the  mystic  in  asserting 
and  re-asserting  the  old  conception  of  absolute  being  under 
new  forms  and  expressions.  It  will  be  necessary  to  ex- 
amine the  newer  statements  of  the  old  philosophic  notion 
of  being  and  reality,  and  to  note  their  bearing  upon  Chris- 
tianity. 

Over  against  the  absolutist  of  every  type  and  the  mystic 
of  every  kind  there  have  arisen  the  pragmatist,  the  vitalist, 
and  the  neo-realist  with  their  apparently  new  positions. 
All  of  these  emphasize  with  Lessing  that  the  search  after 
truth  is  greater  than  the  possession  of  it.  With  the 
pragmatist  the  problem  of  truth  is  most  central,  and  he  has 
much  to  say  in  descriptive  elaboration  of  how  truth  func- 
tions. The  philosophy  of  life,  which  Bergson  and  Eucken 
advocate,  also  pays  attention  to  the  problem  of  truth, 
even  though  its  main  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  fact  of  life, 
and  its  main  contention  is  on  behalf  of  the  idea  of  life 
itself.  The  neo-realistic  school  has  likewise  found  it  neces- 
sary to  declare  itself  on  the  problem  of  truth  and  error. 

While  pragmatism  has  stirred  up  the  question,  how  is 
truth  found,  and  has  sought  to  reduce  it  to  a  psychological 
problem,  the  starting  point  of  the  psychological  problem 
of  truth  lies  further  back.  The  new  claim  and  accent  of 
the  descriptive  study  of  mind,  to  solve  what  truth  really 


The  Finding  of  Truth  165 

is  and  means  for  man  in  its  formal  aspect  and  in  its  es- 
sential features,  is  a  resultant  of  the  whole  movement  of 
modern  philosophy.  When  Descartes  began  to  resolve 
doubt  by  placing  the  emphasis  of  certainty  in  the  think- 
ing ego,  he  centered  the  whole  problem  of  all  things  in 
consciousness.  Despite  the  thorough-going  pantheism  of 
Spinoza,  which  depersonalized  thinking  and  made  con- 
sciousness the  factual  result  rather  than  the  thinking 
source  of  reality,  the  new  emphasis  of  the  ego  maintained 
its  force.  The  monads  of  Leibniz  were  conceived  of  as 
ideal  and  thinking  centers,  and  they  led  modern  thinking 
to  realize  the  importance  of  the  individual  mind.  With 
Leibniz  as  a  background  Kant  formulated  for  the  modern 
age  in  most  distinct  manner  the  problem  of  how  we  know. 
In  this  formulation  he  was,  however,  more  stimulated  by 
the  scepticism  of  Hume  as  to  the  possibility  of  any  certain 
knowledge  beyond  impressions,  than  by  the  personal  ideal- 
ism of  Berkeley.  Kant  set  himself  the  task  of  answering 
the  question  of  truth  by  means  of  logic.  Thus  there  arose 
the  whole  modern  epistemology,  which  claimed  to  be  sep- 
arate from  the  distinct  sciences  of  psychology  and  formal 
logic.  The  foundations  of  knowledge  were  sought  after 
and  examined.  The  answers  which  epistemology  suggested 
were  to  make  a  basis  of  truth  by  carefully  showing,  what 
we  know,  and  what  we  can  know,  and  how  we  know.  But 
it  did  not  aim  to  answer  these  questions  by  examining 
the  phenomenal  processes  of  the  mind,  but  by  finding  the 
ver}^  nature  of  knowledge.  This  science  of  epistemology 
absorbed  the  interest  of  thinkers  everywhere. 

But  the  newer  attitude  which  pragmatism  represents 
raised  serious  objections  to  the  ruling  epistemology.  It 
claimed  that  epistemology  began  generally  with  a  meta- 
physical assumption  and  doctrine,  and  then  it  determined 
logic  and  psychology  from  its  assumption,  and  combined 
them  with  its  metaphysics.     The  newer  accurate  examina- 


166        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

tion  of  psychological  phenomena  set  the  current  against 
philosophical  epistemology.  Psychology  desired  to  have 
knowledge  examined  in  its  process.  The  generalization 
from  the  processes  of  knowledge  was  to  point  the  way  to- 
ward a  doctrine  of  truth.  Truth  was  then  to  be  considered 
as  more  than  a  philosophical  or  even  a  logical  problem. 
The  logical  and  philosophical  considerations  were  to  be 
made  secondary  to  psychology.  As  the  processes  of  actual 
knowledge  in  the  human  mind  include  feeling  and  will  these 
were  made  parts  of  actually  functioning  truth.  It  was  in 
this  way  that  the  newer  attitude  on  truth  arose.  The 
absolutists  who  made  truth  fundamental  before  all  finding 
of  it,  and  who  claimed  that  it  could  never  be  really  realized 
in  the  world  of  appearance,  were  set  aside.  There  was 
equal  opposition  to  any  epistemologist,  who,  from  some 
ideal  of  truth  found  in  examining  the  heart  of  knowledge, 
framed  a  metaphysical  doctrine  upon  a  metaphysical  ex- 
amination. Nor  was  the  emphasis  in  the  newer  doctrine 
put  on  the  mere  finding  of  the  truth  as  something  to  be 
discovered,  but  it  was  also  asserted  that  frequently  the 
finding  and  the  quest  made  the  truth.  Between  the  di- 
lemma of  this  assertion  and  that  of  the  existence  of  truth 
prior  to  all  quest  we  stand  to-day.  Is  truth  existent,  and 
shall  we  find  and  discover  it,  or  is  truth  the  result  of  a  proc- 
ess and  is  it  crystallized  out  of  many  truths  slowly  dis- 
covered in  the  search? 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    ABSOLUTIST    AIM 

IT  has  often  been  supposed  that  the  absolutist  is  the 
best  friend  of  Christianity.  His  conception  of  truth 
as  existent,  eternal,  actual  in  its  constancy  and  being, 
and  his  identification  of  truth  with  absolute,  infinite  and 
individual  reality,  seem  not  merely  truly  religious,  but  also 
most  favorable  to  Christianity's  claim  of  exclusive  and 
final  truth.  Does  not  the  absolutist  pierce  the  veil  of  the 
visible  and  audible  and  tangible,  and  lead  the  mind  to  the 
unchanging  realm  of  existence  beyond  the  "  this,"  the 
"  what,"  and  the  "  now  "  ?  But  Christianity  will  be  com- 
pelled to  learn  through  the  examination  of  the  present 
expositions  of  absolutism,  that  the  result  of  the  newer  ab- 
solutism is  not  different  in  its  effects  and  influences  from 
the  influence  of  Hegel  and  early  Hegelianism.  When 
Hegel  reigned  the  power  and  vitality  of  the  Christian  idea 
of  God  were  lost,  because  the  Absolute  was  as  much  de- 
prived of  real  personality  by  Hegel  as  it  had  been  by 
Spinoza.  All  the  emphasis  on  the  uniqueness  and  individu- 
ality of  the  Absolute  did  not  guarantee  His  real  personal 
existence.  The  doctrine  of  God's  personality  was  not 
asserted.  And  the  Christian  dogma  of  the  Trinity  was 
interpreted  as  an  intellectual  movement,  but  not  as  a  liv- 
ing, throbbing,  feeling,  willing  unity  of  co-equal,  eternal 
persons.  The  atonement  became  a  moral  and  speculative 
fact,  and  was  not  a  historical  and  spiritual  occurrence. 
Through  its  optimism  of  abstract  being  Hegelianism  re- 
moved the  sting  of  sin,  which  it  declared  to  be  unreal  and 

167 


168        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

passing,  a  discord  to  be  dissolved  into  unity.  With  the 
neglect  of  a  real  distinction  between  sin  and  holiness  there 
went  hand  in  hand  the  loss  of  a  really  deep  and  actual 
difference  between  truth  and  error  in  mankind. 

It  has  been  particularly  the  difficulty  of  a  clear  dis- 
tinction between  truth  and  error  which  the  latest  ab- 
solutism, that  rests  on  Hegelianism,  has  brought  to  light. 
The  idealism  of  Professor  Bradley,  in  his  great  book  on 
"  Appearance  and  Reality,"  makes  it  very  clear,  that  while 
perfect  truth  and  reality  are  identical  in  their  absolute 
harmony  and  individuality,  there  is  no  real  cleavage  be- 
tween truth  and  error  in  our  human  experience.  Truth 
as  we  seek  it  and  find  it  finitely  is  not  fundamentally  sep- 
arate from  error.  Only  when  completed  is  truth  reality 
and  fullness  of  existence.  Professor  Bradley  says : 
"  Perfection  of  truth  and  of  reality  has  in  the  end  the 
same  character.  .  .  .  Truth  must  exhibit  the  mark  of  in- 
ternal harmony,  or,  again  the  mark  of  expansion  and  all- 
inclusiveness.  And  these  two  characteristics  are  diverse 
aspects  of  a  single  principle.  .  .  .  But,  in  the  second 
place,  harmony  is  incompatible  with  restriction  and  fini- 
tude."  1  Therefore,  all  finite  relations  are  only  degrees 
toward  the  truth  and  possess  a  side  which  is  at  the  same 
time  error.2  Error  is  only  finite  and  false  appearance ;  it 
is  discrepant  with  reality.  To  eliminate  error  there  must 
be  a  progress  toward  full  reality.  In  his  later  work,  "  Es- 
says on  Truth  and  Reality,"  Bradley,  in  order  to  bring  out 
clearly  the  expansion  of  partial  truth  toward  all-inclusive- 
ness,  and  to  emphasize  the  process  toward  complete  har- 
mony, differentiates  truth  and  reality  only  to  merge  them 
again  finally.  He  says :  "  Truth  claimed  identity  with 
an  individual  and  all-inclusive  whole.  But  such  a  whole, 
when  we  examine  it,  we  find  itself  to  be  the  Universe  and  all 


i  "  Appearance  and  Reality,"  p.  363. 
2  Ibid.,  Chapter  XVI. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  169 

reality.  And  when  we  had  to  see  how  truth  fails,3  as  truth, 
in  attaining  its  own  end,  we  were  being  shown  the  very 
features  of  difference  between  truth  and  reality.  And  in 
passing  over  into  reality  and  in  thus  ceasing  to  be  mere 
truth,  truth  does  not  pass  beyond  its  own  end,  nor  does 
it  fail  to  realize  itself.  Hence,  being  the  same  as  reality, 
and  at  the  same  time  different  from  reality,  truth  is  thus 
able  to  apprehend  its  identity  and  difference.  But,  if 
this  is  so,  we  seem  to  have  reached  the  solution  of  our 
problem."  4  "  And  thus,  if  we  are  asked  for  the  relation  of 
truth  to  reality,  we  must  reply  that  in  the  end  there  is  no 
relation,  since  in  the  end  there  are  no  separate  terms.  All 
that  we  can  say  is  that,  in  order  for  truth  to  complete 
itself  into  reality,  such  and  such  defects  in  truth  itself 
would  have  to  be  rectified."  5  In  other  words,  truth  com- 
pleted is  reality.  It  resolves  itself  into  absolute  unity 
and  harmony,  and  becomes  finally  and  really  truth  in  real- 
ity. This  is  a  logical  process  in  which  every  contradiction 
is  resolved  into  absolute  non-contradiction  beyond  identity 
and  difference. 

Meantime,  however,  in  our  experience,  there  are  grades 
of  truth  and  error.  "  To  be  more  or  less  time,  and  to 
be  more  or  less  real,  is  to  be  separated  by  an  interval, 
smaller  or  greater,  from  all-inclusiveness  or  self-consis- 
tency." 6  On  the  other  hand,  "  error  is  truth,  it  is  par- 
tial truth,  that  is  false  only  because  partial  and  left  in- 
complete."7 "  Error  consists  in  the  deviation  of  the 
idea,  whether  by  excess  or  defect  from  that  reality  at  which 

3  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  114  ff.  Truth  is  claimed  to 
fail  in  its  finite  process,  (1)  because  its  contents  cannot  be  made 
intelligible  throughout  and  entirely;  (2)  failing  thus  truth  fails  again 
to  include  all  the  given  facts.  These  failures  are  in  truth  as  it 
seeks  to  arrive  at  its  standard  of  all-inclusive  completeness. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  116. 
s  Ibid.,  p.  117. 

6  "  Appearance  and  Reality,"  p.  364. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  192. 


170        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

it  aims."  8  Thus  error  and  partial  truth  are  identical,  and 
partial  error  is  also  partial  truth.  The  aim  in  either  is 
toward  a  coherent  and  consistent  whole.  The  higher  the 
structure  and  the  more  complete  the  system  which  relates 
everything  internally  to  the  absolute  whole,  the  nearer 
we  are  to  the  truth.  "  If  we  could  reach  an  all-embracing 
ordered  whole,  then  our  certainty  would  be  absolute."  9 
But  while  this  certainty  is  not  reached  by  us,  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  the  Absolute  works  in  and  through  us. 
However,  this  working  is  only  partial.  "  Truth  is  an  ideal 
expression  of  the  Universe,  at  once  coherent  and  com- 
prehensive. It  must  not  conflict  with  itself,  and  there 
must  be  no  suggestion  which  fails  to  fall  inside  it.  Perfect 
truth  in  short  must  realize  the  idea  of  a  systematic 
whole."  10 

In  full  accord  with  Professor  Bradley  is  Mr.  Joachim 
in  his  book  on  "  The  Nature  of  Truth."  He  holds  that 
an  ideal  experience,  which  is  the  absolute  total,  the  whole 
in  perfect  unity,  is  being  fulfilled  and  found  through  finite 
approach  to  ideal,  final  truth.  The  final  truth  is  con- 
tained in  the  notion  of  coherence,  which  is  inner  and  logical, 
and  leads  to  the  whole.  "  For  the  ideal  of  absolute  truth, 
by  reference  to  which  we  are  measuring  the  relative  de- 
grees of  truth  in  the  various  systems  of  judgments,  and 
(through  them)  in  the  single  judgments,  is  the  completely 
individual,  self-sustained,  significant  whole.  The  truth, 
we  seem  to  see,  emerges  in  its  perfect  completeness  as  an 
individual  meaning  with  an  internal  logical  connectedness 
and  articulation.  Its  articulate  connexion  demands  dis- 
cursive expression  as  a  system  of  judgments.  Its  indi- 
viduality requires  self-containedness  or  complete  self-co- 
herence of  the  system.     And  this  seems  to  be  the  ideal, 

s  "  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  258. 
o  Ibid.,  p.  211. 
io  Ibid.,  p.  223. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  171 

which  human  knowledge  involves  and  partly  attains ; 
though  it  can  never  be  adequately,  fully,  or  finally  embodied 
within  the  actual  knowledge  of  finite  subjects."  n  In  the 
approach  to  the  ideal  and  to  reality  "  systematic  knowl- 
edge, which  is  to  represent  this  '  reality,'  will  include  nega- 
tive as  well  as  affirmative  judgments  on  the  same  level  of 
significance."  12  The  negations  do  not  exclude  the  positive 
instances,  but  only  serve  to  throw  into  relief  positive  judg- 
ments. Just  as  truth  in  its  progress  needs  negation,  it 
also  needs  error,  and  it  requires  error  as  the  road  to  truth. 
Error  is  isolation  and  partakes  of  the  character  of  frag- 
ments, but  still  it  performs  a  positive  service.  Finally 
Joachim,  although  he  cannot  doubt  the  unity  and  whole- 
ness of  truth,  finds  a  real  insoluble  problem.  This  arises 
not  in  the  immediate  recognition  of  the  truth,  nor  in  the 
immediate  recognition  of  various  judgments  or  systems 
of  judgments  as  more  or  less  true  in  approximating  the  one 
standard,  but  it  does  arise  from  the  immediate  experience 
of  truth  when  the  thinker  endeavors  to  raise  immediate 
certainty  to  the  level  of  reflective  knowledge.  In  other 
words,  an  ideal  of  logical,  perfect  harmony,  held  as  a  belief 
cannot  be  logically  and  reflectively  defended  in  discursive 
and  analytic  argument.  Despite  this  failure,  which  makes 
it  impossible  to  apply  the  ideal  of  truth  in  actual  thought 
and  life,  Joachim  is  not  moved  to  test  any  other  concep- 
tion of  truth. 

Professor  Royce  endeavors  to  approach  this  problem 
from  a  somewhat  different  angle,  but  the  final  result  is  the 
same.  He  begins  by  differing  from  what  he  designates  as 
critical  rationalism,  which  seeks  truth  as  the  empirically 
verifiable  truth.  It  is  the  purpose  of  Royce  to  find  as  the 
truth  "  in  a  completed  experience  the  whole  meaning  of  a 
System  of  Ideas."  13     According  to  Royce  experience  is 

11  "  The  Nature  of  Truth,"  p.  113  ff. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  138. 

is  «  The  World  and  the  Individual,"  Vol.  I,  p.  61. 


172        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

truly  interpreted  not  as  partial,  broken,  and  finite,  but  as 
an  absolute,  total,  whole  experience.  Experience  in  its 
completeness  is  made  the  Absolute.  The  meaning  of  the 
Absolute  is  Truth.  But  this  meaning  can  not  be  reached 
except  through  the  whole,  full  apprehension  and  compre- 
hension of  the  System  of  Ideas.  Truth  is  finally  a  har- 
mony sought  and  really  intended  in  all  finite  meanings, 
but  it  is  found  in  them  only  in  part.  The  incompleteness 
makes  the  meaning  partly  true  and  partly  erroneous.  But 
through  this  finiteness  there  is  working  out  the  Whole, 
toward  which  we  are  tending.  In  every  idea  the  important 
element  is  the  meaning.  An  idea  is  any  state  of  mind  that 
has  a  meaning ;  and  a  meaning  is  the  partial  fulfillment  or 
the  relatively  complete  embodiment  of  a  purpose.  Purpose 
is  the  real  internal  core  of  the  meaning  of  the  idea,  which 
we  want  and  but  partly  attain.  When  all  ideas  with  their 
meanings,  i.  e.,  their  internal  purpose  and  aim,  are  in  a 
complete  system,  we  have  the  truth  and  experience  as  ab- 
solute. Such  an  Absolute  is  our  ideal,  our  goal  of  striving, 
but  never  our  finite,  actual  possession. 

The  longer  we  study  the  modern  absolutist  and  Hegelian 
position,  the  more  certain  fundamental  ideas  stand  out 
despite  all  minor  differences.  All  absolutists  emphasize 
system  and  harmony  in  the  complete  and  absolute  whole- 
ness. Such  a  system  and  harmony  is  essentially  intellec- 
tual. It  is  true  that  Professor  Royce  emphasizes  the 
conception  of  purpose,  but,  nevertheless,  he  does  not  be- 
come clearly  voluntaristic,  and  he  does  not  throw  the  ac- 
cent like  Schopenhauer  on  the  will.  He  still  remains  an 
intellectualist.  Through  the  intellect  and  its  ideal  of 
logical  totality  the  modern  absolutists  attempt  to  find 
reality.  Their  striving  is  to  discover  traces  of  reality  in 
appearance,  and  they  hold  that  the  finite,  though  only 
as  a  shadow,  reflects  the  Infinite.  They  start  from  the 
whole  and  struggle  to  express  how  the  part  guarantees 


The  Absolutist  Aim  173 

the  whole,  the  incomplete  the  complete,  the  seeking  the 
finding,  and  the  striving  the  goal.  All  absolutists  are 
idealists  and  accept  and  believe  in  an  ideally  complete, 
harmonious  Universe. 

The  idealism  of  the  absolutists  is  not  out  of  tune  in  its 
tendency  with  Christianity.  Christianity,  as  well  as  ab- 
solutism, has  the  ideal  of  harmony  in  a  more  than  finite 
God.  The  belief  in  a  universe  where  error  is  to  be  at  last 
a  passing  phase,  where  finally,  despite  all  finite  imperfec- 
tions, every  idea  must  come  into  unity  with  the  great  and 
final  purpose  and  intent  of  the  Universe,  possesses  the 
desire  of  Christian  optimism  and  hope.  The  conviction 
that  there  is  a  truth,  whole  and  complete,  before  and  be- 
yond us,  which  is  more  constant  than  Professor  Royce's 
idea  of  a  completed  experience,  seems  to  fit  in  admirably 
with  the  Christian  idea  that  Truth  is  as  God  is.  It  begins 
with  an  all-embracing  ideal,  lofty  and  inspiring,  and  offers 
a  strong  motive  for  our  seeking  and  wanting  the  Truth. 
In  wanting  and  seeking  it  we  are  seeking  the  complete ;  the 
Truth  is  making  us,  and  we  are  not  making  the  Truth. 
This  belief,  that  behind  all  our  feeble  attempts  there  is  ab- 
solute harmony,  furnishes  us  with  a  real  religious  inspira- 
tion. We  make  so  many  sacrifices,  we  give  up  so  much,  we 
contribute  such  value  to  our  little  truth-seeking  and  our 
relative  truth-finding,  because  in  it  and  through  it  Truth 
itself,  with  its  high  perfection  and  its  joy  of  completeness, 
is  laying  hold  on  us.  Does  not  such  an  ideal  of  truth, 
which  can  be  at  once  artistic  and  scientific,  accord  with 
Christian  thinking?  Can  not  Christian  thinking  find  in 
this  philosophic  creed,  an  expression  of  the  perfect  mind  of 
God  working  through  our  minds,  and  of  God's  ideas  find- 
ing their  fulfillment  through  our  thoughts  and  ways  ?  The 
ideal  of  a  perfect  truth  before  all  human  search  is  a  be- 
lief in  divine  Wisdom  and  Providence,  and  in  the  power  of 
a  divine  Ideal  in  human  thought. 


174        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

In  addition  to  the  agreement  in  the  main  tendency  be- 
tween Christianity  and  absolutism  in  accepting  absolute 
truth,  there  is  also  a  unity  of  ideals  in  the  effort  to  reach 
the  Absolute,  as  far  as  this  Absolute  means  God.  It  is 
true  that  Christianity  has  no  philosophic  name  for  God. 
The  terms  Absolute  and  Infinite  are  not  fundamentally 
religious  terms,  but  they  are  philosophic.  While,  there- 
fore, Christianity  as  religion  cannot  be  just  if  it  starts  out 
from  the  philosophic  ideas  of  the  Infinite  and  Absolute,  it 
nevertheless  cannot  accept  a  mere  limited  and  finite  God. 
It  is,  therefore,  in  sympathy  with  the  idea  of  some  sort 
of  an  absolute  and  infinite  God  in  its  theology.  It  cannot 
admit  objective  limitations  in  God.14  Consequently  any 
philosophy  which  starts  from  the  Absolute  and  Infinite 
creates  a  predisposition  in  its  favor  in  the  mind  of  the 
Christian  thinker.  But  while  Christianity  is  thus  in  con- 
sonance with  the  ideal  of  an  Absolute,  we  shall  find  that 
when  absolutism  defines  its  Absolute,  and  gives  meaning  to 
it,  Christianity  must  differ  as  we  shall  see  further  on. 
Thus  Christianity  is  favorable  to  the  tendency  of  absolut- 
ism, to  the  purpose  which  it  seeks,  to  the  spirit  which  seems 
to  move  it,  but  not  to  its  full  argument  and  its  reflective 
exposition.  Christianity  can  estimate  the  strivings  of  ab- 
solutism, its  great  faith,  its  optimistic  hope,  but  it  cannot 
accept  its  worked-out  philosophy  as  a  creed. 

The  first  discrepancy  arises  because  Christianity  can- 
not accept  truth  as  a  purely  intellectual  ideal.  In  it  the 
word  of  Christ :  "  I  am  the  Way,  the  Truth,  and  the  Life," 
has  given  truth  a  vital,  full,  personal  meaning.  The  ideal 
of  truth  in  Christianity,  consequently,  includes  in  truth 
the  satisfaction  of  the  heart  as  well  as  of  the  mind;  it 
implies  the  right  of  feeling  and  will,  and  not  only  of  the 
intellect.  As  far  as  Christianity  attempts  to  define  its 
truth  it  cannot  be  ruled  by  any  mere  philosophic  exposi- 

14  Cf.  below,  Chapter  V,  p.  296. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  175 

tion  of  an  intellectual  order.  Its  system  of  truths  and  its 
scheme  of  doctrines  are  controlled  by  the  living  facts  of 
faith,  but  faith  is  not  modified  through  the  demands  of  the 
unity  of  an  intellectual  system.  It  is  true  that  in  the  ex- 
position of  the  Scriptures  the  Church  early  fixed  a  rule 
of  faith,  and  that  it  constantly  employs  the  analogy  of  the 
faith  believed.  But  neither  the  rule  of  faith  nor  the 
analogy  of  faith  are  aught  else  but  the  original,  normative 
Christian  revelation  in  its  essence,  both  as  communicated 
and  experienced,  though  the  form  is  creedal.  They  de- 
termine by  their  living  content  and  not  by  their  logicality. 
Where  they  have  been  philosophically  colored,  and  where 
the  desire  to  be  consistent  has  entered  in  as  controlling,  a 
wrong  trend  has  taken  hold  of  Christian  truth  and  injured 
the  Scriptural  normativeness  and  the  Christian  life.  Con- 
sistency and  thoroughness  of  system,  logical  non-contra- 
diction and  harmony  are  not  the  essentials  in  Christian 
truth.  Christian  truth  because  it  is  living  is  frequently, 
like  life,  non-logical.  Christianity  at  its  best,  which  is  its 
truth  in  vital  relations,  cannot,  therefore,  be  judged  by 
logical  categories,  and  in  it  the  law  of  absolute  identity 
dare  not  make  its  truth  mechanical  in  opposition  to  its 
vital  nature. 

In  all  the  newer  treatises  of  the  absolutists  one  feature 
of  Hegel's  philosophy  is  constantly  present.  All  absolut- 
ists agree  with  their  master  in  stressing  the  Real  as  the 
Universe,  and  the  Universe  as  Individuality.  It  is,  how- 
ever, particularly  Bosanquet  who  builds  all  his  speculations 
on  the  one,  total,  complete,  perfect  Individuality.15  But 
we  would  be  very  much  mistaken  and  altogether  misunder- 
stand and  misapply  this  idea  of  Individuality,  if  we  were 
to  interpret  it  as  synonymous  with  personality.  Personal- 
ity as  conceived  by  the  absolutists  is  a  limiting  and  finite 

15  Cf.  "The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value";  also  "The 
Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual." 


176       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

determination.  In  this  conception  they  follow  Spinoza, 
who  sees  in  personality  a  determining  idea.  But  a  deter- 
mining idea  is  supposed  to  be  a  negation  of  full  reality. 
Consequently  Individuality,  the  Universe,  the  Absolute  can- 
not be  personal.  Bradley  says :  "  The  highest  Reality, 
so  far  as  I  see  must  be  super-personal."  1G  This  super- 
personality  does  away  with  God's  individuality  ;  He  is  made 
a  part  of  nature  itself.  "  The  Maker  and  Sustainer  be- 
comes also  the  indwelling  Life  and  Mind  and  the  inspiring 
Love  " ;  17  He  is  no  external  Person  beyond  the  Universe. 
Its  Individuality  is  He.  The  reality  of  God  is  His  pres- 
ence in  the  world  and  in  the  individual  soul.  This  presence 
is  He.  Bradley  honestly  confesses  as  a  result :  "  But 
how  this  necessary  '  pantheism '  is  to  be  made  consistent 
with  an  individual  Creator  I  myelf  do  not  perceive."  18 
The  Universe,  therefore,  is  eternal  and  sustains  itself ;  it  is 
the  Individuality,  it  is  God.  Never  in  any  proper  sense  is 
God  an  individuality,  a  person,  and,  therefore,  He  cannot 
be  a  Creator.  With  such  a  result  Christianity  as  a  theistic 
religion  is  utterly  out  of  tune.  If  Individuality  is  the 
Universe,  if  pantheism  is  correct,  there  can  be  no  God 
and  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 

Bradley  in  part  goes  beyond  Spinoza ;  he  is  not  willing 
with  Spinoza  to  really  identify  God  and  the  world.  To 
him  God  is  less  and  less  real  than  the  Universe.  He  is 
not  willing  to  decide  categorically  between  the  real  and 
the  unreal  without  allowing  for  degrees  of  the  real.  If 
this  right  of  assuming  degrees  of  the  real  is  denied  him, 
he  denies  the  reality  of  God.  In  his  own  words  this  is 
his  conclusion :  "  Now,  if  I  am  forced  to  take  reality  as 
having  thus  only  one  sense,  I  must  reply  that  God  is  not 
real  at  all  any  more  than  you  and  I  are  real.     Nothing  to 

16 "Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  436. 
17  Ibid.,  p.  436. 
is  Ibid.,  p.  436. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  177 

me  in  this  sense  19  is  real  except  the  Universe  as  a  whole; 
for  I  cannot  take  God  as  including,  or  as  equivalent  to, 
the  entire  Universe.  This  answer  is  the  result  of  forcing 
me  to  reply  to  a  question  which  I  regard  as  erroneous. 
But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  allowed  to  hold  to  degrees 
in  reality,  the  conclusion  at  once  is  different.  God  to  me 
is  now  so  much  more  real  than  you  or  myself  that  to  com- 
pare God's  reality  with  ours  would  be  ridiculous."  20 
From  this  discussion  we  can  conclude  nothing  else  but 
that  God  is  not  the  absolute  reality,  although  he  is  more 
real  than  we  are.  He  is  far  more  real  than  men,  but  He 
is  not  the  Real,  the  Absolute,  the  Individuality.  The  total 
Real  is  only  the  Universe  as  a  Whole.  The  Universe  guar- 
antees God's  reality,  not  God  the  reality  of  the  Universe. 
He  is  not  all  in  all,  but  some  in  the  all  of  the  Universe. 
In  an  effort  to  find  the  philosophical  basis  of  religion, 
Professor  Watson  argues  for  what  he  calls  Constructive 
Idealism,  which  he  attempts  to  differentiate  from  the  pan- 
theism of  the  absolutists.  He  claims  that  pantheism  fails 
in  conceiving  the  divine  as  equally  manifest  in  nature  and  in 
mind,  and  that  it  robs  the  finite  of  its  worth.  For  his 
thinking  there  must  be  degrees  of  God's  manifestation  and 
the  finite  must  be  recognized.  Nevertheless  he  admits 
this  agreement  between  pantheism  and  Constructive  Ideal- 
ism :  "  The  point  of  agreement  between  them  is  that  both 
affirm  that  the  world  can  have  no  reality  apart  from  God, 
and  therefore  that  the  finite  as  such  has  no  existence."  21 
Even  in  this  attempt  we  at  last  lose  the  finite;  and  while 
Watson  does  not  make  the  Universe  God  like  Bradley,  his 
putting  the  reality  of  the  finite  into  God  is  only  the  re- 
verse, and  leads  to  the  absorption  of  all  things  in  the 
Whole.     It  must  end  in  taking  away  real  personality  and 

19  This  applies  to  absolute  meaning. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  448. 

2i "  The  Philosophical  Basis  of  Religion,"  p.  444. 


178       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

individuality  from  God  because  man  as  finite  personality 
can  have  no  real  self-existence.  Neither  the  God  of  Brad- 
ley nor  the  God  of  Watson  is  the  God  of  Christianity. 

Due  to  the  inferior  place  which  personality  occupies  in 
the  thought  of  absolutism  and  of  any  system  which  ap- 
proaches absolutism,  it  is  quite  natural  and  necessary  that 
a  doubt  should  arise  about  personal  immortality.  This 
doubt  appears  in  the  discussions  of  McTaggart  when,  to 
overcome  the  difficulties  of  the  problem  of  immortality,  he 
says :  "  To  meet  such  doubts  as  these  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  construct  a  complete  metaphysical  system.  We 
should  have  to  determine  what  was  the  general  nature 
of  all  reality,  and  whether  that  nature  involved  the  exist- 
ence of  finite  selves."  22  The  manner  in  which  McTaggart 
believes  that  reality  is  determinative  of  the  finite  selves  in- 
dicates where  we  shall  arrive  through  a  doctrine  of  reality 
like  that  of  absolutism.  But  we  are  not  compelled  to  re- 
main within  inference  alone.  Bradley  clearly  says  :  "  The 
main  demand  of  religion  is  for  the  assurance  that  the 
individual,  as  one  with  the  Good,  has  so  far  conquered 
death,  and  that  what  we  call  this  life  with  its  before  and 
after  is  not  the  main  reality.  If  and  so  far  as  it  is  neces- 
sary in  the  interest  of  religion  to  represent  this  funda- 
mental truth  in  the  form  of  prolonged  existence,  I  approve 
and  I  adhere  to  such  a  doctrine.  But  for  myself  I  feel  the 
gravest  doubt  with  regard  to  such  a  necessity."  23  The 
doubt  of  Mr.  Bradley  is  no  mere  personal  whim,  although 
he  thinks  it  to  be  due  to  a  defect  of  his  temperament  and 
imaginative  power.  He  does  not  seem  to  see  the  result  of 
his  own  logic.  Therefore,  he  continues  and  admits, 
"  Wherever  after  due  consideration  it  is  found  by  any  man 
or  any  set  of  men  that  religion  calls  for  a  genuine  indi- 
vidual personal  existence  after  death,  I  am  on  the  side  of 

22  "Some  Dogmas  of  Religion,"  p.  110. 

23  "  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  438. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  179 

such  a  doctrine.  I  think  that  the  belief,  so  far  is 
right,  and  under  this  condition,  may  be  called  true.  Ex- 
actly what  its  truth  comes  to  in  the  end,  however,  I  think 
that  we  cannot  know,  and,  so  far  as  we  are  religious,  I  am 
sure  that  we  ought  not  much  to  care."  24  In  this  wavering 
attitude,  Bradley  after  all  is  finally  compelled  to  take  back 
what  he  has  doubtfully  granted.  His  philosophic  absolut- 
ism has  led  him  to  a  religion  of  the  Total,  the  Universe, 
in  whose  interest,  of  course,  personal  immortality  is  not  a 
matter  to  care  for  very  much.  Wherever  the  Universe  is 
the  Real,  we  cannot  find  any  sure  foundation  for  the  per- 
manence of  the  individual  soul.  It  is  perfectly  natural, 
and  a  legitimate  result  of  pantheistic  absolutism  to  oppose 
or  at  least  to  doubt  personal  immortality.  In  this  at- 
titude it  must  contradict  the  high  valuation  which  Chris- 
tianity places  upon  the  immortality  of  the  single  soul. 

Absolutism  with  its  effort  to  find  the  Whole,  the  Eternal, 
in  every  part  and  every  finite  self  is  apparently  at  first 
sight  favorable  to  the  Christian  idea  of  incarnation.  It 
seems  to  support  the  presence  of  the  Real  behind  the 
phenomenal.  Bradley  writes :  "  Behind  me  the  absolute 
reality  works  through  and  in  union  with  myself,  and  the 
world  which  confronts  me  is  at  bottom  one  thing  in  sub- 
stance and  in  power  with  this  reality.  There  is  a  world 
of  appearance  and  there  is  a  sensuous  curtain,  and  to  seek 
to  deny  the  presence  of  this  or  to  identify  it  with  reality 
is  mistaken.  But  for  the  truth  I  come  back  always  to  that 
doctrine  of  Hegel,  that '  there  is  nothing  behind  the  curtain 
other  than  that  which  is  in  front  of  it.'  For  what  is  in 
front  of  it  is  the  Absolute  that  is  at  once  one  with  the 
knower  and  behind  him."  25  Strong,  however,  as  this  ad- 
mission is,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  substance 
and  power  of  reality  is  only  present  in  appearance  and  in 

24  Ibid.,  p.  439. 
zs  Ibid.,  p.  218. 


180       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

varying  degrees.  Appearance,  according  to  the  whole 
system  of  Bradley,  is  not  reality,  but  only  partial  and  er- 
roneous reality.  It  cannot  at  once,  if  we  are  consistent, 
be  reality  and  not  reality.  Nevertheless,  this  contradic- 
tion lurks  in  the  idea  of  Bradley  that  there  are  degrees 
of  reality  in  appearance,  and  that  the  substance  is  partially 
evident  in  the  shadow.  But  finally  appearance  rather 
hides  than  reveals  reality;  it  conceals  reality  behind  a 
changing  world.  The  actual  reality  is  the  total,  invisible 
Universe.  There  is  and  must  be  a  constant  discrepancy 
between  what  is  and  what  appears,  for  the  part  at  its  best 
cannot  be  the  whole. 

Now  the  Christian  conception  of  incarnation  cannot 
be  clothed  in  the  garments  of  appearance  and  reality. 
Its  fundamental  idea  is  rather  that  of  revelation  than  of 
concealment,  and  its  purpose  is  not  to  hide  but  to  dis- 
close a  mystery.  Christ  claims  to  be  the  revealer  of 
the  Father;  in  Him  the  Father  is  apparent.  He  says: 
"  He  that  seeth  me  seeth  Him  that  sent  me."  26  The  incar- 
nation brings  God  nearer  to  us,  while  the  appearance  of  the 
absolutist  hides  the  reality  of  the  Absolute.  For  the  Chris- 
tian incarnation  is  the  approach  and  way  to  God ;  and  this 
approach  is  through  the  personality  of  Jesus.  The  abso- 
lutist, however,  begins  with  the  total  Individuality,  the 
whole  Universe,  as  the  Reality,  and  then  attempts  to  find 
it  in  the  world  of  appearance.  His  ideas,  therefore,  ob- 
scure but  do  not  aid  in  grasping  the  Christian  claim  that 
God  is  manifest  in  Christ. 

The  difficulty,  which  was  indicated  at  the  very  beginning 
of  this  chapter,  when  it  was  shown  how  the  absolutists 
fail  to  distinguish  definitely  between  truth  and  error  in 
their  finite  form,  must  again  occupy  us.  While  the  asser- 
tion of  the  absolute  existence  of  Truth  was  seen  to  con- 
tain  an  element   favorable   to   Christianity,   nevertheless, 

26  John,  12:45. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  181 

there  is  a  larger  amount  that  is  unfavorable  to  Christian 
truth.  If  it  be  true  that  there  is  no  real  distinction  be- 
tween finite  truth  and  error,  so  that  error  is  partial  truth, 
and  developing  truth  is  partial  error,  there  arises  a  great 
difficulty  in  making  any  finite  statement.  Then  we  shall 
have  no  right  to  claim  any  strong  superiority  for  any 
finite  truth  or  any  truth  finitely  stated.  But  Christianity 
like  all  religions  must  demand  both  clearness  and  authority 
for  its  message.  It  cannot  come  to  men  with  a  doctrine 
of  salvation,  which  it  claims  as  final,  if  this  doctrine  does 
not  possess  a  certainty  adequate  to  its  claim.  Therefore, 
Christianity  in  stating  its  essential  truth  must  quarrel 
with  any  conception  which  will  make  even  the  human  state- 
ments of  divine  truth  purely  relative  and  uncertain.  It  is 
true  that  Christianity  admits  that  we  have  and  bear  the 
divine  treasure  in  earthen  vessels,  and  that  we  only  know 
in  part;  nevertheless  despite  the  vessel  and  despite  the 
partial  knowledge,  we  do  have  the  treasure  and  we  do 
know.  The  assertion  that  there  are  grades  of  truth  in 
the  communication  of  the  divine,  and  that  in  the  world  of 
finite  appearance  truth  and  error  cannot  be  really  sep- 
arated, must  impair  the  claim  of  Christianity  to  have  the 
final  message  for  the  souls  of  men.  Of  course,  if  this  claim 
is  surrendered  and  if  Christianity  is  only  relatively  true, 
there  will  be  no  quarrel  with  absolutism.  But  as  long 
as  Christianity  does  not  surrender  its  Christ  as  the  Truth, 
it  cannot  be  satisfied  with  the  theory  of  truth  which  the 
absolutist  accepts.  He  possesses  no  guarantee  how  far 
the  relative  truth  is  real  truth  other  than  mere  abstract 
totality,  identity,  and  non-contradiction.  Christianity 
cannot  bow  to  such  a  standard,  and  must  maintain  its  own 
claim  of  certainty  in  its  message. 

Closely  connected  with  the  failure  to  distinguish  be- 
tween truth  and  error  is  the  failure  to  distinguish  funda- 
mentally between  evil  and  good.     A  very  strong  contra- 


182       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

diction  arises  between  absolutism  and  Christianity,  in  the 
assertion  of  absolutism  that  evil  is  only  the  partial,  the 
incomplete,  and  the  logically  disarranged.  Even  as  the 
partial  and  incomplete  evil  is  a  part  of  a  whole,  and  belongs 
to  the  Universe.  It  is  supposed  to  be  over-ruled  and  to 
serve  a  higher  good  end.  Upon  this  final  outcome  the 
claim  is  built,  that  evil  is  unknowingly  good,  and  that  as 
discord  it  disappears  if  the  harmony  is  made  large  enough. 
It  must  fall  within  the  Absolute,  but  in  it  "  The  collision 
and  the  strife  may  be  an  element  in  some  fuller  realiza- 
tion." 27  The  Absolute  resolves  evil  finally.  "  The  Abso- 
lute is  the  richer  for  every  discord,  and  for  all  diversity 
which  it  embraces;  and  it  is  our  ignorance  only  in  which 
consists  the  poverty  of  our  object."  28  If  evil  is  in  the 
Absolute  and  a  passing  phase  in  it  leading  to  a  higher 
unity  and  fullness,  then  there  can  be  in  evil  no  absolute 
opposition  to  goodness.  Goodness  must  be  as  relative  as 
evil.  Such  a  relativity  must  be  absolutely  opposed  by 
Christianity,  for  it  ill  accords  with  the  emphasis  of  salva- 
tion as  a  delivery  from  sin.  The  way  in  which  Christianity 
contends  against  evil,  and  the  estimate  which  it  puts  upon 
its  seriousness,  will  never  allow  evil  to  be  considered  as  a 
mere  discord.  The  belief  of  Christianity  is  that  sin  is  not 
merely  a  discord,  nor  a  blemish,  but  condemnable  selfishness 
and  opposition  to  the  love  of  man  and  God.  It  is  high 
lawlessness  which  God  hates,  and  to  remove  which  God's 
Son  became  incarnate.  Therefore,  sin  is  a  reality  totally 
foreign  to  God ;  it  is  a  fact  in  human  life  to  be  eliminated, 
and  not  a  disharmony  to  be  resolved.  If  Christianity 
would  abandon  this  conception  of  sin,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  undervalue  goodness.  It  is  goodness  which  absolutism 
does  not  value  as  ultimate.29     In  its  Absolute  it  does  not 

27  Bradley,  "  Appearance  and  Reality,"  p.  202. 

28  Ibid.,  p.  204. 

29  Cf.  Bradley,  "  Appearance  and  Reality,"  Chapter  XXV. 


The  Absolutist  Aim  183 

place  moral  distinction ;  the  Absolute  is  fundamentally 
amoral.  Consequently  there  is  no  final  place  for  the  good. 
Thus  Bradley  says :  "  Good  and  evil  reproduce  that 
main  result  which  we  found  in  our  examination  of  truth 
and  error.  The  opposition  in  the  end  is  unreal,  but  it  is, 
for  all  that,  emphatically  actual  and  valid.  Error  and  evil 
are  facts,  and  most  assuredly  there  are  degrees  of  each; 
and  whether  anything  is  better  or  worse,  does  without  any 
doubt  make  a  difference  to  the  Absolute.  And  certainly 
the  better  anything  is,  the  less  totally  in  the  end  is  its 
being  over-ruled.  But  nothing,  however  good,  can  in  the 
end  be  real  precisely  as  it  appears.  Evil  and  good,  in 
short,  are  not  ultimate;  they  are  relative  factors  which 
cannot  retain  their  special  characters  in  the  Whole."  30  In 
other  words,  the  Whole  is  more  fundamental  than  the  Good ; 
and,  therefore,  greater  than  the  idea  of  a  holy  God.  The 
Whole,  the  logical  Total  is  the  Real,  but  this  Real  is  not 
the  Good  and  not  God.  If  absolutism  emphasizes  this  re- 
sult of  its  thinking  it  must  destroy  all  morality  and  re- 
ligion. If  the  good  is  not  absolute,  if  the  ethical  is  not 
higher  than  the  logical,  then  all  virtues  and  faith  are  un- 
dermined. Ideals  cannot  be  maintained  through  a  belief 
in  a  logical  Whole,  in  a  Universe,  in  an  Individuality,  in 
which  moral  and  religious  distinctions  do  not  ultimately  ex- 
ist. This  Whole  is  a  creation  of  human  abstraction,  it  is 
an  idol  of  the  concept  which  man  has  made  and  in  his 
ignorance  worships.  The  Christian  conviction  is  that  of  a 
holy  and  loving  God,  in  Whom  the  Good  in  its  fullness  and 
richness  exists  as  real,  absolute  and  eternal. 
30  ibid.,  p.  430. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE    MYSTIC    ABSORPTION 

WHEREVER  absolutism  is  discussed  as  a 
method  of  approaching  the  problem  of  truth, 
there  the  claim  of  mysticism  must  also  be  con- 
sidered. In  many  respects  absolutism  and  mysticism  dif- 
fer. Absolutism  uses  logic,  mysticism  intuition;  absolu- 
tism relies  on  reasoning,  mysticism  on  feeling;  absolutism 
shows  how  relative  is  the  world  of  appearance,  mysticism 
seeks  practically  to  escape  from  it.  But  finally  absolutism 
and  mysticism  agree  in  their  emphasis  of  the  One  and  the 
Absolute.  In  their  main  tenet  they  belong  together.  It  is 
true  that  Professor  Royce  1  attempts  to  bring  together 
mysticism  and  realism,  but  though  there  are  points  of  con- 
tact between  them,  mysticism  after  all  approaches  far  more 
closely  to  absolutist  idealism  than  to  realism. 

It  is  impossible  and  not  within  the  limit  of  our  purpose 
to  discuss  mysticism  in  all  its  bearings.  We  are  only  con- 
cerned with  its  claim  to  be  able  to  find  the  truth.  Its 
other  qualities  and  characteristics  are  important  for  us 
only  as  they  grow  out  of  and  are  connected  with  this  claim. 
The  side  of  mysticism  which  concerns  us  is  what  James 
calls  its  noetic  quality.  He  says :  "  Although  so  similar 
to  states  of  feeling,  mystical  states  seem  to  those  who  ex- 
perience them  to  be  also  states  of  knowledge.  They  are 
states  of  insight  into  depth  of  truth  unplumbed  by  the 
discursive  intellect."  2  This  knowledge,  however,  of  an  in- 
tuitive  nature   bears   with   it   a   sense   of   authority.     It 

i "  The  World  and  the  Individual,"  Vol.  I,  Lectures  3,  4,  5. 
2  "Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  380. 

184 


The  Mystic  Absorption  185 

exists  first  of  all  for  the  individual  who  has  the  mystic  ex- 
perience, but  its  truth  with  its  remoteness  and  abstractness 
claims  a  general  value.  Mysticism  believes  that  it  reaches 
the  ultimate  which  is  the  final  object  of  pure  reason.  The 
mystic  in  his  approach  to  what  is  finally  reasonable  in 
the  Absolute  does  not  at  the  outset  reject  reflection.  He 
allows  all  facts  to  be  known  before  he  shows  their  illusion. 
Says  Royce:  "  His  doctrine  has  the  honesty  of  reflective 
thought  about  it.  He  tells  you  where  his  own  paradoxes 
are  to  be  found."  3  "  The  mystic  asserts  that  the  real  can- 
not be  wholly  independent  of  knowledge."  4  The  knowl- 
edge, however,  of  the  mystic  does  not  remain  in  the  re- 
flective stage,  for  reflection  is  not  of  value  any  further  than 
to  lead  you  to  analyze  your  own  experience.  In  this 
analysis  mysticism  rises  above  mere  perception  of  conscious 
abstractions  and  seeks  reality  within  the  realm  of  vital 
knowing.  Its  message,  according  to  Royce,  is  this: 
"  '  Know,'  says  Mysticism.  *  The  truth  is  nigh  thee,  even  in 
thy  heart.  Purify  thyself.  In  thee  is  all  truth.  How  shall 
it  be  except  as  known  and  as  one  with  the  Knower?  '  "  3 
But  such  high  knowledge  of  experience  is  found  "  not 
through  a  cultivation  of  what  we  ordinarily  call  Reason, 
but  through  a  quenching  of  Reason  in  the  very  presence 
of  the  absolute  goal  of  all  finite  thought."  6  Reason  is 
merged  into  intuition;  it  is  absorbed  into  the  immediate 
recognition  of  Being  by  that  degree  of  abstraction,  which 
finds  the  unity  of  Being  not  through  definitions  but  through 
feeling.  It  is  the  concentration  of  reason  in  feeling. 
Through  this  concentration  the  self,  with  whose  knowl- 
edge mysticism  begins,  is  lost  in  the  immediate  feeling  of 
its  unity  with  God. 

3  "  The  World  and  the  Individual,"  Vol.  I,  p.  189. 
*  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  189. 
5  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  179. 
« Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  155. 


186       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

The  path  from  reason  to  the  immediacy  of  feeling  neces- 
sarily emphasizes  the  subjective  in  man.  Mysticism  claims 
to  be  no  speculative  projection,  but  an  actual,  vital,  inner 
experience.  In  this  experience  large  stress  is  placed  upon 
the  Self  or  the  Soul.  It  is  only  in  the  Self  or  Soul  that 
truth  can  be  found.  The  Soul,  which  is  the  real  Self,  is 
whither  men  must  go  to  seek  and  secure  truth.  Therefore, 
no  external  letter,  but  only  the  inner  light  leads  to  the 
truth.  Thus  the  mystic  declares  that  "  within  yourself 
lies  the  sole  motive  that  leads  you  to  distinguish  truth 
from  error,  reality  from  unreality,  the  world  from  the  in- 
stant's passing  contents."  7  But  if  experience,  real,  inner, 
felt  personal,  experience  is  needed,  this  experience  itself  is 
not  the  truth.     Through  it  absolute  Being  reveals  itself. 

Finally  in  our  inner  feeling  we  know  not  as  knowing  our- 
selves, but  the  Knower  knows  in  and  through  us.  We 
ourselves  are  lost  and  Being  exists.  Royce  thus  defines  the 
deepest  character  of  mysticism :  "  I  have  said,  more  than 
once,  that  the  essence  of  Mysticism  lies  not  in  the  definition 
of  the  subject  to  which  you  attribute  Being,  but  in  the 
predicate  Being  itself.  This  predicate  in  case  of  Mysti- 
cism is  such  that,  as  soon  as  you  apply  it,  the  subject  in- 
deed loses  all  finite  outlines,  lapses  into  pure  immediacy, 
quenches  thought,  becomes  ineffable,  satisfies  even  by  turn- 
ing into  what  ordinary  Realism  would  call  a  mere  naught."  8 
Naturally  when  Being  thus  predominates  and  absorbs  the 
mind  and  heart  it  cannot  be  defined.  It  becomes  ineffable.9 
By  mere  negative  terms  of  high  feeling  the  mind  seeks 
to  remove  all  limited  and  finite  words  and  thoughts,10  to 
reach  the  great  positive  and  undeiinable  Absolute  which 
is  not  a  conception  but  the  absolute  unity  of  all  reality. 

7  Royce,  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  189. 
s  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  177. 

9  Cf.  James,  "  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  380. 
io  Hocking,    "  The    Meaning    of    God    in    Human    Experience,"    p. 
369  ff. 


The  Mystic  Absorption  187 

Before  this  unity  man  becomes  passive  and  silent.  God, 
the  One,  is  seen  face  to  face  as  silence  fills  the  soul.  In  this 
lonely  stillness  the  Absolute  alone  is  left,  while  man  is  re- 
signed and  lapses  into  dormancy,  idleness,  emptiness,  noth- 
ingness.11 The  silence  of  the  soul  may  lead  into  quietism, 
and  in  some  types  of  mysticism  to  unconsciousness.  Per- 
sonal unconsciousness  is  the  last  step  in  the  purification  of 
the  mystic.  While  not  all  mystics  reach  this  final  stage, 
and  while  not  all  claim  this  final  stage,  nevertheless  there 
must  be  such  a  disconnection  from  the  world,  that  all  de- 
sires and  conflicting  perceptions  may  be  eliminated  and  the 
soul  live  in  the  illumination  of  the  Absolute.12  The  goal  is 
at  all  times  the  absorption  into  the  One.  God  is  this 
One,  the  supreme,  all-pervading,  indwelling  power,  in 
Whom  all  existence  has  synthesis  and  oneness.  His  center 
is  everywhere  and  His  circumference  is  nowhere.  He  is  not 
nature,  not  the  universe,  not  mind,  not  reason,  not  feeling 
and  not  will.  He  is  Being,  He  is  Reality.  "  For  the 
mystic,  according  to  the  genuinely  historical  definition 
of  what  constitutes  speculative  Mysticism,  to  be  real 
means  to  be  in  such  wise  Immediate  that  in  the  presence  of 
this  immediacy,  all  thought  and  all  ideas,  absolutely  sat- 
isfied, are  quenched,  so  that  the  finite  search  ceases,  and  the 
Other  is  no  longer  another,  but  is  absolutely  found.  The 
object  which  fulfils  this  definition,  and  which  is  therefore 
worthy  to  be  called  real,  is  of  necessity  in  itself  One  and 
only  One."13 

There  is  much  in  mysticism  with  which  Christianity  can 
agree.  But  the  question  is  this,  whether  mysticism  has 
the  method  of  finding  truth  which  Christianity  can  accept. 
The  occurrence  of  mystic  elements  in  Christianity  is  no 

n  Cf.  James,  "  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,"  p.  381 ;  Hock- 
ing, "The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,"  p.  382  ff;  p.  402. 

12  Cf.  Hocking,  Ibid.,  p.  397. 

13  Royce,  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  144. 


188       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

proof  that  Christianity  is  essentially  mysticism.  Like 
all  religions,  Christianity  has  had  its  great  mystics ;  14  it 
is  not,  however,  like  Brahmanism  and  Buddhism,  essen- 
tially and  unconditionally  mystical.  It  cannot  be  shown 
that  the  many  utterances  in  the  sayings  of  Christ  and  in 
the  words  of  the  apostles  are  genuinely  mystical.  Of 
course,  we  can  put  a  mystical  coloring  on  some  of  the 
experiences  of  Christ,  if,  e.g.,  we  explain  the  temptation 
and  transfiguration  of  Christ,  not  as  historical  outward 
occurrences  and  facts,  but  as  descriptions  of  ecstatic  in- 
ner experiences.  But  such  an  assertion  and  such  an  ex- 
planation of  Christ's  temptation  and  transfiguration  de- 
stroy their  vital  objectivity.  If  this  be  maintained,  these 
experiences  cannot  be  mystic  because  they  cannot  be  sub- 
jective. As  soon  as  we  attribute  to  them  historical  reve- 
latory character,  they  must  become  essentially  non-mysti- 
cal. 

Similarly  Christ's  word  in  reference  to  His  spiritual 
presence,15  His  beatitude  for  the  pure  in  heart,  who  shall 
see  God,16  and  His  saying  "  The  Kingdom  of  God  is 
within  17  you,"  18  are  spiritual  facts  and  not  necessarily 
mystic  experiences.  Of  course,  if  spiritual  facts  are  in 
themselves  mystical  experiences,  then  the  two  can  be  iden- 
tified. But  these  spiritual  facts  emphasized  in  Christian- 
ity lack  the  important  elements  of  mysticism,  as,  e.g.,  the 
merging  of  reason  into  feeling,  and  the  absorption  of  self 
in  God.  There  are,  however,  among  spiritual  facts  in 
Christianity,  those  which  approach  a  mystical  type;  but 

I*  Cf.  Inge,  "Christian  Mysticism";  W.  Major  Scott,  "Aspects  of 
Christian  Mysticism";  E.  C.  Gregory,  "An  Introduction  to  Christian 
Mysticism";  W.  K.  Fleming,  "Mysticism  in  Christianity";  Rufus  M. 
Jones,  "  Studies  in  Mystical  Religion." 

is  Matthew,  28:20. 

16  Matthew,  5:8. 

17  Strictly  speaking  it  is  not  "  within  "  but  "  in  the  midst  of  you." 
is  Luke,  17:21. 


The  Mystic  Absorption  189 

even  in  these  we  must  observe  what  Fleming  is  compelled 
to  admit:  "The  aim  of  Christianity  is  catholic;  it  is 
meant  to  embrace  human  nature  as  a  whole  and  not  a  spe- 
cialized function  of  it."  19  With  this  reservation  in  mind 
we  must  admit  that,  the  indwelling  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  be- 
lievers, and  through  Him  the  indwelling  of  the  Father  and 
Son  in  us,  and  the  real  inner  union  and  communion  of 
God  with  us,  are  in  large  measure  mystical  and  inward. 

The  spiritual  experiences  have  not  made  the  message, 
nor  the  life  of  the  apostles  and  the  early  Church  mystical. 
While  Paul  has  his  visions  and  is  lifted  up  into  the  heav- 
ens, where  he  hears  unspeakable  words,  he  does  not  glory 
in  this  experience,  nor  make  it  the  basis  of  his  Christian 
life.20  While  he  glories  that  the  Father  revealed  the  Son 
in  him,21  as  a  basis  for  his  preaching  he  refers  to  his  com- 
mission and  not  to  his  message.  Paul  does  say :  "  I  am 
crucified  with  Christ;  nevertheless  I  live;  yet  not  I,  but 
Christ  liveth  in  me:  and  the  life  which  I  now  live  in  the 
flesh  I  live  by  the  faith  of  the  Son  of  God,  who  loved  me 
and  gave  Himself  for  me."  22  But  in  this  statement  we  find 
that  the  life  of  Christ  in  Paul  is  one  which  conserves  Paul's 
personality  and  does  not  absorb  him.  He  grasps  the  Son 
of  God  by  faith,  and  faith  requires  two  personalities. 
From  the  manner  in  which  Paul  thus  interprets  the  inner 
life  of  Christ  in  his  own  life,  light  is  thrown  on  the  truth 
of  the  indwelling  of  the  Spirit,  and  the  so-called  "  mystical 
union  "  in  Christian  life.  These  experiences  never  do 
away  with  the  separate  personality  of  man  over  against 
God.  Man  is  not  absorbed  into  God,  and  consequently  we 
have  no  pure  mysticism.  It  is  rather  the  religions  of  India 
which  exhibit  a  pure  mystical  absorption. 

19  "  Mysticism  in  Christianity,"  p.  27. 

20  Cf.  II  Corinthians,  12:4. 
2iGalatians,  1:16. 
22Galatians,  2:20. 


190        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

St.  John  like  St.  Paul  is  no  mystic  in  the  strict  and 
full  sense  of  the  word.  Despite  his  apparently  mystic 
terms,  as,  e.  g.,  life,  light,  new  birth,  he  has  the  equally 
important  historical  term,  "  witness,"  which  implies  ex- 
ternal testimony  and  occurrences.  John  may  exhibit  in 
the  Apocalypse  a  symbolism  which  lends  itself  to  mystic 
uses,  for  mysticism  loves  symbolism  and  delights  in  allegory. 
On  the  whole,  however,  John  bears  a  historic  message. 
Fleming,  while  favoring  the  interpretation  of  John  in 
a  mystical  manner,  must  admit :  "  That  by  this  very  insist- 
ence on  a  historical  revelation,  he  (John)  counterpoises 
the  strong  mystical  tendency  in  succeeding  ages  to  regard 
the  Gospel  story  as  a  kind  of  drama  merely,  correspond- 
ent to  a  more  vital  reality. "  23  It  was  in  a  later  day  that 
mysticism  crept  into  certain  types  of  Christianity.  The 
one  character  through  whom  very  largely  the  mystic  in- 
fluence entered  Christian  thought  was  Dionysius,  the  Areo- 
pagite,  who  is  really  the  father  of  Christian  mysticism. 
But  Dionysius  is  largely  indebted  to  the  neo-Platonist 
Plotinus. 

While  primitive  Christianity  is,  however,  not  essentially 
mystic,  it  can  approve  of  certain  elements  in  mysticism. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  emphasis  on  a  real  knowledge  of 
the  divine  which  is  not  the  result  of  reason.  Christianity 
has  always  favored  a  communication  of  divine  truth  from 
without  and  from  within,  not  through  the  processes  of 
logic,  but  through  direct  intuition.  In  this  intuition  truth 
is  directly  received  and  immediately  recognized.  Chris- 
tianity emphasizes  the  conscience  as  that  part  of  man  which 
receives  and  preserves  Christian  truth.24  It  does  not  de- 
mand as  essential  to  truth  a  logical  proof  or  a  consistent 
scientific  foundation,  but  it  holds  to  the  possibility  of  real 
knowledge  otherwise  gained  than  by   reflection.     In  this 

23  "  Mysticism  in  Christianity,"  p.  38. 

24  II  Corinthians,  4:2;  I  Timothy,  3:9. 


The  Mystic  Absorption  191 

respect  it  favors  mysticism.  The  point  of  dispute  among 
Christians  is,  however,  whether  such  knowledge,  as  mysti- 
cism asserts,  is  finally  of  the  nature  of  feeling.  It  is  not 
ratiocinative  purely  and  Simply,  but  this  negation  does  not 
necessarily  imply  the  assertion,  that  the  immediacy  and 
authority  of  Christian  truth  is  shifting  and  transient  like 
the  coming  and  going  of  feeling.  Such  an  assumption  is 
not  adequate  to  the  intellectual  and  volitional  elements  of 
Christian  truth.  The  latest  result  of  the  best  psychology 
of  religion  does  not  approve  of  affection  or  feeling25  as 
the  primal  element  in  religious  life,  but  it  rather  argues  for 
the  total  mental  life. 

The  second  characteristic  in  which  Christianity  and  mys- 
ticism agree  is  the  strong  emphasis  on  the  soul.  The  soul 
or  self  of  mysticism  never  remains  purely  psychological, 
but  it  is  always  given  a  religious  meaning.  The  process 
of  knowing  that  leads  to  feeling,  and  the  essential  dwelling 
in  feeling,  is  in  most  of  the  interpretations  of  mysticism 
a  religious  act.  Now  Christianity  favors  any  philosophy 
which  makes  much  of  the  soul  and  the  value  of  the  individ- 
ual in  contrast  with  the  world  and  its  passing  show.  Chris- 
tianity believes  that  this  world  and  the  fashion  thereof 
perisheth,  but  that  the  soul  liveth  forever. 

Again  Christianity  is  in  harmony  with  the  belief  of 
mysticism  that  there  is  a  real  inner  revelation.  While 
inner  revelation  is  not  the  only  kind  that  Christianity 
knows,  it  nevertheless  accepts  it  and  approves  of  it.  The 
revelation  which  is  the  basis  of  the  communication  of  truth 
to  others  may  be  made  through  historical  acts  and  deeds 
of  great  personages,  but  men  are  also  inwardly  moved  by 
the  Holy  Spirit.  They  have  visions  and  dreams,  and  re- 
ceive truth  through  the  organ  of  the  soul.  Christianity 
also  holds,  that  such  revelation,  which  has  now  become  ob- 
jective, and  is  guaranteed  through  the  sources  of  early 

25  Cf.  above,  Part  I,  Chapter  VII,  p.  130. 


192        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

Apostolic  Christianity,  is  the  medium  through  which  God 
communicates  with  the  soul.  In  this  communication  it  is 
not  the  letter  which  counts,  but  the  spirit.  The  revela- 
tion becomes  real  in  the  human  soul  as  God  adds  through 
the  conveying  Word  the  enlightenment  of  His  Spirit. 
Thus  there  is  a  real  communion  of  God  with  the  soul.  In 
consequence  the  assertion  of  an  actual  inner  life  and  a  real 
inner  experience,  which  mysticism  constantly  dwells  on, 
is  acceptable  to  Christian  faith  and  to  Christian  ideals,  if 
there  is  also  a  dependence  on  God's  objective  revelation. 

But  after  all  these  agreements,  some  very  serious  ob- 
jections must  be  made  by  Christian  thinking  against  mys- 
ticism. First,  Christian  truth  opposes  the  subjectivism 
of  the  source  of  truth  in  mysticism.  No  matter  whither 
mysticism  leads,  it  mostly  regards  the  inner  intuition 
and  light  as  the  origin  of  truth.  It  is  out  of  the  self  that 
the  truth  is  born.  We  must  pass  through  the  path  of 
reflection  and  reason  to  find  feeling.  When  we  have 
reached  the  state  of  feeling  we  shall  really  know.  Conse- 
quently feeling  is  the  guarantee  of  the  process  of  knowing 
truth.  There  is  a  subjective  character  despite  all  absorp- 
tion of  the  self  in  mysticism.  Mystics  frequently  speak 
as  though  their  condition  was  the  guarantee  of  the  truth. 
The  emphasis  on  the  reception  of  truth  is  lessened  by  the 
strong  subjective  element.  Consequently  mysticism  fre- 
quently deals  in  a  rather  arbitrary  manner  with  what  ap- 
pears to  contradict  its  inner  light.  It  has  a  prejudice 
which  arises  from  the  projections  and  imaginations  of  the 
feeling  self.  In  its  individualism  it  is  really  a  half-brother 
of  individualistic  rationalism. 

On  the  other  hand  mysticism  is  not  true  to  the  individ- 
ual. Individualistic  in  process  it  does  not  preserve  true 
personality.  The  self  is  to  be  absorbed  into  the  One. 
But,  first  of  all,  the  self,  like  the  individual  ego  of  the 
absolutist,  is  a  part  and  a  reflection  of  the  One.     The 


The  Mystic  Absorption  193 

One  is  found  in  the  soul.  When  mysticism  asserts  the  loss 
of  self  in  the  One  it  denies  the  separateness  of  man  from 
God.  Despite  all  struggle  to  remain  theistic,  mysticism, 
even  in  most  of  its  Christian  representatives,  has  a  pan- 
theistic tendency. 

When  mysticism  simply  asserts  the  One,  it  can  be  com- 
bined not  only  with  an  ideal  unity,  but  it  can  also  give 
poetic  color  to  a  materialistic  pantheism.  Such  a  mysti- 
cism appears  in  the  naturalistic  pantheism  of  Maeterlinck. 
His  interpretation  of  life  is  thus  summed  up  by  Professor 
Dewey :  "  The  natural  kinship  of  man's  intellectual  and 
moral  life  with  nature,  naturalistically  reported  and  ac- 
cepted ;  the  mutual  interpretation  of  unconscious  instinct, 
blind  passion,  and  conscious  luminous  reason ;  the  unfath- 
omable and  equable  character  of  our  immediate,  ordinary, 
commonplace  experiences,  so  that  our  experience  has  no 
goal  save  itself  —  these  ideas  define  his  interpretation  of 
life."  26  In  these  ideas  Maeterlinck  combines  Walt  Whit- 
man with  Emerson,  the  naturalism  of  the  first  with  the 
mystic  pantheism  of  the  second.  Mysticism,  therefore,  is 
no  guarantee  of  ideality  in  itself.  Its  doctrine  of  the  One 
may  combine  with  idealistic  or  materialistic  pantheism. 

When  mysticism  has  an  opportunity  to  work  itself  out 
as  in  Brahmanism  it  arrives  at  Nirvana.  Its  zero  may 
claim  a  positive  quality  as  does  Plotinus  in  his  One,  his 
Absolute,  and  Being.  But  mysticism  in  its  consistent 
forms  can  have  neither  a  personal  nor  a  triune  God.  One 
can  color  the  belief  in  a  personal  God,  or  in  a  Trinity,  with 
mystic  fervor,  but  it  is  impossible  to  be  either  a  real  uni- 
tarian or  trinitarian  mystic.  The  God  of  mysticism  al- 
ways tends  toward  impersonalism,  even  though  the  mystic 
may  believe  that  he  has  a  personal  God.  The  intuition 
of  the  mystic  is  often  a  philosophy  of  ignorance  produced 
by  unbridled  imagination.     Therefore,  the  claim  of  the 

26  The  Hibbert  Journal,  Vol.  IX,  p.  778. 


194        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

mystic  contradicts  the  implication  of  his  own  position. 
He  thinks  he  has  a  personal  God,  but  he  is  really  absorbed 
into  impersonal  Being. 

Mysticism  believes  in  passivity,  sometimes  to  the  degree 
of  unconsciousness.     It  is  a  religion  of  rest  and  not  of 
work.     On  the  one  hand  it  revels  in  the  joy  of  its  inner 
experience,  on  the  other  hand  its  tendency  is  ascetic.     It 
flees  the  world  and  seeks  escape  from  the  life  of  sense  with- 
out.    Real  life  for  it  is  rest  from  the  pressing  and  chang- 
ing beauties  of  actuality  about  us.     Out  of  such  quietism 
which  only  seeks  personal  peace  no  ethical  result  can  legiti- 
mately follow.     It  is  only  as  the  mystic  leaves  his  dreams 
that  he  can  live  in  the  world.     Mysticism  seeks  to  save 
itself  and  in  its  deepest  asceticism  it  is  selfish.     The  love 
of  God  and  the  life  in  the  One  is  sought  by  the  mystic  as 
a  haven   of  peace,  but  it  does   not  with  the   consistent 
mystic  become  a  motive  for  an  active,  helpful  life.     The 
soul  loses  itself  in  God,  but  the  life  of  the  soul  remains 
inactive  and  contemplative.     Mysticism  is  no  faith  which 
conquers  the  world,  redeems  man,  changes  conditions  and 
transforms  civilization.     It  is  destructive  of  a  Christianity 
which  is   active,  missionary   and   progressive.     Where   it 
actually  obtains  in  its  real  meaning,  Christianity  has  no 
mission  to  control  the  world,  sanctify  literature,  inspire 
art,  baptize  science,  and  glorify  culture.     Mysticism  in 
its  truest  aspect  is  the  religion  of  monasticism.     It  is  true 
that  monasticism  actually  became  active  and  forsook  its 
mysticism.     But   as   consistently  mystic  monasticism   de- 
spised the  world.     It  lived  and  died  to  itself.     A  Chris- 
tianity with  a  life  to  be  lived,  a  message  to  be  given,  and 
a  world   to  be   gained    for   Christ    can   never   be   mystic. 
The  more  mystic  man  is  the  less  ethical  is  he,  and  the  less 
ethical  he  is  the  less  Christian  faith  can  affect  him,  and 
make  its  purposes  real  in  his  life.     It  is  of  the  very  na- 


The  Mystic  Absorption  195 

ture  of  Christianity  to  have  and  demand  strong  ethical 
results;  it  is  religio-ethical  and  ethico-religious.  These 
two  can  never  really  be  divorced  in  any  vital  Christian 
ideal. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    PRAGMATIC    PROGRAM 

THE  whole  problem  of  truth  and  the  effort  to  de- 
termine it  logically  and  to  define  it  formally  is 
due  to  the  modem  pragmatic  movement.  The 
meaning  of  pragmatism  is  the  theory,  that  truth  is  the  re- 
sult of  practice  and  that  it  is  eminently  practical.  Its 
origin  has  thus  been  described  by  Professor  James :  "  It 
was  first  introduced  into  philosophy  by  Mr.  Charles  Peirce 
in  1878.  In  an  article  entitled  '  How  to  Make  Our  Ideas 
Clear,'  in  the  Popular  Science  Monthly  for  January  of 
that  year  Mr.  Peirce,  after  pointing  out  that  our  beliefs 
are  really  rules  for  action,  said  that,  to  develop  a  thought's 
meaning,  we  need  only  determine  what  conduct  it  is  fitted 
to  produce:  that  conduct  is  for  us  its  sole  significance. 
And  the  tangible  fact  at  the  root  of  all  our  thought-dis- 
tinctions, however  subtle,  is  that  there  is  no  one  of  them 
so  fine  as  to  consist  in  anything  but  a  possible  difference 
of  practice.  To  attain  perfect  clearness  in  our  thoughts 
of  an  object,  then,  we  need  only  consider  what  conceivable 
effects  of  a  practical  kind  the  object  may  involve  —  what 
sensations  we  are  to  expect  from  it,  and  what  reactions 
we  must  prepare.  Our  conception  of  these  effects,  whether 
immediate  or  remote,  is  then  for  us  the  whole  of  our  con- 
ception of  the  object,  so  far  as  that  conception  has  posi- 
tive significance  at  all.  This  is  the  principle  of  Peirce, 
the  principle  of  pragmatism.  It  lay  entirely  unnoticed  by 
any  one  for  twenty  years,  until  I,  in  an  address  before 
Professor  Howison's  philosophical  union  at  the  University 

196 


The  Pragmatic  Program  197 

of  California,  brought  it  forward  again  and  made  a  spe- 
cial application  of  it  to  religion.  By  that  date  (1898) 
the  times  seemed  ripe  for  its  reception.  The  word  '  prag- 
matism '  spread,  and  at  present  it  fairly  spots  the  pages 
of  the  philosophic  journals."  1  The  reason  why  Professor 
James'  resuscitation  of  Peirce's  initial  idea  of  pragmatism 
was  effective  lies  deeper  than  the  great  influence  of  the 
scholarship  of  James.  His  interpretation  that  the  real 
logical  method  and  the  nature  of  truth  are  found  in  the 
active  functioning  of  thought  tested  by  its  results  and 
effects ;  his  use  of  pragmatism  on  behalf  of  pluralism  or 
the  theory  of  the  many ;  and  his  advocacy  of  radical  em- 
piricism, were  not  in  themselves  sufficient  to  advance  the 
cause  of  pragmatism. 

In  the  same  way  we  cannot  explain  the  vogue  of  prag- 
matism through  the  acute  logical  discussions  and  dis- 
crimination of  Professor  Dewey  and  his  followers. 
Dewey  emphasized  experience  as  immediate,  and  claimed 
that  in  it  knowledge  and  truth  are  experienced  relations 
of  things,  and  that  neither  have  meaning  outside  of  such 
relation.  For  Dewey :  "  Like  knowledge  itself,  truth 
is  an  experienced  relation  of  things  and  it  has  no  meaning 
outside  of  such  relation,  any  more  than  such  adjectives 
as  comfortable  applied  to  lodging,  correct  applied  to 
speech,  persuasive  applied  to  an  orator,  etc.,  have  worth 
apart  from  the  specific  things  to  which  they  are  applied."  2 
It  was  not  through  such  and  similar  novel  ways  of  stating 
pragmatism  that  it  gained  its  hold.  As  little  as  to  James 
and  to  Dewey  can  we  ascribe  the  credit  of  the  spread  of 
pragmatism  to  the  efforts  of  Professor  Schiller.  It  is 
true  that  his  defense  of  pragmatism  added  to  its  modes 
of  statement  and  to  its  ethical  applications.     He  coined 

i  "  Pragmatism,"  p.  46. 

2  "The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  and  Other  Essays  in 
Contemporary  Thought,"  p.  95. 


198        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

the  word  "  Humanism,"  as  representative  of  pragmatism, 
over  against  a  theory  of  absolute  truth  which  did  not  re- 
gard man.  Through  him  and  his  pupils  "  Personalism," 
or  the  theory  of  living  individual  persons  as  functioning 
and  creating  the  truth,  arose.  He  strongly  accented  the 
human  meaning  of  truth  and  the  human  making  of  truth, 
and  he  stood  for  the  right  of  feelings,  beliefs,  and  hopes 
as  elements  of  truth  both  in  our  general  experience  and  in 
our  religious  life.  But  even  these  points  of  view  of  Schiller 
are  not  adequate  to  explain  the  spread  of  pragmatism. 
Nor  can  the  combined  influence  of  James,  Dewey,  and 
Schiller  be  considered  the  reason  why  pragmatism  spread 
and  grew  as  it  did. 

The  real  explanation  of  pragmatism  and  its  method,  is 
that  it  interprets  ruling  tendencies  of  the  present  age. 
It  is  empirical  in  an  age  of  the  search  after  details  and  of 
laboratory  methods  in  science ;  it  is  pluralistic  in  an  age  of 
many  separate  opinions  and  ideas,  but  not  of  great  over- 
ruling passions  and  commanding  ideals ;  it  is  experimental 
and  hypothetical  in  its  theory  of  truth  in  an  age  of  unrest, 
trying  out  many  expedients  in  literature,  science,  art,  eco- 
nomic life,  morals  and  religion.  Because  the  will  to  do 
is  prominent  in  our  active  age,  pragmatism  has  a  voluntar- 
istic  coloring.  As  intellectualism  has  its  great  problems 
and  is  strongly  reminded  of  its  limitations  at  the  present, 
pragmatism  gravitates  toward  feelings  and  becomes  human- 
istic. It  is  against  all  that  is  ultimate  and  final  in  a 
changing  age,  and  it  keeps  man  conscious  of  his  part  in 
the  making  of  ideals.  The  very  God  of  the  age  is  to  be 
limited  by  experience  and  to  be  found  in  the  searching  of 
men.  It  is  quite  explicable  also  why  pragmatism  in  an 
empirical  age  caters  to  utilitarianism  and  gives  its  ap- 
proval to  what  works  best.  What  works  best  leads  to 
the  description  of  processes,  therefore,  pragmatism  is 
descriptive,  and  it  is  by  no  mere  accident  that  its  form  is 


The  Pragmatic  Program  199 

psychological.  Because  it  is  psychological  it  derives  its 
logic  from  psychological  observation.  Truth  is  not  found 
by  means  of  the  old  logical  norms.  At  all  times  its 
logical  method  is  psychological.  But  psychology  is  its 
method  and  its  starting  point  because  of  the  emphasis  put 
on  the  functioning  of  truth.  Functioning  is  fundamen- 
tally a  biological  term  and  indicates  that  the  psychology 
of  pragmatism  is  biological.  Pragmatism  has  fully 
adopted  the  biological  point  of  view  in  modern  psychology. 
The  adoption  of  this  view  and  the  biological  standard  of 
pragmatism  is  the  outcome  finally  of  the  modern  emphasis 
on  biology  with  its  evolutionary  point  of  view.  Pragma- 
tism has  been  begotten  in  an  age  which  still  feels,  despite 
all  opposition  and  change  of  hypotheses  in  biology,  the  in- 
fluence of  Darwin.  The  evolutionary  standpoint  is  really 
the  leading  point  of  view  in  pragmatism.  Out  of  this  point 
of  view  others  follow,  and,  therefore,  it  deserves  to  be  con- 
sidered first,  as  controlling  and  shaping  the  whole  theory 
of  pragmatism.  All  other  elements  will  be  seen  to  be  con- 
ditioned by  it. 

There  is  entire  agreement  among  many  more  or  less  pro- 
nounced pragmatists,  that  the  pragmatic  method  is  the 
best  logical  exposition  of  evolution.  It  is  an  entirely  rep- 
resentative statement  when  De  Laguna  says :  "  Prag- 
matism is  the  first  whole-hearted  attempt  at  an  apprecia- 
tion of  the  significance  of  Darwinism  for  logical  theory." 
He  admits  that  the  development  even  of  the  highest  mental 
forms  in  ideas  is  essentially  a  development  of  interests. 
Consciousness  is  necessary  for  the  control  of  conduct. 
"  The  function  of  consciousness  in  the  biological  organism 
being  the  control  of  conduct,  it  is  only  in  and  through  the 
performance  of  that  function  that  its  development  is  pos- 
sible. If  we  examine  into  the  use  and  context  of  a  newly 
developed  idea,  we  find  that  we  must  recognize :  (1)  its  rela- 

s  «  Dogmatism  and  Evolution,"  p.  123. 


200        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

tion  to  the  relatively  simple  idea  from  which  it  has  sprung, 
as  well  as  to  the  contrasted  idea  from  which  it  has  been 
distinguished  (and,  perhaps,  soon  also  to  the  more  complex 
ideas  to  which  it  in  turn  gives  rise)  ;  and  (£)  its  relation 
to  the  conduct  to  which  it  prompts  —  briefly  and  crudely 
—  its  genetic  and  functional  relations."  4  In  this  whole 
discussion  consciousness  and  ideas  are  interpreted  in  a 
purely  biological  manner.  Origin  and  function  are  made 
entirely  determinative  of  the  action  of  consciousness  and  of 
the  movement  of  ideas.  It  is  out  of  the  movement  of  ideas  in 
a  genetic  and  functional  manner  that  meaning  is  supposed 
to  grow.  Schiller  is  in  entire  agreement  with  De  Laguna 
and  definitely  states :  "  Evolutionism,  the  great  scien- 
tific movement  of  the  nineteenth  century,  is  at  length  in- 
vesting the  last  well-nigh  inaccessible  stronghold  of  '  pure  ' 
metaphysics,  and  systematically  grappling  with  the  ulti- 
mate abstractions  which  human  thought  has  recognized 
and  respected  for  ages,  but  has  never  succeeded  in  render- 
ing really  useful  and  intelligible."  5  The  result  of  this  in- 
vasion and  its  influence  is  defined  by  Schiller  in  the  same 
terms  of  functioning  and  process.  The  underlying  condi- 
tional definition  of  evolution  is  thus  given :  "  The  es- 
sence of  Evolutionism  "  is  "  the  doctrine  that  the  world  is 
in  process." G  The  whole  general  aspect,  therefore,  of 
pragmatism  as  one  of  function  and  process  rests  on  Dar- 
winian assumptions.  Through  them  the  origin  and  the 
successive  steps  of  thought  and  truth  are  explained.  But 
it  is  not  only  in  this  fundamental  manner  that  evolutionism 
has  influenced  pragmatism.  The  specific  terms  of  evolu- 
tionism, variation,  selection,  survival  of  the  fittest,  and 
adaptation  are  employed  to  illustrate  the  movement  of 
thought  in  the  finding  of  truth. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  126. 

s  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  224. 

a  Ibid.,  p.  225. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  201 

The  very  idea  of  variation  is  that  of  a  constantly  pro- 
ceeding change.  Minute  variations  are  the  basis  among 
observed  facts  through  whose  accumulation  and  progress 
evolution  finds  its  point  of  departure.  Nothing  is  by  sup- 
position without  the  chain  of  constantly  proceeding  varia- 
tions. It  is  altogether  on  the  same  ground  that  pragma- 
tism finds  knowledge  and  truth  wholly  within  the  variation 
of  ideas,  feelings  and  volitions.  These  reacting  and  being 
reacted  upon  constitute  experience  in  and  through  which 
the  functioning  of  thought  works  its  way  out  toward  truth. 
The  fact  which  is  emphasized  is  not  fixity  but  movement, 
not  a  firm  truth  but  variation  of  mind.  Dewey  says: 
"  Once  admit  that  the  whole  verifiable  or  fruitful  object 
of  knowledge  is  the  particular  set  of  changes  that  generate 
the  object  of  study  together  with  the  consequences  that 
flow  from  it,  and  no  intelligible  question  can  be  asked  about 
what,  by  assumption,  lies  outside."  7  In  other  words,  there 
can  be  no  recourse  to  any  logical  norm  or  any  eternal 
principle  behind  truth.  Any  such  effort  is  supposed  to  be 
an  unjust  abstraction  from  the  existing  course  of  events. 
It  is  out  of  the  changing  events  and  the  set  of  variations 
within  experience,  as  it  touches  the  mind,  that  truth  must 
be  found.  By  test  and  trial,  by  elimination  and  survival, 
man  must  finally  establish  his  truths  and  his  knowledge. 

Pragmatism  is  not  only  favorable  to  the  use  of  variation 
as  rightly  descriptive  of  the  process  of  truth-finding,  but  it 
is  also  friendly  to  the  idea  of  natural  selection.  In  life- 
forms  the  struggle  for  existence  explains  how  the  unfit  are 
eliminated.  It  breaks  down  the  actual  continuity  of 
forms,  and  thus  brings  about  the  result  of  the  remnant 
of  selected  forms  through  a  purely  natural  process.  By 
a  very  similar  selection  the  thoughts  that  remain  after  the 
struggle  for  existence  in  experience  are  those  which  are 
valuable  as  elements  of  truth.     Truth  "  happens  "  in  the 

7  "  The  Influence  of  Darwinism  on  Philosophy,"  p.  14. 


202        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

conflict  of  experience.  The  selection  in  our  mind  may  be 
mediated  by  attention,  or  voluntary  selection,  but  finally, 
according  to  most  pragmatists,  the  selection  is  attained  in 
a  more  indirect  manner.  We  keep  as  truth  what  proves 
valuable  and  what  is  finally  existent  in  our  experience. 
Professor  Schiller,  in  consistence  with  the  pragmatic  idea, 
has  expressed  the  concept  of  selection  thus :  "  A  human 
mind  initially  commences  its  career  in  a  jumble  resembling 
a  chaotic  rag-bag.  It  finds  itself  containing  things  valu- 
able, worthless,  and  pernicious,  dreams,  illusions,  fancies, 
delusions,  incongruities,  inconsistencies,  etc.,  all  jost- 
ling the  materials  for  what  are  subsequently  construed  as 
realities.  If,  therefore,  anything  approaching  a  har- 
monious life  is  to  be  constructed  out  of  such  stuff,  a  large 
amount  of  selection  is  necessary.  The  pernicious  contents 
must  be  kept  under  and  as  far  as  possible  eliminated ;  the 
worthless  and  useless  must  be  neglected ;  and  so  chaos  must 
be  turned  into  something  like  cosmos.  This  we  do  by 
selectively  attending  to  what  turns  out  to  be  valuable,  and 
by  ignoring  those  elements  in  our  experience  which  we  can- 
not use."  8  In  other  words  it  is  use  after  trial  that  deter- 
mines the  selection.  What  persists  is  valuable.  Purpose 
is  sometimes  admitted  in  such  selection,  but,  after  all,  the 
selection  is  purely  natural  in  its  character,  and  is  deter- 
mined by  use  and  value. 

It  is  very  evident  that  when  variation  and  selection  are 
ruling  ideas,  that  survival  of  the  fittest  must  also  be  in- 
cluded. In  the  logic  of  pragmatism  it  is  the  very  survival, 
the  verification  of  truth  as  it  answers  human  uses,  which 
constitutes  truth  as  truth.  If  there  were  no  survival  of 
certain  ideas  after  the  trying-out  of  human  experience, 
there  could  be  no  remaining  truth.  Never  can  that  be 
truth  which  has  not  stood  trial  and  test  and  come  out 
victorious.      Sometimes  an  apparent  truth  may  live  for  a 

s  Ibid.,  p.  233. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  203 

time,  but  it  will  not  finally  survive  a  closer  search  and  a 
fuller  knowledge.  Its  failure  to  survive  causes  it  to  cease 
to  be  a  truth.  Whatever  is  not  a  strong  survival  and 
forms  a  basis  for  belief  and  action,  and  whatever  is  not 
approved  by  the  effects  of  belief  and  action,  is  not  really 
true.  Truth  never  lies  back  of  experience  as  a  great  ideal 
or  motive.  It  is  only  the  usable,  valuable,  satisfying  ex- 
perience which  survives.  Survival  in  the  evolutionary 
sense  is  always  the  essential  precondition  of  all  the  various 
phenomena  of  life.  It  is  also,  according  to  pragmatism, 
the  precondition  of  all  truths  as  living  facts. 

But  when  survival  is  a  precondition,  it  needs,  prior 
to  it,  adaptation.  Evolution  cannot  maintain  survival 
without  the  supposition  of  the  adaptation  of  life-forms  to 
their  environment,  whether  it  stresses  selection  or  environ- 
ment. This  hypothesis  of  adaptation,  which  biology  so 
largely  employs,  is  also  applied  to  knowledge  and  to  truth 
by  the  pragmatist.  While  consciousness  seems  to  inter- 
fere when  merely  reflex  adjustment  and  habitual  adapta- 
tion fail,  it  only  interferes  for  a  time  and  retires  again. 
Its  whole  concern  is  to  aid  the  proper  adjustment  of  con- 
duct and  it  has  no  value  in  itself.  Finally  it  is  itself  con- 
duct and  action,  and  all  that  it  does,  even  in  the  highest 
idea,  is  to  mediate  proper  adjustment.  Ideas  themselves 
only  live  as  they  are  adapted  to  the  conditions  of  life. 
Truth  constituted  through  ideas  is  the  adapted  remainder 
of  our  experience  out  of  which  we  can  explain  other  pos- 
sible experience.  Truth,  therefore,  is  the  deposit  of  real 
experience.  But  this  deposit  is  formed  only  after  the  re- 
sponse to  environment  is  successful.  Ideas  are  true  when 
they  properly  meet  the  call  of  the  surroundings.  Says 
Dewey :  "So  I  beg  to  remind  you  that,  according  to 
pragmatism,  ideas  (judgments  and  reasonings  being  in- 
cluded for  convenience  in  this  term)  are  attitudes  of  re- 
sponse taken  toward  extra-ideal,  extra-mental  things.     In- 


204        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

stinct  and  habit  express,  for  instance,  modes  of  response, 
but  modes  inadequate  for  a  progressive  being,  or  for  adap- 
tation to  an  environment  presenting  novel  and  unmastered 
features.  Under  such  conditions  ideas  are  their  surro- 
gates. The  origin  of  an  idea  is  thus  some  empirical,  ex- 
tra-mental situation  which  provokes  ideas  as  modes  of  re- 
sponse, while  their  meaning  is  found  in  the  modifications 
—  the  '  differences  ' —  they  make  in  this  extra-mental  sit- 
uation. Their  validity  in  turn  is  measured  by  their  ca- 
pacity to  effect  the  transformation  they  intend."  9  If  this 
transformation  is  really  effected  the  idea  that  has  vital 
adaptation  is  true.  Consequently  not  some  inner  ideal, 
some  light  beckoning  man  on,  forms  his  ideas  and  ideals, 
even  the  highest  of  them,  but  ideas  and  ideals  are  only 
the  adaptive  resultant  called  forth  by  environment.  Their 
success  in  meeting  the  condition  of  environment,  which  de- 
termines their  workableness,  stamps  them  as  true. 

It  is  very  apparent  from  all  this,  that  since  pragmatism 
finds  in  the  general  idea  and  the  specific  terminology  of 
evolution  a  basis  adequate  to  explain  its  conception  of 
knowledge  and  truth,  it  is  fundamentally  biological.  But 
biology  to  it  means  not  merely  biology  as  a  natural  science, 
but  such  speculation  as  may  be  built  upon  it  starting 
from  experience.  Every  trace,  however,  of  an  ideal  de- 
termination of  life  is  generally  avoided.  Perry  rightly 
says :  "  Pragmatism  means  in  the  broadest  sense,  the 
acceptance  of  the  categories  of  life  as  fundamental.  It  is 
the  bio-centric  philosophy.  And  it  must  be  added  at  once 
that  the  pragmatist  means  by  '  life,'  not  the  imaginary 
or  ideal  life  of  any  hypothetical  being,  not  the  '  eternal ' 
life  or  the  '  absolute '  life ;  but  the  temporal,  operative 
life  of  animals  and  men,  the  life  of  instinct  and  desire, 
of  adaptation  and  environment,  of  civilization  and  prog- 
ress." 10      It  is  true  that  in  this  conception  of  life  pragma- 

9  Ibid.,  p.  155. 

io  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  197. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  205 

tism  is  not  compelled  to  advocate  a  mechanical  or  chemi- 
cal idea  of  the  origin  of  life.  It  everywhere  prefers  to 
rest  on  the  actual  biology,  it  even  adds  a  feature  of  purpose 
at  times,  for  we  can  have  no  truth  as  value  without  the 
implication  of  end  or  purpose.  But  whatever  notions  it 
finds  in  life  do  not  lead  it  to  an  ideal  point  of  view.  It  al- 
ways remains  purely  natural,  and  its  idea  of  purpose  is 
a  purpose  altogether  immanent  in  man  and  the  world. 
And,  therefore,  Perry  is  entirely  correct  when  he  char- 
acterizes pragmatism  thus :  "  It  may  even  in  a  sense 
be  called  '  naturalistic'  For  it  identifies  reality  with  '  this 
world,'  with  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  going  on  here  and 
now;  and  regards  perception  as  the  most  reliable  means 
of  knowledge."  ll 

The  biologism  of  the  pragmatist  finds  its  expression 
and  realizes  its  outcome  in  the  psychological  attitude. 
The  problem  of  knowledge  and  of  truth  is  placed  wholly 
within  the  limits  of  the  phenomenal  process  in  the  human 
mind.  The  mind,  conditioned  by  the  physiological  struc- 
ture of  man,  is  considered  from  the  viewpoint  of  biology. 
Consequently  the  psychological  analysis  of  knowledge  is 
altogether  the  analysis  of  a  function.  There  is  no  admis- 
sion at  all  of  any  theory  of  knowledge  on  a  normative 
basis.  Truth,  consequently,  is  also  a  question  of  procedure 
and  result,  and  it  can  never  be  determined  by  standards 
or  norms  which  logic  establishes.  There  is  no  legitimate 
place  for  logic ;  its  abstractions  are  supposed  to  be  hin- 
drances and  not  aids.  Schiller  defies  the  logician  "  (1) 
to  produce  his  *  pure  '  thought;  (2)  to  account  for  the 
movement  of  thought  by  anything  but  an  appeal  to  psy- 
chological motives,  desire,  feeling,  interest,  attention,  will, 
etc. ;  (3)  even  to  describe  what  he  conceives  to  happen  in 
strictly  logical  terms  and  without  constant  recourse  to 
psychology."  12     Logical  coherence  is  analyzed  by  Schiller 

ii  Ibid.,  p.  198. 

12  "  Humanism,"  p.  51. 


206       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

as  interest.  Identity  is  supposed  to  be  due  to  association. 
Schiller  believes  that  thought  without  interest  to  set  think- 
ing into  motion  is  no  thought  at  all.  He  endeavors  a  fun- 
damental criticism  of  all  logic.13  His  attitude  truly  rep- 
resents the  endeavor  of  pragmatism  to  absorb  the  older 
formal  logic  into  psychology.  The  tendency  of  pragma- 
tism is  anti-logical,  and  opposes  older  logical  positions. 
Professor  Boodin  in  his  book  on  "  Truth  and  Reality  " 
proceeds  from  the  mind  as  instinct  and  the  categories  of 
intelligence  to  the  truth  process.  While  he  conceives  the 
truth  process  to  involve  ideation,  feeling,  and  will,  he  de- 
fines it  purely  in  a  psychological  manner  thus :  "  It  is 
the  realization  of  an  idea,  selected  and  fixated  by  the  will, 
which  has  a  definite  hedonic  value,  as  the  process  fails  or 
succeeds  of  realization.  The  truth  process  is  self-realiza- 
tion —  the  whole  self  striving  to  realize  a  definite  end  — 
the  will  to  know."  14  After  truth  has  been  given  this  vol- 
untaristic  attitude,  which  is  characteristic  of  pragmatism,15 
Professor  Boodin  discusses  its  morphology  and  form. 
The  determination  of  the  form  of  thought  is  supposed  to  be 
found,  when  one  begins  with  the  hypothetical  judgment 
which  is  the  trial  stage.  From  the  hypothetical  judgment 
one  can  pass  to  the  categorical  judgment  and  to  full  affirm- 
ative and  negative  assertion.  Judgment  and  assertion 
are  always  a  part  of  a  concrete  situation.  "  Judgment 
is  always  a  process,  with  beginning,  middle  and  end,  the 
developing  of  a  drama  of  determinate  interest.  The  tradi- 
tional names  of  judgment  we  have  found  to  be  mere  stages, 
artificially  isolated  from  this  concrete  process.  Judgment, 
inference  and  concept  again  are  not  different  activities. 
Inference  is  merely  the  expansion  of  the  judgment  into 
its  reasons,  machinery  in  its  realization."  16     In  this  proc- 

13  Cf.  Schiller,  "  Formal  Logic." 

I*  P.  85. 

is  James,  "Pragmatism,"  p.  46. 

ia  Boodin,  "  Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  98. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  207 

ess  and  expansion,  which  is   movement   and  phenomenal 
connection,  thought  seeks  its  identity. 

The  psychological  attitude  of  Boodin  is  fully  shared  by 
Dewey,  who  claims :  "  All  the  distinctions  of  the  thought- 
function,  of  conception  as  over  against  sense-perception,  of 
judgment  in  its  various  modes  and  forms,  of  inference  in  its 
vast  diversity  of  operation  —  all  these  distinctions  come 
within  the  thought-situation  as  growing  out  of  a  character- 
istic antecedent  typical  formation  of  experience ;  and  have 
for  their  purpose  the  solution  of  the  peculiar  problem  with 
respect  to  which  the  thought  function  is  generated  or 
evolved :  the  restoration  of  a  deliberately  integrated  expe- 
rience from  the  inherent  conflict  into  which  it  has  fallen."  17 
The  whole  description  of  Dewey  shows  us  that  the  estimate 
of  thought  is  by  no  means  logical  in  the  usual  sense  of  the 
term.  Thought  is  altogether  a  functioning,  and  its  move- 
ment is  the  important  part.  It  must  then  follow  "  if 
thought's  nature  is  dependent  upon  its  actual  conditions 
and  circumstances,  the  primary  logical  problem  is  to  study 
thought-in-its-conditioning ;  it  is  to  detect  the  crisis  within 
which  thought  and  its  subject-matter  present  themselves  in 
their  mutual  distinction  and  cross-reference."  18  Thought 
is  altogether  considered  in  its  correlations  as  it  appears  in 
the  phenomena  of  the  mind.  It  is  joined  to  its  contents 
not  by  any  standard  of  logic,  but  only  by  psychological 
considerations.  "  Thinking  is  adaptation  to  an  end 
through  the  adjustment  of  particular  objective  con- 
tents." 19  It  is  the  particular  contents  working  them- 
selves out  which  make  the  truth.  The  whole  process  of 
thinking  is  supposed  to  lead  from  sense  to  image,  from 
image  to  logical  functioning.  "  The  complexity  of  the 
thinking  process  resides  in  consciousness  also ;  it  resides 
in  the  imagery,  the  stimuli,  the  mere  symbols,  if  you  like, 

17  «  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,"  p.  47. 

is  Dewey,  "Studies  in  Logical  Theory,"  p.  63. 

19  Ibid.,  p.  81. 


208       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

that  have  '  come  '  to  consciousness.  As  soon  as  the  com- 
plexity begins  to  be  felt,  as  soon  as  any  discrimination 
whatsoever  begins  to  be  introduced  or  appreciated,  at  that 
instant  the  sense-content,  the  quale,  of  imagery  begins  to 
have  a  logical  function.  ...  It  is  only  as  the  sense-con- 
tents of  various  images  are  discriminated  and  compared 
that  anything  like  thinking  can  be  conceived  to  go  on."  20 
It  is  perfectly  explicable  that  on  such  a  basis  conception 
is  altogether  to  be  accounted  for  by  psychological  reasons. 
There  can  be  no  real  distinction  between  logic  and  psychol- 
ogy. Logic  has  unduly  limited  psychology.21  These  clear 
statements,  which  deny  separate  logical  standards,  entirely 
justify  Professor  Pratt's  description:  "We  have  noted 
the  emphasis  placed  by  pragmatists  upon  the  concrete, 
psychological  nature  of  our  human  truths.  These  do  not, 
they  insist,  dwell  apart  in  a  Platonic  realm ;  they  are  all 
of  them  concrete  mental  facts,  they  are  of  such  stuff  as 
dreams  and  feelings  and  sensations  are  made  of."  22 

Out  of  this  theory,  which  constantly  emphasizes  the 
psychological  attitude,  there  grow  a  number  of  peculiar 
terms  in  which  thought  is  characterized,  and  in  which  truth 
is  supposed  to  be  related  to  thought.  The  first  of  these 
terms  is  the  description  of  knowledge  as  a  process  of  lead- 
ing. The  manner  in  which  thought  flows  on  is  described 
to  be  the  result  of  leading.  Agreement  is  supposed  to  re- 
sult through  proper  leading  which  justifies  itself  by  its 
direction  and  outcome.  "  True  ideas  lead  us  into  useful 
verbal  and  conceptional  quarters  as  well  as  directly  up  to 
useful  sensible  termini.  They  lead  to  consistency,  stability 
and  flowing  human  intercourse.  They  lead  away  from 
excentricity  and  isolation,  from  foiled  and  barren  thinking. 
The  untrammelled  flowing  of  the  leading-process,  its  gen- 

20  Professor  Gore,  "Studies  in  Logical  Theory,"  p.  201. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  185. 

22  "What  is  Pragmatism?"  p.  84. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  209 

eral  freedom  from  clash  and  contradiction,  passes  for  its 
indirect  verification ;  but  all  roads  lead  to  Rome,  and  in  the 
end  and  eventually,  all  true  processes  must  lead  to  the  face 
of  directly  verifying  sensible  experiences  somewhere,  which 
somebody's  ideas  have  copied."  23  The  important  thing 
is,  that  after  all  the  flowing  of  thought  ends  in  the  sen- 
sible experience.  The  proof  of  truth  is  altogether  practi- 
cal and  we  are  conducted  through  a  present  idea  success- 
fully to  truth  if  the  idea  runs  off  prosperously.  It  is  in 
this  manner  that  pragmatism  supposes  that  we  find  the 
agreement  of  truth,  and  it  is  out  of  such  leading  that  the 
kindly  light  of  moving  ideas  guides  us  into  truth. 

Because  knowledge  is  a  leading,  a  leading  from  the  con- 
fused to  the  clear  idea,  from  separation  to  unity,  its 
prospects  always  lie  ahead.  The  leading  is  a  leading  away 
into  the  future.  Thought  is  supposed  to  look  to  ends, 
for  ends  and  aims  are  what  action  wants.  If  thought  is 
essentially  not  static  but  dynamic  it  must  be  determined  by 
its  future  result.  Thought,  as  active  and  functioning, 
must  be  purposive  and  look  to  the  future.  It  is  the  suc- 
cess of  its  venture  which  makes  its  functioning  truth. 
Therefore,  the  pragmatic  method  means:  "  The  attitude 
of  looking  away  from  first  things,  principles,  '  categories' 
supposed  necessities;  and  of  looking  towards  last  things, 
fruits,  consequences,  facts"  24  There  is,  therefore,  no  way 
of  deciding  truth  in  the  present  without  regard  to  its 
future  consequences.  Truth  must  be  found  by  a  teleology 
of  action.     The  end  makes  true  and  justifies  the  means. 

Pragmatism  in  this  attitude  of  moving  toward  the  fu- 
ture, and  in  this  position  which  looks  towards  ends,  must 
define  knowledge  as  a  truth-seeking  and  a  truth-finding. 
The  truth-seeking  becomes  a  truth-finding  when  it  reaches 
proper    satisfaction.     The    end    of    all    the    process    of 

23  James,  "  Pragmatism,"  p.  215. 

24  Ibid.,  p.  54  ff. 


210        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

thought,  as  it  aims  at  truth,  is  to  give  real  satisfaction. 
The  only  ends  that  can  be  acknowledged  are  those  that 
satisfy.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  ends  become  real  pur- 
poses. Purposes  are  real  and  true  when  they  possess  the 
quality  of  answering  to  a  want,  whether  it  be  a  want  of 
sensation,  of  perception,  or  of  idea.  The  satisfactions 
vary  with  the  situation  and  the  need.  But  even  the  high- 
est ideals  are  finally  nothing  but  satisfactions.  There  is 
no  other  standard  or  criterion.  "  The  criterion  proposed 
is  satisfaction,  and  primarily  every  kind  of  satisfaction. 
In  so  far  as  a  theory,  idea,  judgment  gives  us  any  kind  of 
satisfaction,  so  far  forth  it  is  true;  in  so  far  as  it  runs 
counter  to  this  and  produces  dissatisfaction  it  is  false."  25 
There  is  no  other  test  but  just  the  way  in  which  truth 
satisfies  and  fits  in  to  the  experiences  which  constitute  our 
lives.  "  Ideas  {which  themselves  are  but  parts  of  our  ex- 
perience) become  true  just  in  so  far  as  they  help  us  to  get 
into  satisfactory  relation  with  other  parts  of  our  experi- 
ence." 26 

It  is  due  to  the  reference  which  thought  has  for  the  fu- 
ture, and  it  is  owing  to  the  emphasis  on  satisfaction,  that 
it  must  be  supposed,  that  thoughts  properly  functioning 
make  the  truth.  Truth  is  not  any  quality  or  property 
which  inheres  in  ideas.  The  only  thing  that  makes  ideas 
true  is  that  truth  happens  to  them.  It  is  the  outcome 
which  establishes  the  truth  of  an  idea.  An  idea  becomes 
true  when  we  can  assimilate  it,  confirm  it,  corroborate  it 
and  verify  it.  It  is  false  if  we  cannot  do  this.  "  It  be- 
comes true,  is  made  true  by  events.  Its  verity  is  in  fact 
an  event,  a  process ;  the  process  namely  of  its  verifying 
itself,  its  \eri-fication.  Its  validity  is  the  process  of  its 
\a]id-ation."  27      By  verification  the  ends  are  satisfied,  by 

25  J.  M.  O'Sullivan,  "  Old  Criticism  and  New  Pragmatism,"  p.  269. 

26  James,  "  Pragmatism,"  p.  58. 

27  Ibid.,  p.  901. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  211 

validation  the  leadings  of  thought  are  established.  Thus, 
and  thus  only,  through  the  immediate  and  concrete  proc- 
ess of  verifying  leadings  do  we  attain  the  truth.  "  Such 
simply  and  fully  verified  leadings  are  certamly  the  origi- 
nals and  prototypes  of  the  truth-process."  2S 

On  the  whole  Schiller  agrees  with  James  in  his  emphasis 
upon  the  making  of  truth.  But  Schiller  assigns  a  greater 
place  in  the  process  to  man  himself.  His  theory  becomes 
real  humanism,  because  the  verification  is  a  procedure  into 
which  human  feelings  and  volitions  enter  together  with 
ideas.  Truth-finding  is  no  process  of  a  mere  intellectual 
order.  It  has  the  warmth  of  human  nature,  because  in 
truth  man  seeks  and  finds  satisfaction.  The  problem  is 
not  whether  we  can  construct  an  unexceptionable  theory, 
but  whether  we  recognize  the  importance  of  subjective 
activity  in  the  making  of  truth.  "  It  must  frankly  be 
admitted  that  truth  is  human  truth,  and  incapable  of  com- 
ing into  being  without  human  effort  and  agency;  that 
human  action  is  psychologically  conditioned;  that,  there- 
fore, the  concrete  fulness  of  human  interests,  desires,  emo- 
tions, satisfactions,  purposes,  hopes,  and  fears  is  relevant 
to  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  must  not  be  abstracted 
from."  29  Truth  is  not  independent,  but  thoroughly  de- 
pendent on  human  life.  There  can  be  no  real  absolute 
and  transcendent  truth.  Life  offers  to  us  problems.  We 
must  distinguish  between  the  right  and  the  wrong  solution 
of  these  problems.  It  is  this  situation  of  life  which  pre- 
sents to  us  truth  in  its  inception  as  ambiguous.  The 
ambiguity  of  truth  presents  us  with  a  claim  which  we  must 
either  accept  or  reject.  "  Truth,  therefore,  will  become 
ambiguous.  It  will  mean  primarily  a  claim  which  may  or 
may  not  turn  out  to  be  valid.  It  will  mean,  secondarily, 
such  a  claim  after  it  has  been  tested  and  ratified,  by  proc- 

28  James,  Ibid.,  p.  206. 

29  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  182. 


212       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

esses  which  it  behooves  us  to  examine."  30  In  this  ex- 
amination the  claim  of  truth  is  validated  when  truth  ac- 
tually works.  It  is  by  no  process  of  formal  logic  that  we 
can  establish  it,  but  only  by  its  own  inherent  workableness. 
This  workableness  will  aid  us  to  separate  it  from  what  is 
false.  But  a  part  of  the  workableness  is  the  very  fact 
that  truth  yields  satisfaction  and  answers  to  real  human 
interests.  By  its  workings,  when  the  claims  are  really 
verified,  truth  itself  helps  to  make  reality.  It  is  not  the 
initial  state  of  truth  that  counts,  but  what  truth  finally 
and  really  makes  out  of  the  data  of  human  experience.31 
When  we  have  considered  how  truth  establishes  itself, 
how  it  makes  reality,  how  it  answers  satisfactions,  how 
it  looks  to  the  future,  how  it  is  successful  in  its  leadings, 
we  are  ready  to  acknowledge  that  truth  is  useful.  The 
reduction  of  truth  to  the  test  of  usefulness  demands  care- 
ful consideration.  The  standard  of  utility  advocated,  as 
a  test  of  truth,  by  pragmatism  is  not  necessarily  a  narrow 
one.  Utility  need  not  be  employed  in  an  unideal  sense. 
Consequently  the  utilitarian  standard,  which  follows  from 
pragmatism,  is  not  to  be  immediately  identified  with  earlier 
utilitarianism.  The  conception  of  use  in  most  pragmatic 
discussions  is  far  wider  and  more  balanced,  than  the  same 
idea  in  the  utilitarianism  of  morals,  which  Bentham  and 
Mill  introduced  into  English  thought.  But,  after  all,  the 
theory  of  resultant,  satisfactory  ends  as  validating  truth, 
and  the  hypothesis  of  its  successful  operation  in  justifying 
a  claim,  give  truth  a  strong  utilitarian  color.  Truth  is 
not  finally  a  vital  credit,  but  it  is  a  usable  cash  value.  Its 
importance  is  its  expediency  in  the  long  run  and  to  meet 
all  wants.  "  *  The  true?  to  put  it  very  briefly,  is  only 
the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our  thinking,  just  as  *  the 

so  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  144  ff. 

si  Cf.  "  Studies  in  Humanism;  The  Making  of  Reality,"  p.  421  ff. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  213 

right  '  is  only  the  expedient  in  the  way  of  our  behaving"  32 
When  we  have  arrived  at  such  a  definition  the  balance  of 
the  broader  idea  of  use  in  pragmatism  has  been  lost.  The 
moral  standard  of  expediency  has  led  us  back  again  to  the 
utilitarianism  of  a  Mill.  Not  all  pragmatists,  however, 
will  fully  admit  the  identification  of  the  right  with  the  ex- 
pedient. Nevertheless,  not  one  can  get  away  from  the  im- 
plication of  the  practical  consequences  implied  in  the 
pragmatic  program.  Utility  may  be  broadly  defined,  but 
finally  it  sinks  again  to  mere  practical  expediency  which 
can  be  applied  to  every  kind  of  idea.  James,  who  has 
been  most  outspoken  and  clear  in  indicating  the  last  result 
of  pragmatism,  applies  the  standard  of  use  to  religion 
and  theological  ideas.  He  says :  "  If  theological  ideas 
prove  to  have  a  value  for  concrete  life,  they  will  be  true, 
for  pragmatism,  in  the  sense  of  being  good  for  so  much. 
For  how  much  more  they  are  true,  will  depend  entirely 
on  their  relations  to  the  other  truths  that  also  have  to  be 
acknowledged."  33  The  standard  of  usefulness  is  discussed 
more  cautiously  by  Boodin.  While  he  admits  that  truth 
may  turn  out  to  be  useful,  and  that  the  utilitarian  motive 
has  been  important  in  the  investigation  of  truth,  he  denies 
that  the  usefulness  of  any  search  in  science  and  life  makes 
it  true.  He  claims :  "  But  the  statement  that  truth  is,  on 
the  whole,  useful  is  a  conclusion  and  not  a  part  of  prag- 
matism as  an  epistemological  criterion."34  Doubtless 
this  is  correct.  Utility  is  not  the  initial  standard  of  the 
process  but  its  consequence.  However,  in  as  far  as  it  is  a 
real  and  admitted  consequence  it  points  to  the  testing  of 
all  claims  of  truth  by  their  outcome  in  the  procedure  of  ex- 
perience. 

All  the  special  and  peculiar  psychological  definitions  of 

32  James,  "  Pragmatism,"  p.  222. 

as  Ibid.,  p.  73. 

34 "Truth  and  Reality,"  p.  191. 


£14       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

truth  emphasize  that  truth  is  purely  within  experience. 
It  has  been  constantly  necessary  to  assert  and  to  re-assert 
this  limitation  of  truth.  The  emphasis  upon  experience 
and  its  workings  is  as  fundamental  to  pragmatism  as  the 
evolutional  point  of  view.  Of  course,  this  experience  need 
not  be  at  all  times  material.  The  earlier  pragmatists 
emphasized  conduct  and  behaviour  as  a  result  in  a  purely 
perceptual  and  sensible  manner.  This  reduction  to  the 
external  and  material  has  never  been  fully  removed  from 
pragmatism.  Nevertheless,  it  must  be  admitted,  that 
some  of  the  pragmatists  have  put  a  larger  emphasis  on  the 
ideal  side.  None  have  absolutely  denied  it.  It  has  been 
definitely  stated  by  Boodin:  "  There  is  a  conduct  of  the 
understanding  as  well  as  a  conduct  involving  certain 
perceptual  events  as  its  outcome.  The  procedure  may  be 
entirely  of  a  logical  kind  as  in  formal  logic  and  pure 
mathematics.  But  here,  too,  the  idea  is  true  only  as  it 
terminates  consistently  in  its  intended  result."  35  There  is 
an  ideal  termination  of  the  process  of  thinking  admitted 
in  these  words  of  Boodin.  Nevertheless  the  result  is 
reached  not  through  the  validity  of  the  axiom,  or  prin- 
ciple, or  law,  but  the  trial  and  the  experience  make  it  true. 
Consequently  truth  is  included  within  the  limits  of  ex- 
perience. It  is  conditioned  by  the  situation  in  which  men 
are.  "  Hence  the  criterion  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the 
meaning,  of  the  adequacy,  of  the  cognitional  thing  lies 
withm  the  relationships  of  the  situation  and  not  with- 
out" 36  We  are  to  remain  totally  within  the  elements 
that  experience  offers,  and  we  have  to  do  only  with  its 
values.  B3'  no  other  way  can  we  explain  thought  or 
truth.  "  Is  it  not  clear  that  the  reason  that  there  is  a 
dialectic  of  thought  is  because  at  bottom  thought  is  a  part 
of  the  total  process  of  an  efficient  desire  and  effort  to 

35  Ibid.,  p.  187. 

se  Dewey,  "  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,"  p.  107. 


The  Pragmatic  Program  215 

effect  a  change  m  experienced  values?  "  37  In  other  words, 
when  experience  becomes  interpreted  in  the  human  mind 
and  the  human  mind  acts  upon  it,  there  arise  certain  values. 
In  these  values  lies  the  problem  of  truth.  When  they 
possess  the  power  to  work,  to  satisfy  and  to  agree,  they 
are  true.  A  true  value  meets  a  situation.  Truth  and 
falsity  do  not  belong  to  any  facts  in  themselves.  They 
are  not  mere  existences,  but  they  are  found  when  assurance 
and  belief  enter  in.  It  is  through  belief  and  assurance 
that  a  meaning  is  found.  The  fulfillment  of  use,  the  an- 
swer of  satisfaction,  the  completion  of  purpose,  the  reply 
to  the  claim,  the  ending  of  the  leading,  these  constitute 
truth  and  give  lasting  meaning.  Things,  percepts,  feel- 
ings, volitions,  ideas, —  all  tending  to  ends  and  actions 
and  purposes  are  relations  whose  meanings  can  furnish 
truth.  When  the  proper  assurance  has  been  answered  and 
consciously  satisfied  we  have  truth.  Truth  is  an  experi- 
enced relation  of  things  and  gives  them  real  meaning. 
Falsity  is  equally  a  situation,  but  one  which  does  not  sat- 
isfy. "  Truth  and  falsity  present  themselves  as  signifi- 
cant facts  only  m  situations  m  which  specific  meanings 
and  their  already  experienced  fulfillments  and  non-fulfill- 
ments are  intentionally  compared  and  contrasted  with  ref- 
erence to  the  question  of  the  worth,  as  to  reliability  of 
meaning,  of  the  given  meaning  or  class  of  meanings."  38 
Thus  truth  works  itself  out  and  justifies  itself.  It  gives 
meaning  to  life  in  and  through  the  flow  of  life  itself. 

37  Moore,  "  Pragmatism  and  Its  Critics,"  p.  93. 

38  Dewey,  "  The  Influence  of  Darwin,"  p.  95. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE    RESULTS    OF    PRAGMATISM 

INTERESTING  and  suggestive  as  the  program  of 
pragmatism  may  be  in  itself,  its  theories  concern  us 
and  become  important  for  us  in  their  results.  When 
the  results  are  examined  the  question  at  once  arises,  what 
is  their  bearing  upon  the  truth  of  Christianity.  Pragma- 
tism has  been  received  most  variously  by  different  types 
of  thinkers.  While  some  have  accorded  it  a  high  place 
as  the  best  ally  of  Christianity,  others  have  assailed  it 
as  a  most  dangerous  enemy  because  of  its  emphasis  on 
actuality,  its  endorsement  of  evolution,  and  its  trend  to- 
ward utility.  A  careful  and  just  estimate  must  lead  us 
to  the  same  final  judgment  which  we  find  necessary  in 
reference  to  all  the  modern  methods  of  thought.  We 
shall  be  constrained  to  mediate  between  wholesale  adoption 
and  complete  rejection. 

In  as  far  as  pragmatism  is  an  evolutionary  theory  and 
uses  the  terms  of  a  biological  hypothesis,  it  can  be  used  in 
appreciating  Christianity  as  a  developing  religion.  Of 
course  we  must  exercise  great  care  not  to  confuse  the 
usableness  of  biological  terms  in  Christian  truth  with 
their  basal  bearing  on  the  determination  of  Christian  truth. 
Perhaps  the  relation  of  biologic  terms  to  Christianity  is 
more  of  an  illustrative  character,  and,  if  rightly  balanced, 
of  a  comparative  nature,  than  of  a  fundamental  and  con- 
stitutive value.  If  we  desire  to  tell  the  story  of  Christian 
truth  in  the  Church  and  in  the  world,  we  may  employ  the 
formulas  of  variation,  struggle,  selection  and  survival. 
There   is   a   sense  in  which  biological  evolution  has  dis- 

216 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  217 

covered  fundamental  points  of  view,  which,  if  properly 
modified,  do  in  part  obtain  in  the  development  of  thought 
and  truth.  To  the  degree  in  which  Christianity  employed 
human  thought  and  the  vessels  of  human  thinking  it  is 
affected  by  the  relation  of  biological  terminology  to 
thought.  After  Christianity  had  announced  its  first  mes- 
sage it  did  not  rest  with  the  mere  proclamation  of  this 
initial  truth,  but  it  compelled  men's  attention  and  called 
forth  their  statements  about  it.  Some,  like  the  early 
Gnostics,  endeavored  to  submerge  it  in  other  systems  of 
religion  and  philosophy.  Some,  like  the  great  Apologists 
of  the  second  century,  sought  to  save  its  distinctness,  even 
though  they  were  compelled  to  state  it  through  the  medium 
of  Greek  thought.  Thus  whatever  the  medium,  Chris- 
tianity was  shaped  according  to  a  number  of  varieties. 

Through  a  continuous  selection  there  arose  standard 
Christianity  with  its  orthodoxy.  It  had  at  first  to  strug- 
gle for  its  existence,  but  it  survived  despite  all  opposition 
because  of  its  fitness  to  meet  the  needs  of  man's  cry  for 
salvation.  Its  fortunes  at  times  wavered;  but  has  it  not 
succeeded?  As  far  as  we  trace  it  historically  and  are 
compelled  to  judge  it  in  its  force  among  men,  it  has  lived 
by  best  meeting  the  conditions  and  situations  of  a  religion 
that  can  and  shall  live.  There  can  be  no  quarrel,  there- 
fore, on  the  part  of  fair-minded  Christianity,  about  allow- 
ing a  delineation  of  its  history  and  of  the  growth  of  its 
truth  along  the  lines  of  the  pragmatic  emphasis  upon  de- 
velopment. A  generalization  from  the  facts  of  Christian 
history  allows  us  to  see  the  worth  of  the  application  of 
pragmatic  evolutionary  terms,  even  though  these  terms  do 
not  describe  the  actual  motive  forces. 

When  pragmatism  applies  the  psychological  test  it  has 
offered  a  valuable  and  usable  medium.  Through  prag- 
matism the  advantages  of  the  psychological  view  1  have 

i  Cf.  above,  Part  I,  Chapter  VII,  p.  129  ff. 


218       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

been  furthered.  It  has  rendered  real  service  in  classifying 
and  differentiating  religious  phenomena,  and  it  has  aided 
in  the  study  of  the  religious  consciousness.  The  psy- 
chological point  of  view,  as  it  has  applied  the  biological 
attitude,  opened  up  the  possibility  of  a  real  research  into 
the  effect  of  different  types  of  religion  and  of  different 
kinds  of  religious  life  upon  the  whole  of  man's  life.  As 
far  as  pragmatism  favors  psychology  it  has  helped  to  make 
the  study  of  religion  in  the  human  mind  not  a  mere  ab- 
stract, philosophic  procedure,  but  a  living,  concrete  analy- 
sis. Pragmatism  has  carried  forward  the  scientific  analy- 
sis of  spiritual  life,  and  has  done  this  most  successfully 
when  most  careful  in  its  collection  of  data  and  in  its  ob- 
servation, and  when  least  influenced  by  a  metaphysical  bias. 
Through  careful  psychological  analysis  pragmatism  has 
advanced  the  application  of  inductive  reasoning  2  to  the 
truth  of  Christianity.  The  manner  in  which  inductive 
modes  of  thought,  which  were  most  largely  advanced 
through  modern  psychology  and  biology,  have  become 
the  ruling  ways  of  thinking,  can  only  be  welcomed  by 
Christianity  in  so  far  forth  as  it  desires  and  uses  the  facts, 
the  data,  and  the  living  growth  of  the  human  mind.  With 
these  before  it  Christianity  can  more  clearly  and  definitely 
show  its  bearings  and  the  influence  of  its  truth  upon  man. 
The  attitude  of  pragmatism  towards  verification  has  an 
element  through  which  it  can  be  brought  into  harmony 
with  Christian  ideals  and  claims.  When  truth  is  por- 
trayed as  the  outgrowth  of  a  claim,  and  as  verifying 
itself  through  its  own  development,  is  this  viewpoint  al- 
together objectionable?  Can  we  not  rather  use  this  idea 
and  may  it  not  serve  to  show  how  Christianity  is  its  own 
defense?  In  its  unfoldment  and  history  Christianity  has 
constantly  gained  strength  and  has  become  its  own  evi- 
dence, because  its  truths  met  the  demand,  and  satisfied  and 

2Cf.  Part  I,  Chapter  II. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  &19 

answered  the  need  of  man.  The  claim  which  Christianity 
made  to  be  the  religion  was  established  as  Christianity 
was  tried  out  in  history.  It  is  through  the  comparison 
of  its  history  with  the  history  of  other  faiths,  it  is  through 
the  study  of  its  results  and  effects  that  it  has  justified 
itself.  The  immediate  verification  and  validation  of  Chris- 
tianity to  the  conscience  is  also  an  establishment  of  its 
truth  in  and  through  the  experience  of  the  recipient. 
When  Christianity  is  received  it  validates  itself.  Its  as- 
surance of  grace  and  its  power  of  salvation  work  out  im- 
mediately and  establish  the  heart  of  man.  And  in  the  long 
run  the  apologetic  of  Christianity  is  best  found  in  the  man- 
ner in  which  Christianity  has  validated  itself,  and  through 
which  it  is  still  verifying  itself  among  men.  This  test  is 
its  defense,  and  to  this  test  men  naturally  look.  The  good 
tree  can  be  known  in  no  other  way  than  by  its  fruits.  It 
may  be  good,  but  men  do  not  know  it  to  be  good  until  it 
bears  fruit. 

The  pragmatic  conception  of  satisfaction,  which  is  a 
particular  application  of  the  idea  of  verification,  also  con- 
tains a  true  point  of  view.  Christianity  argues  that  its 
offer  of  salvation  satisfies  the  human  soul,  and  with  the 
claim  of  this  satisfaction  that  will  be  received  Christianity 
presses  forward.  It  is  certainly  true  that  Christianity 
interprets  satisfaction  in  the  highest  sense,  and  it  makes 
the  supreme  satisfaction  of  man  to  be  the  satisfaction  of 
his  soul.  It  constantly  puts  forward  the  fact  of  this 
satisfaction  as  a  basis  for  accepting  its  message.  While 
there  may  be  some  who  interpret  Christianity's  proffer 
of  satisfaction  in  a  selfish  sense,  there  are  others  who 
realize  that  even  spiritual  satisfaction  should  not  be  the 
main  motive.  Nevertheless  even  these  advocates  of  a 
Christianity,  in  which  man  does  not  primarily  seek  the 
salvation  of  his  soul,  do  not  deny  the  final  attainment 
of  a  satisfaction.     Now  such  a  procedure  in  Christianity 


220       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

is  entirely  pragmatic.  It  is  a  result  of  the  practical  lead- 
ing of  Christian  truth  that  it  renders  satisfaction,  and  in 
rendering  this  satisfaction  Christian  truth  has  become 
really  useful.  The  practical  outcome  and  utility  of  Chris- 
tianity as  an  evidence  and  an  establishment  of  its  claim 
is  indicated  even  in  the  sayings  of  Christ.  He  says  of 
men  that  claim  to  be  prophets,  "  Ye  shall  know  them  by 
their  fruits."  3  His  own  doctrine  He  submits  for  its  es- 
tablishment to  the  test  of  its  results  and  effects.  To  ob- 
tain these  results  men  must  accept  the  condition  of  prac- 
tically acting  in  accord  with  Christ's  teaching ;  then,  in  the 
doing  of  this  teaching,  it  will  become  established  as  certain 
in  the  mind  of  the  doer  as  the  truth  of  God  Himself. 
Christ  says  :  "  My  doctrine  is  not  mine,  but  His  that  sent 
me.  If  any  man  will  do  His  will,  he  shall  know  of  the 
doctrine,  whether  it  be  of  God,  or  whether  I  speak  of  my- 
self." 4  The  same  test  of  results  is  applied  when,  in  keep- 
ing with  this  principle  announced  by  Christ,  emphasis  is 
placed  upon  the  ethical  character  of  Christianity.  Its 
faith  works  through  love,  its  love  does  good.  There  is 
no  standard  to  be  applied  finally  to  man  but  the  standard 
of  the  deeds  of  love.5  This  is  purely  and  simply  the  prag- 
matic standard.  The  fact  that  Christianity  works  now 
and  will  work  hereafter  is  its  appeal  and  justification. 
There  is  no  peculiar  term  of  the  pragmatic  attitude  which 
cannot  readily  be  employed  by  Christianity  as  a  defense 
of  its  truth  in  the  practical  working  out  of  it. 

Again  and  again  it  has  been  borne  in  upon  us,  that  the 
truth  of  Christianity  is  not  merely  intellectual.  When 
pragmatism  asserts  and  reiterates  the  contention,  that 
feeling  and  will  are  elements  of  truth,  it  presents  a  theory 
of  truth  which  Christianity  regards  with  favor.     There 

3  Matthew,  7:16. 

4  John,  7:16,  17. 

s  Matthew,  25:35  ff. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  221 

can  be  no  living  faith  in  Christianity  which  does  not  receive 
the  impetus  of  the  feelings,  no  matter  how  temperaments 
may  differ.  In  the  same  way  the  will  is  an  essential  ele- 
ment in  all  trust  and  faith.  When  Professor  James  accen- 
tuates the  will  to  believe  he  has  found,  despite  many  diffi- 
culties inherent  in  this  attitude,  the  very  heart  of  faith. 
Faith  as  defined  in  the  New  Testament  is  confidence  and 
trust,  and  its  psychological  center  is  will.  Though  there 
is  more  in  faith  than  mere  will,  and  though  it  embraces 
knowledge  and  feeling,  yet  without  will  faith  is  impossible. 
Even  if  we  interpret  faith  in  itself,  not  as  living  trust,  but 
as  intellectual  assent,  nevertheless  even  this  assent  de- 
mands an  attitude  of  will.  Therefore,  the  pragmatic 
method,  reasserting  the  voluntaristic  element  in  faith,  is 
in  agreement  not  only  with  the  evangelical,  New  Testament 
conception  of  faith,  but  also  with  that  idea  of  it  which 
makes  it  an  assent  to  the  creed  of  the  Church.  There  is 
no  interpretation  which  can  overlook  the  fact  of  will  in 
faith.  It  is  through  emphasis  on  will  and  faith  that  prag- 
matism has  derived  its  humanistic  trend.  By  the  valuation 
of  the  will  pragmatism  has  made  truth  a  living  reality  and 
found  a  just  basis  for  the  element  of  faith.  With  such 
a  valuation  Christianity  and  religion  can  remain  no  ab- 
stractions. Christianity  must  be  in  thorough  sympathy 
with  any  opposition  to  the  interpretation  of  religion  as 
intellectual,  which  is  the  basis  of  absolutism.  Consequently 
it  approves  of  the  pragmatic  attack  upon  the  absolut- 
ist. It  has  entire  sympathy  with  Schiller,6  when  he  dis- 
tinguishes absolutism  and  religion.  The  rejection  of  the 
intellectualism  of  absolutism,  of  its  pantheism,  of  its  denial 
of  evil,  and  of  its  detraction  from  the  reality  about  us 
are  entirely  agreeable  to  Christianity. 

Pragmatism  has  also  helped  us  in  reasserting  the  doc- 
trine of  values.     It  is  not  the  originator  of  the  idea  of 

6  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  274  ff. 


222       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

values.  The  neo-Kantian  philosophy  of  the  modern  period 
was  most  instrumental  in  introducing  the  thought  of  value. 
From  this  philosophy  it  crept  into  theology  through 
Ritschl,  even  though  he  claimed  to  have  divorced  philoso- 
phy from  religion.  But  it  is  pragmatism  which,  at  least  in 
America,  has  done  most  to  introduce  the  idea  of  value. 
Now  while  there  is  a  danger  in  contrasting  value  with  exist- 
ence, it  is  nevertheless  true  that  the  mere  assertion  of  exist- 
ence without  value  cannot  aid  Christianity.  Religious  facts 
and  religious  truths,  like  moral  facts  and  laws,  and  like 
aesthetic  judgments,  and  like  logical  abstractions  and 
formulas,  cannot  be  maintained  and  held  to  be  mere  exist- 
ences. The  very  nature  of  a  religious  reality,  whether  God, 
the  soul,  freedom,  sin,  grace,  falls  short  of  what  it  is,  if  it  is 
not  more  than  the  assertion  of  an  existence  by  the  mind.  It 
is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  God  is ;  He  cannot  really  be  God 
unless  His  existence  has  a  meaning  and  value  for  us. 
Whether  men  want  to  do  so  or  not,  they  always  evaluate 
in  every  confession  of  Christian  truth.  Those  thinkers  are 
entirely  astray  who  forget  that  the  message  of  Christian- 
ity, its  claim  of  truth,  the  demand  of  its  history,  are  all 
calls  for  a  judgment  of  special  value.  The  worth  and 
value  of  Christianity  is  its  defense.  Not  merely  that 
Christianity  is  what  it  is,  but  that  it  gives  what  it  gives, 
makes  Christianity  the  religion  it  is.  Christ  always  calls 
for  an  evaluation  of  Himself;  He  demands  that  men  de- 
clare for  Him  or  against  Him;  and  such  a  declaration  is 
not  the  mere  acceptance  of  His  existence,  but  the  confes- 
sion of  His  divine  Sonship  and  of  His  Messiahship.  He 
cannot  be  what  He  is  to  men  unless  He  is  a  value.  He 
must  become  their  life,  their  light,  their  truth.  In  all  this 
becoming  lies  His  meaning  and  value,  and  without  it  men 
do  not  have  Him.  Similarly  in  all  the  truth  and  history 
of  Christianity  an  equal  demand  is  made  upon  us  to  ac- 
cept it  as  a  worth  and  as  a  value. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  223 

Out  of  pragmatism  with  its  opposition  to  a  mere  fixed 
truth  and  universe  there  grows  a  new  appreciation  of  free- 
dom.7 In  the  theory  that  things  are  constantly  moving 
and  changing,  that  they  are  becoming,  and  that  truth  is 
that  which  works  out  in  man's  development,  we  are  offered 
a  real  opportunity  of  choice.8  Men  are  not  supposed  to 
be  merely  determined ;  but  as  they  take  part  in  the  making 
of  truth  and  reality  they  can  really  decide.  Their  de- 
cisions are  not  illusions  though  their  choices  are  not  un- 
restricted. Though  character  affects  them  and  habits 
must  be  accounted  for,  yet  both  character  and  habits  are 
under  the  control  of  truth-shaping  man.  The  moral  de- 
mands of  freedom  and  of  obligation  to  do  one's  duty  are 
justified.  At  the  same  time  science  is  not  set  aside,  be- 
cause the  empirically  free  acts  arise  continuously  out  of 
the  given  situation.  The  choice  that  has  been  made  is, 
after  its  making,  found  to  be  intelligible.  But  whatever 
choice  we  take,  the  alternative  may  also  seem  intelligible 
because  it  is  equally  natural  and  calculable  in  human  ex- 
perience and  its  living  and  connected  course.  With  the 
possibility  of  such  freedom,  but  not  unreasonable  arbi- 
trariness, imbedded  in  the  conception  of  experience,  Chris- 
tianity can  agree.  A  place  seems  to  be  made  for  man  as 
a  growing  personality,  who  can  highly  value  his  own  soul 
freely  over  against  the  world  and  as  separate  from,  though 
not  independent  of,  God.  The  accountability  of  man  re- 
mains in  balance  with  the  justice  of  God.  Man  can  be 
justly  punished  because  he  has  his  own  choice.  Through 
such  ideals  we  can  maintain  the  free  inter-relation  of  God 
and  man,  of  Father  and  child.  In  the  development  of  life 
man  finds  God  and  God  leads  man,  but  He  does  not  control 
him  through  an  absolute  decree.     No  matter  what  God 

7  Cf.  Schiller's  Essay  on  Freedom,  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  391. 
sCf.  James,  The  Dilemma  of  Determinism  in  "The  Will  to  Be- 
lieve," etc.,  p.  175  ff. 


224       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

may  foresee,  He  cannot  determine  man  without  man's 
responsibility,  unless  the  choice  of  man  is  abolished.  The 
newer  attitudes  of  Christianity  favor  such  a  redefinition 
of  the  problem  of  freedom  and  necessity,  of  predestination 
and  faith,  as  to  conserve  both  God's  justice  and  man's 
responsibility.  In  the  balance  of  these  the  moral  de- 
mands are  more  justly  satisfied  than  in  any  absolute  theory 
of  election.  This  solution  of  Christian  thinking  rests  on  a 
pragmatic  basis.  It  regards  freedom  as  necessary  and  as 
discovered  in  the  life  and  experience  of  men. 

Pragmatism,  because  it  opposes  a  pantheistic  universe, 
is  necessarily  moved  to  accept  an  attitude  of  pluralism. 
It  is  clearly  and  openly  pluralistic  over  against  any  theory 
of  monism,  which  absorbs  all  personalities  into  a  unitary 
existence  or  reality,  whether  this  be  defined  to  be  matter 
or  mind.  Christianity  can  also  not  allow  the  absorption 
of  human  souls  into  God,  or  their  submergence  into  the 
world.  It  believes  in  many  separate  spirits.  From  these 
it  sets  God  apart  as  the  highest  Spirit.  Consequently 
Christianity  favors  any  philosophy  which  maintains  a 
theistic  attitude.  Any  hypothesis  which  allows  for  a  co- 
ordinated world,  and  a  God,  not  the  world,  as  well  as  a 
world  not  God,  is  far  more  favorable  to  Christian  truth 
than  any  speculation  of  idealism,  in  which  all  separate 
entities  are  made  subservient  to  a  single  substance.  With 
a  single  substance  posited  there  can  be  no  relatively  inde- 
pendent man  and  no  absolutely  independent  God.  Unless 
there  be  separate  personalities  it  is  impossible  to  main- 
tain the  true  individuality  of  man,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
believe  in  God  or  in  the  Christian  Trinity. 

The  maintenance  of  separate  personality  has  been  par- 
ticularly favored  by  the  development  of  modern  "  Personal 
Idealism."  This  personal  idealism  has  grown  up  under  the 
influence  of  pragmatism.  It  is  most  clearly  argued  out 
by  Professor  Rashdall  in  his  essay  on  "  Personality :  Hu- 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  £25 

man  and  Divine,"  which  is  included  in  the  series  of  essays 
entitled  "  Personal  Idealism "  edited  by  Henry  Sturt.9 
According  to  Professor  Rashdall,  the  fundamental  ele- 
ments in  personality  are  not  merely  a  feeling  but  a  think- 
ing consciousness  which  has  a  certain  permanence.  The 
permanent  thinking  consciousness  distinguishes  itself  from 
the  objects  as  things  and  as  other  persons.  Personality 
also  possesses  as  its  most  important  element  and  its  most 
essential  attribute  the  power  to  will  and  through  will  to 
originate.  This  idea  of  personality  is  not  at  all  satisfied 
by  any  form  of  consciousness  below  the  human,  but  it  is 
not  even  adequately  fulfilled  through  the  human  conscious- 
ness. It  is  only  in  God  that  personality  finds  its  fulfill- 
ment, but  this  fulfillment  does  not  do  away  with  the  human 
selves.  There  is  an  independence  about  personality  which 
dare  not  be  denied.  The  mistake  in  the  monistic  idealism 
is  "  the  assumption  that  what  constitutes  existence  for 
others  is  the  same  as  what  constitutes  existence  for  self."  10 
We  must  take  this  attitude :  "  A  thing  is  as  it  is  known : 
its  esse  is  to  be  known:  what  it  is  for  the  experience  of 
spirits,  is  its  whole  reality:  it  is  that  and  nothing  more. 
But  the  esse  of  a  person  is  to  know  himself,  to  be  for  him- 
self, to  feel  and  to  think  for  himself,  to  act  on  his  own 
knowledge,  and  to  know  that  he  acts.  In  dealing  with 
persons,  therefore,  there  is  an  unfathomable  gulf  between 
knowledge  and  reality.  What  a  person  is  for  himself  is 
entirely  unaffected  by  what  he  is  for  any  other,  so  long  as 
he  does  not  know  what  he  is  for  that  other."  n  "  The 
essence  of  a  person  is  not  what  he  is  for  another,  but  what 
he  is  for  himself."  12     But  the  being  for  itself  does  not  ex- 

9  Two  other  books  resting  on  the  same  basis  are,  "  Personality 
and  the  Christian  Ideal,"  by  Buckham ;  "  Personality,  Human  and 
Divine,"  by  Illingworth. 

10  Sturt,  Essay  of  Rashdall,  "Personal  Idealism,"  p.  382. 
ii  Ibid.,  p.  383. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  383. 


226       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

elude  from  personality  the  not-self.  When  the  not-self  is 
a  thing  it  is  not  real  apart  from  what  it  is  for  me  and  for 
other  selves.  "  When  the  not-self  is  a  person,  the  knowl- 
edge of  that  self  is  part  of  my  experience,  and  so  (if  you 
like  it)  in  a  sense  part  of  me;  but  that  does  not  show  that 
there  is  not  a  something  which  he  is  for  himself,  which  is 
no  part  at  all  of  me,  and  which  is  as  real  as  I  am."  13 
This  independent  self  is  no  doubt  in  relation  with  others, 
but  it  never  loses  itself  in  them.  There  can  be  no  self 
which  entirely  covers  another.  This  is  true  even  if  that 
self  be  God.  "  The  knowledge  of  the  finite  self  by  God 
does  not  exhaust  its  being  as  is  the  case  with  the  mere 
object.  It  is  the  knowledge  of  them  that  is  in  God.  God 
must  know  the  self  as  a  self  which  has  a  consciousness,  an 
experience,  a  will  which  is  its  own  —  that  is,  as  a  being 
which  is  not  identical  with  the  knowledge  that  He  has  of 
it."14  Such  knowledge  of  God  is  of  course  infinitely 
deeper  and  completer  than  any  other  selves  can  have  of 
each  other.  This  is  the  result  of  the  fuller  personality 
of  God.  "  God  must  then,  it  would  seem,  know  other 
selves  by  the  analogy  of  what  He  is  Himself;  He  could 
not  (it  is  reasonable  to  infer)  have  created  beings  wholly 
unlike  Himself.  His  knowledge  of  other  selves  may  be 
perfect  knowledge  without  his  ever  being  or  becoming  the 
selves  which  He  knows."  15  He  can  penetrate  into  human 
life  without  that  human  life  being  contained  in  Him.  It 
is  through  ideals  of  human  personality  like  these,  indi- 
cated by  Professor  Rashdall  that  Christianity  finds  it  pos- 
sible to  maintain  its  belief  in  separate  human  souls,  in 
God  the  Creator,  and  in  God's  personality.  In  as  far  as 
the  pluralism  of  pragmatism  favors  these  conceptions  of 
separate  personalities  it  is  in  harmony  with  Christian 
truth. 

is  ibid.,  p.  386. 
I*  Ibid.,  p.  386. 
is  Ibid.,  p.  387. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  227 

But  after  all  these  aspects  of  pragmatism,  which  are 
favorable  to  Christianity,  it  is  necessary  to  pass  to  the 
examination  of  other  aspects,  which  are  inimical  to  Chris- 
tian truth.  The  fact  of  development  has  frequently  been 
stated  in  such  a  naturalistic  manner  as  to  injure  the  spirit- 
ual content  of  Christianity.  There  exists  in  pragmatism 
a  trend  to  see  and  stress  the  merely  natural  side  of  de- 
velopment and  progress.  Because  the  finding  of  the  truth 
is  in  the  process,  it  is  through  the  process  that  truth  is 
made.  Now  while  Christian  history  and  its  development 
shows  that  truth  has  assumed  many  forms,  and  that  it 
cannot  be  explained  apart  from  human  receptivity,  yet 
Christianity  can  never  grant  that  the  receptivity  produced 
the  reality  of  truth.  The  changing  forms  of  the  Christian 
message  are  not  the  explanation  of  its  essence.  If  it  is 
true  that  the  human  experience  made  Christianity,  then 
Christianity  must  surrender  its  claim  to  be  really  super- 
natural. It  is  not  supernatural  without  a  history  into 
which  the  supernatural  descends,  but  it  is  also  not  his- 
torical and  a  natural  development  without  a  deposit  of  the 
eternal.  The  stressing  of  development  and  evolution  is 
liable  to  deeply  injure  religion.  Eucken  rightly  doubts 
whether  any  naturalistic  evolution  is  congruent  with 
Christianity.  It  cannot  satisfy  the  claim  of  the  eternal 
reasonableness  of  religion  within  its  sphere.  While  reli- 
gion is  not  reason  it  is  reasonable.  The  inner  reasonable- 
ness cannot  be  found  in  the  confusion  of  development  and 
history  in  which  both  the  reasonable  and  the  unreasonable 
occur.  The  very  substance  of  Christianity  is  denied  when 
development  claims  to  be  the  solvent  of  the  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity. 

The  naturalism  of  most  pragmatists  hinders  them  from 
giving  real  value  to  the  separation  of  the  psychological 
facts  from  the  biological  facts.  While  in  theory  they 
adhere    to   the   parallelism   of   modem   psychology,   they 


228        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

finally  reduce  phenomena  of  the  mind  too  largely  to  the 
objective  external  biological  data.  This  appears  in  the 
manner  in  which  survival  in  the  biologist's  sense  is  made 
an  end  of  consciousness.  We  agree  in  great  part  with 
DeLaguna  when  he  says :  "  For  in  the  rise  of  con- 
sciousness a  second  end  (in  the  sense  above  defined) 
emerges,  namely,  the  satisfaction  of  desire  or  happiness. 
That  happiness  does  thus  operate  as  a  determining  con- 
dition in  the  psychical  selection  by  which  the  more  com- 
plex mental  processes  are  developed,  is  well  known  and 
none  have  illustrated  the  fact  better  than  the  pragmatists. 
Their  fault,  as  we  conceive  it,  has  been  a  failure  to  dis- 
tinguish accurately  between  the  conditions  of  happiness 
and  those  of  survival."  16  In  other  words  the  biological 
attitude  has  crowded  out  a  just  psychological  fact.  In  a 
similar  manner  the  biological  and  physiological  coloring 
of  the  psychology  of  pragmatism  has  hindered  the  proper 
estimate  of  consciousness  in  other  directions.  The  reduc- 
tion of  ideas  and  ideals,  of  thoughts  and  conceptions,  to 
mere  actions  and  mere  functions  has  aided  in  overthrow- 
ing the  real  worth  of  the  psychological.  Consequently  the 
psychology  of  pragmatism  has  become  material.  Be- 
cause of  its  material  and  naturalistic  tendency  it  is 
detrimental  to  a  spiritual  conception  of  mind.  When 
the  spiritual  idea  of  the  mind  is  lost  there  is  no  ade- 
quate basis  in  human  nature  for  religion.  Consequently 
pragmatism  in  its  materializing  of  mind  has  injured  its 
best  observations  and  inferences  derived  from  the  psychol- 
ogy of  religion.  It  has  injured  the  idea  of  the  soul,  of  the 
conscience,  and  of  the  character  of  man.  The  studies  of 
religious  experience  and  their  varieties,  when  they  were 
observed  in  feelings  and  in  the  will,  brought  them  closer  to 
nerve  action.  Religious  ideas  became  subservient  to  feel- 
ing and  will,  and  this  subservience  was  aided  by  the  nat- 

16  "  Dogmatism  and  Evolution,"  p.  137. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  229 

uralistic  conception  of  both  feeling  and  will.  Christian- 
ity demands  against  all  such  notions,  that  man's  spiritual 
nature  remain  intact  and  that  it  be  given  an  ideal  value. 
Another  difficulty  with  the  pragmatic  theory  is  the  man- 
ner in  which  it  seems  to  restrict  the  working  out  of  truth 
to  the  basis  of  perception.  There  is  no  real  place  for  ideas. 
Because  these  are  depreciated,  there  is  no  real  way  of  ex- 
plaining some  very  fundamental  notions  of  the  human 
mind.  We  are  entirely  at  sea  when  we  attempt  to  derive 
the  axioms  of  mathematics,17  or  to  unfold  the  conception 
of  causality.  The  failure  of  pragmatism  to  furnish  a 
foundation  for  ideas,  because  it  is  too  much  entranced  by 
perception,  has  also  led  to  the  denial  of  the  separateness 
of  logic.  Pragmatism  has  no  real  logic,  but  only  a  descrip- 
tive psychology.  Now  Christian  truth  demands  a  norm 
and  a  standard.  The  demand  of  a  standard  cannot  be 
upheld,  if  there  is  no  value,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
truth,  for  any  logical  norm  apart  from  its  psychological 
derivation.  The  psychological  conditions  of  a  standard  do 
not  explain  its  essence.  If  they  are  stressed  we  shall 
finally  have  a  standard  which  always  moves  and  shifts, 
but  a  shifting  standard  is  a  perishing  standard.  The 
mere  occurrence  of  any  fact  is  sufficient  in  the  theory  of 
pragmatism  to  justify  it,  if  it  does  not  actually  disagree 
with  another  experience.  Now  this  matter  of  mere  prac- 
tical agreement  or  disagreement  may  be  a  working  basis 
and  a  provisional  platform,  but  the  standard  of  truth 
demands  a  higher  justification.  Christianity  cannot 
abandon  its  claim,  that  there  is  a  fixity  and  a  certainty 
about  Christian  truth  which  is  due  to  its  own  inner  na- 
ture. Therefore,  no  change  of  interpretation  and  no 
varieties  of  experience  can  decide  as  to  the  final  worth  of 
Christian  truth. 

The  pragmatic  theory  of  the  workableness  of  truth,  of 

17  DeLaguna,  ibid.,  p.  155. 


230        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

its  satisfaction,  and  of  its  utility,  which  has  a  favorable 
side,  also  has  a  very  dangerous  implication.  It  seems 
to  rest  truth  on  the  possibility  of  its  being  tested.  A 
claim  and  a  truth  which  cannot  be  tested  can  never  be  es- 
tablished. Now  Christian  truth  claims  to  be  ethically 
right  and  justifiable  on  its  own  foundations.  It  works, 
it  satisfies,  and  is  truly  useful,  because  it  is  what  it  is. 
The  truth  is  the  cause  of  the  workableness,  not  the  work- 
ableness the  cause  of  the  truth.  Many  religious  truths, 
because  they  are  supernatural,  are  above  man's  possible 
experience.  They  cannot  be  tested  in  themselves.  Their 
unity  with  other  truths  is  possible  through  a  Christian 
system  of  truth,  but  the  unity  of  such  a  system  is  a  merely 
logical  expedient.  A  logical  expedient  is  not  the  satis- 
faction which  experience  must  give.  Therefore,  pragma- 
tism would  be  compelled  to  eliminate  many  transcendent 
ideas  of  Christianity.  Some  truths  may  not  at  all  appear 
practicable.  They  must  be  believed  to  become  practical, 
but  the  belief  does  not  make  them  so.  If,  e.  g.,  we  take 
the  Christian  teaching  of  non-resistance,  the  opposition  of 
Christ  to  the  notion  of  "  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a 
tooth,"  and  His  commendation  of  suffering  evil,  it  seems 
that  the  practical  life  of  man,  his  struggle  for  existence, 
and  his  necessity  of  self-preservation  contradict  the  claim 
of  non-resistance  in  every  way.  There  is  no  satisfaction 
to  be  found  in  it,  and  it  is  not  at  all  usable  in  the  world, 
but  if,  prior  to  all  verification  and  in  the  face  of  difficul- 
ties, Christians  would  become  sufficiently  Christian  to  ac- 
cept the  value  of  the  ideal  of  non-resistance  the  ideal 
would  transform  the  world.  In  other  words,  it  would  not 
be  the  workableness  which  would  establish  the  truth,  but 
the  truth  accepted  would  make  its  way.  With  all  its 
emphasis  on  the  will  to  believe,  pragmatism  has  not  solved 
the  problem  of  the  power  of  Christian  truth.  It  has 
failed  in  its  solution,  just  because  it  has  no  independent 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  231 

ideal  of  truth.  There  is  an  element  of  unbelief  or  of 
agnosticism  in  the  theory  of  pragmatism  in  as  far  as  it 
claims  that  only  verification  is  truth.  The  acceptance  of 
the  ideal  can  be  translated  into  action,  but  it  is  not  the 
translation  and  the  success  of  the  action  that  make  the 
ideal.  Great  religious  ideals  are  not  taken  up  by  men 
because  they  work.  But  they  work  because  they  are  be- 
lieved. And  a  true  belief  is  not  a  blind  venture,  for  there 
is  an  inherent  reasonableness  in  a  great  ideal.  Great 
ideals  and  great  ideas  create  true  reality  because  of  their 
inner  truth  and  reality.  The  weakness  of  pragmatism  is 
the  conception  that  only  what  has  received  a  certain  en- 
dorsement and  proof  can  be  true.  It  has  transferred  the 
principles  of  the  scientific  laboratory  to  the  realm  of 
spiritual  values.  It  has  reduced  the  inner  certainty  of 
Christian  truth  to  the  uncertainty  of  a  human  experi- 
ment. 

It  is  necessary  for  Christianity  when  it  admits  that  its 
judgments  are  values  to  know  more  about  them  than  that 
they  are  values.  If  values  are  only  values,  it  is  easily  pos- 
sible to  declare  the  question  of  their  existence  irrelevant  or 
to  doubt  existence  and  its  necessity.  Now,  as  was  main- 
tained above,18  the  truth  of  real  religion  is  never  the  mere 
statement  of  existence,  e.  g.,  God  is,  Christ  saves,  etc.  But 
if  we  believe  in  God  we  must  be  assured  that  He  exists. 
Christ  our  Saviour  dare  not  remain  a  mere  estimate  of  what 
He  is  worth  to  us.  The  maintenance  of  a  religious  value 
suffers  if  its  existence  is  uncertain.  Any  theory  of  truth, 
therefore,  which  demands  that  religious  judgments  are  to 
be  tested  by  their  adaptability  to  and  their  existence 
within  human  experience  alone,  and  which  does  not  begin 
with  the  belief  in  the  existence  and  reality  of  truth  be- 
fore and  beyond  human  experience,  will  fail  to  satisfy 
the   demands   of   Christianity.     The   estimation   of   value 

is  P.  222. 


232        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

through  test  alone  makes  truth  ambiguous.  It  can  then 
only  become  certain  when  it  is  established  by  the  thought 
and  experience  of  men.  This  appears  clearly  if  we  quote 
again  a  very  characteristic  statement  of  Schiller,  in 
which  he  says :  "  Truth,  therefore,  will  become  ambiguous. 
It  will  mean  primarily  a  claim  which  may  or  may  not  turn 
out  to  be  valid.  It  will  mean,  secondarily,  such  a  claim 
after  it  has  been  tested  and  ratified,  by  processes,  which  it 
behooves  us  to  examine."  19  As  long  as  truth,  conse- 
quently, remains  a  mere  claim  and  is  not  ratified,  it  must  al- 
ways be  regarded  with  some  suspicion.  We  shall  not  be  able 
to  know  whether  the  claim  is  really  and  actually  true. 
"  We  shall  tend  to  reserve  this  honourable  predicate  for 
what  has  victoriously  sustained  its  claim."  20  In  other 
words,  apart  from  truth  through  the  experience  of  men 
truth  is  doubtful.  Such  an  assertion  will  fit  human  gen- 
eralizations and  human  assumptions  in  scientific  experi- 
mentation and  in  deducing  certain  results  from  life,  but  in 
religion  the  prime  assumption  must  be  that  God  is  true 
though  all  men  be  liars.  The  submission  of  divine  truth 
to  human  experience  is  for  the  sake  of  humanity  and  not  for 
the  sake  of  truth.  It  cannot  be  claimed,  if  Christian  truth 
is  to  remain  pure  that  its  validity  and  permanence  is  due  to 
human  testing.  It  may  be  necessary  in  the  human  recep- 
tion of  divine  truth  to  show  its  real  harmonization  with  the 
demands  of  the  soul  and  of  life,  but  such  harmonization  is 
not  the  establishment  of  the  fundamental  verity  of  Chris- 
tian truth. 

A  logical  theory,  which  can  possess  no  firm  certainty 
before  it  has  been  tried  out,  and  whose  hypothesis  of  truth 
allows  truth  to  have  only  as  much  validity  as  it  has  prac- 
ticability, can  never  furnish  a  basis  for  strong  moral 
postulates.     Now  an  ethical  religion  like  Christianity  must 

19  "  Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  144. 

20  Schiller,  Ibid.,  p.  145. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  233 

hold  to  the  certainty  of  its  moral  principles  and  demands. 
The  persistence  in  emphasizing  the  certainty  of  moral 
principles  in  Christianity  arises  from  the  fact,  that  its 
ethics  are  not  due  to  the  assumptions  of  a  mere  specula- 
tive theory,  but  that  they  are  founded  on  the  sure  founda- 
tion of  a  truth  divinely  communicated.  As  long  as  Chris- 
tianity claims  a  specific  revelation,  the  assurance  of  the 
right  and  truth  of  its  moral  system  is  not  subject  to  the 
uncertainties  of  experience.  A  virtue  like  mercy  is  true, 
therefore,  not  because  mercy  is  practicable,  but  because 
mercy  is  an  eternal  reality  in  God  who  is  merciful.  Even 
though  mercy  would  be  a  failure  among  men  it  could  not  be 
doubted  as  long  as  it  is  sustained  by  the  nature  of  God. 
In  the  same  manner  forgiveness  is  moral  because  God  for- 
gives, not  because  forgiveness  is  of  larger  worth  in  hu- 
man life  than  revenge.  Justice  and  truthfulness,  honesty 
and  purity  are  right  not  because  they  are  expedient  or 
prove  to  be  the  best  policy,  but  because  they  are  divine 
in  their  origin  and  claim.  To  take  any  other  attitude 
would  undermine  the  specific  force  of  Christian  moral 
motives.  Their  certainty  must  lie  within  the  immedi- 
ate authority  of  the  divine  command,  and  not  within  the 
problematic  establishment  by  human  test. 

The  constant  appeal  to  proof  and  test  undermines  finally 
all  authority  in  morals  and  faith.  If  authority  is  need- 
less in  religion,  this  difficulty  does  not  in  the  least  trouble 
us.  But  if  authority  of  some  sort  or  kind  is  necessary  to 
maintain  and  propagate  faith,  it  follows  that  any  theory 
which  disturbs  authority  is  detrimental.  The  proof  that 
can  be  demanded  is  only  the  proof  that  the  authority  is 
the  right  authority.  To  demonstrate  the  reasonableness 
of  authority  is  good  as  far  as  it  furnishes  a  ground  why 
men  are  willing  to  bow  to  authority,  and  why  such  sub- 
mission is  advantageous.  But  the  verification  of  authority 
by  being  found  to  be  useful  does  not  establish  it.     Au- 


234        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

thority  is  authority  prior  to  all  proof,  and  it  must  be  re- 
ceived and  accepted  directly.  The  authoritative  claim 
of  Christianity  upon  the  conscience  and  upon  the  soul  of 
man  asks  to  be  received  not  through  argument  but  upon 
its  own  demand.  If  it  is  received  in  this  manner  it  will 
justify  itself,  but  no  rational  proof,  and  no  demonstra- 
tion in  life,  give  certainty  to  the  authoritative  and  divine 
claim  of  Christianity.  It  is  true  that  men  accept  au- 
thority in  religion  because  they  feel  its  need  and  recog- 
nize its  necessity,  but  the  feeling  of  this  need  and  the 
satisfaction  which  may  come  through  authority  do  not 
constitute  the  authority.  Real  religious  authority  and 
divine  authority  must  rest  upon  itself.  When  Christian- 
ity claims  divine  origin  and  authority,  it  cannot  permit 
this  authority  to  be  derived  from  human  experience,  for 
this  would  mean  a  confusion  between  the  human  and  divine. 
It  would  base  an  authority  which  claims  to  be  divine  upon 
the  mere  workings  of  human  experience,  and,  consequently, 
the  authority  would  be  a  delusion.  Christianity  permits 
and  encourages  its  demand  of  authority  to  be  tested,  but 
the  test  is  not  that  which  makes  the  authority. 

The  lack  of  authority  appears  in  the  manner  in  which 
the  pragmatist  arrives  at  his  conception  of  God.  Be- 
cause his  universe  is  pluralistic,  and  because  the  work- 
ableness of  an  idea  is  thought  sufficient  to  establish  the 
truth,  the  pragmatist  argues  for  a  finite  God.  As  Chris- 
tians we  can  sympathize  with  the  pragmatist  when  he  op- 
poses the  Absolute  of  the  pantheist,  which  is  Substance, 
the  Universe,  the  Whole.  Every  such  abstract  notion  of 
God  destroys  His  personality.21  Therefore,  as  far  as  the 
pragmatist  is  justly  pluralistic  he  is  favorable  to  Chris- 
tianity, but  the  difficulty  is  the  lack  of  authority.  This 
appears  in  the  manner  in  which  Professor  James  ap- 
proaches  the   problem    of   God.     He    says :     "  On    prag- 

21  Cf.  p.  175  ff. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  235 

matistic  principles,  if  the  hypothesis  of  God  works  satis- 
factorily in  the  widest  sense  of  the  word,  it  is  true.  Now 
whatever  its  residual  difficulties  may  be,  experience  shows 
that  it  certainly  does  work,  and  that  the  problem  is  to 
build  it  out  and  determine  it  so  that  it  will  combine  satis- 
factorily with  all  the  other  working  truths."  22  When 
Professor  James  begins  to  approach  the  working  out  of  the 
hypothesis  of  God,  and  strives  to  adjust  it  to  other  truths, 
he  arrives  at  the  conception  of  a  finite  God.  This  idea  is 
not  a  new  one  in  philosophic  thinking.  It  was  broached 
by  John  Stuart  Mill,  who  claimed :  "  If  the  maker  of  the 
world  can  all  that  he  will,  he  wills  misery,  and  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  conclusion."  23  He  holds  that  men  have 
usually  saved  God's  goodness  at  the  expense  of  His  power, 
and  says :  "  But  those  who  have  been  strengthened  in 
goodness  by  relying  on  the  sympathizing  support  of  a 
powerful  and  good  Governor  of  the  world,  have,  I  am 
satisfied,  never  really  believed  that  Governor  to  be,  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  term,  omnipotent."  24  In  a  similar  way 
Mill  claims  that  the  argument  from  Design  in  the  world 
does  not  justify  an  omnipotent  God.  In  this  contention 
he  followed  Kant. 

Influenced  by  Mill's  arguments,  Schiller,  in  order  to 
overthrow  the  pantheistic  Absolute,  and  to  meet  the  di- 
lemma between  God's  power  and  goodness,  rejects  the  idea 
of  an  Infinite.  He  argues  for  a  finite  God  and  claims 
that  only  a  "  personal  and  finite,  but  non-phenomenal, 
God  is  the  only  possible  cause  that  can  account  for  the 
existence  and  character  of  the  world-process."  25  In  the 
very  same  manner  Professor  James  defines  his  attitude 
thus :     "  The  line  of   least   resistance,   then,   as   it   seems 

22  "  Pragmatism,"  p.  299. 

23  "  Three  Essays  on  Religion,"  p.  37. 

24  Ibid.,  p.  40. 

25 "Riddles  of  the  Sphinx,"  p.  372.  Cf.  also  the  whole  of  Chap- 
ter X. 


236        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

to  me,  both  in  theology  and  in  philosophy,  is  to  accept 
along  with  the  superhuman  consciousness,  the  notion  that 
it  is  not  all-embracing,  the  notion  in  other  words,  that 
there  is  a  God,  but  that  he  is  finite,  either  in  power  or 
in  knowledge,  or  in  both  at  once."  26  Such  is  the  final 
resultant  which  a  theory  of  workableness  arrives  at  in  ex- 
plaining a  pluralistic  universe. 

The  attitude  of  Christianity  cannot  accept  such  a  limita- 
tion of  God  as  proposed  by  Mill,  Schiller  and  James.  The 
pluralistic  universe  of  Christian  thinking  is  monistic  in  ori- 
gin and  purpose.  While  it  does  not  place  the  unity  of  the 
universe  in  the  world,  and  allows  for  individualities  and  real 
things,  it  demands  a  unification  in  God.  When  the  single 
units  of  the  universe,  however,  are  all-determining  and  the 
test  of  truth  is  agreement  with  their  actuality  and  expe- 
rience, there  can  remain  no  God  in  the  sense  of  Christianity. 
Christianity  in  contrast  with  the  finiteness  of  the  world 
must  apply  in  some  manner  the  adjectives  infinite  and  abso- 
lute to  God.  It  can  only  permit  such  a  limitation  as  lies 
within  God's  self-determination.  God  limits  Himself  when 
He  permits  human  freedom ;  He  limits  Himself  as  He  en- 
ters into  history.  From  this  self-limitation  it  is  possible 
to  explain  evil,  or  at  least  to  show  that  it  does  not  con- 
tradict God's  power,  and  that  it  does  not  impugn  God's 
goodness.  When  the  effort  is  made  to  justify  God  by  a 
limitation  of  His  own  nature,  and  when  He  is  reduced  to 
one  among  many  beings,  although  far  higher,  this  justifi- 
cation is  bought  at  too  high  a  price.  Christianity  can- 
not allow  God  to  be  reduced  to  mere  substance,  nor  His 
might  to  be  interpreted  impersonally,  for  this  would  lead 
to  pantheism  with  all  its  implications.  At  the  same  time 
Christianity  cannot  gravitate  into  mere  pragmatism,  and 
believe  in  a  finite  God.  Such  a  belief  would  take  away 
the  certainty  of  Christian  faith. 

26  "A  Pluralistic  Universe,"  p.  311. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  237 

The  effort  which  approaches  more  closely  to  a  balanced 
center,  is  that  of  Rashdall.  He  argues  thus :  "  God  is 
certainly  limited  by  all  other  beings  in  the  Universe,  that  is 
to  say,  by  other  selves,  in  so  far  as  He  is  not  those  selves. 
He  is  not  limited,  as  I  hold,  by  anything  which  does  not  ul- 
timately proceed  from  his  own  Nature  or  Will  or  Power. 
That  power  is  doubtless  limited,  and  in  the  frank  recogni- 
tion of  power  lies  the  only  solution  of  the  problem  of  Evil 
which  does  not  either  destroy  the  goodness  of  God  or  de- 
stroy moral  distinctions  altogether.  He  is  limited  by  his 
own  eternal,  if  you  like  '  necessary  '  nature  —  a  nature 
which  wills  eternally  the  best  which  that  nature  has  in  it  to 
create.  The  limitation  is  therefore  what  Theologians  have 
often  called  a  self-limitation :  provided  only  that  this  limi- 
tation must  not  be  regarded  as  an  arbitrary  self-limita- 
tion, but  as  arising  from  the  presence  of  that  idea  of  the 
best  that  is  eternally  present  to  a  will  whose  potentialities 
are  limited  —  that  idea  of  the  best  which  to  Platonising 
Fathers  and  Schoolmen  became  the  Second  Person  of  the 
Holy  Trinity.  The  truth  of  the  world  is  then  neither 
Monism,  in  the  pantheising  sense  of  the  word,  nor  Plural- 
ism: the  world  is  neither  a  single  Being,  nor  many  co- 
ordinate and  independent  Beings,  but  a  One  Mind  who  gives 
rise  to  many."  27  If  the  limitations  of  God  which  Rash- 
dall suggests  be  placed  altogether  within  His  control,  and 
if  His  personality  be  not  subjected  to  His  nature,  nor  His 
nature  divorced  from  His  personality,  we  shall  approach 
more  closely  to  the  heart  of  this  great  problem.  Chris- 
tianity conceives  of  God  as  Spirit  and  as  Love.  If  the 
character  of  God  as  Love  expresses  itself  through  Him  as 
Spirit,  His  limitation  will  not  be  arbitrary  but  in  agree- 
ment with  what  He  is  and  what  He  wills.  He  is  His  na- 
ture ;  and  an  abstraction  like  nature  dare  never  be  greater 

27  "  Personality,  Human  and  Divine,"  p.  390  ff,  in  Sturt,  "  Personal 
Idealism." 


238        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  more  determinative  of  the  idea  of  God  than  that  of  a 
living,  personal  God.  His  personality,  however,  must  not 
be  so  construed  as  to  injure  the  essential  deity  of  the  Son 
and  the  Spirit.  It  dare  not  become  unitary  and  indi- 
vidualistic. With  these  reservations  we  have  a  real  God 
who  can  and  does  limit  Himself  by  love  and  who  grants 
the  right  of  freedom.  But  such  a  self-limiting  God,  not 
a  force,  moving  by  its  own  impetus,  not  a  world  in  its  un- 
conscious totality,  is  not  the  finite  God  of  the  pluralistic 
universe  of  pragmatism. 

Because  pragmatism  has  a  finite  God  it  denies  the  power 
of  determination  in  God.  God  is  not  allowed  really  to 
determine  the  world.  Says  Schiller :  "  //  human  free- 
dom is  real,  the  world  is  really  indeterminate/9  2S  In  the 
indeterminate  world  men  are  subject  to  chance,  although 
this  chance  is  limited  by  the  laws  of  nature  and  is  con- 
trolled by  the  choice  of  men.  In  such  a  universe  there  is 
no  place  for  an  absolute  control  by  God.  Even  though 
He  is  given  a  specific  place  higher  than  man  He  is  only 
freer  than  man.  His  power  is  thus  described  by  Schiller : 
"  A  higher  and  more  perfect  being  than  man,  if  the  intelli- 
gent operations  of  such  a  one  are  traceable  in  the  world, 
would  be  both  '  freer  '  than  man,  that  is  more  able  to 
achieve  his  ends  and  less  often  thwarted,  and  also  more 
determinate  in  his  action,  and  more  uniform  and  calculable 
in  the  execution  of  his  purposes."  29  But  such  a  higher 
being  though  He  possesses  more  power  than  man  and  is 
more  uniform  in  action,  is  only  different  in  degree  from 
man.  There  is  no  absolute  difference  of  kind.  With  such 
a  notion  prevalent  in  pragmatism,  there  can  be  no  real 
room  for  any  Christian  doctrine  of  providence,  nor  for 
even  the  mildest  possible  formulation  of  predestination. 
The  greater  freedom  and  knowledge  of  God  would  only 

28  "Studies  in  Humanism,"  p.  411. 

29  Ibid.,  p.  413. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  239 

show  greater  power  to  use  the  universe.  God  is  after  all 
only  a  higher  unit  in  a  pluralistic  universe,  but  He  is  not 
above  the  universe.  When  the  pragmatist,  therefore,  as- 
sails the  absolutist  so  severely,  he  is  not  entirely  justified. 
For  although  the  absolutist  absorbs  God  in  the  universe, 
as  an  ideally  conceived  whole,  he  does  not  make  God  a 
mere  part.  But  the  pluralistic  pragmatist,  unconsciously 
influenced  by  his  naturalism,  makes  God  only  one  among 
many  personalities.  The  God  of  the  pragmatist  does  not 
seem  to  be  above  the  laws  of  nature.  He  is  enclosed  in  a 
multiverse,  and  is  not  the  real  Creator  and  Governor  of  the 
world. 

It  follows  legitimately  from  such  a  conception  of  God 
that  there  can  be  no  real  purpose  of  God  in  the  world. 
God  is  not  really  the  First  Cause.  The  pragmatist  lives 
altogether  in  a  world  of  secondary  causes.  In  the  chain 
of  secondary  causes  he  may  admit  the  occurrence  of  pur- 
pose. Moore  asks :  "  Does  not  the  conception  of  the 
mutability  of  species  at  any  rate  make  an  opening  for 
purposive,  ideational  control  as  a  type  of  change?  "  30 
He  asserts :  "  Variation  in  species  implies  at  least  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  purposive  species  of  variation."  31  But  this 
purposive  control  is  merely  within  a  moving  world,  but  it 
does  not  admit  a  transcendent  power  and  purpose. 
Pragmatism  does  not,  if  it  be  true  to  itself,  seek  for  the 
transcendant.  Dewey  clearly  states :  "  Merely  because 
Spencer  labeled  his  unknowable  energy  '  God,'  this  faded 
piece  of  metaphysical  goods  was  greeted  as  an  important 
and  grateful  concession  to  the  reality  of  the  spiritual 
realm.  Were  it  not  for  the  deep  hold  of  the  habit  of 
seeking  justification  for  ideal  values  in  the  remote  and 
transcendent,  surely  this  reference  of  them  to  an  unknow- 
able absolute  would  be  despised  in  comparison  with  the 

so  "  Pragmatism  and  Its  Critics,"  p.  77. 
si  Ibid.,  p.  77. 


240        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

demonstrations  of  experience  that  knowable  energies  are 
daily  generating  about  us  precious  values."  32  Dewey  does 
not  explain  the  real  reason  of  the  deep  hold  of  ideal  values 
and  of  the  human  trend  to  seek  a  single  transcendent 
energy.  He  claims  that  we  do  not  really  need  it.  "  And 
were  it  a  thousand  times  dialectically  demonstrated  that 
life  as  a  whole  is  regulated  by  a  transcendent  principle  to 
a  final  inclusive  goal,  none  the  less  truth  and  error,  health 
and  disease,  good  and  evil,  hope  and  fear  in  the  concrete, 
would  remain  just  what  and  where  they  now  are."  33  But 
the  question  remains  whether  all  experiences  would  be 
"  what  and  where  they  are  now,"  if  there  were  not  in  the 
world  and  in  the  religious  history  of  man  the  belief  in  a 
transcendent,  divine  power  and  purpose.  Does  such  a 
hypothesis  of  God's  rule  make  no  difference  in  the  life  of 
men?  Does  it  not  aid  the  righteous  and  their  cause  in 
their  deepest  distress  and  in  their  temporary  failures?  Is 
life,  without  belief  in  a  purposing  and  powerful  God,  finally 
the  same  and  will  it  create  the  same  results  as  a  belief  in 
mere  purpose  found  in  the  working  of  the  world?  Chris- 
tianity claims  that  the  world  and  the  life  of  the  soul  of  man 
do  need  faith  in  God's  determination.  Without  it  man 
is  lost  in  the  world  of  secondary  causes.  The  denial  of 
pragmatism  that  there  is  purpose  beyond  the  experience 
of  man  is  a  real  indication  of  its  enslavement  to  biologism. 
Pragmatism  has  not  shaken  off  the  accidentalism  of  the 
Darwinian  theory.  And  because  it  is  not  free  from  this 
it  cannot  have  a  real  God.  If  we  suppose  God  to  be  im- 
manent in  the  universe,  He  can  be  immanent,  according  to 
pragmatic  theory,  only  as  a  result.  The  consistent  prag- 
matist  must  believe  that  God  is  being  shaped  and  made 
in  the  world.  As  Truth  will  be  the  final  summing  up  of 
many  truths  tried  out  and  found  valuable,  so  God  will  be 

32  "  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy  and  Other  Essays,"  p.  16. 

33  Ibid.,  p.  16  ff. 


The  Results  of  Pragmatism  241 

the  final  summing  up  of  man's  religious  experiences.  He 
will  come  at  the  end,  and  not  at  the  beginning;  He  will 
be  the  Omega,  but  not  the  Alpha  of  the  world.  His 
immanence  is  not  a  real  one  but  a  developing  one.  Man 
is  making  his  God  as  he  is  making  his  truth.  It  is  this 
emphasis  on  humanism,  it  is  this  proud  claim  of  pragma- 
tism, whether  it  be  openly  uttered  or  not,  that  brings  it 
into  opposition  with  Christianity,  which  teaches  humility, 
and  whose  central  figure,  Jesus  Christ,  gloried  as  man  to 
be  meek  and  lowly.  For  Jesus  only  God  was  good.  The 
God  of  Jesus  is  not  the  God  of  pragmatism.  Humanity 
as  Jesus  sees  it  is  not  humanity  as  pragmatism  paints  it. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    VITALJST    VIEW 

THE  discussion  of  the  pragmatist's  position  leads 
very  naturally  to  the  two  other  ruling  modern 
attitudes,  the  vitalistic  conception  of  reality  and 
truth,  and  the  realistic  interpretation.  The  former  must 
be  clearly  distinguished  from  what  is  known  as  vitalism 
in  biology.  The  older  vitalism  in  biology,  which  was 
largely  believed  in  before  the  reign  of  Darwinism,  was  the 
conception  of  a  force  known  as  life-force,  which,  though 
in  its  essence  wonderful  and  mysterious,  was  supposed  to 
explain  organic  structure,  continuous  purpose,  and  the 
transmission  of  life  from  form  to  form.  Since  Darwinism 
there  has  been  an  effort  to  return  to  vitalism.  The  atti- 
tude of  neo-vitalism  is  represented  through  such  leading 
German  biologists  as  Driesch  and  Reinke.  These  men  op- 
pose any  mechanical  explanation  of  life,  and  hold  that 
there  are  certain  distinct  formative  and  purposive  indi- 
vidual centers.  These  individual  life-centers  through 
which  separate  organic  life-forms  are  shaped,  are  known 
as  "  dominants,"  or  "  entelechies."  But  it  is  not  this 
theory  which  concerns  us  in  the  discussion  of  the  vitalistic 
view  of  the  present.  The  vitalism  of  present  philosophical 
thinking  is  due  to  the  effort  of  Henri  Bergson  and  Rudolf 
Eucken,  to  make  life,  as  a  real,  full,  concrete,  active  force 
and  tendency,  which  is  fundamentally  ideal,  the  central 
and  all-embracing  reality. 

The  new  philosophy  of  life,  distinct  as  it  is  from  the 

pragmatic   method,  because   it   is   metaphysical   and  not 

242 


The  Vitalist  View  MS 

merely  logical,  nevertheless  possesses  several  points  of  con- 
tact with  pragmatism.  It  strives,  though  more  so  in  Berg- 
son  than  in  Eucken,  to  be  the  legitimate  philosophic  ex- 
planation of  evolution  and  the  corrective  of  a  mere  ma- 
terial conception  of  development.  Like  pragmatism  it, 
therefore,  grows  out  of  the  evolutionary  point  of  view. 
Bergson's  whole  discussion  is  due  to  the  effort  to  demon- 
strate, in  his  great  book,  "  Creative  Evolution,"  how  con- 
stant creative  activity  is  the  essence  of  development. 
Eucken  does  not  begin  with  biology,  nor  does  he,  like 
Bergson,  discuss  mechanism  and  finality  as  great  problems. 
He  rather  outlines  and  attacks  the  problem  of  life  from 
the  cultural,  ethical,  and  religious  standpoints,  which  show 
life  as  a  force,  a  fact  and  a  developing  reality.  To  his 
mind  there  is  danger  in  stressing  biology,  and  in  biologism 
he  sees  a  defective  description  of  the  full  reality  of  life. 
Nevertheless  he  claims  to  be  an  actualist,  who  explains  the 
world  through  movement  and  action.  In  this  actualism 
he  agrees  with  Bergson;  and  both  philosophers  in  their 
emphasis  of  movement  and  actualism  are  acceptable  to 
the  pragmatists.  Eucken,  however,  is  not  as  emphatic 
an  advocate  of  movement  as  Bergson,  although  he  values 
the  conception  of  movement  in  the  pragmatic  point  of 
view,  the  close  attention  to  experience,  and  the  humanistic 
elements.  He  definitely  opposes  the  distractedness,  the 
atomism  and  the  shifting  character  of  pragmatism.  Its 
separation  of  action  from  causality,  and  its  underestima- 
tion of  the  part  which  thought  plays  in  creating  life,  and 
not  merely  furthering  it  as  an  instrument  or  tool,  is 
strongly  disapproved  of  by  Eucken.  Bergson  takes  a 
friendlier  attitude  toward  pragmatic  efforts,  and  he  has 
received  the  endorsement  of  Professor  James.1  Both 
Eucken  and  Bergson  agree  with  pragmatism  on  the  whole 
in  its  anti-intellectual  attitude.     Neither  of  these  philoso- 

i "  A  Pluralistic  Universe,"  Lecture  VI. 


244        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

phers,  however,  accept  the  pluralistic  conception  of  prag- 
matism. Eucken  has  a  more  pregnant  monistic  ideal  of 
life  than  Bergson,  but  even  Bergson's  notion  of  life  is  not 
individualistic,  nor  pluralistic,  but  fundamentally  unitary. 

BERGSON 

Life,  according  to  Bergson,  must  be  grasped  in  its  to- 
tality and  movement.  It  is  a  creative  effort,  but  not  of 
a  material  sort.  Even  in  its  humblest  stages  life  already 
constitutes  a  spiritual  activity  and  takes  on  a  spiritual 
character.  "  Life  is  conscious,  spiritual  activity,  creative 
effort  leading  towards  freedom."  2  There  is  no  rest  in 
life,  but  it  is  continued  and  continuous  movement.  "  It 
is  movement  that  we  must  accustom  ourselves  to  look  upon 
as  simplest  and  clearest,  immobility  being  only  the  ex- 
treme limit  of  the  slowing  down  of  movement,  a  limit 
reached  only,  perhaps,  in  thought  and  never  realized  in 
nature."  3  This  ineradicable  mobility,  in  which  life  con- 
sists, is  due  to  "  an  original  impetus  of  life,  passing  from 
one  generation  of  germs  to  the  following  generation  of 
germs  through  the  developed  organisms  which  bridge  the 
interval  between  the  generations.  This  impetus,  sus- 
tained right  along  the  lines  of  evolution  among  which  it 
gets  divided,  is  the  fundamental  cause  of  variations,  at 
least  of  those  that  are  regularly  passed  on,  that  accumu- 
late and  create  new  species."  4  The  vital  impulse  keeps  a 
true,  inward  unity,  but  it  does  not  remain  a  single  move- 
ment and  the  same  tendency.  Vegetative,  instinctive  and 
rational  life  are  not  "  three  successive  degrees  of  the  de- 
velopment of  one  and  the  same  tendency."  5  "  They  are 
three  divergent  directions  of  an  activity  that  has  split  up 

2  LeRoy,  "  The  New  Philosophy  of  Henri  Bergson,"  p.  213. 
s  Bergson,  "  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,"  p.  51. 
*  Bergson,  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  87. 
5  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  135. 


The  Vitalist  View  245 

as  it  grew.  The  difference  between  them  is  not  a  differ- 
ence of  intensity,  nor,  more  generally  of  degree,  but  of 
kind."  6  In  the  balance  brought  about  by  this  difference 
of  tendency  and  by  the  unity  of  the  movement  of  life,  we 
find  the  solution  of  the  progress  of  life. 

Wherever  life  moves  and  pushes  along,  it  has  to  over- 
come the  torpor  of  matter,  which  is  the  very  inverse  of  life. 
It  is  in  the  living  species  and  the  connected  life-forms  that 
we  must  trace  the  original  impetus  and  impulsion  of  life. 
Life  may  be  compared  to  an  immense  vessel  "  full  of  steam 
at  a  high  pressure,  and  here  and  there  in  its  sides  a  crack 
through  which  the  steam  is  escaping  in  a  jet.  The  steam 
thrown  into  the  air  is  nearly  all  condensed  into  little  drops 
which  fall  back  and  this  condensation  and  this  fall  repre- 
sent simply  the  loss  of  something,  an  interruption,  a 
deficit."  7  The  condensation  and  the  falling  of  the  con- 
densed drops  represent  matter,  while  the  living  steam  rep- 
resents the  impulse  of  life.  The  condensation  is  a  picture 
of  the  way  in  which  the  creative  activity  unmakes  itself 
in  matter.  But  the  vital  activity  is  that  which  exists  and 
continues  as  the  direct  movement  in  the  indirect  move- 
ment, which  works  against  it.  Life,  however,  goes  on 
persistently.  "  In  vital  activity,  we  see,  then,  that  which 
subsists  of  the  direct  movement  in  the  inverted  movement, 
a  reality  which  is  making  itself  in  a  reality  which  is  im- 
making  itself  "  8 

The  direct  creative  movement,  which  is  an  ascending 
movement,  an  inner  ripening  and  unfolding,  endures  in  its 
essence.  The  very  continuation  of  the  universe  is  de- 
pendent upon  this  continuance  and  duration  of  movement. 
Without  the  living  movement,  there  would  be  no  duration, 
but  duration  is  the  key  to  movement.     In  the  speculation 

e  Ibid.,  p.  135. 

7  Ibid.,  p.  247. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  248. 


246        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

of  Bergson  duration  forms  a  very  essential  conception. 
Through  it  he  finds  the  ideal  factor.  It  is  the  absolute 
opposite  of  any  static  notion.  Through  duration  and  its 
tension,  Bergson  describes  consciousness  and  ideal  life. 
"  The  duration  lived  by  our  consciousness  is  a  duration 
with  its  own  determined  rhythm,  a  duration  very  different 
from  the  time  of  the  physicist,  which  can  store  up,  in  a 
given  interval,  as  great  a  number  of  phenomena  as  we 
please."  9  This  flowing  duration,  which  is  real  life,  is 
summed  up  by  our  consciousness.  Not  the  separate  deeds 
measured  by  a  fixed  order,  but  a  flowing  connection  marks 
continuation.  It  is  by  this  free  flow  that  we  conquer 
necessity.  Therefore,  the  continuous  and  untrammeled 
movement  of  duration  is  the  solution  of  time.  Time  is  no 
static  notion.  But  it  is  the  full  complete  movement  of 
real  duration.  "  Pure  duration  is  the  form  which  the  suc- 
cession of  our  conscious  states  assumes  when  our  ego  lets 
itself  live,  when  it  refrains  from  separating  its  present 
state  from  its  former  states.  For  this  purpose  it  need 
not  be  entirely  absorbed  in  the  passing  sensation  or  idea; 
for  then,  on  the  contrary,  it  would  no  longer  endure."  10 
As  the  ego  endures  in  the  living  movement  of  time  it  finds 
its  freedom.  Time  and  free  will  belong  together.  There 
is  a  constant  unfoldment  in  the  onward  trend  of  real  time 
and  duration.  "  Duration  is  the  continuous  progress  of 
the  past  which  gnaws  into  the  future  and  which  swells  as 
it  advances.  And  as  the  past  grows  without  ceasing,  so 
also  there  is  no  limit  to  its  preservation."  ll 

It  is  through  memory  that  duration  continues  and  lives. 
No  mere  physical  continuation  in  any  way  explains  time 
and  duration,  but  consciousness  lies  back  of  duration  and 
works  through  it.     Matter  must  be  clearly  separated  from 

»  "  Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  272. 
io  "  Time  and  Free  Will,"  p.  100. 
ii  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  4. 


The  Vitalist  View  247 

memory,  through  which  the  bond  is  formed  for  the  contin- 
uation of  the  movement  of  the  living  impulse.  Without 
memory  we  fail  to  really  understand  duration.  "  Inner 
duration  is  the  continuous  life  of  a  memory  which  pro- 
longs the  past  into  the  present,  the  present  either  contain- 
ing within  it  in  a  distinct  form,  the  ceaselessly  growing 
image  of  the  past,  or,  more  probably,  showing  by  its  con- 
tinual change  of  quality  the  heavier  and  still  heavier  load 
we  drag  behind  us  as  we  grow  older.  Without  this  sur- 
vival of  the  past  into  the  present  there  would  be  no  dura- 
tion, but  only  instantaneity."  12  But  continued  memory 
is  no  emanation  of  matter.  It  is  "just  the  intersection 
of  mind  and  matter,"  13  and  no  brain  lesion  destroys  it. 
It  is  through  memory  that  we  pass  from  perception  and 
from  material  images  to  spiritual  continuance.  "  To 
touch  the  reality  of  spirit  we  must  place  ourselves  at  the 
point  where  an  individual  consciousness,  continuing  and 
retaining  the  past  in  a  present  enriched  by  it,  thus  escapes 
the  law  of  necessity,  the  law  which  ordains  that  the  past 
shall  ever  follow  itself  in  a  present  which  merely  repeats  it 
in  another  form,  and  that  all  things  shall  ever  be  flowing 
away.  When  we  pass  from  pure  perception  to  memory, 
we  definitely  abandon  matter  for  spirit."  14  Memory, 
therefore,  becomes  the  solvent  for  the  problem  of  duration. 
The  correlation  of  unity  and  multiplicity  in  consciousness 
is  effected  through  the  synthesis  of  living  tension.  This 
living  tension  is  memory,  which  is  entirely  distinct  from 
every  sort  and  kind  of  matter. 

It  naturally  follows  that  if  duration  is  the  solvent  of 
the  vital  impulse,  and  if  the  center  of  duration  is  memory, 
by  which  consciousness  continuously  moves  on,  we  cannot 
separate    these   three.     The    result    is    that   "  theory    of 

12  "  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,"  p.  44  ff. 

13  "  Matter  and  Memory,"  Introduction,  p.  xii. 
i*  w  Matter  and  Memory,"  p.  313. 


248        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

knowledge  and  theory  of  life  seem  to  us  inseparable."  l5 
We  must  explain  knowledge  from  the  angle  of  life.  Now 
as  life  progresses  and  pushes  on,  consciousness  can  not 
remain  within  itself.  It  launches  into  matter  and  strug- 
gles with  it.  The  world  shows  us  consciousness  falling 
asleep  in  matter,  but  it  again  arouses  itself,  and  impels 
itself  onward.  In  the  onward  movement  life  may  pay  at- 
tention to  its  own  movement,  or  it  may  direct  itself  toward 
the  matter  it  passes  through.  If  life  pays  attention  to  its 
own  movement  it  appears  as  intuition,  in  which  life  and 
consciousness  remain  within  themselves.  If,  however,  life 
looks  to  matter  it  needs  the  intellect,  which  is  the  concen- 
tration of  consciousness  on  matter.  Intellect  is  demanded 
for  the  sake  of  matter,  but  in  intuition  we  have  the  key 
to  the  inwardness  of  knowledge  and  life.16  Intuition  fully 
reinstates  us  into  original  life.  We  gain  full  reality  and 
find  an  absolute  through  intuition.  "  By  intuition  is 
meant  the  kind  of  intellectual  sympathy  by  which  one 
places  oneself  within  an  object  in  order  to  coincide  with 
what  is  unique  in  it  and  consequently  inexpressible."  17 
Through  intuition,  therefore,  we  enter  into  the  very  heart 
of  knowledge. 

There  are,  however,  practical  reasons  which  compel  us 
to  turn  to  the  intellect  with  its  fixed  concepts.  It  is  true 
that  intuition  precedes  the  concepts,  which  are  demanded 
through  matter  and  for  the  sake  of  matter.  They  "  are 
the  deposited  sediment  of  intuition."  18  But  we  are  at 
times  forced  to  go  outside  of  intuition  and  the  living  flow 
of  duration.  There  are  static  relations  of  matter  and 
space,  which  call  for  mechanics  and  physics.  The  needs  of 
these  sciences,  and  the  practical  necessity  of  actual  living 

is  "  Creative  Evolution,"  Introduction,  p.  xiii. 

is  Cf.  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  181  ff. 

17  "  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,"  p.  7. 

is  LeRoy,  "  The  New  Philosophy  of  Henri  Bergson,"  p.  53. 


The  Vitalist  View  249 

in  space  with  its  relations,  justify  and  require  the  intel- 
lect.    Through  the  external  relations  and  connections  the 
intellect  frames  its  static  concepts.     We  begin  with  real 
living  intuition ;  but  the  fundamental  thinking,  which  is  of 
an   intuitional   nature,   passes   from   the   actually   experi- 
enced things  to  concepts.     The  movement  is  not  vice  versa 
and  man  does  not  pass   from  concepts  to  things.     The 
living  grasp  of  things  found  in  the  intuition  of  life  must 
give   way   as   man   deals   with   matter.     Through   matter 
there  arises  the  idea  of  static  space.     When  we  have  ar- 
rived at  this  idea  the  intellect  has  already  had  its  history. 
The  theoretical  speculations  on  matter  and  space  may  ex- 
press scientifically  the  character  of  the  intellect,  but  they 
do  not  originate  it.     The  origin  of  intellect  is  due  to  prac- 
tical demands,  and  fundamentally  it  arises  as  an  instru- 
ment or  tool  to  meet  practical  demands.     "  In  short,  in- 
telligence, considered  in  what  seems  to  be  its  original  fea- 
ture, is  the  faculty  of  manufacturing  artificial  objects,  es- 
pecially tools  to  make  tools,  and  of  indefinitely  varying 
the    manufacture" 19     Because    the    intellect    has    arisen 
through  meeting  practical  mechanical  needs,  it  is  funda- 
mentally mechanical  and  spatial,  and  it  is  not  meant  for 
real  theorizing.     "  If  the  intellect  were  meant  for  pure 
theorizing,  it  would  take  its  place  within  movement,  for 
movement  is  reality  itself,  and  immobility  is  always  only 
apparent  or  relative.     But  the  intellect  is  meant  for  some- 
thing altogether  different.     Unless  it  does  violence  to  it- 
self, it  takes  the  opposite  course;  it  always  starts  from 
immobility,  as  if  this  were  the  ultimate  reality;  when  it 
tries  to  form  an  idea  of  movement,  it  does  so  by  construct- 
ing movement  out  of  immobilities  put  together."  20     The 
mistake  which  the  intellect  makes,  when  it  starts  with  a 
fixed  world,  is  due  to  the  very  character  of  the  intellect, 

is  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  139. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  155. 


250       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

for  it  can  only  grasp  the  immovable.  There  is  no  way 
in  which  it  can  lay  hold  of  a  living  flux.  "  The  intellect 
is  characterized  by  a  natural  inability  to  comprehend 
life."  21  But  it  is  also  "  characterized  by  the  unlimited 
power  of  decomposing  according  to  any  law  and  of  recom- 
posing  into  any  system-."  22  The  human  intellect  thus 
has  the  power  to  fabricate  its  systems,  but  whatever  it 
projects  is  an  adaptation  to  the  fundamental  static  char- 
acter of  space.  Consequently  the  intellect,  in  all  its  sys- 
tems and  through  all  its  speculations,  can  never  build  up 
the  real  duration  nor  find  the  vital  impulse.  Its  use,  there- 
fore, is  purely  instrumental  and  secondary;  it  can  never 
solve  the  riddle  of  the  universe,  which  must  be  approached 
from  the  point  of  view  of  moving,  creating,  and  progress- 
ing life. 

There  are  many  valuable  deductions  to  be  derived  for 
the  elucidation  of  Christian  truth  from  Bergson's  funda- 
mental notions.  Of  all  these  notions,  the  most  central  and 
the  ever- recur  ring  one  is  that  of  life  as  movement.  Chris- 
tianity, when  it  regards  the  message  of  the  Gospel  of  John, 
can  well  employ  any  true  effort  to  describe  life  as  inner 
creative  continuity,  full,  rich,  ideal  and  spiritual.  If 
God's  life  in  us  and  our  life  in  God  are  thought  of  as  real 
power,  we  can  discover  in  Bergson's  pictures  of  unfolding 
life  illustrations  of  life  in  its  inmost  spiritual  reality.  The 
constant  trend  toward  the  Johannine  conception,  which 
considers  Christianity  fundamentally  as  life,  finds  itself 
in  agreement  with  the  philosophic  attempt  to  make  life 
the  all-determining  center  of  a  real  view  of  the  world. 
The  manner  in  which  Bergson  aims  to  combine  the  di- 
versity in  the  unfoldment  of  life  with  its  underlying  unity 
may  be  employed  to  show  the  divergences  of  the  divine  life 
in  the  world  and  also  its  unity.     The  oneness  and  central 

21  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  165. 

22  Ibid.,  p.  157. 


The  Vitalist  View  251 

continuity  of  divine  life  in  its  eternal  character  enters  into 
the  changes  of  history  and  through  them  works  out  its 
plans.  We  men  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  in  God, 
and  still  develop  along  our  own  separate  lines  of  charac- 
ter. The  Christian  life  in  Christ  and  His  presence  in  us 
is  one  of  strong  unity ;  but,  nevertheless,  at  certain  nodal 
points  it  starts  in  different  men  and  at  different  times  and 
among  different  peoples  on  new  and  varying  lines  of  di- 
vergent development,  unfolding  into  ever  richer  complexity 
and  bursting  into  ever  greater  glory  as  it  proceeds. 

The  separation  of  matter  and  memory  in  the  philosophy 
of  Bergson  is  very  important.  It  follows  from  this  fact, 
that  matter  is  purely  secondary,  and  results  as  a  deposit 
of  the  real  life,  which  in  its  essence  is  fundamentally  of  an 
ideal  and  spiritual  nature.  The  import  of  the  speculation 
of  Bergson,  who,  with  all  his  careful  knowledge  of  biology, 
has  found  it  necessary  to  define  life  not  mechanically,  but 
as  a  real  force,  a  vital  impulse,  a  spiritual  activity,  is  very 
great.  From  the  observations  of  life  in  the  world,  we  are 
led  away  into  an  inner  life  which  is  not  material.  The 
very  threshold  of  Christianity  is  approached  when  life  is 
spiritualized.  Of  course,  no  speculation  can  reach  the 
life  that  proceeds  from  the  Father  and  that  is  fully  and 
really  present  in  Christ,  the  Life.  But  the  spiritualiza- 
tion  of  life  in  the  world,  and  that  view  of  it,  which  does 
not  rest  with  the  interpretation  of  a  chemical  process  or  a 
mechanical  movement,  approaches  the  mystery  of  life  in 
Christianity.  While,  of  course,  Christianity  does  not  deal 
with  the  external  and  observable  phenomena  of  life,  and 
while  it  does  not  deny  any  just  generalizations  to  be  de- 
rived from  them,  nevertheless,  it  is  favorably  inclined  to  a 
view  of  life,  even  in  the  phenomenal  world,  which  rises 
above  the  level  of  the  material.  It  has  an  interest  in  the 
emphasis  of  the  soul-life  of  man,  and  in  God  as  life,  who 
determines  all  life  in  its  final  source  and  in  its  deepest  as- 


252        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

pects.  A  real  broad  Christianity  will  never  quarrel  with 
the  manner  and  form  of  hypotheses  that  are  framed  on 
the  basis  of  the  observable  progress  of  life  in  the  sphere  of 
secondary  causes  and  movements.  But  no  Christianity 
can  allow  that  the  solutions  of  science  shall  contradict  or 
deny  the  fact  that  life  in  its  first  origin  and  in  its  last 
analysis  is  of  the  spirit.  It  is,  therefore,  ready  gladly  to 
receive  and  to  employ  any  view  of  total  life,  which  is  anti- 
material  and  rightly  ideal.  Its  agreement  is  all  the  greater 
when  the  ideal  life  is  placed  at  the  very  center  of  all 
being. 

The  opposition  of  Bergson  to  the  intellect  as  primary, 
and  his  emphasis  of  intuition,  are  also  valuable  for  Chris- 
tianity. The  appeal  of  Christianity  is  to  the  conscience, 
and  the  value  of  Christian  truth  does  not  rest  upon  its 
demonstrability.  Christian  truth  is  not  logically  estab- 
lished, but  comes  with  a  direct  demand  of  acceptance. 
Now  such  a  direct  demand,  which  comes  not  in  words  of 
human  wisdom,  but  through  the  paradox  of  human  fool- 
ishness and  divine  wisdom,  can  never  rest  upon  the  proofs 
of  the  intellect.  In  calling  upon  the  deepest  appre- 
hensive power  of  the  human  soul,  Christian  truth  rests 
its  case  upon  and  seeks  its  reception  through  an  inner, 
immediate,  intuitive  recognition  of  what  it  is  and  what  it 
means.  The  belief  that  underlies  Christian  truth  is  the 
conviction  that  spiritual  truth  is  spiritually  discerned  by 
spiritual  man.  The  natural  man  with  his  reasoning  can- 
not find  it  through  logic  or  rhetoric.23  Spiritual  discern- 
ment is  in  its  very  nature  alogical ;  its  axioms  arise  from 
the  agreement  with  the  intuition  of  the  spiritual  man,  who 
has  been  born  again  of  the  Spirit.  The  very  experience 
by  which  man  is  permitted  to  test  Christianity,  and  his 
possibility  of  understanding  it,  rest  upon  a  spiritual  ex- 
perience of  the  new  birth  which  is  intuitional  and  not  in  its 

23  I  Corinthians,  2. 


The  Vitalist  View  253 

essence  intellectual.  The  spiritual  man  knows  the  truth, 
and  needs  not  to  be  taught,  for  he  is  born  of  God.  This 
inner  intuition  of  truth  in  the  Christian  life  is  a  sympathy 
which  takes  intellectual  color,  but  it  really  instates  itself 
within  the  divine,  the  mysterious,  the  everlasting  truth,  by 
ready  child-like  receptivity,  and  through  trust  in  the  in- 
ward leading  of  the  Spirit  of  God.  The  theory  of  knowl- 
edge in  Christianity  is  fundamentally  intuitional,  and, 
therefore,  Christianity  readily  understands  and  highly  es- 
teems any  theory  that  seeks  to  define  and  establish  the 
knowledge  of  intuition. 

It  is  out  of  living  intuition  that  we  arrive  at  the  true 
self  and  discover  personality.  Our  self  is  multiple,  but  it 
is  not  like  other  multiplicity,  for  it  has  a  real  unity  and 
continuity.  It  is  through  the  vital,  multiple  unity  of  the 
self  that  we  find  the  balance  between  unity  and  multiplicity. 
The  self  is  a  reality  superior  to  abstract  unity  and  mul- 
tiplicity. This  character  of  the  self  can  only  be  found 
through  intuition.  "  Now  philosophy  will  know  this  only 
when  it  recovers  possession  of  the  simple  intuition  of  the 
self  by  the  self."  24  It  is  the  self  which  is  the  enduring 
fact.  "  There  is  one  reality,  at  least,  which  we  all  seize 
from  within,  by  intuition  and  not  by  simple  analysis.  It  is 
our  own  personality  in  its  flowing  through  time  —  our  self 
which  endures."  25  As  our  self  and  our  expanding  per- 
sonality is  given  through  real  intuition,  it  can  never  be 
constituted  or  re-constituted  out  of  the  operations  of  the 
mind.  It  is  a  fundamental  mistake  to  "  try  to  reconstruct 
personality  with  psychical  states,  whether  they  confine 
themselves  to  those  states  alone,  or  whether  they  add  a 
kind  of  thread  for  the  purpose  of  joining  the  states  to- 
gether." 26     The  self  or  soul,  which  is  a  real  unity  of  life, 

24  "  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,"  p.  38. 

25  Ibid.,  p.  9. 

26  Ibid.,  p.  30. 


254        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

is  constantly  being  created,  but  it  also  pre-exists  as  one 
of  "  the  little  rills  into  which  the  great  river  of  life  divides 
itself,  flowing  through  the  body  of  humanity."  27  This 
flowing  life  expressing  itself  through  soul  is  conscious,  and 
because  it  is  conscious  it  is  free.  "  Consciousness  is  essen- 
tially free ;  it  is  freedom  itself." 2S  As  consciousness 
passes  through  matter  it  must  adapt  itself,  and  this  adap- 
tation is  intellectuality,  but  in  itself  the  soul  can  not  be 
explained  by  psychological  phenomena.  Even  on  the  basis 
of  the  associations  in  the  phenomenal  life  of  the  mind,  "  it 
is  difficult  to  maintain  that  an  act  is  absolutely  determined 
by  its  motive  and  our  conscious  states  by  one  another."  29 
But  it  is  not  this  possibility  of  demonstrating  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  self  psychologically  upon  which  the  whole 
matter  is  to  be  determined.  In  intuition  we  finally  find 
the  real,  conscious  and  truly  free  personality. 

In  this  conception  of  personality,  advocated  by  Berg- 
son,  there  is  much  that  is  highly  valuable  for  Christian 
truth.  The  opposition  to  a  psychology  of  mere  phenom- 
enalism, and  the  affirmation  that  the  soul  is  found  as  a 
living  concrete  unity  in  man's  intuition,  offers  an  excel- 
lent philosophic  explanation  of  the  Christian  emphasis  on 
the  soul.  A  psychology  of  mere  disjoinable  states  and  of 
separable  personalities,  in  which  the  abnormal  experience 
of  divided  selves  is  fundamental,  must  always  be  in  conflict 
with  the  unitary  idea  of  the  soul  or  self  as  a  spiritual  unit, 
which  Christianity  posits  in  determining  personality. 
Christianity  desires  the  inward  grasp  and  the  intuitive 
belief  in  the  soul  which  Bergson  deduces  from  life.  Not 
the  psychologism  of  the  soul,  but  the  apprehension  of  it 
as  a  living  unity  in  multiplicity,  approaches  the  Christian 
idea  of  the  soul  or  of  the  human  spirit  as  coming  from  God. 

27  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  270. 

2R  Ibid.,  p.  270. 

29  "  Time  and  Free  Will,"  p.  158. 


The  Vitalist  View  255 

When  the  soul  is  found  by  Bergson  in  the  stream  of  life, 
and  when  he  does  not  interpret  it  as  a  reflection  of  matter, 
he  has  put  himself  in  strong  opposition  to  materialistic 
science.  For  him  the  soul  cannot  be  an  after-effect,  which 
will  cease  when  the  mechanical  and  chemical  actions  and 
reactions  of  the  body  stop.  The  soul  is  valued  at  a  price 
which  materialistic  and  naturalistic  science  cannot  meet. 
The  derivation  of  souls  from  life  itself  gives  them  an  ideal 
worth  and  a  spiritual  origin.  Christianity  in  its  own  terms 
and  on  its  own  foundation  can  find  in  such  philosophic 
speculation  an  approach  to  its  ideals.  It  may  employ 
such  conceptions  for  its  conviction  that  we  are  of  the  life  of 
God.  Our  souls  are  His  breath,  and  not  the  shadow  of 
matter  ascending  through  the  brutes  and  animals.  Such 
origin  and  descent  of  man  is  not  strictly  Darwinian,  it  is 
not  a  creative  evolution  in  the  naturalistic  sense.  The 
soul-theory  of  Bergson  leads  us  into  spiritual  and  ideal 
realms,  and  it  is,  therefore,  that  Christianity  may  and 
does  welcome  it. 

It  is  of  great  interest  to  find  that  Bergson  allows  per- 
sonality to  be  continually  created  and  shaped,  and  to  be 
vitally  free  in  itself.  The  continuity  of  life  in  which  men 
are  freely  made  personalities  can  be  viewed  favorably  by 
Christianity.  It  may  agree  with  the  idea  that  God  is  con- 
stantly making  and  shaping  us  in  our  inmost  souls.  He, 
in  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being,  did  not  make 
us  absolutely  finished,  predestined  personalities;  but 
through  and  in  Jesus  Christ  He  is  building  up  our  lives 
and  our  souls  constantly.  This  very  construction  is  re- 
alized by  us  in  vital  inner  freedom.  Our  sanctification  as 
Christians,  and  the  life  through  which  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
constantly  leading  us  into  the  truth,  is  really  a  new  crea- 
tion within  us.  Christianity  at  its  best  is  not  favorable 
to  any  theory  of  the  dead  level  of  the  soul.  It  opposes 
any  determinism  of  the  soul  as  soul,  although  it  finds  the 


%56       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

actual  soul  burdened  and  enthralled  by  sin;  but  in  the 
ideal  state  the  soul  is  free,  and  sin  does  not  belong  to  its 
being.  In  like  manner  Christianity  will  not  allow  any 
other  slavery  of  the  soul  through  heredity,  environment 
or  any  such  thing.  Whatever  degrading  inheritance  of 
sin  attaches  to  the  soul  is  overcome  for  the  Christian,  when 
he  is  born  again  and  becomes  a  new  creature.  The  as- 
surance that  the  guilt  is  removed  lies  at  the  foundation, 
but  the  process  of  the  removal  is  continuous.  In  this  new 
spiritual  re-creation  the  creation  and  its  ideal  is  com- 
pleting itself.  There  is  a  creative  evolution  of  God  in 
the  human  soul,  and  God  is  working  out  a  new  development 
in  human  lives. 

There  is  much  also  in  Bergson's  philosophy,  which  as 
far  as  it  is  now  developed  by  him,  seems  favorable  to  theism. 
His  God  is  not.  an  intellectual  Absolute,  not  a  mere  name 
for  the  universe,  and  not  a  synonym  for  nature  or 
matter.  The  God  of  Bergson  is  life.  In  a  letter  Bergson 
says  that  God  is  "  a  free,  creating  God  producing  matter 
and  life  at  once,  whose  creative  effort  is  continued  in  a 
vital  direction  by  the  creation  of  species  and  the  construc- 
tion of  human  personalities."  30  Apparently  we  have  here 
a  freely  working  and  freely  creating  God.  He  is  imma- 
nent in  the  world  and  shaping  it  constantly  and  continu- 
ously out  of  the  fullness  of  His  life,  but  apparently  He  is 
not  His  creation,  for  He  is  free  and  produces  life  and 
matter. 

But  after  we  have  considered  the  strong  and  favorable 
aspects  of  the  Bergsonian  philosophy,  and  after  we  have 
noted  its  close  approach  to  Christian  ideas  and  to  Chris- 
tian truth  in  many  particulars,  it  remains  for  us  to  dis- 
cuss certain  weaknesses  and  defects.  The  first  of  these  is 
the  elimination  of  the  idea  of  rest.  Duration  is  eternal, 
but  it  is  movement.     In  this  so  central  idea  of  his  phi- 

30  LeRoy,  "  The  New  Philosophy  of  Henri  Bergson,"  p.  224. 


The  Vitalist  View  257 

losophy  Bergson  has  in  essence  returned  to  the  specula- 
tions of  the  Greek  philosopher,  Heraclitus.  He  has  built 
up  his  philosophy  on  a  world  of  change.  The  opposition 
of  Bergson  to  any  static  conception  is  apparently  true  to 
the  idea  of  life  as  we  see  it  developing  and  growing  in  the 
world.  But  Bergson  has  been  influenced  by  the  phenom- 
enal side  of  life,  and  has  used  the  observable  changes  in 
physical  life  to  determine  the  character  and  constitution 
of  life  in  itself.  Because  he  has  noted  the  development  of 
life,  this  very  development  is  its  creation.  There  is  no 
distinction  between  the  beginning  and  the  continuance. 
Life  itself  as  changing  and  unfolding  is  made  eternal. 
Consequently  there  can  be  no  distinction  between  the  crea- 
tion and  the  preservation  of  life  in  the  world,  the  former  is 
absorbed  into  the  latter.  Life,  in  its  changing  aspects 
that  we  find  now,  is  made  the  prime  assumption.  The 
origin  of  life  lies  in  itself  and  in  its  present  processes. 
Life  is  a  flowing  river  without  beginning  or  end,  and  it  has 
no  banks.  Is  it  possible  for  Christian  truth  to  be  satis- 
fied with  such  a  notion  of  life,  or  must  there  be  a  demand 
for  more  permanence,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  implications 
of  spiritual  life?  Is  spiritual  life  nothing  but  movement 
and  progress,  or  does  it  demand  strong,  permanent,  and 
conserved  elements  ?  Is  the  memory  of  the  soul  only  move- 
ment because  the  recall  of  the  memory  is  movement,  or  is 
the  spiritual  content  and  the  truth  which  memory  returns 
fixed  and  static  in  nature?  We  cannot  but  assume  that 
there  is  a  constancy  in  truth,  an  eternity  in  great  ideals, 
a  fixity  in  spiritual  conceptions,  even  though  all  of  these 
may  at  times  be  forgotten  or  neglected.  A  philosophy  of 
movement  and  of  action  cannot  really  appreciate  the  fact 
of  eternal,  fixed  ideals.  Christianity  does  hold  to  a  faith 
once  delivered  to  the  saints.  It  believes  in  a  permanence 
of  divine  truth  for  the  soul,  and  in  an  inner  identity  of  the 
soul  which  no  creative  change  can  destroy  or  make.    There 


258        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

is  an  underlying  idea  of  duration  in  Christianity,  which  is 
not  the  interpenetration  of  moving  elements,  but  of  a  great 
lasting  fixity. 

Bergson's  view  seems  to  offer  no  idea  of  rest  over  against 
the  shifting  of  time.  It  has  translated  flowing  time  it- 
self into  eternity.  There  is  no  separation  between  the 
eternity  when  there  was  no  time,  and  the  time  which  is  the 
framework  for  finite  development.  Because  time  and 
change  are  made  so  fundamental  the  conception  of  eternity 
suffers.  Through  its  depreciation  the  Christian  ideals  of 
a  rest  for  the  people  of  God,  of  a  cessation  from  the  trials, 
burdens  and  labors  of  time,  and  of  a  heaven  of  peaceful 
and  restful  calm  suffer.  God  Himself,  if  all  is  in  time, 
and  if  all  is  movement,  must  work  hitherto  and  be  move- 
ment in  Himself  in  such  a  manner  that  He  does  not  rest 
from  His  labors.  The  elimination  of  the  idea  of  rest  may 
carry  with  it  the  loss  of  the  idea  of  peace.  The  striving 
creative  evolution  seems  to  offer  no  support  for  those  ele- 
ments in  Christian  truth  that  demand  rest  and  peace. 
Nor  can  there  seem  to  be  any  end  or  fulfillment  for  hope. 
The  process  goes  on  forever,  for  evolution  is  eternal. 
There  can  be  no  finally  new  heaven  and  new  earth.  Growth 
is  eternal  and  life  is  eternal,  and,  therefore,  development 
can  not  cease.  While  it  may  be  true  that  the  Christian 
life  will  unceasingly  unfold  into  all  eternity,  is  this  unfold- 
ment  the  same  as  that  of  time?  Does  not  the  Christian 
hope  call  for  a  new  condition  in  heaven,  through  which  the 
very  development  of  man  must  be  differentiated  very 
clearly  from  all  growth  of  the  spirit  in  the  present  age  and 
time?  There  appears  to  be  in  Bergson's  philosophy  a 
naturalistic  remnant,  which  is  not  removed  although  life 
is  translated  into  the  terms  of  consciousness. 

Despite  the  emphasis  put  on  the  soul  as  it  is  found 
in  intuition,  the  consciousness  described  is,  after  all,  the 
consciousness   of  phenomenal  psychology,  the  stream  of 


The  Vitalist  View  259 

thoughts,  feelings,  and  volition.  This  phenomenal  con- 
sciousness is  exalted  into  the  eternal,  and  consequently 
there  can  be  no  vital,  absolute  truth  larger  and  more  real 
than  the  change  of  external  life.  Everything  is  within  the 
stream  and  nothing  is  without  it.  Fixity  is  a  mere  neces- 
sity of  matter,  and  movement  is  of  the  very  nature  of  life. 
From  this  it  must  follow  that  a  truth  is  not  true  because 
of  itself,  but  because  it  is  life  and  movement,  and  the  soul 
is  eternal  not  because  it  is  divine,  but  because  it  is  life 
and  life  lasts.  Life  itself,  not  really  freed  from  biological 
determinations,  is  not  eternal  as  God's  life,  but  as  a  mov- 
ing and  unfolding  duration. 

It  is  through  the  reinstatement  into  life  that  we  really 
know  and  find  truth,  for  in  life  we  have  everlasting  moving 
duration.  But  the  reinstatement  into  life  is  possible  only 
through  intuition.  Intuition,  as  stated  above,31  is  the 
deepest  and  truest  knowledge,  for  through  it  we  find  re- 
ality. The  intellect  is  secondary  and  exists  for  material 
ends  and  practical  purposes.  This  emphasis  upon  intui- 
tion which,  as  previously  stated,  has  its  great  worth  for 
Christian  truth,  is,  however,  in  its  strong  accentuation 
dangerous.  In  Christian  truth  intuition  is  allowed  as  a 
means  for  receiving  the  great  fixed  truths  of  God.  The 
Bergsonian  intuition  is  a  part  of  the  moving  and  shaping 
reality.  It  does  not  receive  eternal  facts  and  realities, 
but  it  is  carried  along  by  the  creative  flux.  As  man's 
mind  dips  into  the  living  stream  of  life  and  duration  he 
finds  truth.     Truth  is  within  the  movement. 

From  this  exclusive  right  of  intuition  the  depreciation 
of  the  intellect  naturally  results.  While  Bergson  calls  in- 
tuition "  intellectual  sympathy,"  the  adjective  "  intellec- 
tual "  is  really  lost  in  the  stressing  of  sympathy.  Intui- 
tion is  fundamentally  anti-intellectual.  Because  the  in- 
tuition is  found  in  life  and  its  unfoldment,  and  because  true 

3i  P.  248. 


260       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

knowledge  is  gathered  out  of  the  reinstatement  of  the 
mind  in  the  great  stream  of  life,  the  nature  of  the  intui- 
tion takes  on  the  character  of  feeling  and  striving.  The 
will  aids  in  the  reinstatement,  and  the  experience  of  the 
sympathy  is  in  feeling.  Consequently  this  intuitionism 
has  no  place  for  thought  and  intellect  as  necessary  to  find 
spiritual  truth.  But  the  spiritual  truth  of  Christianity 
has  never  been  without  an  intellectual  side.  No  form  of 
Christianity  has  been  able  finally  to  get  along  without 
doctrines.  In  this  attitude  Christianity  has  been  true  to 
the  best  in  religious  experience.  If,  however,  the  intellect 
is  merely  instrumental  to  material  uses,  then  reflection  has 
no  place  in  religious  life.  Modern  religious  ps}rchology 
in  its  latest  development  is  not  willing,  however,  to  sup- 
press the  intellectual  side  of  religious  experience  and 
truth.  Professor  Galloway  rightly  says :  "  Religious 
belief  and  doctrines  have  a  cognitive  aspect,  and,  in  virtue 
of  this,  thought  has  the  right  to  examine  them  and  to  test, 
so  far  as  that  is  possible,  their  consistency  with  the  articu- 
lated whole  of  knowledge.  Where  applicable,  reason  is 
the  most  adequate  criterion ;  feeling  is  individual ;  working 
value  has  a  social  and  historic  aspect ;  but  thought  is  uni- 
versal. And  reflective  thinking  alone  makes  it  possible  to 
connect  and  compare  the  religious  experience  with  experi- 
ence as  a  whole."  32  In  order  that  a  religion  may  become 
universal  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  both  understood  and 
taught.  It  must,  therefore,  employ  intellect  and  reflec- 
tion. While  Christianity  does  not  rest  upon  logic,  it  can 
and  must  employ  it  in  unifying  its  truth,  in  confessing  its 
faith  and  in  communicating  its  ideals.  Any  theory  which 
limits  the  truth  of  Christianity  by  mere  intuitionalism 
makes  Christianity  individualistic,  uncertain  and  shifting. 
The  depression  of  the  intellect  will  also  finally  impugn  the 
place  of  knowledge  and  wisdom  in  God  Himself.     If  in- 

32  "  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.  869. 


The  Vitalist  View  261 

tellect  must  be  altogether  removed  from  the  unity  of  life 
and  its  inward  reality,  then  as  God  is  in  such  life  there 
can  be  no  real  intellect  in  God.  His  knowledge  must  be 
reduced  to  the  movement  of  life  itself.  That  this  result- 
ant has  actually  been  indicated  by  Bergson,  despite  his 
care,  will  appear  further  on. 

The  mere  intuitionalist,  like  Bergson,  who  has  no  place 
for  intellect  in  the  greatest  religious  issues,  can  consist- 
ently have  no  fixed  standards  of  judgment.  His  norm 
of  truth,  like  that  of  the  pragmatist,  must  become  ex- 
periential and  purely  psychological.  But  truth  for  its  vi- 
tality demands  firm  logical  criteria.  Above  all  Christian 
truth,  which  asks  to  be  accepted  as  divine  and  authorita- 
tive, must  hold  to  standards  which  are  eternally  stable  and 
true  in  themselves,  although  they  are  never  experienced. 
There  is,  it  is  true,  a  necessity  for  flowing  experience,  but 
this  does  not  guarantee  divine  truth  in  itself.  Mere  move- 
ment can  never  assure  us  of  standards,  and  where  there 
are  no  standards  there  can  be  no  real  distinction  of  true 
and  false.  That  by  which  we  measure  must  be  fixed. 
The  higher  the  issue,  the  more  certain  must  be  the  stand- 
ard. If  the  yard-stick  would  move  with  the  cloth,  how 
could  it  measure?  If  the  hands  on  the  dial  of  the  clock 
were  not  the  only  moving  thing,  but  if  the  dial  would  re- 
volve with  the  hands,  how  could  we  have  any  standard  of 
the  fleeting  moments?  If  there  is  nothing  but  on-going 
life  by  what  shall  it  be  measured?  Christianity,  there- 
fore, does  not  favor  an  exposition  of  movement  that  in- 
jures its  standard  and  its  claim  to  be  the  final  and  uni- 
versal religion.  The  abandonment  of  the  peculiar  claim 
of  Christianity,  its  reduction  to  a  mere  experience  like 
other  experience,  and  its  depression  to  changing  life, 
would  invalidate  its  very  being.  It  is  equally  true,  that 
if  Christianity  is  interpreted  as  only  social  and  historical, 
and  if  all  its  types  are  considered  equally  right  and  true, 


262        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

then  its  worth  becomes  questionable.  Such  a  procedure 
produces  indifferentism  and  detracts  from  the  power  and 
definiteness  of  the  Christian  message.  The  end  of  in- 
tuitionism  would  be,  in  the  sympathy  of  feeling  to  do  away 
with  the  intellectual  strength  and  the  reflective  universal- 
ity of  Christian  truth. 

When  we  approach  the  problem  of  the  self  or  soul,  we 
shall  find  that  the  under-estimation  of  the  intellect  has 
its  effect  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  soul.  Great  as  has 
been  the  service  of  Bergson  in  calling  attention  to  the 
freedom  of  the  soul,  there  has  been  offered  no  sufficient 
guarantee  for  the  real  separate  individuality  of  the  soul. 
While  the  great  stream  of  life  finds  certain  spiritual  and 
nodal  points  in  spiritual  centers,  these  are  not  really  in- 
dependent. The  souls  are  not  placed  above  on-flowing 
life,  even  though  they  are  said  to  pre-exist  in  a  certain 
undefined  sense.  The  rising  wave  of  consciousness,  which 
includes  potentialities  without  number,  bears  matter  along 
with  it.  In  the  interstices  of  this  matter  consciousness 
inserts  itself,  but  the  matter  divides  it  into  distinct  in- 
dividualities. "  On  flows  the  current,  running  through 
human  generations,  subdividing  itself  into  individuals. 
This  subdivision  was  vaguely  indicated  in  it,  but  could  not 
have  been  made  clear  without  matter.  Thus  souls  are  con- 
tinually being  created,  which,  nevertheless,  in  a  certain 
sense  pre-existed."  33  Individuality  of  the  soul  is,  there- 
fore, not  clearly  ascribed  to  the  spirit  but  caused  by  mat- 
ter. It  is  the  body  which  after  all  divides  the  souls  from 
the  great  stream  of  life.  The  souls  are  compared  to 
"  little  rills  into  which  the  great  river  of  life  divides  itself, 
flowing  through  the  body  of  humanity."  34  If  this  illustra- 
tion means  anything,  it  means  that  the  soul  is  only  a  wave 
in  the  great  river  of  life  itself.      Hindered  by  the  body  it 

33  «  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  269  if. 

34  Ibid.,  p.  270. 


The  Vitalist  View  263 

is  separate  from  all  life  in  its  individuality.  The  problem 
is,  through  intuition  to  seek  again  the  immersion  in  the 
river  of  life.  Back  of  the  effort  of  Bergson  to  unite  the 
fullness  of  life  with  human  personality  there  lies  a  ro- 
mantic pantheism,  which  must  destroy  real  personality  and 
responsibility.  The  soul  is  not,  as  in  Christianity,  con- 
nected with  a  wise,  knowing,  and  personal  God,  but  is  a 
wave  in  the  vital  impulsion,  divided  from  the  whole  of  life 
by  the  body.  There  is  a  secret  Platonism  in  Bergson,  but 
still  no  Platonism  of  individual  souls.  Along  with  it  there 
is  a  depreciation  of  the  body  which  Christianity  does  not 
favor.  For  to  the  Christian  the  body  is  the  temple  of  the 
Spirit,  and  his  hope  is  that  of  a  final  spiritual  organism. 
Neither,  therefore,  in  the  dependence  of  the  soul  on  the 
pantheistic  notion  of  life,  nor  in  the  relation  of  the  soul 
to  the  body,  can  Christianity  gain  any  advantage  from 
the  Bergsonian  point  of  view. 

Because  Bergson  makes  life  greater  than  the  soul,  he 
is  also  compelled  to  make  life  greater  than  God.  Where- 
ever  the  soul  is  sunk  into  the  general  stream  of  movement, 
and  does  not  remain  personal,  there  the  conception  of 
God  as  Creator  and  Father  must  also  suffer.  While 
LeRoy,35  quoted  above,  seems  to  imply  that  Bergson  has 
a  free,  creative,  personal  God,  this  statement  is  only  found 
in  a  letter  of  Bergson.  What  can  be  gleaned  from  the 
statements  in  "Creative  Evolution"  does  not  justify  us 
in  maintaining  that  within  the  system  of  Bergson,  there 
is  a  place  for  a  real,  personal  God.  God  seems  to  exist 
as  secondary  to  life  and  for  the  sake  of  life.  There  is 
no  clear  and  definite  statement  that  life  flows  forth  from 
God.  It  is  the  action  of  life  itself  which  moves  Bergson 
to  say :  "  I  simply  express  this  probable  similitude  when 
I  speak  of  a  center  from  which  worlds  shoot  out  like 
rockets  in  a  fire-works  display  —  provided,  however,  that 

35  See  p.  256. 


264       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

I  do  not  present  this  center  as  a  thing,  but  as  a  continuity 
of  shooting  out.  God,  thus  defined,  has  nothing  of  the 
already  made;  He  is  unceasing  life,  action,  freedom. 
Creation,  so  conceived,  is  not  a  mystery ;  we  experience  it 
in  ourselves  when  we  act  freely."  36  The  God  of  Berg- 
son,  as  here  defined,  is  a  "  continuity  of  shooting  out 
and  "  unceasing  life,  action,  freedom."  There  is  no  mys- 
tery in  His  creation,  for  our  own  free  actions  are  the 
same.  It  follows  from  this,  that  God  cannot  be  the 
Supreme  Person.  He  is  in  a  process;  and  the  opposition 
of  Bergson  to  God  as  a  thing  is  really  an  opposition  to 
God  in  His  self-possessed  personality.  God  is  motion, 
and  this  really  means  that  motion  is  God.  Life,  action, 
freedom  of  movement  in  life,  is  really  Bergson's  God.  He 
has  subsumed  the  personal  conception  of  God  to  the  im- 
personal concept  of  life;  therefore,  he  is  really  a  vital- 
istic  pantheist  and  not  a  theist.  He  has  no  God  and 
Father  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour  Jesus  Christ,  because 
he  has  no  separate  place  for  the  soul  of  man. 

Because  Bergson's  God,  like  the  God  of  consistent  prag- 
matists,  is  wholly  within  the  world,  it  naturally  follows 
that  the  purposes  and  plans  of  God  are  not  above  but 
within  the  universe.  In  the  great  discussion  on  the  re- 
lation of  mechanism  and  finalism,37  Bergson  opposes  the 
mere  mechanical  notion ;  but  he  gives  no  room  to  the  old 
conception  of  finalism.  Evidences  of  purpose  in  the  world 
are  not  denied.  Purpose,  however,  is  supposed  not  to  be 
prior  to  the  development,  but  to  be  found  as  we  look  back 
upon  life.  Evolution  is  held  to  produce  not  only  the 
forms  of  life,  but  also  the  ideas  that  will  enable  the  intellect 
to  understand  these  forms  in  their  correlation  and  pur- 
pose. Purpose  and  teleological  value  are  among  the  ideas 
wrought  out  in  the  process  of  life.     Says  Bergson :     "  If 

se  "  Creative  Evolution,"  p.  248. 
3T  Cf.  Ibid.,  p.  37  ff. 


The  Vitalist  View  265 

life  realizes  a  plan,  it  ought  to  manifest  a  greater  har- 
mony the  further  it  advances,  just  as  the  house  shows 
better  and  better  the  idea  of  the  architect  as  stone  is  set 
upon  stone.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  unity  of  life  is  to 
be  found  solely  in  the  impetus  that  pushes  it  along  the 
road  of  time,  the  harmony  is  not  in  front,  but  behind. 
The  unity  is  derived  from  a.  vis  a  tergo:  it  is  given  at 
the  start  as  an  impulsion,  not  placed  at  the  end  as  an 
attraction."  38  In  this  description  we  note  that  life  is 
to  derive  its  unity  from  the  mere  impulse  of  life.  The 
harmony  of  life  and  its  plan  is  behind  the  universe.  It  is 
picked  out  of  the  process.  Bergson  does  not  desire  it  to 
be  pictured  as  an  attractive  force  at  the  end.  It  is  the 
pictorial  representation  of  a  purpose  pulling  the  world 
on  which  has  misled  Bergson.  He  has  overlooked  the 
fact,  that  the  increasing  complexity  of  life,  which  shows 
harmony  and  purpose,  must  either  be  explained  as  pur- 
posive through  accident,  or  through  design.  It  must  be 
the  latter;  but  to  include  design  in  the  impulse  of  life 
makes  life  intellectual.  The  inclusion  of  design  working 
itself  out  and  appearing  at  the  end  is  a  peculiar  con- 
tradiction. It  might  seem  guaranteed  by  the  notion  of 
Bergson  that  life  is  finally  spiritual.  But  the  problem 
remains,  whether  it  is  impersonally  spiritual,  or  personally 
spiritual.  Can  it  be  impersonally  spiritual  and  still  re- 
main purposive?  In  this  denial  of  purpose  as  pointing  to 
a  personal  God,  a  supreme  Mind  beyond  the  universe, 
Bergson  has  been  true  to  the  limitations  of  the  thought  of 
evolution.  Because  he  has  included  everything  within 
evolution  he  cannot  make  mind  greater  than  its  purposive 
actions.  He  is  at  one  with  other  thinkers  for  whom  Hob- 
house  speaks,  when  he  says,  "  It  is  submitted,  not  in  the 
least  as  a  matter  of  faith,  but  as  a  sound  working  hy- 
pothesis, that  the  evolutionary  process  can  be  best  under- 
ss  ibid.,  p.  103. 


266       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

stood  as  the  effect  of  a  purpose  slowly  working  itself  out 
under  limiting  conditions  which  it  brings  successively  un- 
der control."  39  But  Bergson  differs  from  Hobhouse  in  his 
defining  the  evolutionary  process  to  be  life,  and  life  finally 
as  spiritual.  But  this  definition  does  not  overcome  the 
evolutionary  conception.  Because  this  is  all-controlling 
for  Bergson,  he  has  no  place  for  an  over-ruling  and  pur- 
posing God  and  Father  outside  of  and  beyond  the  world. 
Because  his  God  is  simply  life  and  movement,  the  purposes 
of  God  must  be  within  life  and  movement.  These  pur- 
poses cannot  be  the  plans  of  the  transcendent,  personal 
God  that  Christianity  believes  in.  The  purposes  in  the 
world  arise  from  the  impulsion  of  life.  Consequently 
they  are  the  result  of  will,  and  there  is  only  in  the  idea  of 
Bergson  a  forward-pushing  of  life,  but  not  a  forward-look- 
ing in  life.  The  lack  of  the  intellectual  element  in  plan 
and  purpose  destroys  its  meaning.  While  plan,  design, 
and  aim  cannot  be  explained  as  mere  calculation  without 
will,  it  is  equally  impossible  to  exclude  the  intellect  from 
these  conceptions.  But  if  the  intellect  must  be  included, 
Bergson  fails  in  his  theory  of  finalism.  And  he  fails,  be- 
cause his  immanence  of  plan  is  not  connected  with  trans- 
cendence of  intellect ;  and  there  can  be  no  transcendence 
of  intellect  without  a  real  personal  God.  Bergson  never 
sees  that  there  can  be  no  finality  of  purpose  without  pri- 
ority, and  that  finality  cannot  be  maintained  in  the  notion 
of  a  mere  moving  series.  All  these  errors  in  the  concep- 
tion of  Bergson  finally  lead  him  to  a  denial  of  the  Creator 
and  Preserver  of  the  world,  whom  Christianity  accepts. 
The  God  of  Bergson  cannot  be  the  God  of  the  Christian. 
The  purposing  and  planning  God  of  Christianity  is  not 
the  God  whom  Bergson  includes  within  the  stream  of  life. 

39  "  Development  and  Purpose,"  Introduction,  p.  xxvi. 


The  Vitalist  View  267 


EUCKEN 

When  we  turn  from  Bergson,  the  Frenchman,  with  his 
brilliant  pictorial  philosophy,  to  Eucken,  the  German, 
with  his  depth  of  sentiment,  his  height  of  ideality,  and  his 
breadth  of  spirit,  the  definition  of  life  and  its  relation  to 
thought  and  truth  take  on  an  entirely  different  aspect. 
While  life,  as  evidenced  in  this  world  and  in  time,  is  not 
a  finished  magnitude  but  a  problem,  nevertheless  the  great- 
ness of  life  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  dwells  and  remains 
within  itself.  This  self-centering  life  is  truly  spiritual. 
"  Man  cannot  produce  a  spiritual  life  of  his  own  capacity : 
a  spiritual  world  must  impart  itself  to  him  and  raise  him 
to  itself."  40  It  is  characteristic  of  this  life  "  that  it  is 
conducted  from  the  whole;  the  elements  are  moulded  by 
a  comprehensive  unity ;  the  different  complexes  and  tend- 
encies which  arise  within  this  life  strive  ultimately  towards 
a  single  realm."41  The  movement  of  this  life  is  not  a 
scattered  one,  but  it  shapes  everything  that  belongs  to 
life  as  ordinarily  lived.  The  whole  range  of  interests  of 
man  are  covered,  and  all  meanness  and  smallness  is  over- 
come. The  spiritual  life  is  a  true  independent  reality, 
which  comprehends  the  opposition  of  subject  and  object. 
"  It  is  not  that  a  primary  thought  or  even  a  creative  moral 
activity  operates  in  us,  but  that  a  new  totality  of  life,  a 
self-existent  and  self-sufficing  being,  a  primary  creative 
power  which  fashions  the  world  and  expresses  itself  in 
complete  acts,  makes  its  presence  felt  in  us  —  this  is  the 
cardinal  principle  on  the  attainment  and  vivid  realization 
of  which  all  truth  of  thought  and  life  depends  for  us."  42 

In  such  spiritual  life  unity  and  multiplicity  are  rightly 
balanced,  through  it  eternity  comes  into  time,  the  outer 

40  "  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,"  p.  144. 

4i  Ibid.,  p.  145. 

42  «  The  Life  of  the  Spirit,"  p.  329. 


268       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  the  inner  world  are  united;  and  happiness  is 
found  when  truth  is  life.  This  life  does  not  leave  us  hol- 
low and  unsatisfied  because  it  is  richer  than  all  that  mere 
intellect  implies.  "  It  is  swayed  by  strong  spiritual  pas- 
sion, by  a  deep  longing  to  make  life  more  dependent  on 
personal  decision  and  to  shape  it  by  personal  effort;  it  is 
absorbed  in  a  keen  struggle  to  secure  a  master-position 
from  which  the  whole  environment  can  be  brought  under 
control."43  The  life  of  this  nature  has  authoritative 
fixity,  a  sure  goal,  and  is  independent  of  human  caprices. 
Out  of  it  comes  the  completion  of  all  that  incomplete  and 
minor  living  seeks,  for  its  movements  are  transcending,  and 
it  is  the  original  source  of  life.  "  Only  as  life  thus  turns 
itself  and  elaborates  a  depth  can  it  win  a  content  and  an 
independent  footing.  Here  for  the  first  time  we  see  a 
reality  that  is  grounded  in  itself.  Thus  the  new  life  is 
not  one  particular  kind  of  life  as  contrasted  with  others, 
but  the  completion  of  life  in  general.  The  only  life  that 
is  life  in  the  genuine  sense  is  that  which  becomes  ensouled 
through  the  growth  of  an  independent  inward  world. 
That  this  life  does  not  remain  a  mere  vague  outline  is 
shown  both  by  its  development  in  particular  directions, 
e.g.,  those  of  the  good,  the  true,  and  the  beautiful,  and 
by  the  formation  of  well-defined  departments  of  life,  such 
as  we  find  in  science  and  art,  in  law  and  economics,  and 
so  on.  All  these  are  by  no  means  merely  special  applica- 
tions of  one  general  idea,  but  rather  distinctive  develop- 
ments of  an  independent  inward  principle."  44 

It  is  the  fullness  of  the  inner  life  which  enables  men  to 
accomplish  what  they  do.  The  results  in  the  life  of  great 
leaders  and  thinkers,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  solve 
the  problem  of  life  is  due  to  a  full,  deeply  active  life, 
which  embraces  power  and  has  its  object  of  action.     There 

43  «  Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?  "  p.  87. 

44  Ibid.,  p.  96. 


The  Vitalist  View  269 

arises  a  peculiar  atmosphere  about  those  who  stand  on 
the  heights,  but  we  are  not  to  turn  to  them  and  their 
own  ideas.  "  No ;  we  are  not  concerned  with  the  reflec- 
tions of  these  thinkers  about  life,  but  with  life  itself  as  it 
is  fashioned  forth  in  their  world  of  thought."  45  Through 
them  life  has  creative  power,  and  to  work  out  its  creative 
emphasis  is  its  purpose.  When  it  enters  into  history,  and 
is  subject  to  development,  it  may  be  pressed  about  with 
difficulties,  but  at  last  it  breaks  through  again  triumphant 
and  victorious,  autonomous  and  free,  full  of  originality 
and  force.  Though  there  are  many  movements  and  mul- 
titudinous changes  in  the  universe  and  in  historic  experi- 
ence, yet  through  all  these  different  phases  there  is  a  single, 
total  movement.  "  In  it  life  seeks  itself,  its  self-presence 
(Beisichselbstsein),  and  at  the  same  time  its  full  content, 
its  full  depth."  46  "  History  offers  this  self-presence  not 
as  a  mere  succession,  but  only  in  as  far  as  out  of  the 
movement  of  history  there  is  lifted  up  a  life  beyond  time 
(zeitueberlegenes  Leben)."47  Its  leading  spirits  are 
those  in  whom  new  life  and  powers  come  to  be  developed. 
They  are  conquerors  in  the  realm  of  the  spirit.  The  life 
of  the  spirit  requires  effort;  it  must  be  gained  through 
actual  hope,  strength  and  striving,  but  it  must  also  be 
believed  in.  It  requires  faith  because  it  is  a  life,  true, 
eternal,  beyond  material  conditions,  beyond  temporal 
forms  of  economic  development,  beyond  cultural  advance 
and  even  above  historic  forms  of  religion.  Into  this  real 
and  divine  life  all  human  endeavor  must  be  raised,  but 
the  lifting  up  into  the  lasting  life  needs  struggle.  It  is 
accomplished  as  men  by  striving  allow  it  to  encompass 
and  conquer  the  temporal  flow  of  succession. 

Out  of  such  a  conception  of  life  it  follows  that  mere 

45  "  The  Problem  of  Human  Life,"  Introduction,  p.  xx. 

46  "  Erkennen  und  Leben,"  p.  97.     Engl.  Translation — "  Knowledge 
and  Life." 

47  Ibid.,  p.  160. 


270       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

intellectualism  will  never  suffice.  It  is  particularly  mod- 
ern life  with  its  many  intellectual  problems  and  difficulties, 
thinks  Eucken,  that  has  led  philosophy  necessarily  to  the 
problem  of  life  which  is  more  inclusive  than  the  problem  of 
thought  and  truth.  "  The  constantly  growing  expansion 
of  life  in  great  outlines  as  well  as  in  details  revealed  it  as 
far  too  rich  and  differently  colored,  as  far  too  movable 
and  changeable  than  to  permit  it  to  be  absorbed  into  the 
forms  and  formulas  of  thinking."  48  Thought  instead  of 
offering  real  things  dealt  with  symbols,  signs  and  pictures ; 
through  its  ceaseless  reflection  and  discussion  it  appeared 
to  dissipate  life  and  to  wander  into  a  land  of  shadows. 
It  did  not  satisfy  the  passionate  thirst  for  reality. 

But  perhaps  we  can  flee  to  the  immediacy  of  intuition,  as 
men  did  in  the  past.  Can  we  thus  grasp  reality  ?  "  This 
immediate  grasping  the  past  centuries  designated  as  in- 
tuition, which  shaped  itself  at  times  more  artistically  as 
the  grasp  of  unity  in  multiplicity,  at  times  it  shaped  itself 
more  religiously  as  the  grasp  of  a  unity  over  against  all 
multiplicity  and  evident  through  all  multiplicity.  Thus 
there  met  in  intuition  the  demands  of  immediacy  and 
unity;  as  discursive  thinking  had  resolved  reality  into 
single  pieces  and  theories,  it  becomes  the  task  of  intuition 
to  effect  a  combination  into  a  whole  and  out  of  this  whole 
to  permeate  all  multiplicity  with  quickening  spirit.  It  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  conception  of  intuition 
gained  all  the  love  of  men,  but  it  is  also  not  surprising  that 
the  willing  recognition  of  an  indisputable  task  allowed  the 
question,  whether  the  solution  offered  was  adequate,  to 
be  treated  far  too  summarily."  49  Through  such  intui- 
tive thinking  it  happened  that  the  scientific  aspect  of  the 
world  was  reduced  to  the  artistic  point  of  view.  Such 
a  view  the  ancient  world  could  accept,  but  the  modern 

« ibid.,  p.  29. 
49  Ibid.,  p.  138. 


The  Vitalist  View  271 

world  cannot  accept  it,  for  the  modern  world  cannot  so 
readily  separate  sense  and  spirit,  as  did  the  ancient  world, 
but  it  unites  the  two.  Back  of  this  unity  of  modern 
thought  is  the  failure  to  be  readily  satisfied  with  what 
formerly  seemed  final  and  axiomatic.  Modern  thinking 
not  only  asks  for  stronger  unity  of  sense  and  spirit,  but 
it  also  is  far  more  critical.  It  constantly  pushes  former 
axioms  further  back.  Together  with  its  critical  doubt 
modern  thought  is  translating  everything  into  action. 
What  is  needed,  therefore,  is  not  the  intuition  of  the  past, 
but  the  instatement  into  creative  reality,  and  the  reduction 
of  this  creative  reality  to  the  "  total  of  a  purely  original 
life."  50 

There  are  two  extremes  that  we  must  avoid.  We  can- 
not remain  mere  intellectualists,  but  we  can  also  not  be 
mere  intuitionalists.  Therefore,  thought  must  be  within 
life.  From  this,  however,  it  does  not  follow  that  the  mod- 
ern thinkers  are  correct  in  their  anti-intellectualism,  when 
they  totally  disregard  and  reject  the  importance  of  logic. 
"  The  reaction  against  intellectualism  in  the  midst  of 
which  we  find  ourselves  to-day  leads  us  easily  to  under- 
value the  logical  elements  in  the  work  of  knowledge.  Cer- 
tainly logic  cannot  create  out  of  itself ;  it  can  only  criticize 
and  regulate.  It  pre-supposes  something  as  a  basis  of 
its  activity.  But  it  is  an  indispensable  means  for  attain- 
ing unity  of  life,  for  removing  contradictions,  for  binding 
together  isolated  members  into  a  whole.  The  lack  of 
logic  is  always  avenged  in  the  end  by  a  dismemberment  of 
life.  Our  striving  for  a  full  comprehension  of  reality,  for 
a  transformation  of  the  world  in  our  own  life,  certainty 
meets  insurmountable  limits ;  but  shall  we  on  that  account 
at  once  take  refuge  in  the  irrational?  He  who  always 
gives  first  place  to  life  and  regards  an  enhancement  of  it 
as  possible,  will  try  to  enrich  thought  with  elements  de- 

50  ibid.,  p.  139. 


Ti%       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

rived  from  life;  he  certainly  will  not  undervalue  thought 
and  seek  knowledge  outside  of  it.  One  may  reject  Ra- 
tionalism without  necessarily  becoming  a  Romanticist."  51 
Though  logic  may  tempt  to  formalism  this  danger  ought 
never  to  recommend  to  men  the  romantic  disposition,  which 
rejoices  in  the  illogical  and  allows  contradictions  to  stand. 
Whatever  dangers  and  difficulties  there  are  in  logic  must 
only  serve  to  drive  it  beyond  itself  into  broader  connec- 
tions, and  to  compel  it  to  seek  animating  and  discriminat- 
ing forces  in  the  total  of  life. 

In  order  to  carry  through  the  legitimate  use  of  logic 
and  to  combine  with  it  whatever  is  valuable  in  the  older 
idea  of  intuition,  Eucken  aims  to  combine  thought  and 
life.  He  derives  thought  and  truth  out  of  the  reality  and 
independence  of  the  spiritual  life.  This  independent  life 
through  all  complications  strives  toward  a  common  goal, 
and  in  its  striving  develops  a  characteristic  form.  In 
such  development  thinking  is  fructified  and  becomes  a  vital 
knowing.  A  true  reality  arises  out  of  the  labor  of  think- 
ing, a  reality  which  cannot  be  hidden,  but  which  allows 
a  full  and  thorough  permeation  of  light  and  life.  The 
whole  seeking  and  striving,  moving  and  developing,  is  not 
an  abstract  tendency  of  thought.  It  is  a  real  movement 
which  arises  out  of  the  wholeness  of  total  life,  which  is 
spiritual  life.  It  leads  from  life  to  true  enlightenment  and 
knowledge  in  three  distinctive  stages,  the  stages  of  Criti- 
cism, of  Creation,  and  of  Work. 

"  As  Criticism  it  causes  the  immediately  preceding  con- 
dition of  man  to  be  felt  as  intolerable  incompleteness  and 
confusion,  and  arouses  him  to  action  to  free  himself  from 
that  condition.  In  the  problem  of  knowledge  the  conflict 
of  philosophy  with  the  traditional  stand-point  is  especially 
severe,  since  here  philosophy  makes  evident  the  insecurity, 

5i "  Knowledge  and  Life,"  The  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXII,  p. 
13.     Cf.  also,  "  Erkennen  und  Leben,"  p.  141. 


The  Vitalist  View  273 

even  the  emptiness,  of  all  that  with  which  man  is  usually 
satisfied.  In  like  manner  when  dealing  with  the  problems 
of  the  good  and  the  beautiful,  philosophy  has  been  a  power- 
ful force  in  arousing  men  from  their  comfortable  self- 
satisfaction  and  lethargy."  52  The  confusion  and  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  existing  intellectual,  aesthetic  and  moral 
life,  must  be  overcome,  if  the  spiritual  life  is  to  find  its 
originality  and  independence.  The  spiritual  life  must 
contradict  the  existing  order,  arouse  men  from  their  com- 
fortable self-satisfaction  and  idleness,  and  show  them 
through  keen  analysis  the  smallness,  the  meanness,  the 
shadowiness  and  uncertainty  of  their  attitude.  How 
weak  are  the  usual  means  suggested  to  heal  the  hurt  of 
spiritual  life!  But  the  result  of  criticism,  which  condi- 
tions of  thought  and  life  force  on  us,  cannot  be  reached 
unless  criticism  begins  with  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
Because  men  held  that  they  knew  and  had  the  truth,  while 
they  really  lacked  in  real  foundations  and  firm  support 
for  their  supposed  truth,  great  thinkers  were  moved  to 
anger  and  determined  struggle  against  the  blindness  and 
stubbornness  of  men.  The  thinkers  sought  and  found 
the  truth  through  the  purgatory  of  doubt  and  through 
the  negation  of  existent  but  erroneous  ideas.  When  the 
intellectual  sphere  had  forced  men  to  criticism,  other  great 
spheres  of  life,  like  art,  morality,  and  religion,  were  also 
criticised  and  revealed  in  their  defects.  Criticism  was  es- 
sential if  life  was  to  be  reached.  It  had  to  remove  the  hin- 
drances and  the  obstacles  that  thwarted  life  and  its  de- 
velopments. 

"  In  all  genuine  criticism  there  lies  a  germ  of  positive 
truth,  but  this  germ  must  be  fully  developed.  Now  this 
can  only  be  done  through  a  continuous  creative  movement, 
in  which,  with  the  help  of  logical  fancy,  the  spiritual  life 
constitutes  itself  as  an  independent  world,  and  at  the  same 

52  "  Knowledge  and  Life,"  Philos.  Review,  XXII,  p.  8. 


274       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

time  develops  its  own  peculiar  character."  53  It  is  thus 
that  criticism  merges  into  creative  life,  in  which  man  is 
elevated  above  the  needs  and  purposes  of  mere  man.  Into 
whatever  sphere  creative  power  enters  it  constructs  a  new 
reality  with  its  self  determining  reason,  that  transcends 
the  opinions  and  desires  of  finite  individuals.  The  crea- 
tive spiritual  life,  although  it  works  through  man,  is  above 
man.  It  re-creates  him,  his  needs,  his  thoughts,  and  his 
ideals.  The  reality  of  the  life  in  itself,  which  criticism 
could  not  give,  but  toward  which  it  pointed,  is  found  in 
creation.  But  man  himself  as  a  creator  is  not  finally  the 
fact.  He  only  grasps  the  original  life  which  exists  in  it- 
self. This  life  can  exercise  its  creative,  superhuman, 
spiritual,  and  divine  function  after  criticism  has  removed 
the  pretenses  and  the  obstacles  of  ordinary  external  life. 
Creation  is  the  joyous  gospel  of  life,  while  criticism  is  its 
necessary  and  prevenient  law. 

It  would  be  an  error  were  we  to  suppose  that  Eucken 
held  that  this  creative  stage  was  the  end,  and  that  its 
goal  was  our  mere  passive  reception  of  the  creative  power 
of  life.  Creation  leads  to  work,  as  criticism  was  needed 
that  creation  might  have  its  full  sway.  It  is  true  that 
creation  must  precede,  if  work  is  to  succeed  and  is  not  to 
be  occupied  with  merely  external  aspects.  The  heroes 
of  revolution  and  of  creative  innovation  must  appear  to 
prepare  the  way  for  the  heroes  of  ceaseless  toil  and  steady 
advance.  "  But  to  Creation  there  must  finally  be  added 
Work,  which  leads  us  back  from  the  transcendence  of  the 
world  to  the  realm  of  experience.  It  is  in  the  subjection 
of  this  latter  world  through  Work  that  the  spiritual  world 
proves  itself  to  be  the  all-ruling  truth,  and  at  the  same 
time  brings  the  world  of  experience  to  a  fuller  reality  and 
perfection."  54     The  world  of  Work  is  not  so  easily  con- 

53  "  Knowledge  and  Life,"  Philos.  Review,  XXII,  p.  8. 
s*  Ibid.,  Philos.  Review,  XXII,  p.  9. 


The  Vitalist  View  275 

quered.  "  The  new  kingdom  is  not  ready-made,  so  that 
we  can  appropriate  it  without  trouble,  but  it  needs  to  be 
formed  within  us  and  demands  our  labor  and  devotion ;  in 
turning  toward  it  and  holding  it  fast  there  lies  an  act,  an 
act  which  dare  not  form  a  mere  transition,  but  which 
must  continue,  and  support  and  permeate  all  doing.  In 
this  respect  this  new  kingdom  may  be  called  a  kingdom  of 
act  (Tatwelt).  But  it  does  not  thereby  become  a  work 
of  mere  man,  it  is  not  something  which  he  thinks  out  and 
spins  out.  But  what  happens  in  man  here,  that  lies  at 
the  same  time  above  him,  and  lifts  him  in  devotion  above 
himself,  is  the  unfoldment  of  independent  happening,  the 
revelation  of  a  new  world,  whose  grasp  makes  something 
different  of  us  and  transports  the  center  of  gravity  of  our 
very  being."  55  When  such  work  is  thus  performed,  real 
spiritual  life  has  its  power  over  us.  We  are  led  on  to  con- 
trol all  being,  to  see  connections  everywhere,  to  correlate 
all  that  is  related,  to  explain  not  single  features,  but  to 
find  life  as  a  total.  A  new  world  opens  itself  thus  to  man, 
and  his  life  receives  a  new  tension  and  magnitude.  A 
mighty  movement  enters  into  experience,  and  the  meta- 
physic  of  life  begins  through  the  life  of  the  spirit. 

But  after  we  have  been  on  the  mountain  and  received 
the  inward  inspiration  of  labor  we  must  turn  toward  the 
external  tasks  of  life.  Without  abandoning  its  independ- 
ence the  new  life  must  enter  the  world  and  its  confusion, 
and  attempt  to  encompass  it.  The  world  of  thought 
must  spread  out  and  branch  out,  and  systematize  the 
whole  world  of  thought  and  action  through  the  new  center 
of  spiritual  life.  The  creative  act  as  it  bursts  forth  in 
works  leads  to  the  task  of  applying  its  force  and  meaning 
constantly.  Without  creation  thought  and  its  systems 
are  soulless  efforts.  After  creation,  however,  comes  the 
demand  of  the  use  and  development  of  life.     Creative  life 

55  «  Erkennen  und  Leben,"  p.  82. 


276       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

must  be  carried  down  into  everyday  experience,  and  the 
world  must  be  made  the  better  in  every  direction;  better 
thought,  better  ideals,  better  science,  better  art,  better 
morals,  and  better  religion  must  appear.  The  inner  life 
must  complete  itself,  but  its  fulfillment  is  not  the  result 
of  a  mere  world  of  action  or  of  outer  surroundings. 

It  is  in  the  inter-relation  of  the  three  stages  of  criticism, 
of  creation,  and  of  work  that  knowledge  arises.  These 
must  be  equally  developed,  and  in  their  co-operation  they 
form  the  ideal  to  be  approached,  in  which  truth  is  appre- 
hended. When  their  balance  is  lost  danger  arises. 
Criticism  will  become  mere  fruitless  dialectic  and  idle  rea- 
soning, it  will  lead  to  destructive  doubt  and  skepticism,  and 
it  will  tear  apart  the  unities  of  life,  unless  it  be  united 
with  creation.  Creation,  the  quickening  soul  of  the  whole 
procedure,  must  not  only  follow  but  constantly  animate 
criticism,  if  criticism  is  not  to  be  lost  like  a  stream  in  the 
swamp.  Without  creation  work  must  become  a  useless 
undertaking  and  an  idle  venture,  tiresome,  oppressive, 
without  force  and  lasting  result.  Creation  alone  can  add 
to  work  its  real  impetus  and  power.  But  if  creation  lacks 
criticism,  it  camiot  be  separated  from  the  standard  general 
average  of  effort.  The  severer  and  keener  the  criticism 
the  more  creative  life  is  longed  for,  and  the  more  clearly 
it  stands  out.  Without  work  creation  may  lose  the  nec- 
essary self-clarification  and  the  possibility  to  make  itself 
felt  in  the  whole,  wide  world.  Through  the  whole  proc- 
ess of  knowledge  as  it  reaches  truth,  there  must  be  the  in- 
dispensable co-operation  of  criticism,  creation  and  work 
for  the  completing  of  life.  In  this  way  life  uses  thought, 
for  life  needs  thought  as  thought  also  needs  life. 
Through  life  thought  remains  vital;  in  itself  it  is  but  a 
skeleton.  In  life  thought  seeks  and  finds  as  it  is  led  be- 
yond itself.  Its  powers  are  exalted  and  it  centers  in  a 
real  world  of  totality,  and  enters  into  the  unity  of  being. 


The  Vitalist  View  277 

Thus  thought  and  life  are  the  expression  of  the  real 
philosophy  of  activism.  It  is  activism  for  which  Eucken 
stands.56  But  this  activism  is  not  a  mere  movement  of 
life  in  the  manner  in  which  Bergson  conceives  life  to  be 
action  and  movement.  Eucken  believes  that  life  must  be 
found  in  activity,  but  this  activity  does  not  seem  possible 
to  him  "  starting  from  given  being  with  its  strong  en- 
chainments, but  only  through  a  reversal  of  this  being, 
through  the  grasping  of  a  new  point  of  departure  and 
the  unfoldment  of  a  new  life."  57  This  constitutes  the 
activism  of  Eucken. 

In  the  philosophy  of  Eucken  we  find  an  ideal  of  life 
which  is  more  friendly  to  Christianity  than  that  of  Berg- 
son. Up  to  this  time  the  latter  has  never  fully  freed  him- 
self from  psychological  presuppositions,  and  his  reasoning 
is  largely  clothed  in  biological  terms.  Eucken,  however, 
has  sought  for  life  in  the  cultural  and  spiritual  movements 
of  the  world.  He  has  searched  the  ideals  of  great  think- 
ers, and  he  has  analyzed  great  currents  of  striving 
thought  and  truth  as  the  expression  of  fundamental  life. 
Consequently  his  conception  of  life  is  more  closely  af- 
filiated to  religion.  Religion  itself  is  included  in  many  of 
his  thoughts  on  life,  and  he  has  endeavored  to  find  and 
describe  its  real  content  of  truth.  He  would  not  have 
religion  regarded  from  the  mere  subjective  point  of  view 
and  clearly  shows  that  its  real  purpose  is  universal. 
"  Religion  has  quite  a  different  content,  and  thus  a  dif- 
ferent significance  for  knowledge,  according  as  it  is  looked 
upon  as  a  means  to  further  the  subjective  well-being  of 
man  —  whether  as  an  individual  or  as  a  social  complex, — 
to  strengthen  and  afford  support  for  his  wishes  and 
hopes,  or  as  a  force  which  carries  further  the  demands  of 

se  "  Geistige  Stroemungen  der  Gegenwart,"  p.  51  ff.  Engl.  Transla- 
tion, "  Main  Current  of  Thought." 

57  "  Geistige  Stroemungen  der  Gegenwart,"  p.  52. 


278       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

a  natural  life.  Under  this  latter  conception,  religion 
awakens  man  to  consciousness  of  new  tasks  and  capacities, 
calls  forth  new  activities  and  alters  his  whole  view  of 
life.  In  short,  religion  effects  such  a  complete  revolution 
of  life-processes  in  man  that  all  former  pursuits  and 
standards,  indeed  all  previously  recognized  forms  of 
reality  become  unreal  and  even  intolerable  to  him."  5S  It 
is  in  this  manner  that  we  find  real  universal  religion.  The 
universal  life  breaks  through  and  lifts  us  above  the  weak- 
ness and  pettiness  of  our  life.  "  But  all  this  is  no  prod- 
uct of  natural  evolution;  it  arises  through  man  being  up- 
lifted by  the  power  of  the  whole,  in  other  words  through 
his  turning  to  religion.  The  presupposition  of  religion 
is  in  fact  just  this,  that  something  higher  makes  its  ap- 
pearance in  man  and  yet  is  hindered  and  restricted  in  the 
condition  in  which  it  first  finds  him.  Religion  is  the  over- 
coming of  such  hindrance  and  restriction."  59 

But  out  of  this  universal  religion  grow  historic  religions. 
"  The  main  concern  of  the  historic  religions  was  not  the 
kindling  of  spirituality,  but  the  saving  of  the  human  soul 
and  of  the  whole  human  life  from  intolerable  contradiction, 
the  emancipation  from  sin  and  sorrow,  the  upholding  of  the 
spiritual  life  against  the  destruction  which  threatens  it 
on  every  hand.  In  pursuit  of  this  aim  these  religions 
were  obliged  to  sever  themselves  from  the  rest  of  life  and 
to  found  a  new  order  of  fellowship."  60  The  historic  re- 
ligions helped  to  save  the  spiritual  life;  they  allowed  the 
universal  religion  to  work  its  way  through  and  to  lift 
them  beyond  themselves.  Historic  religions  become  in 
the  terminology  of  Eucken,  "  characteristic."  "  As  all 
religion  in  the  characteristic  sense  springs  from  the  de- 
sire to  be  freed  from  sorrow  and  sin,  it  must  effect  a  con- 
es Philos.  Review,  XXII,  p.  5. 

bo  "  Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?  "  p.  102.    Cf.  also  Part  II  in  "  The 
Truth  of  Religion." 
so  Ibid.,  p.  114. 


The  Vitalist  View  279 

quest  of  these  and,  in  so  doing,  must  convert  life  into  a 
great  onward  movement.  This  movement  seeks  to  press 
beyond  sorrow,  but  can  still  allow  a  value  to  sorrow  in  so 
far  as  it  rouses  life  from  inertia  and  sloth,  awakens  long- 
ing in  the  soul,  and  thus  paves  the  way  for  the  uplifting 
into  a  new  life."  61  The  approach  to  religion  and  Chris- 
tianity is  opened  through  interpreting  all  religion  as  spirit- 
ual life  and  its  true  movement.  There  is  no  neglect,  nor 
undervaluation  of  the  fact  and  reality  of  religion  in  the 
theory  of  Eucken. 

There  is  an  inwardness  in  Eucken's  idea  of  life  com- 
bined with  a  rich  and  full  concreteness  of  reality.  The 
manner  in  which  he  elevates  life,  and  attempts  to  keep  it 
full  and  real,  allows  a  religious  use  of  his  philosophic  en- 
deavor to  describe  life.  What  Christianity  claims  to  be 
man's  real  life  in  God,  what  it  describes  as  man's  life  in 
Christ,  and  what  it  assigns  to  life  in  spiritual  possessions 
and  gifts,  agrees  with  the  endeavor  to  define  reality  as 
life.  For  Eucken  his  philosophy  is  no  mere  speculative 
attempt  at  definition.  It  is  to  aid  not  in  discussion  or 
intellectual  subtlety,  but  in  forming  a  real  world-view. 
In  the  "  Weltanschauung  "  of  Eucken  a  number  of  ele- 
ments have  been  fused  together  to  bring  about  his  richly 
colored  notion  of  life.  He  began  as  a  student  of  Aristotle 
and  was  influenced  by  his  realism  and  his  actualism.  He 
possesses  the  rich  breadth  of  Hegel,  without  emphasizing 
mechanically  the  logical,  absolute  reason  of  Hegelianism. 
The  strong  actualism  and  moral  earnestness  of  Fichte 
appears  in  him,  but  he  has  combined  the  moral  purpose  of 
Fichte  with  the  religious  idealism  of  Hegel.  Through  the 
unity  of  these  elements  the  "  Weltanschauung  "  of  Eucken 
becomes  in  its  highest  ranges  ethical  and  religious.  Be- 
cause ethical  and  religious  elements  interpenetrate,  and 
because  faith  and  morals  are  summed  up  into  a  totality 

ei  Ibid.,  p.  120  ff .    Cf .  Part  IV,  "  The  Truth  of  Religion." 


280       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

and  combined  with  all  life,  the  philosophy  of  Eucken  can 
be  welcomed  by  such  a  religion  as  Christianity,  whose  truth 
always  seeks  fulfillment  in  religious  and  moral  life. 

Eucken  in  his  anti-intellectual  attitude  is  less  pro- 
nounced than  Bergson.  While  he  desires  to  avoid  stress- 
ing the  logical  movement  of  reason,  as  Hegel  did,  he  is 
still  more  inimical  to  the  naturalistic  monism  of  his  col- 
league at  Jena,  Haeckel.  Consequently  he  does  not  de- 
press the  intellect  unduly,62  and  he  allows  logic  an  im- 
portant place  in  maintaining  the  balance  and  consist- 
ency of  truth.  Eucken's  appreciation  of  logic  in  its 
place,  and  his  defense  of  its  necessity,  not  as  foundational 
but  as  regulative,  appeals  very  much  to  Christianity, 
which  cannot  do  without  a  firm  logical  assumption  in  the 
theory  of  knowledge.  In  order  to  unify  its  messages  and 
in  order  to  defend  them  over  against  false  implications 
and  inferences,  Christianity  needs  logic  for  systematiza- 
tion.  But  the  logic  of  Christianity  is  not  constitutive 
of  its  truth,  and  must  constantly  be  permeated  and  kept 
alive  by  the  free  Spirit  of  God.  In  similar  manner 
Eucken  desires  no  mere  mechanical  logic  as  master  of 
reality.  He  desires  life  to  fill  logical  forms,  but  he  does 
not  deny  the  use  of  logical  axioms  and  categories  over 
against  unsystematized  truth.  The  balance  of  life  and 
logic  in  Eucken  is  most  suggestive,  and  it  can  aid  Chris- 
tian truth  in  its  endeavor  rightly  to  keep  apart  and  yet 
justly  to  combine  logic  and  life. 

A  very  striking  feature  in  Eucken's  speculation  is  the 
emphasis  on  the  super-human  character  of  real  life.  For 
him  life  is  a  higher  actuality  than  a  mere  stream  of  flowing 
duration,  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  Bergson's  thinking. 
Ever  and  again  Eucken  lifts  life  above  mere  man.  He 
gives  it  a  place,  a  content,  and  a  character  of  an  eternal 
kind.     The  true  life,  as  it  in  part  appears  in  religious 

62  See  above  p.  271. 


The  Vitalist  View  281 

faith,  comes  from  above  and  has  its  own  right  of  exist- 
ence. It  is  not  given  merely  to  satisfy  our  desires  or  to 
strengthen  our  hopes.  To  give  such  an  interpretation  to 
life  in  religion  would  be  to  make  religion  psychological, 
but  psychological  religion,  thinks  Eucken,  would  never 
raise  us  above  ourselves.  It  can  never  remove  the  doubt, 
whether  the  whole  sphere  of  religion  is  not  a  mere  spinning 
out  of  human  wishes  and  ideas,  and  whether  man  is  not 
building  up  a  world  of  imagination  which  has  no  claim 
upon  truth.  "  But  when  religion  calls  forth  movements, 
which  directly  oppose  the  natural  comfort  of  man,  which 
generate  severe  complications  and  throw  man  into  great 
unrest,  but  which  through  all  arousal  and  negation  open 
up  for  man  new  contents  of  life,  new  motive  powers,  new 
aims,  yea,  which  accomplish  a  reversal  of  life  —  can  all  this 
be  derived  from  that  given  existence,  which  most  directly 
surrounds  us;  is  there  not  to  be  recognized  here  a  wide 
opening  of  reality,  which  carries  its  legitimation  within 
itself?  "  63  Such  a  conception  as  this  rests  on  the  ideal 
of  a  great,  free  and  independent  life,  which  is  the  reality. 
Eucken  opens  up  the  way  for  divine  life  in  man.  Life 
eternal  becomes  incarnate  in  humanity.  This  attempt  at 
a  philosophic  exposition  of  the  divine  in  the  human  is 
closer  to  the  Christian  idea  of  incarnation  than  the 
Hegelian  embodiment  of  reason.  It  also  offers  an 
analogy  to  the  Christian  ideal  of  the  overcoming  life.  In 
the  Christian  ideal  regeneration  makes  man  a  new  crea- 
ture and  the  new  life  conquers  the  old  sinful  life  in  man. 
Through  all  difficulties  the  new  life,  which  is  God's  life, 
maintains  itself.  For  these  two  ideas  of  incarnation  and 
the  new,  regenerate  life  of  the  Christian  Eucken  has  fur- 
nished an  important  philosophical  parallel.  He  has  ap- 
proached to  the  very  kernel  of  the  truth  of  Christianity. 
Because  Eucken  has  an  ideal  of  superhuman  life,  he  has 

63  "  Erkennen  und  Leben,"  p.  49. 


282       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

also  been  able  rightly  to  stress  the  spiritual  character  of 
life.  Life  to  him  is  not  full  nor  real  if  it  is  not  spiritual. 
It  is  true,  that  his  idea  of  a  struggle  for  a  spiritual  con- 
tent of  life  begins  on  a  lower  level  than  that  of  religion, 
but  at  the  end  it  rises  up  to  it.  In  all  history  Eucken 
finds  spiritual  reality.  This  reality,  however,  does  not 
appear  in  mere  outward  deeds  but  in  spiritual  inward- 
ness. It  is  not  in  nature,  not  in  individual  soul-life,  not 
in  ontological  speculation,  but  in  the  inner  world  of  the 
spiritual  life,  its  struggles  and  opposition,  its  revelations 
and  experiences,  that  real  knowledge  and  truth  are  found. 
They  cannot  be  gathered  apart  from  life  but  must  arise 
in  its  own  self-development.  It  is  the  constant  effort  of 
Eucken  to  keep  his  concept  of  spiritual  life  entirely  pure 
and  uncontaminated  from  all  individualistic,  socialistic, 
economic  and  naturalistic  features.  He  repeats  and  re- 
peats in  one  form  or  another  his  emphasis  on  the  spirit- 
uality of  life  as  the  guiding  reality  of  mankind.  In  this 
endeavor  Eucken's  philosophy  seeks  to  define  on  its  level 
what  Christianity  aims  at  when  it  so  strongly  holds  to  the 
fact  that  the  highest  truth  is  the  truth  of  the  Spirit,  into 
which  men  are  constantly  led  and  guided  by  the  living 
presence,  power  and  enlightenment  of  God. 

Eucken,  in  holding  to  the  unity  of  the  spiritual  life, 
raises  it  above  science,  culture,  and  social  ends.  In  so 
doing  he  vindicates  philosophically  the  right  of  religion  to 
demand  its  own  independence  and  reality.  He  deprecates 
the  claim  that  science  can  give  a  "  Weltanschauung." 
The  change  of  science  into  "  Weltanschauung "  is  only 
possible,  he  thinks,  when  man,  the  subject,  is  overlooked 
and  the  great  spiritual  process  in  history  is  neglected. 
It  is  this  process  which  really  bears  the  work  of  science, 
and  which  has  brought  forth  contents  and  aims  that  are 
far  broader  and  larger  than  science,  and  that  are  truly 
human.     Among  such   contents   and   aims   of  human  en- 


The  Vitalist  View  283 

deavor  Eucken  includes  art,  literature,  morals  and  re- 
ligion.    Religion  is  made  a  full  cultural  fact  and  reality. 

In  the  same  way  Eucken,  although  he  approaches  in  his 
conception  of  culture  to  religion,  would  not  have  cul- 
ture and  religion  identified.  He  believes  that  a  mere  hu- 
manistic and  naturalistic  culture  is  insufficient.  On  the 
one  hand  there  is  too  much  subjective  emotionalism,  on  the 
other  hand  there  is  too  much  soulless  objectivity.  Be- 
tween these  two  man's  life  is  rent  apart.  If  man  is  not  to 
surrender  himself  his  "  effort  will  inevitably  take  the  form 
of  a  struggle  for  spiritual  self-preservation."  64  In  this 
struggle  religion  must  be  a  mighty  aid. 

In  the  same  manner  as  religion  is  independent  over 
against  mere  culture  and  science,  it  must  be  independent 
of  and  cannot  be  controlled  by  the  mere  interests  of  so- 
ciety. These  are  very  liable  to  reduce  man's  spiritual 
life  to  material  terms.  While  there  are  ideals  in  the 
new  social  striving  it  cannot  compensate  for  religion,  for 
it  does  not  answer  to  the  spiritual  need.  "  This  striving, 
which  in  itself  cannot  be  rejected,  enters  upon  a  narrow 
course  and  at  the  same  time  upon  much  that  is  prob- 
lematical, in  that  it  unites  with  the  positivistic  tendencies 
of  the  age  in  the  rejection  of  all  invisible  connections 
and  the  restriction  of  life  to  the  experience  of  sense.  In- 
stead of  the  whole,  we  now  have  the  average  and  the  masses, 
and  instead  of  a  creation  from  the  whole,  a  building  up 
from  below;  the  needs  of  the  masses  are  the  main  motive 
power  of  life.  But  as  with  the  masses  the  chief  questions 
are  those  of  the  physical  preservation  of  life,  and  of 
economic  existence,  it  seems  as  if,  with  their  solution, 
with  the  deliverance  from  the  oppressing  cares  and  ne- 
cessity through  a  radical  revolution,  a  complete  state 
of  happiness  and  a  ceaseless  spiritual  advance  of  hu- 
manity  are  assured.     Material  welfare,  which  in  earlier 

64  «  Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?  "  p.  79. 


284*       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

organizations  of  life  was  so  depreciated,  in  the  new  sys- 
tem becomes  the  matter  of  chief  concern;  it  is  regarded 
as  that  which  more  than  anything  else  leads  to  the  de- 
velopment of  every  power  and  makes  culture  the  truth  for 
the  whole  of  humanity."  65  In  the  clear  elimination  of 
the  purely  social  ideal  as  adequate  for  human  life  Eucken 
again  aids  in  bringing  out  definitely  the  supreme  need  of 
all-embracing  life.  Christianity  can  only  welcome  such 
an  approximation  to  its  claim  of  the  right  of  religion,  and 
of  its  supreme  necessity  in  human  life  to  solve  the  deep- 
est problems,  to  maintain  the  real  ideality,  and  to  furnish 
permanent  happiness. 

While  Eucken's  philosophy  thus  has  many  ideas  which 
Christian  thinking  can  hail  with  delight,  it  also  has  ele- 
ments against  which  Christianity  must  remain  in  a  doubt- 
ful attitude.  The  first  of  the  difficulties  is  the  way  in 
which  Eucken  deals  with  the  problem  of  personality.  Ap- 
parently Eucken  is  favorable  to  personality  as  he  seeks 
a  unity,  which  will  recognize  both  the  ethical  and  specula- 
tive movement  of  mankind.  He  says:  "that  we  should 
cling  to  the  word  '  personal '  as  descriptive  of  that  unity 
is  not  due  to  any  love  of  the  mere  word,  which  we  could 
easily  consent  to  drop.  It  is  due  rather  to  that  which 
lies  behind  the  word.  Thinkers  such  as  Leibniz  and 
Kant,  whom  no  one  can  accuse  of  a  crass  anthropomor- 
phism, have  used  it  to  designate  the  transcendence  of  the 
spiritual  life.  We  desire  to  retain  it  in  order  that  the 
spiritual  may  be  understood  and  recognized  as  an  active 
element,  and  the  divine  as  self-determining  life,  not  as  the 
mysterious,  dreamy,  enchained  process  which  romanticism 
conceived  it  to  be.  But  our  object  becomes  imperilled, 
or  at  least  obscured,  if  once  we  designate  and  treat  the 
ultimate  cause  of  things  as  impersonal.  Because  con- 
cepts drawn  from  human  life  do  not  satisfy  us  completely, 

as  «  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,"  p.  48  ff. 


The  Vitalist  View  285 

we  must  not,  therefore,  sink  back  upon  something  infra- 
human,  as  has  so  often  happened  and  is  happening  in 
many  quarters  to-day."  6C  This  seemingly  so  strong  de- 
fense appears  to  do  full  justice  to  the  idea  of  the  per- 
sonality. But,  after  all,  while  there  is  a  strong  effort  to 
overcome  indefinite  impersonalism,  the  problem  remains 
whether  personality,  in  which  the  spiritual  becomes  active 
and  the  divine  determining,  is  a  higher  idea  than  spirit- 
ual life.  Is  personality  essential  to  the  transcendent,  di- 
vine life,  or  does  the  transcendent,  divine  life  only  become 
personal  in  man?  Is  the  spiritual,  divine  life  essentially 
personal?  While  Eucken  seems  to  assert  this  in  main- 
taining that  personality  is  needed  to  make  the  divine  a 
self-determining  life,  nevertheless  he  determines  per- 
sonality not  as  a  fixed  possession.  Personality  for  man 
is  defined  as  a  constant  appropriation  of  higher  life,  a 
great  task,  and  the  winning  of  a  new  self.  Personality  is 
to  be  a  concentration  in  man  gained  through  experiences 
and  decisions,  through  struggle  and  conquest.  Per- 
sonality lies  at  the  height  of  a  spiritual  movement.67 
Eucken  nowhere  clearly  says  that  God  has  personality. 
And  the  conception  of  personality  as  mere  becoming  will 
not  allow  of  its  consistent  application  to  the  idea  of  God. 
Eucken  has  freed  himself  from  the  non-personal  intellec- 
tualism  of  Hegel,  but  he  has  not  really  gained  a  full 
theistic  foundation.  The  spiritual  life  as  a  category  and 
an  idea  retains  a  larger  place  than  God  as  a  person. 
With  all  his  efforts  Eucken  does  not  seem  to  have  kept 
clearly  away  from  a  pantheistic  trend.  His  idea  of  life 
is  supreme.  The  ultimate  is  not  God,  but  spiritual  life. 
Another  difficulty  in  Eucken's  thinking  is  the  failure  to 
find  definite  standards  of  truth  in  the  notion  of  life. 
While  life  is  largely  described  it  retains  elements  of  in- 

ee  «  Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?  "  p.  153. 

67  Cf.  "  Geistige  Stroemungen  der  Gegenwart,"  p.  348  ff. 


286       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

definiteness.  There  may  not  be  in  Eucken's  description 
of  life  as  much  pictorialness  as  in  Bergson's  conception, 
but  nevertheless  Eucken  does  employ  the  illustrative 
method  of  portraying  life.  He  would  resent  being  called 
a  romanticist,  and  he  is  no  romanticist  of  the  extreme, 
illogical  type,  but  his  actualism  and  his  notion  of  life  are 
richer  in  descriptive  detail  and  poetic  fervor  than  in 
logical  accuracy  and  in  distinct  norms  of  truth.  Eucken 
is  a  romantic,  idealistic  preacher  who  sermonizes  on  life, 
and  preaches  a  definitely  thought  out  romantic  conception 
like  a  religion.  If  we  ask  for  the  definite  contents  of 
Eucken's  philosophy  we  shall  not  find  that  they  are  worked 
out  in  a  great  system.  He  has  a  great  central  theme  in 
spiritual  life,  which  he  constantly  elaborates  upon  and 
applies.  Everything  is  subservient  to  this  ruling  idea. 
Not  only  the  matter  but  also  the  very  manner  of  Eucken  as 
a  lecturer  demonstrate  how  large  an  element  feeling  and 
imagination  play  in  his  thinking.  Were  all  truth  of  this 
nature  it  would  lead  to  much  uncertainty,  for  with  all 
his  brilliancy  Eucken  has  not  given  the  world  strong 
standards.  It  is  in  this  respect  that  Christianity  holds, 
that  a  mere  philosophy  of  life  cannot  compensate  for 
strong,  fixed  standards  of  truth.  Christianity  has  a  sys- 
tem of  truth  to  which  it  must  cling.  Eucken,  it  is  true, 
says,  that  life  must  have  authoritative  fixity;  but  how 
does  he  define  this  fixity  ?  "  Unless  life  have  some  such 
authoritative  fixity  over  against  human  dealings,  we  can 
never  arrive  at  any  sure  goal,  any  inner  fellowship,  any 
independence  of  time's  fluctuations.  To  us  modern  men, 
however,  taught  by  long  experience  of  the  world's  work, 
that  authoritative  fixity  can  never  come  from  without."  68 
But  if  the  authority  cannot  come  from  without,  if  truth 
has  no  value  apart  from  life  and  as  shaping  life,  does  not 
truth  become  changeable  and  flowing?     On  this  founda- 

es  "Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?"  p.  88. 


The  Vitalist  View  287 

tion  Eucken  cannot  hold  to  any  fixed  eternal  truth.  He 
has  no  such  standard  as  Christianity  accepts  in  its  au- 
thoritative revelation  of  truth. 

Because  Eucken's  philosophy,  despite  his  protest,  has 
a  romantic  flavor ;  and  because  he  claims  for  it  the  real  in- 
wardness and  unity,  and  because  he  uses  it  to  determine 
the  whole  problem  of  man,  the  world,  and  God,  he  must 
place  philosophy  above  religion.  He  claims  that  only 
through  philosophy  can  the  problems  of  life  be  lifted  up 
into  the  character  of  principles,  and  only  through 
philosophy  can  the  complications  of  life  be  resolved  into 
unity.69  Of  course  this  philosophy  is  not  the  mere 
philosophy  of  the  schools,  but  it  is  a  philosophy  of  human 
life.  Such  a  philosophy  is,  however,  superior  and  unifies 
all  that  man  possesses.  While  Eucken  does  not  subsume 
religion  to  reason,  like  Hegel,  he  is,  after  all,  Hegelian  in 
as  far  as  religion  is  secondary  to  philosophy.  He  be- 
lieves that  though  art  and  religion  bring  inward  reality  to 
man,  and  though  they  possess  independence  over  against 
philosophy,  nevertheless  philosophy  must  furnish  the 
final  justification  of  their  strivings.  It  is  the  great  unifier 
which  is  superior  to  all  other  forms  of  life.  But  such 
a  claim  Christianity  can  never  admit.  It  must  main- 
tain not  only  its  independence,  but  also  its  authoritative 
superiority  to  every  philosophy.  It  does  not  need  any 
philosophy  to  give  unity  and  clarity  to  its  own  life.  It 
may  use  philosophies  to  approach  to  the  mind  of  man, 
but  the  value  of  its  truth  lies  within  itself.  The  life  of 
religion,  particularly  in  Christianity,  can  never  bow  to  the 
demand  of  philosophy  whose  source  is  reflection,  whether 
it  be  colored  with  imagination  or  not.  The  immediacy 
of  the  authority  and  truth  of  Christian  revelation  can 
suffer  no  abatement  through  any  philosophical  claim. 
Christianity  cannot  admit  that  it  must  in  any  way  finally 

69  Cf.  "  Erkennen  und  Leben,"  p.  159. 


288       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

stand  aside  for  either  philosophy,   science  or  art. 

In  addition  to  these  general  discrepancies  between 
Christian  truth  and  the  philosophy  of  Eucken,  we  have 
some  very  direct  utterances  which  affect  the  central  place 
of  Christianity  and  some  of  its  essential  doctrines. 
Eucken  has  discussed  his  view  of  Christianity  in  "  The 
Truth  of  Religion."70  But  he  has  most  definitely  de- 
scribed his  attitude  toward  Christianity,  in  view  of  the 
modem  world,  in  the  volume  "  Can  We  Still  Be  Chris- 
tians ?  "  He  admits  that  Christianity  has  certain  great 
and  supreme  elements.  It  makes  religion  the  sovereign 
mistress  of  man's  life  and  destiny,  and  reveals  another 
world  to  him  than  that  of  his  surroundings.  This  new 
world  is  a  supra-sensible,  invisible  kingdom  and  consti- 
tutes Christianity,  as  a  religion  of  the  spirit.  Spiritual- 
ity marks  Christianity,  for  it  is  not  a  religion  of  the 
law,  but  a  religion  of  redemption.  The  redemption  which 
Christianity  promises  is  ethical  and  not  intellectual. 
Through  these  truths  Christianity  attempts  to  close  up 
the  rift  between  God  and  man  in  its  message  of  the  com- 
ing of  the  kingdom  and  of  the  incarnation  and  mediation 
through  Christ.  Eucken  believes  that  Christianity  can 
still  be  maintained  and  cannot  be  rejected  altogether,  be- 
cause through  it  alone  can  we  rightly  define  our  relation 
to  the  world,  maintain  the  true  value  of  our  nature,  and 
properly  control  and  shape  the  real  work  of  life. 

But  with  all  this  strength  of  estimation  of  the  value  of 
Christianity,  Eucken  does  not  give  it  the  place  of  the  final 
religion.  He  says,  "  Therefore,  we  must  most  resolutely 
resist  the  claim  of  any  one  particular  religion,  Chris- 
tianity included,  to  be  the  one  and  only  true  religion  to 
the  exclusion  and  rejection  of  all  others.  It  is  only 
necessary  to  think  out  the  consequences  of  a  claim  of  this 
kind  in  order  to  feel  its  monstrosity.     Other  religions  be- 

to  Cf.  Part  V. 


The  Vitalist  View  289 

sides  Christianity  allow  man  to  live  and  die  in  the  belief 
that  divine  life  is  ruling  within  him  and  drawing  him  away 
and  beyond  himself.  If  now  the  manifestation  of  divinity 
be  limited  to  Christianity,  then  this  belief  can  be  nothing 
more  than  a  gross  illusion;  the  supposed  revelation  be- 
comes mere  semblance  and  deception."71  The  difficulty 
in  this  estimate  of  Christianity  is,  that  there  is  permitted 
to  be  in  it  no  specific  and  final  message  of  God  to  men. 
A  real,  broad  Christianity  does  not  deny  that  God  at  all 
times  was  seeking  men;  but  is  the  divine  which  other  re- 
ligions than  Christianity  claim  of  the  same  redemptive 
value  that  Christianity  is,  and  has  it  the  same  vital  truth? 
Because  Eucken  has  a  great,  general  spiritual  life,  which 
is  found  in  universal  religion,  he  cannot  admit  that  the 
peculiar  characteristics  of  Christianity  constitute  it  the 
religion  for  mankind.  But  can  a  consistent  Christianity 
abandon  this  claim?  If  it  can,  Eucken  is  correct;  if  it 
cannot,  we  must  reject  the  depression  of  Christianity  in 
Eucken's  point  of  view.  The  latter  is  the  general  assump- 
tion among  Christians,  and  is  the  outcome  of  Christian 
truth  and  experience. 

Out  of  Eucken's  view  of  Christianity,  and  closely  con- 
nected with  it,  there  arises  his  conception  of  the  Church. 
He  is  willing  to  give  the  Church  a  real  spiritual  value. 
He  says :  "  We  have  touched  repeatedly  on  the  prob- 
lem of  the  Church  and  convinced  ourselves  that,  in  spite 
of  all  defects  and  imperfections,  a  religious  community  is 
nevertheless  indispensable.  Christianity,  moreover,  must 
find  such  a  community  particularly  essential  and  valuable, 
since,  with  more  than  ordinary  boldness,  it  builds  up  a 
new  world  over  against  the  world  as  given,  and  instead 
of  looking  upon  the  kingdom  of  God  as  a  far-distant  goal 
seeks  to  bring  it  right  into  human  existence."  72     High 

7i  "  Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?  "  p.  133  if. 
« Ibid.,  p.  180  ff. 


290       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

as  this  estimate  appears  to  be,  it  justifies  the  Church 
solely  on  the  necessity  of  religious  fellowship  and  of  a 
religious  community.  There  is  no  appreciation  of  the 
relation  of  the  Church  to  Christ.  It  seems  to  grow,  in 
Eucken's  view,  out  of  the  religious  need.  Of  course,  it 
cannot  be  expected  that  the  fullness  of  Christian  truth 
about  the  Church,  as  the  body  of  Christ,  is  to  be  found  in 
the  philosophic  approach.  Nevertheless  the  definition 
of  the  Church  is  too  broad  and  lacks  character. 

Over  against  the  ideal  need  of  the  Church  Eucken  finds 
many  difficulties  in  the  practical  life  of  the  Church.  He 
knows  and  admits  that  there  must  be  an  inner  connection  of 
Christian  truth  starting  out  from  the  incarnation  and 
the  redemption.  From  these  central  dogmas  there  fol- 
low for  Christianity  "  all  its  other  distinctive  dogmas, 
such  as  the  Trinity,  the  miraculous  birth,  the  bodily 
resurrection,  and  the  ascension.  There  is  something  ex- 
ceedingly logical  in  the  development  of  these  dogmas. 
There  is  no  stopping  midway ;  he  who  wishes  to  retain  one 
must  accept  the  others."  73  But  the  problem  for  Chris- 
tians, according  to  Eucken,  is,  "  whether  the  religious  for- 
mation which  we  find  in  Christianity  has  really  the  funda- 
mental contact  which  will  enable  it  to  maintain  itself 
as  the  supreme  climax  of  religious  life,  in  face  of  all  the 
attacks  and  opposition  which  it  must  encounter  to-day."  74 
Another  question  is  "  whether  the  forms  in  which  Chris- 
tianity is  at  present  enshrined  are  really  capable  of  in- 
cluding the  truth-content  of  the  life  which  has  been  grad- 
ually growing  up  anew  in  the  movements  and  experiences 
of  the  last  few  centuries."  75  In  general  it  is  the  opinion 
of  Eucken  that  present  Christianity  in  its  ecclesiastical 
forms  cannot  solve  these  problems. 

73  ibid.,  p.  13. 

74  Ibid.,  p.  137. 

75  Ibid.,  p.  137. 


Tht  Vitalist  View  291 

A  new  Christianity  is  indispensable  because  the  present 
cannot  be  reformed.  To  prove  this  he  analyzes  broadly 
both  Catholicism  and  Protestantism.  As  to  the  former 
he  states,  that  the  manner  in  which  Catholicism  controlled 
culture  is  no  longer  possible.  It  is  attached  to  an  old 
culture  and,  therefore,  cannot  control  the  present.  In 
addition  it  dwells  too  much  in  the  sensible  embodiment  of 
the  spiritual,  and  is  liable  to  make  the  Church  an  end  in 
itself.  All  this  dooms  it  in  view  of  the  inner  life  which  the 
modern  age  demands.  Protestantism  is  divided  into  old 
and  new  Protestantism.  Of  the  old  Protestantism  it  is 
said,  that  it  "  did  not  regard  itself  as  in  any  way  a  mere 
part  of  a  progressive  movement,  but  rather  as  a  highly 
necessary  restoration  of  a  truth  which  had  been  tarnished 
and  disfigured  but  was  in  itself  valid  to  all  eternity.  To 
this  extent  it  shows  just  as  decided  an  aversion  to  the  idea 
of  progress  as  did  Catholicism." 76  The  newer  Prot- 
estantism is  supposed  to  be  ineffective  because  in  its  lib- 
erality, in  its  confidence  in  man's  powers,  and  in  its  strong 
immanental  leaning,  it  has  "  a  tendency  to  overlook  the  ob- 
scurity of  life  and  its  inward  struggles."  77  Every  his- 
toric form,  therefore,  of  Christianity  is  insufficient,  and 
the  maintenance  of  Christianity  is  supposed  to  demand  a 
freeing  from  ecclesiastical  control.  Christianity  is  sup- 
posed only  to  be  able  to  live  "  on  the  one  condition,  that 
Christianity  be  recognized  as  a  progressive  historic  move- 
ment still  in  the  making,  that  it  be  shaken  free  from  the 
numbing  influence  of  ecclesiasticism  and  placed  upon  a 
broader  foundation."  78  In  other  words,  the  value  of  the 
present  historic  forms  of  Christianity  has  ceased,  in 
Eucken's  opinion.  There  must  be  a  new  broad  move- 
ment   in    which    universal    religion,    the    religion    of    the 

76  ibid.,  p.  201. 

77  ibid.,  p.  202. 

78  Ibid.,  p.  218. 


292       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

spiritual  life,  redeems  what  is  eternal  in  Christianity. 
On  such  a  theory  there  has  been  no  continuity  of  Chris- 
tian life,  and  the  Spirit  has  forsaken  the  Church. 
The  broad  development  of  thought  is  to  re-make  and  re- 
formulate Christian  truth,  not  out  of  its  own  treasures, 
but  in  accord  with  the  philosophic  notion  of  what  con- 
stitutes spiritual  life.  The  Church  has  no  normative 
Word  of  God  to  which  it  can  return;  it  has  no  innate  au- 
thority of  truth.  Eucken  seems  to  have  given  away  alto- 
gether to  the  modern  criticism  against  the  Church.  He 
would  not  re-vivify  her,  as  far  as  she  needs  it,  out  of  her 
own  life,  but  in  agreement  with  modern  ideals  and  modern 
culture. 

The  difference  between  Eucken's  point  of  view  and  Chris- 
tianity also  appears  in  the  manner  in  which  he  attempts 
to  eliminate  the  temporal  elements  of  Christian  truth  in 
some  of  its  great  teachings.  He  singles  out,  first  of  all, 
the  doctrines  of  human  sin  and  guilt,  and  of  atonement. 
There  is,  according  to  Eucken,  a  real  problem  of  evil, 
which  optimism  cannot  so  easily  explain  away.  But 
Eucken  hopes  that  the  contradiction  of  evil  may  be  over- 
come by  the  new  spiritual  life.  He  says :  "  The  harm 
and  perversion  would  be  impossible,  if  there  were  nothing 
to  harm  and  to  pervert.  Without  good,  evil  is  unthink- 
able. The  very  risks  we  run  may  make  us  conscious  of 
something  deeper  than  we  before  suspected.  Guilt  may 
strengthen  our  certainty  of  the  government  of  a  moral 
order;  doubt  may  make  us  more  convinced  of  the  existence 
of  a  truth.  But  this  reflection  still  leaves  us  our  contra- 
diction, and  with  it  the  danger  that  our  life  and  effort  may 
come  to  a  complete  standstill."  79  The  manner  in  which 
the  danger  can  be  met  and  the  burden  overcome  is  summed 
up  in  this  manner:  "  That  through  the  opening-up  of  an 
immediate  relationship  of  the  soul  and  of  man  to  a  God- 

79  Ibid.,  p.  117. 


The  V  it  alls  t  View 

head  which  is  not  merely  immanent  in  the  world  but  also 
transcendent,  a  new  spiritual  life  wells  up  which  cannot 
be  thus  imperilled  and  distorted,  since  now  all  human  acT 
tivity  has  the  support  and  sustenance  of  the  divine."  80 
With  all  the  effort  to  appreciate  guilt  and  evil  justly,  it  is, 
nevertheless,  not  grasped  in  its  depth.     There  is  no  easy 
attempt  to  get  rid  of  the  complications  of  life  and  its  real 
wrongs.     But  the  apprehension  of  sin  in  its  depth  is  lack- 
ing, and  the  emphasis  of  redemption  from  sin  is  wanting, 
for    these    ideas    are    supposed   to    savor    "  of    old-world 
weakness  and  weariness,  and  cannot  be  adopted  by  the  man 
of  to-day  unless  he  be  disloyal  to  himself."  81     There  is 
no  estimate  of  sin  which  makes  it  guilt  before  God,  for  the 
wrath  of  God  is  disallowed,  and  the  greatness  of  sin  in  its 
source  and  results,  which  Christianity  claims,  is  neglected. 
There  is  also  an  under-estimation  of  real  atonement. 
Its   sacrificial   character   is   questioned.     It   is    supposed 
to    be    mythical.     Says    Eucken:     "When    further    we 
contemplate   the   important   part   played   by    the    sacri- 
ficial blood  in  this  doctrine  of  mediation  and  substitution, 
we  cannot  but  realize  that  this  whole  mode  of  presentation, 
penetrated  though  it  be  by  a  depth  of  real  spiritual  feel- 
ing, yet  belongs  to  another,  more  childish  and  more  picture- 
loving  stage  of  spiritual  development  than  that  in  which 
we  find  ourselves  to-day  after  all  our  centuries  of  experi- 
ence and  struggle.     That  which  once  seemed  a  fitting  ex- 
pression of  divine  truth  bids  fair  to  become  for  us  an- 
thropomorphic and  mythological.     And  no  power  on  earth 
can  force  us  to  respect  as  religious  a  conception  which  we 
once  perceive  to  be  of  the  nature  of  myth."  82     In  the 
same  manner  it  is  doubted  that  the  divine  love,  grace,  and 
reaction   against   sin  depend  upon  any   manifestation  in 

so  Ibid.,  p.  118. 
si  Ibid.,  p.  159. 
82  Ibid.,  p.  32. 


294       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

Jesus  Christ,  and  that  they  are  evident  in  His  redemption. 
"  The  imaginative  conceptions,  moreover,  which  support 
the  whole  edifice  of  Christian  dogma, —  particularly  that 
of  the  wrath  of  God  only  to  be  appeased  through  the  blood 
of  His  son, —  we  are  bound  to  reject  as  far  too  an- 
thropomorphic and  irreconcilable  with  our  purer  concep- 
tions of  the  Godhead."  83  Eucken  has  mentioned  as  his 
objections  anthropomorphism  and  mythologism.  The 
former  has  often  been  urged  since  the  days  of  the  early 
Greek  thinker,  Xenophanes,  but  its  value  cannot  be  de- 
nied if  it  is  rightly  limited.  To  remove  all  anthropo- 
morphism would  lead  into  vagueness,  abstraction  and 
finally  agnosticism.  The  removal  of  the  elements  which 
Eucken  disapproves  of  would  depreciate  sin  and  the  per- 
sonal conception  of  God.  The  mythologism  charged  is  due 
to  a  questioning  of  the  historical  sources  of  Christianity. 
Eucken's  main  quarrel  is  with  any  historic  redemption 
through  Jesus  Christ,  and  with  any  doctrine  in  which  real 
sin  before  God  is  atoned  for  through  Jesus  Christ.  No 
room  is  left  for  any  formulation  of  atonement  such  as  the 
teaching  of  Christ  and  early  Christianity  demands. 
Eucken  must  reject  the  statement  of  Jesus,  that  He  gave 
His  life  as  a  ransom  for  many.84  In  the  same  way  the 
reference  to  sacrifice,  when  Jesus  says  at  the  Last  Supper, 
that  the  cup  is  the  New  Testament  in  His  blood,85  must 
be  repudiated.  Christ  cannot  be  made  sin  for  us  by 
God,86  and  God  is  not  really  in  Christ,  reconciling  men, 
and  not  imputing  their  sins  to  them.87  All  such  teach- 
ings have  no  place  if  the  sacrifice  of  Jesus  be  set  aside, 
and  if  the  mention  of  His  blood  is  pure  anthropomorphism. 
Eucken  cannot  square  himself  with  the  Christian  doctrines 

83  ibid.,  p.  172. 

84  Mark,  10:45. 

85  Matthew,  26:28. 
sell  Corinthians,  5:21. 
87  II  Corinthians,  5:19. 


The  Vitalist  View  295 

of  sin  and  atonement,  because  his  activism  will  not  allow 
for  real  sin,  and  his  depreciation  of  the  historical  Jesus, 
as  will  appear  below,  hinders  him  from  accepting  a  real 
atonement.  The  romantic  character  of  the  doctrine  of 
spiritual  life  makes  this  life  itself  the  atoning  factor,  and, 
therefore,  no  historic  atonement  and  no  sacrifice  is  really 
needed.  Christianity  finds  in  Eucken's  re-formulation  of 
sin  and  sacrifice  the  same  hindrances  which  it  found  in 
Hegel's  effort  to  discover  permanent  rational  Christianity. 
The  real  historical  is  lost  in  Eucken's  case  as  well  as  in 
Hegel's.  The  all-determining  influence  of  the  creative 
life  reigns  and  in  all  consistency  suffers  no  real  atone- 
ment. 

When,  at  last,  we  come  to  the  fact  of  Jesus  Himself, 
there  is  discovered  in  Eucken  a  combination  of  an  high 
estimate  of  Jesus  with  a  doubt  of  His  actual  incarnation 
and  of  His  divine  nature.  Says  Eucken :  "  The  Christian 
conviction  of  love  as  a  world-ruling  power  was  embodied  in 
a  personality  which  in  its  union  of  childlike  simplicity 
with  historic  greatness,  outward  poverty  with  inward 
loftiness,  tenderest  spirituality  with  world-compelling 
power,  youthful  joyousness  with  impressive  seriousness, 
has  made  a  deep  and  lasting  impression  upon  humanity 
and  stands  out  clear  and  vivid  in  the  minds  of  all  Chris- 
tian believers."  88  Jesus  is  the  personality  which  brought 
divine  truth  to  historic  realization.  "  A  personality  like 
that  of  Jesus  is  not  a  mere  carrier  of  doctrines  or  moods, 
but  a  convincing  actual  proof  of  divine  life,  from  which 
new  divine  life  can  constantly  be  kindled."  89  The  fact 
of  Jesus  is  the  source  of  an  endless  movement.  But  after 
all  Jesus  is  not  the  Christ  of  confessing  Christianity,  al- 
though He  is  not  lowered  to  a  mere  teacher.     "  The  per- 

ss  "Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?"  p.  14. 

89  Translated  from  "  Der  Wahrheitsgehalt  der  Religion,"  p.  427. 
Engl.  Translation,  "  The  Truth  of  Religion." 


296        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

sonality  of  Jesus,  the  man  Jesus,  is  in  no  wise  robbed  of 
its  pre-eminent  significance,  nor  is  his  status  lowered  to 
that  of  a  mere  teacher  of  wisdom."  90  But  Jesus  is  not 
vitally  the  Son  of  God ;  He  is  simply  a  unique  Creator  of 
spiritual  life. 

There  is  no  approval  of  the  union  of  the  divine  and 
human  in  Jesus.  In  fact,  many  difficulties  are  found. 
Says  Eucken,  "  The  full  unity  of  Godhead  and  hu- 
manity in  one  person  has  not  become  a  living  reality 
for  the  religious  life  through  the  dogmatic  decreeing  of 
it."  91  There  is  supposed  to  be  an  insoluble  contradic- 
tion in  a  man  who  is  God,  who  bears  human  cares  and  suf- 
ferings, and  still  remains  in  possession  of  the  full  com- 
pleteness of  divine  absolute  truth.  Not  only  is  Jesus  op- 
posed in  view  of  His  Godhead,  but  there  is  a  fear  that 
Christianity  is  too  much  bound  to  holding  fast  the  truth 
as  it  was  realized  in  Jesus.  Consequently  Eucken  says: 
"  Nor  is  our  resistance  on  this  point  confined  to  the  old, 
in  itself  consistent,  doctrine  of  the  God-man ;  it  is  directed 
also  against  the  modern  halfway  position  which  drops  the 
old  doctrine,  but  nevertheless  calls  Jesus  unconditionally 
lord  and  master  and  must  consequently  bind  our  whole 
religious  life  indissolubly  to  him,  thus  taking  away  all 
independence  with  regard  to  him,  and  robbing  our  own  life 
of  its  full  originative  power."  92  The  desire  of  Eucken 
to  be  free  from  the  control  of  the  personality  of  Jesus, 
after  he  has  so  highly  estimated  Him,  may  at  first  seem 
strange.  The  doubt  of  Eucken  and  his  rejection  of  the 
divine-human  Jesus  is,  however,  readily  explicable  if  we 
recall  Eucken's  leading  conceptions. 

There  is  no  room  for  the  inclusion  of  divine,  spiritual 
life  in  one  great  personality,  if  divine  life  is  a  universal 

so  "Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?"  p.  178. 

9i  "  Der  Wahrheitsgehalt  der  Religion,"  p.  424. 

92  "Can  We  Still  Be  Christians?"  p.  173. 


The  Vitalist  View  297 

idea.  Eucken  cannot  accept  the  uniqueness  of  Jesus  just 
because  his  idea  of  life  is  greater  than  that  of  personality. 
Despite  his  exaltation  of  the  personal,  quoted  above,93  in 
which  the  divine  is  supposed  to  have  its  self-determination 
in  personality,  Eucken  cannot  bring  himself  to  a  consist- 
ent and  real  conviction  that  the  divine  and  human,  that  di- 
vinity and  humanity  can  coalesce  in  one  person.  The 
unity  of  divine  and  human  cannot  be  found  in  one  person 
because  personality  itself  is  not  concrete  in  God.  It  is 
rather  identified  with  the  indefinite,  general,  romantic  term 
of  spiritual  life.  Eucken  finds  contradiction  in  the  real 
vital  unity  of  divine  and  human  in  Jesus,  and  still  he 
maintains  that  the  spiritual  life  is  divine.  Why  should 
there  be  more  contradiction,  when  the  contrast  is  centered 
in  a  person,  than  if  we  suppose  a  divine  movement  of  life  to 
be  struggling  with  human  movements  ?  If  the  divine  can- 
not enter  a  person,  can  it  enter  finite  human  movements? 
Either  Eucken's  divine  can  not  be  a  real  full  divine,  or  his 
human  must  be  lost  in  the  divine,  when  spiritual  life  breaks 
through. 

In  general  the  divine  plays  a  minor  part  in  Eucken's 
theory.  The  activism  of  the  divine  in  creation  is  fre- 
quently forgotten  in  the  stressing  of  human  work. 
The  labor  is  man's  labor,  and  the  divine  in  life  is  not  by 
grace.94  Consequently  there  is  a  failure  in  the  inter- 
relation of  the  divine  and  human  in  Eucken's  speculation. 
His  objection,  therefore,  to  centering  divinity  and  human- 
ity in  their  fullness  in  Jesus,  is  a  result  of  his  lack  of  a 
real,  absolutely  divine  element.  There  is  also  a  constant 
reluctance  against  making  a  single  historical  personality 
like  Jesus  all-determining.  Should  we  grant  that  Eucken 
has  maintained  the  balance  of  the  divine  and  human  in 

93  See  p.  284. 

94  Even  where  grace  is  appreciated  activity  and  freedom  are  largely 
stressed  (cf.  "Ethics  and  Modern  Thought,"  p.  57). 


298       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

spiritual  life,  as  he  intends  to  do,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  ascribe  his  objection  to  the  divine-human  in  Jesus  to 
the  dwelling  within  the  romantic  notion  of  life.  This  no- 
tion seeks  to  absorb  subjective  and  objective  into  a  unity, 
and  is  averse  to  personality  in  its  concreteness  because  it 
may  become  individuality. 

At  all  events,  whatever  may  be  the  reason,  Eucken  does 
not  possess  the  Christ  of  Christianity.  He  does  not 
want  Him  as  divine  Saviour,  not  even,  on  a  liberal  basis, 
as  Lord  and  Master.  But  Christianity  can  never  sur- 
render its  central  figure  to  any  such  idea  as  that  of 
Eucken.  The  vitality  and  power  of  Christianity  would 
be  gone  with  the  fading  away  of  the  picture  of  Jesus 
in  all  its  fullness.  It  is  specifically  in  the  incar- 
nation of  Jesus  and  all  that  follows  from  it  that  Chris- 
tianity finds  its  support.  But  the  end  of  this  incarnation 
is  for  Christianity  no  speculative  aim,  but  the  practical 
necessity  of  a  real  salvation  through  God  and  in  God  for 
man.  The  injury  done  to  any  of  the  vital  elements  that 
are  embraced  in  the  truth  of  the  salvation  of  Jesus,  through 
His  person  and  merit,  is  an  injury,  which  must  at  last  de- 
stroy Christianity,  as  the  best  interpretation  of  the  re- 
ligion of  salvation  in  the  world.  Consequently  a  Chris- 
tianity that  knows  what  it  possesses  will  always  maintain 
the  integrity  of  Jesus  in  His  human  and  divine  character. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE    REALIST    REALM 

AMONG  the  diverse  modern  movements  in  America 
one  of  the  latest  is  the  philosophical  movement 
which  calls  itself  Neo-Realism.  It  is  a  common 
endeavor  of  the  following  university  professors :  Edwin 
B.  Holt  of  Harvard,  Ralph  Barton  Perry  of  Harvard, 
W.  P.  Montague  of  Columbia,  Walter  B.  Pitkin  of  Co- 
lumbia, E.  G.  Spaulding  of  Princeton,  and  Walter  T. 
Marvin  of  Rutgers  College.  These  are  the  distinct  lead- 
ers of  American  Neo-Realism,  although  there  is  a  realistic 
trend  in  Professor  Fullerton's  later  publications,  and  in 
Bertrand  Russell's  speculations.  The  neo-realists  in  op- 
position to  all  assumptions  of  a  single  substance  are  seek- 
ing to  assert  that  there  are  only  functioning  centers. 
Over  against  the  priority  of  mere  first  simples  they  de- 
mand continuing  energies.  They  attack  idealism  by  de- 
nying the  ego-centric  character  of  the  world  and  its  purely 
ideal  nature.  They  hold  to  independent  entities  which 
exist  in  themselves  and  are  not  dependent  upon  the  mind. 
In  their  realism  they  do  not  follow  the  older  Scottish  phi- 
losophers who  opposed  idealism,  and  became  common-sense 
dualists,  demanding  both  mind  and  matter.  The  Amer- 
ican realists  are  not  satisfied  with  such  a  naive  theory. 
Their  attitude  strives  for  a  different  kind  of  pluralistic 
world.  It  is  not  the  world  of  everybody,  it  is  not  the 
shifting  world  of  pragmatism,  it  is  not  the  dream  world 

of  idealism,  but  a  world  of  immediate  experience  of  physi- 

299 


300       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

cal  phenomena,  which  are  not  to  be  made  mental.1  The 
attitudes  of  the  neo-realists  are  still  largely  critical  and 
negative,  but  a  common  program  and  platform  has 
been  announced.2  Although  neo-realism  objects  to  any 
identification  with  naturalism,  idealism  or  pragmatism,  it 
is  nevertheless  in  agreement  with  many  important  teach- 
ings of  these  attitudes.  "  With  naturalism,  for  example, 
it  maintains  the  unimpeachable  truth  of  the  accredited  re- 
sults of  science,  and  the  independence  of  physical  nature 
on  knowledge;  with  idealism  it  maintains  the  validity  and 
irreducibility  of  logical  and  moral  science ;  and  with  prag- 
matism, the  practical  and  empirical  character  of  the 
knowledge  process,  and  the  presumptively  pluralistic  con- 
stitution of  the  universe."  3 

Realism  begins  with  a  world  of  manifold  entities.  These 
are  "  not  all  mental,  conscious,  or  spiritual,"  and  "  are 
knowable  without  being  known." 4  It  is  even  asserted 
that  "  the  entities  (objects,  facts,  etc.)  under  study  in 
logic,  mathematics,  and  the  physical  sciences  are  not  mental 
in  any  usual  or  proper  meaning  of  the  word  '  mental.'  "  5 
There  is  a  drift  away  from  mental  emphasis,  and  the  claim 
of  Professor  Perry,  that  neo-realism  like  idealism  main- 
tains the  irreducibility  of  logical  and  moral  science,  is 
hardly  sustained.  The  entities  are  not  fundamentally  of 
an  ideal  nature.  The  pressure  everywhere  is  against  any 
assertion  or  stressing  of  mental  entities  in  the  sense  of 
their  being  conditioned  upon  knowledge.  Such  an  atti- 
tude might  lead  in  logic  and  morals  to  either  Platonic 
ideas,  or  to  the  spiritual  monads  of  Leibniz,  or  to  the  ideal 

i  Cf.  "  The  New  Realism,"  by  Professor  Fullerton,  in  "  Essays 
Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  William  James,"  etc., 
p.  3  ff.—  Cf.  also,  Fullerton,  "  The  World  We  Live  Tn,"  Chapters  IX, 
X,  XI. 

2  «  The  New  Realism,"  p.  471  ff. 

3  Perry,  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  272. 
*  Professor  Spaulding,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  478. 
e  Professor  Holt,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  472. 


The  Realist  Realm  301 

reals  of  Herbart,  but  this  is  not  the  case.  It  will  appear 
that  in  logic,  morals  and  religion,  neo-realism  has  prac- 
tically become  pragmatic.  Its  strong  assertion  of  the  in- 
dependence of  entities,  and  its  opposition  to  knowledge  as 
conditioning  any  of  them,  tend  toward  making  the  enti- 
ties really  physical.  In  other  words,  because  neo-realism 
is  not  dualistic  in  an  outspoken  manner,  and  because  it 
denies  the  ideality  of  all  entities,  it  is  actually  monistic  in 
a  physical  and  naturalistic  manner.  Its  pluralism  is  sci- 
entific and  external,  and  can  be  used  even  less  for  mental 
ends  than  pragmatic  pluralism.  It  becomes  as  inde- 
terminate and  shifting  in  its  pluralism  as  does  pragmatism. 
Its  emphasis  of  manyness  and  irrevelance  goes  even  further 
than  that  of  pragmatism. 

The  indefinite  description  of  entities,  which  really  looks 
toward  materialism,  is  strongly  seconded  by  the  opposition 
of  neo-realism  to  an  idealistic  theory  of  knowledge.  The 
entities  are  never  to  be  conditioned  in  their  nature  or  being 
through  being  known.  They  enter  into  many  relations 
which  do  not  change  them  in  their  substance.  One  of  these 
relations  may  be  knowledge.  But  the  entities  are  never 
completely  immanent  in  knowledge,  for  they  may  be  im- 
manent in  many  connections,  combinations,  and  relations, 
and  still  remain  transcendent  and  independent.  This  in- 
dependence is  denominated  "  the  external  view  of  rela- 
tions." It  is  opposed  to  a  connected,  inner  relationship 
of  all  things,  which  absolutism  asserts.  The  assertion 
that  all  things  are  external  to  each  other  is  the  great 
fundamental  logical  principle  which  is  to  be  prior  to  all 
metaphysical  systems  and  theories  of  knowledge.  Many 
propositions  are  built  upon  it.  "  There  are  many  ex- 
istential, as  well  as  non-existential,  propositions  which  are 
logically  prior  to  epistemology,"  for  "  epistemology  is  not 
logically  fundamental."  6  In  all  propositions  "  one  identi- 
e  Professor  Marvin,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  473. 


302       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

cal  term  may  stand  in  many  relations,"  7  and  it  may  change 
some  relations  without  changing  all.  There  is  no  real  al- 
teration brought  about  by  knowledge.  "  Realism  holds 
that  things  known  may  continue  to  exist  unaltered  when 
they  are  not  known,  or  that  things  may  pass  in  and  out 
of  the  cognitive  relation  without  prejudice  to  their  re- 
ality." 8  Knowledge  plays  its  part  within  an  independent 
environment.  It  is  "  a  complex  process,  involving  physi- 
cal, physiological,  biological,  and  ethical  factors  that  are 
determinable  by  the  laws  proper  to  these  sciences." 9 
There  is  the  strongest  emphasis  on  a  naturalistic  theory  of 
knowledge.  Professor  Perry  claims  that  modern  realism 
is  closer  to  the  phenomenal  monistic  realism  of  Hume  than 
to  the  dualistic  realism  of  the  Scottish  philosophers. 
There  is  an  effort  to  regard  things  not  merely  as  inde- 
pendent of  the  mind,  but  as  identical  with  perception  when 
they  are  present  to  the  mind.  Things  may  enter  directly 
into  the  mind  and  then  become  ideas.  This  theory  of  the 
mind  largely  deals  with  entities  as  physical  things,  and 
certainly  under-values  mental  entities. 

The  whole  neo-realistic  school  does  not  accentuate  ob- 
jective mental  facts  in  themselves  and  in  their  relation  to 
knowledge.  There  are  occasional  utterances  about  spir- 
itual entities,  but  the  whole  trend  is  toward  a  neglect  of 
the  spiritual  and  an  exaltation  of  the  natural.  It  is 
through  the  speculations  of  the  English  thinker  Bertrand 
Russell  that  we  find  a  better  valuation  of  objective  mental 
facts.  His  theory  of  knowledge  and  of  truth  asserts  that 
there  are  many  things  which  enter  into  multiple  relations 
through  the  mind.  When  a  judgment  is  made  there  is 
"  not  a  dual  relation  of  the  mind  to  a  single  objective,  but 
a  multiple  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  various  other  terms 

7  Professor  Pitkin,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  477. 
s  Professor  Montague,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  474. 
o  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  135. 


The  Realist  Realm 

with  which  the  judgment  is  concerned."  10  It  is  through 
such  multiple  relations  that  the  mind  finds  both  things  and 
ideas.  Out  of  the  proper  relations  truth  is  constituted. 
When  a  judgment  is  true,  there  is  a  relation  between  the 
objects  of  the  judgment,  which  really  exist.  "  Every 
judgment  is  a  relation  of  a  mind  to  several  objects,  one  of 
which  is  a  relation;  the  judgment  is  true  when  the  rela- 
tion which  is  one  of  the  objects  relates  the  other  objects, 
otherwise  it  is  false."  1X  Knowledge,  therefore,  rests  on 
the  relating  which  has  objective  facts  with  which  the  mind 
must  connect.  The  objective  facts  are  not  merely  ma- 
terial, they  may  be  ideal.  The  relation,  however,  of  the 
mind  does  not  make  the  existence,  it  only  establishes  con- 
nections. There  is  more  room  for  both  the  mind  and  the 
world  in  this  theory  than  in  that  of  neo-realism. 

From  the  doctrine  of  knowledge,  which  the  realists  hold, 
there  follows  a  peculiar  explanation  of  the  mind.  The 
mind  is  only  a  center  of  relationships.  In  its  conscious- 
ness, says  Professor  Woodbridge,  "  we  have  simply  an  in- 
stance of  the  existence  of  different  things  together,  .  .  . 
consciousness  is  only  a  form  of  connection  of  objects,  a 
relation  between  them."  12  The  relations  established  by 
the  mind  do  not  change  the  objects  which  persist  in  their 
nature.  When  the  mind  is  studied  and  observed  in  its 
experience  of  sensations  and  perceptions,  the  result,  ac- 
cording to  neo-realism,  shows  that  the  mind  is  not  distinc- 
tive and  separate  in  nature  and  function.  It  is  a  complex 
which  has  arisen  from  certain  biological  processes  that 
acted  in  the  direction  of  self-preservation.  These 
processes  protected,  renewed  and  finally  isolated  them- 
selves, and  thus  they  developed  a  variety  of  special  inter- 
ests.    Out  of  such  origin  the  mind  through  biological  de- 

10  "  Philosophical  Essays,"  p.  180. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  181. 

12  Perry,  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  278. 


304        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

termination  became  a  complex  organization  which  acted 
desideratively  or  interestedly.  In  the  action  of  biological 
interest  the  vital  processes  were  developed.  "  Such 
processes,  interested  in  their  general  form,  possess  charac- 
teristic instrumentalities,  notably  a  bodily  nervous  system 
which  localizes  the  interest  and  conditions  the  refinement 
and  range  of  its  intercourse  with  its  environment."  13 
Through  these  instrumentalities  the  mind  has,  taken  up 
such  contents  of  the  environment  as  it  sought  on  behalf 
of  the  biological  interests  and  desires.  This  theory  of  the 
mind  is  certainly  naturalistic  and  material.  It  is  not 
parallelistic  like  the  prevailing  theory  of  most  psycholo- 
gists. It  does  not  allow  for  any  real  interaction,  but  is 
simply  and  solely  a  biological  process.  Consequently  the 
mind  must  be  only  a  name  for  the  fact  of  the  functioning 
of  entities  through  a  center.  The  mind  and  its  phenom- 
ena are  natural,  for  biology  and  physiology  altogether 
determine  it.  There  is  no  distinctive  spiritual  character 
and  life  of  the  mind.  "  The  natural  mind,  as  here  and 
now  existing,  is  thus  an  organization  possessing  as  dis- 
tinguishable, but  complementary,  aspects,  interest,  nervous 
system,  and  contents.  Or,  if  interest  and  nervous  system 
be  taken  together  as  constituting  the  action  of  the  mind, 
we  may  summarize  mind  as  action  and  contents"  14  On 
such  a  theory  of  mind  no  place  is  left  for  any  real  spirit 
or  for  any  truly  spiritual  ertities,  and  even  logical,  moral, 
and  religious  facts  must  be  fundamentally  naturalistic. 

At  times  the  characteristics  of  naturalism  may  appear 
more  disguised,  but  finally  they  will  break  through  again. 
This  result  is  very  evident  in  the  discussion  of  the  prob- 
lem of  truth  by  neo-realism.  Truth  is  approached  as  in 
pragmatism  not  from  a  unitary  ideal,  but  through  the 
collection  of  details.     "  The  logical  categories  of  unity, 

is  Perry,  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  304. 
14  Perry,  Ibid.,  p.  304. 


The  Realist  Realm  305 

such  as  homogeneity,  consistency,  coherence,  interrelation, 
etc.,  do  not  in  any  case  imply  a  determinate  degree  of 
unitj\  Hence  the  degree  of  unity  which  the  world  pos- 
sesses can  not  be  determined  logically,  but  only  by  assem- 
bling the  results  of  the  special  branches  of  knowledge."  15 
It  is  only  through  the  special  results  of  special  sciences 
that  we  are  enabled  to  reach  truths.  The  relation  and 
relevancy  of  special  facts  allows  us  to  approach  to  truths, 
and  from  truths  we  can  seek  for  truth.  It  is,  therefore, 
relation  and  not  inner  value  that  actually  establishes  a 
truth.  No  intuition  and  no  axiomatic  truth  is  really  pos- 
sible. "  There  may  be  axiomatic  truths  or  intuitive 
truths.  But  the  fact  that  a  truth  belongs  to  either  of 
these  classes  does  not  make  it  fundamental  or  important 
for  a  theory  of  knowledge,  much  less  for  a  theory  of  re- 
ality. Like  all  other  truths,  it  too  must  be  interpreted  in 
the  light  of  other  relevant  truths."  16 

The  whole  investigation  of  truth,  therefore,  is  the  prob- 
lem of  relevancy,  and  relevancy  must  be  established 
through  the  existence  of  objective  facts,  but  objective 
facts  largely  depend  upon  the  immediate  experience  of  the 
senses.  Professor  Montague  clearly  demonstrates  this  in 
his  essay  on  "  A  Theory  of  Truth  and  Error."  He  says : 
"  I  hold  that  the  true  and  the  false  are  respectively  the  real 
and  the  unreal,  considered  as  objects  of  a  'possible  belief 
or  judgment.  There  is,  that  is  to  say,  the  same  difference 
between  what  is  real  and  what  is  true  as  between  George 
Washington  and  President  George  Washington.  Presi- 
dent George  Washington  refers  to  Washington  in  a  certain 
relation  to  our  government.  George  Washington  denotes 
precisely  the  same  individual  without  calling  attention  to 
the  presidential  relation."  17      The  real  world  from  which 

is  Perry,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  476. 

is  Professor  Pitkin,  in  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  478. 

17  "  The  New  Realism,"  p.  252. 


306       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

truths  are  found  is  the  world  of  qualities  and  objects  in 
space  and  time.  "  The  real  universe  consists  of  the  space- 
time  system  of  existence,  together  with  all  that  is  pre- 
supposed by  that  system."  18  Toward  this  universe,  this 
reality,  when  its  existents  are  expressed  in  propositions,  we 
take  an  attitude  of  belief  or  judgment.  This  belief  or 
judgment  about  objects  of  the  space-time  universe  is  truth. 
In  the  working  out  of  this  relation  there  is  no  partial  truth 
and  error;  truth  and  error  are  always  definite  and  distinct. 
The  world  as  we  find  it  in  its  complexity  must  be 
analyzed  into  its  simpler  elements.  In  the  proper  analysis 
we  find  the  existents  which  guarantee  the  truth.  When  we 
elaborate  the  relation  of  existent  objects  to  belief  we  have 
three  facts  to  consider:  first,  the  actually  existing,  external, 
object;  second,  the  cerebral  state;  third,  the  object  per- 
ceived and  apprehended.  When  truth  is  found  the  real, 
external  object  or  event  is  identical  with  the  perceived  ob- 
ject or  event.  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  "  that  the 
medium  through  which  the  energy  has  been  carried  from 
the  external  object  to  the  brain  has  not  altered  the  char- 
acter of  that  energy."  19  Then  the  cerebral  event  cor- 
responds with  the  object.  But  more  frequently  the  me- 
dium has  distorted  the  energy  in  quality,  time  or  space, 
"  but  the  brain  through  inherited  capacities  or  through 
memory-traces  will  have  neutralized  and  corrected  this 
distortion."  20  We  are  limited  to  these  origins  in  the  re- 
lation which  is  called  truth.  Even  when  we  appear  to  be 
conscious  of  ourselves  and  our  states,  there  is  merely  "  the 
consciousness  at  each  moment  of  the  brain  processes  and 
implications  of  the  just  preceding  moment."  21  When  we 
are  conscious  of  our  brain-states,  the  consciousness  is  in- 
traorganic.    "  And   in  this   intra-organic   consciousness, 

is  Ibid.,  p.  255. 
i»  Ibid.,  p.  289. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  289. 
2i  Ibid.,  p.  290. 


The  Realist  Realm  307 

where  the  self-transcending  implication  '  reaches  '  only  to 
the  next  moment,  there  would  seem  to  be  no  chance  for 
error."  22  In  other  words,  the  certainty  of  truth  in  in- 
trospection is  greater  than  from  external  objects,  and  we 
are  more  sure  of  our  own  thoughts  and  feelings  than  of 
anything  else.  This  sureness,  however,  is  greater  because 
of  the  temporal  closeness  of  observed  brain-states.  Thus 
through  cerebral  concatenation  in  time  arises  the  idea  of 
the  greater  certainty  of  our  thoughts  and  feelings.  We 
are  determined  even  here  not  by  spiritual  axioms  and  sur- 
roundings, but  by  physical  environment  and  conditions. 
The  most  certain  truth  is  established  by  closeness  to  the 
brain  environment  of  the  self. 

By  statements  like  these  realism  gravitates  back  into  a 
materialistic  evaluation  of  truth  and  of  mind.  Professor 
Perry  definitely  states,  "  Mind  operates  in  an  environment, 
and  succeeds  or  fails,  according  as  it  meets  or  violates  the 
terms  which  the  environment  dictates.  Truth  is  the 
achievement  and  error  the  risk,  incidental  to  the  great 
adventure  of  knowledge.  But  eternal  being,  and  the  order 
of  nature,  are  not  implicated  in  its  vicissitudes."  23  There 
is  a  return  in  this  statement  to  a  grosser  pragmatism  than 
that  maintained  by  any  regular  pragmatist.  Truth  is 
mere  adjustment  and  there  are  no  eternal  values  to  be 
found  in  it.  It  is  no  guiding  star,  no  inner  ideal  and  no 
leading  hope,  but  it  may  be  compared  to  a  ship  risking  its 
way  and  making  its  compass  as  it  goes.  The  certainties 
of  this  theory  of  truth  are  finally  uncertainties.  They  are 
risks  taken  and  relative  assurance  in  the  risks. 

If  the  inquiry  is  made  as  to  the  advantages  for  Chris- 
tian truth  from  neo-realism,  no  great  claim  can  be  estab- 
lished until  realism  changes  some  of  its  attitudes.  As  far 
as  it  is  pluralistic  it  is  more  material  and  not  as  congenial 

22  ibid.,  p.  290. 

23  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  328. 


308        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

to  Christianity  as  pragmatism.  It  cannot  at  all  measure 
itself  with  the  pluralism  of  Leibniz  whose  theory  of 
monads  is  quite  usable  by  Christian  theism.  The  entities 
of  realism  are  mostly  gross,  sense-entities,  or  energy-cen- 
ters. Professor  Holt  in  his  book  on  "  The  Concept  of 
Consciousness,"  argues  for  neutral,  simple  entities.  These, 
however,  are  not  spiritual  nor  ideal  like  Leibniz's  monads. 
Most  of  the  realists  entirely  disregard  spiritual  and  ideal 
centers.  As  far  as  realism  opposes  idealism  it  is  no  ad- 
vance on  pragmatism.  Its  theory  of  knowledge  is  in- 
ferior to  that  of  pragmatism. 

Neo-realism  claims  to  have  aided  positive  freedom  on 
the  basis  of  decision  and  intention,  and  to  have  favored 
negative  freedom  from  the  exclusive  control  of  mechanical 
laws.  Professor  Perry  claims  that  there  is  also  a  free- 
dom for  the  individual  from  cosmic  moral  laws.  He 
says :  "  There  is  a  sense  in  which  every  individual  is 
morally  a  law  unto  himself."  24  With  this  in  mind  it  is 
possible  to  see  how  far  the  negative  freedom  extends.  It  is 
not  only  asserted  that  moral  laws  take  precedence  in  the 
control  of  life  over  mechanical  laws,  but  the  individual  is 
free  within  himself.  In  other  words,  freedom  has  become 
mere  individualism.  But  when  we  ask  upon  what  psychol- 
ogy such  individualism  and  such  freedom  rest,  we  are  dis- 
appointed, for  we  learn  that  "  mental  action  is  a  property 
of  the  physical  organism."  25  A  physically  determined 
organism  is  free  in  its  choices.  This  means  that  a  phys- 
ically controlled  man  is  free  in  the  determinations  and  in 
the  laws  of  his  organism.  In  other  words  he  is  not  really 
free  as  a  biological  center.  He  is  only  free  from  mechan- 
ical control  and  from  cosmic  moral  control.  Such  a 
theory  of  freedom  is  really  deterministic.  On  its  moral 
side  it  does  away  with  all  general  moral  laws,  and  it  de- 

2*  "  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,"  p.  343. 
25  Ibid.,  p.  298. 


The  Realist  Realm  309 

stroys  the  foundations  of  common  ethics  and  common 
moral  purposes. 

Scientific,  mechanical,  physical,  and  biological  attitudes 
control  realism.  It  is  materialistic  to  a  remarkable  de- 
gree and  has  no  real  place  for  the  spirit.  The  claim  of 
the  independence  of  logical,  aesthetical,  moral  and  religious 
facts  is  not  warranted  by  the  gross  psychology  of  realism. 
Because  it  has  no  real  foundation  for  spiritual  independ- 
ence, and  because  it  denies  the  ideality  of  knowledge,  truth 
for  it  is  a  question  of  brain-states.  There  is  no  spiritual 
element  in  its  theory  of  truth.  It  has  borrowed  from  the 
most  materialistic  German  philosophers,  like  Mach  and 
Avenarius,  but  it  has  no  sympathy  with  the  strivings  of 
the  mind  and  the  ideals  of  the  spirit.  If  Christianity  must 
fundamentally  combat  any  modern  type  of  thinking  and 
any  scheme  of  philosophy,  it  must  combat  this  inconsistent 
materialism  parading  under  the  name  of  realism. 

Apparently  Professor  Perry  rescues  morals  and  re- 
ligion in  his  endeavor  at  a  realistic  philosophy  of  life.26 
But  what  does  he  leave  us  of  morals  and  religion,  and  how 
does  he  seek  to  establish  them  ?  He  says :  "  A  philos- 
ophy of  life  must  always  contain  two  principal  com- 
ponents, a  theory  concerning  the  nature  of  goodness  or 
value,  and  a  theory  concerning  the  conditions  and  pros- 
pect of  its  realization.  The  former  is  the  central  topic 
of  ethics,  and  the  second  is  the  central  topic  of  a  philos- 
ophy of  religion."  27  In  this  definition  Professor  Perry 
has  borrowed  a  Kantian  idea  to  determine  the  place  and 
use  of  religion.  Religion  is  only  necessary  and  its  phi- 
losophy is  only  demanded  for  the  realization  of  goodness 
or  value.  Thus  religion  is  the  servant  of  ethics,  and  its 
own  life  and  worth  is  denied.  Value  is  fundamentally 
value  of  goodness.      Consequently  ethics  is  all  that  really 

zolbid.,  p.  329  ff. 
27  Ibid.,  p.  331. 


310       Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

constitutes  life.  It  is  supposed  that  there  must  be  faith, 
but  when  faith  acts  it  must  create  a  habit.  The  making 
of  a  habit  is,  however,  advantageous,  for  though  faith 
and  religious  optimism  cannot  be  proven,  as  little  can 
pessimism  be  sustained.  Pessimism  holds  that  man's  hope 
must  be  buried  in  the  final  collapse  of  the  universe.  It  is 
better  not  to  believe  in  the  collapse  of  the  universe.  Op- 
timism, consequently,  and  faith  in  goodness  is  most  profit- 
able. Therefore,  the  religion  of  neo-realism  is  a  belief 
in  an  optimistic  chance  of  man  in  the  universe  of  neces- 
sity. Such  is  the  extent  of  the  religious  philosophy  in 
realism.  It  does  not  assert  a  God.  It  has  no  place  for 
superhuman  and  supernatural  fact.  God  can  only  be  a 
hypothesis,  and  a  hypothesis  which  is  a  habit.  Because 
there  is  no  emphasis  placed  upon  directly  and  immediately 
experienced  spiritual  realities,  and  because  there  is  no  al- 
lowance for  an  inner  spiritual  grasp  of  God,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  have  any  real  religion  or  any  real  philosophy  of 
religion  except  as  an  inference  from  morals.  The  vitiat- 
ing influence  of  the  materialistic  psychology  of  realism 
stands  in  the  way  of  the  recognition  of  real  religion  as  a 
human  experience.  There  can  be  no  truce  between  such 
an  uncertain  optimism,  misnamed  religion,  and  Chris- 
tianity. Even  the  moral  hopefulness  of  mere  realism  is 
not  the  outcome  of  a  strong  ethical  idealism.  Kant's 
thought  is  borrowed,  but  it  has  not  grown  out  of  this  new 
philosophy.  Realism  has  attempted  to  graft  an  incom- 
patible part  of  an  idealistic  belief  in  optimism  on  a  barren 
naturalistic  tree. 

The  attitude  which  Professor  Perry  assumes  toward 
religion  leads  us  to  ask  how  the  moral  values  are  conserved, 
for  the  sake  of  which  optimism,  called  religion,  is  de- 
manded. The  good  is  not  conceded  to  be  good  because 
it  is  inherently  good.  Its  value  depends  on  desire.  There 
is  no  inherent  worth  because  every  value  is  supposed  to 


The  Realist  Realm  311 

arise  from  a  relation  to  interests  in  which  desire  expresses 
itself.  "  Moral  value  arises  from  the  complexity  and 
mutual  relation  of  interests."  2S  This  moral  value  de- 
pends first  of  all  on  Tightness  and  when  an  action  is  right 
it  conduces  to  goodness.  But  rightness  only  leads  to  com- 
parative goodness,  and  this  is  the  outcome  of  proper  ac- 
tion controlled  by  interest.  "  When  an  interest  is  con- 
fronted by  an  occasion,  or  particular  phase  of  the  environ- 
ment, there  is  an  action  which  will  so  meet  the  occasion 
as  to  fulfill  the  interest.  This  is  the  right  act  in  the 
premises."29  "But  rightness  is  not  necessarily  moral; 
it  may  be  merely  intelligence  or  expediency.  Moral 
values  adhere  only  when  there  is  a  question  of  comparative 
value.  And  this  question  arises  from  the  contact  and  con- 
flict of  interests."  30  In  all  this  conflict  of  actions  that 
is  best  which  fulfills  all  interests.  "  Morality,  then,  is 
such  performance  as  under  the  circumstances,  and  in  view 
of  all  the  interests  affected,  conduces  to  most  goodness."  31 
Morality,  consequently,  can  only  be  a  probable  decision 
about  the  good.  There  can  be  no  absolute  value  and  no 
absolute  ideal.  Only  what  is  best  for  existing  interests 
under  existing  conditions  can  be  reached.  Moral  life  has 
no  fixed  ideals  toward  which  it  strives.  It  is  true  that 
Professor  Perry  claims  that  this  theory  is  not  "  relativis- 
tic  in  any  vicious  or  sceptical  sense,"  32  but  it  is  after  all 
strongly  relative.  It  has  no  foundation  in  absolute  good- 
ness. All  actions  are  determined  by  relation  to  desires 
and  interests.  The  satisfactions  are  not  clearly  empha- 
sized as  moral  satisfactions  even  in  a  relative  sense.  The 
outcome  of  this  relativism  in  morals  can  be  readily  fore- 
seen.    In  such  a  shifting  morality  of  mere  comparative 

28  ibid.,  p.  333. 

29  Ibid.,  p.  333  ff. 

30  Ibid.,  p.  334. 
3i  Ibid.,  p.  334. 
32  Ibid.,  p.  337. 


312         Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

values,  Christianity  can  find  no  friend,  but  it  can  only  de- 
tect an  enemy.  If  Christianity  is  ever  to  use  the  new 
realism,  the  realists  must  remove  the  leaven  of  scientific 
materialism,  of  naturalistic  psychologism,  of  uncertain 
standards  of  truth  and  morals,  and  of  an  unfounded  op- 
timism wrongly  called  religion.  Christian  truth  has  its 
own  basis  and  its  own  value;  and  these  do  not  agree  with 
the  uncertainties,  the  relativism,  and  the  materialism  of 
the  new  realism. 


It  has  been  necessary,  in  examining  all  the  trends  of 
thought  and  all  the  solutions  of  the  problem  of  truth,  for 
Christianity  to  maintain  its  own  standard  and  ideals.  It 
has  discovered  points  of  contact,  but  it  has  also  fre- 
quently found  points  of  difference.  There  can  be  no 
acceptance  of  a  natural  theology,  which  rests  on  the 
supposition  that  the  only  accurate  thinking  is  mathe- 
matical. Christianity  has  to  dissent  from  the  quantita- 
tive, a  priori  idea  of  truth.  It  finds  a  better  plan  in  a 
rightly  guarded  conception  of  induction,  which  considers 
the  living  facts  of  experience.  The  religion  of  Chris- 
tianity is  a  life  and  it  derives  its  principles  from  a  real 
life.  It  can  employ  real  comparison  and  just  conjec- 
ture. It  cannot  throw  itself  into  the  arms  of  a  me- 
chanical theory  of  the  world,  but  it  accepts  real  external 
things  and  is  not  to  be  misled  into  an  illusive  idealism. 
For  it  the  theories  of  physical  life  cannot  determine 
all  life,  and  its  world  cannot  be  a  world  of  chance  but 
one  of  purpose,  of  an  unfolding  purpose  of  God.  No 
theory  of  mind  which  impairs  spiritual  reality  is  ac- 
ceptable to  it.  In  its  truth  no  conception  of  society  which 
endangers  the  soul  is  possible.  It  uses,  however,  true 
ideals  of  the  things  in  the  world,  of  the  interests  of  mind, 
of  the  plans  of  life,  and  of  the  values  of  society. 

With  a  high  standard  of  truth,  personally  expressed 


The  Realist  Realm  313 

in  Christ,  before  it,  Christianity  has  a  conception  of  truth 
and  life  which  gives  it  its  own  character.  It  cannot, 
therefore,  become  absolutistic,  merge  God  into  the  world, 
injure  freedom  and  virtually  deny  sin,  as  does  absolutism. 
The  ideality  of  the  absolutist  appeals  to  it,  but  it  finds  a 
deeper  striving  of  inwardness  in  mysticism.  But  even 
mysticism  gravitates  to  a  negative  position,  to  an  abso- 
lute One,  which  injures  the  living  God  and  Father  of  Chris- 
tianity. Christianity  is,  therefore,  not  essentially  abso- 
lutist or  mystical  in  its  idea  of  truth.  It  has  real  rela- 
tions with  a  living  verification  of  truth  in  a  pragmatic 
world,  but  it  must  reject  the  uncertainty,  the  utilitarian- 
ism and  the  naturalism  of  pragmatism.  In  sympathy 
with  the  ideal  of  life,  it  nevertheless  finds  that  neither  the 
vital  impulse,  nor  the  God  who  is  an  outbursting  of  forces, 
can  satisfy  it.  In  closer  affinity  with  the  conception  of  a 
divine  life  in  the  world,  it  must,  nevertheless,  dissent  from 
a  philosophy  of  life  which  has  no  definite  personal  God, 
no  divine-human  Christ,  no  real  appreciation  of  guilt  and 
sin,  no  vital  atonement,  and  no  really  Spirit-guided 
Church.  It  stands  altogether  aloof  from  the  materialism 
and  relativism  of  the  newer  realistic  philosophy. 

While  Christianity  is  no  philosophy,  it  bears  within  its 
life  the  implications  and  the  truths  which  compel  it  to  take 
these  attitudes.  It  is  neither  materialistic  nor  philosoph- 
ically idealistic,  for  it  accepts  real  things  but  claims  an 
ideal  origin  and  purpose  for  the  world.  It  is  neither 
monistic  nor  purely  pluralistic,  but  it  wants  a  unity  of 
origin  and  plan  in  a  world  of  many  things  and  persons. 
It  is  neither  totally  absolutistic,  nor  in  any  way  relativis- 
tic.  It  emphasizes  neither  the  intellect  exclusively,  nor 
feelings  exclusively,  nor  the  will  exclusively,  but  rests  on 
man's  total  nature.  It  uses  intuition,  but  is  not  alto- 
gether intuitional  or  inspirational.  It  does  not  depreciate 
the  body  for  the  sake  of  the  soul,  and  it  does  not  condemn 


314        Trends  of  Thought  and  Christian  Truth 

the  individual  because  of  society.  The  aim  of  Christianity, 
as  it  works  its  way  through  succeeding  ages  of  civiliza- 
tion and  culture,  is  to  correlate  the  discordant  opposites 
in  all  the  specific  philosophies.  Its  unity  is  larger  than 
that  of  mere  logic,  but  it  is  not  a  harmony  of  indefinite  de- 
sires and  feelings.  The  mere  consistency  of  any  single 
system  of  thought  is  not  the  aim  or  fulfillment  of  Chris- 
tian truth.  It  has  its  correlations  and  unities  of  thought 
and  truth,  but  its  life  is  larger.  If  difficulties  of  logic 
within  any  Christian  system  are  criticized,  they  are  only 
the  result  of  the  whole  problem  of  knowledge.  Professor 
Ladd,  in  discussing  knowledge  on  its  own  basis,  is  willing 
to  accept  the  criticism  that  he  does  not  belong  to  any 
one  school  in  the  problem  of  knowledge,  which  is  due  to  the 
vitality  and  difficulties  of  knowledge.  But  he  finally 
says : 33  "  Knowledge  does  not  come  by  indisputable 
logic ;  truth  is  not  revealed  to  those  who  will  not  seek,  and 
pay  its  price;  the  path  of  right  living  is  not  all  in  the 
'  lime-light.'  "  Knowledge  and  life  have  never  been  com- 
passed by  any  system.  The  fact  that  Christianity  and 
its  truth  cannot  be  encased  in  any  one  philosophy,  and  that 
they  are  larger  than  logic,  connects  them  with  all  real  life 
and  vital  knowledge.  The  demand  of  standards  and  their 
use  does  not  reduce  Christianity  to  logic.  It  only  aids 
in  preserving  revelation  which  is  not  to  be  corrected  by 
logic.  Christianity  must  and  will  create  its  systems  of 
doctrine,  but  these  are  not  philosophies  in  the  true  sense. 
Their  principle  is  not  reason.  In  them  Christianity  seeks 
to  hold  fast  and  defend  its  vital  elements.  If  Christianity 
surrenders  any  of  its  vital  elements  it  will  become  a  mere 
human  philosophy ;  if  it  maintains  its  essentials,  its  life  and 
truth  will  again  and  again  overcome  the  errors  of  time  and 
lead  mankind  to  a  larger  synthesis  of  all  truth  in  Him,  who 
is  truly  the  Way,  the  Truth  and  the  Life. 

33  "What  Can  I  Know?"  p.  307. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Absolute,  the,   16 

as  truth,  172 

and  God,  174 
Absolutism 

and   personal  immortality,   178 

and  incarnation,   179 

and  mysticism,  184 
Absolutist 

aim,  167ff. 

and  Christianity,  167,  174 
Absolutists 

assert  absolute  wholeness,  172 

and  individuality,  175ff. 
Accidental  change,  its  difficulties, 

111 
Accounts  of  the  Gospels,  78 
Activism  of  Eucken,  277 
Adaptation,  115 

and  pragmatism,  203 ff. 
Ames, 

religion  claims  total  life,  130 

subconsciousness    not    peculiar 
place  of  religion,  133 

on  ideas  as  movements,  140 
Analogy,  61 

and  conservation  of  energy,  62 

analyzed,  63ff. 

in  religion  and  science,  65 

of  man  and  God,  68 

and  purpose,  69 

between   Christianity   and   gen- 
eral history,  70 

in  comparative  religion,  72 

of  faith,  175 
Ancestor  worship,  73 
Animism,  73 
Anselm,  100 

Anthropomorphism,  68,  294 
Apologetics  and  mathematics,  35 
Aristotle 

and  induction,  46ff. 

in  Christian  truth,  58 

gains   new  power  in   Christian 
truth,  58 


Aristotle — Continued. 

and  purpose,  105 
Art,   relation  to   religion,   lOff. 
Assyriology  and  analogy,  63 
Atomism,  94 
Atonement 

for  community,  150ff. 

as  speculative  fact,  167 

according  to  Eucken,  293 
Augustine  and  Platonism,  99 
Authority  in  religion,  233 

Bacon  formulated  induction,  47 
Bergson,  Henri,  17,  105,  109, 
111,  244ff. 

his  discussion  of  mathematics, 
44ff. 

evolution  and  unity,  54 

on  difficulty  of  sudden  varia- 
tion, 112 

on  life,  124 

compared  with  Eucken,  243 

on  life  as  mobility,  244 

on  vital  impulse,  245 

on  duration,  245ff. 

on  time,  246 

on  matter  and  memory,  247 

on  theory  of  knowledge,  248 

on  intuition,  248 

on  the  intellect,  249 

and  the  Christian  idea  of  life, 
250 

opposition  to  intellect,  252 

on  personality,  253 

on  soul,  254,  262 

opposes  psychology  of  phenom- 
enalism, 254 

on  personality  as  continually 
created,  255 

and  theism,  256,  263 

eliminates   idea  of   rest,   256ff. 

his   philosophy   of  change,  257 

no  strong  conception  of  eter- 
nity, 258 


317 


318 


Index 


Bergson — Continued, 
evolution  as  eternal,  258 
has     partly    phenomenal    con- 
sciousness, 259 
lacks  strong  norms,  261 
has  romantic  pantheism,  263 
Ins  Platonism,  263 
makes   life   greater   than   God, 

263 
his  God,  life  and  action,  264 
and  purpose,  264ff. 
on  design,  265 

no  place  for  over-ruling  God, 
266 
Berkeley's     psychological     ideal- 
ism, lOOff. 
Biological  supposition,  14,  104ff. 
Biology 

and  the   Unseen,  87 

its    influence    on    the    sciences, 

104 
and  purpose,  106ff. 
and  philosophy,  107 
Boodin,  Professor 

on    truth    as    self    realization, 

206 
on  judgment  as  a  process,  206 
on  utility  as  a  criterion,  213 
on  truth  as  result,  214 
Bosanquet,  Professor,  175 

on  the  danger  of  sole  applica- 
tion of  quantity,  42ff. 
Boscovich,  94 
Brahmanism,   93,   188,   193 
Bradley,  Professor 
truth  as  harmony,  168 
on    the    super-personal,    176 
on  degrees  of  reality,  177 
doubts     personal     immortality, 

178ff. 
on   the   reality   in    appearance, 

179 
on  relativity  of  good  and  evil, 
183 
Buddhism,  93,  136,  188 
Burroughs,  John,  on  mechanism, 

98 
Burton,  on  sin,  120 
Butler's  Analogy,  64 

Calvin,  58 
Carlyle,  146 


Catholicism,  according  to 

Eucken,  291 
Causal  chain,  48 ff. 
Cause   in   the  Darwinian   theory, 

107  ff. 
Centers,  four,  of  discussion,  12ff. 
Certainty 

in  mathematics,  32,  35 

in  hypothesis,  85 
Chance,  doctrine  of,  77,  110 
Characteristic  religion,  278 
Chemistry  and  the  Unseen,  87 
Child  mind,  127 
Christ 

and  history,  71  ff. 

as  ideal  in  Christianity,  74 

and  mysticism,  188 

on  practical  test  of  truth,  220 

calls    for   a   valuation   of  him- 
self, 222 
Christianity 

types  of,  18 ff. 

dogmatic  ideal  of,  19 

mystic  conception  of,  19 

voluntarist  ideal  of,  20 

communal  idea  of,  23 

eternal   and   temporal  idea   of, 
24 

as  vital  knowledge,  45 

and  inductive  science,  53 

and  inductive  argument,  56ff. 

not  necessarily  deductive,  57 

and     single     controlling    prin- 
ciple, 58 

and  Aristotle,  58,  100 

history    of,    and    general    his- 
tory, 70 

and  ethical  development,  75ff. 

and  hypothesis,  82 

and  criticism,  82ff. 

and  a  static  universe,  93ff. 

and  idealism,  99ff.,  136 

can  use  mechanism,  97,  99,  103 

and    naturalistic    determinism, 
117 

and  heredity,  120 

and  evolution,  121 

and  life,  125 

demands    objective    revelation, 
135 

a  new  humanity,  152 

and  social  betterment,  153 


Index 


319 


Christianity— Continued. 

and  socialism,  153ff. 

and  social  reform,  154 

and  economic  interests,  155ff. 

and  the  economic  state,   157 

and  the  individual,  157ff. 

and  philosophy  of  history, 
158ff. 

and  absolutist,  167 

and  absolutism  as  to  harmony, 
173 

believes  that  truth  is,  173 

and  the  infinite  and  absolute, 
174 

and  the  intellectual  ideal, 
174ff. 

demands  finite  truth,  181 

seeks  certainty  for  its  mes- 
sage, 181 

denies  that  evil  is  partial,  182 

and  mystic  elements,  187ff. 

what  it  approves  of  in  mysti- 
cism, 190ff. 

and  conscience,  190 

and  mysticism  on  the  soul,  191 

and  inner  revelation,  191 

and  passivity,  194 

and  biological  terms,  216 

and  selection,  217 

and  verification,  218fT. 

and  satisfaction,  219ff. 

not  merely  intellectual,  220ff. 

and  values,  222 

and  pluralism,  224 

and  development,  227 

demands   fixity  of  truth,  229 

its  transcendent  ideas,  230 

and  non-resistance,  230 

needs  strong  moral  principles, 
233 

and  a  limited  God,  236ff. 

and  Bergson's  depreciation  of 
matter,  251 

and  spiritual  life,  251  ff. 

and  spiritual  experience,  253 

and  Bergson's  soul,  254ff. 

not  fully  satisfied  with  a  phi- 
losophy of  change,  257 

and  eternity,  258 

and  the  intellectual  side  of 
man,  260 

and  intuitionalism,  260 


Christianity— Continued. 

approves  of  no  movement  with- 
out standards,  261 
and     Eucken's     idea    of    life. 

279ff. 
and  Eucken's   anti-intellectual- 
ism,  280 
wherein  it  differs  from  Eucken, 

284  ff. 
cannot    admit    superiority     of 

philosophy,  287 
Eucken's  idea  of,  288 ff. 
denied     as     final     religion     by 

Eucken,  288ff. 
a    specific    and    final    message, 

289  fo 

cannot    accept    the    Christ    of 

Eucken,  298 
and  realism,  307ff. 
a  life,  312ff. 
no  philosophy,  313 
uses  all  truths,  314 
Church 

Eucken's  view  of  the,  289 ff. 
Eucken's      criticism      of      the, 
290ff. 
Coe,    Professor,    psychology    of 

religion,  128 
Communal   idea   of   Christianity, 
23  , 

Community    claimed    as    central 
doctrine  of  Christianity,  150 
Comparative  thinking,  13 
Comparative  idea,  61  ff. 
Comparative     method     in     lan- 
guages, 62ff. 
Comparative  religion,  72ff. 
Comte,  and  sociology,  147 
Conjectural  thinking,  13 
Conjectural  scheme,  77ff. 
Conscience  in  Christianity,  190 
Consciousness, 
Christian,  52 
and  brain  states,  306 
Constant 
in  induction,  50ff. 
and  the  human  mind,  51 
as  external,  51 
and  religion,  52 
in  each  group  of  facts,  52ff. 
Continuity, 
mathematical,  39 


320 


Index 


Continuity — Continued, 
problem  of  denning,  54ff. 
and  religion,  55 
and  a  personal  God,  56 
idea    developed    in    the    Nine- 
teenth Century,   145 
Conventions   in  mathematics,  41 
Co-ordination  in  evolution,  113 
Cosmological  proof,  33 
Creation 
and  evolution,  122 
its    relation    to    criticism    and 
work  in  Eucken's  philosophy, 
276 
Creative    thought    according    to 

Eucken,  273ff. 
Criticism,  83ff. 
in  Eucken,  272ff. 
its      relation      and      work      in 
Eucken's  philosophy,  276 
Culture  and  religion,  283 

Darwin,  Charles,  47,  81 
and  analogy,  6 Iff. 
repudiates  design,  105ff. 
and  idea  of  God,  106 
use  of  natural  selection,  110 
Darwinism,  104,  145 

and  pragmatism,  199ff. 
Deduction  and  Christianity,  57ff. 
DeLaguna, 

on   pragmatism  as  Darwinism, 

199 
on    function    of    consciousness, 

199ff. 
on  happiness  as  separate  from 
survival,  228 
Descartes,  31,  47,  100 

emphasizes  thinking  ego,  165 
Design, 

opposed  by  Darwin,  105ff. 
in  Bergson's  philosophy,  265 
DeVries,  112 
Dewey,  Professor 
on  Maeterlinck,  193 
on   truth   as   experienced    rela- 
tion, 197 
on      knowledge      as      set      of 

changes,  201 
on    ideas    as    attitudes    of    re- 
sponse, 203ff. 


Dewey,   Professor — Continued, 
on  thought  as  dependent  upon 

actual  conditions,  207 
on  truth  as  within  experience, 

214 
on  truth  as  experienced  fulfil- 
ment, 215 
against   Spencer's    unknowable, 

239 
against       transcendent       prin- 
ciple, 240 
Difference  in  science,  philosophy 

and  Christianity,  11 
Dogmatic  ideal,  19 
Dominants,  115,  242 
Drummond,  and  analogy,  64 
Duration    in    Bergson's    philoso- 
phy, 245  ff. 


Ebbinghaus,  Herman,  139 
Economic    consideration    in    his- 
tory, 146 
Entelechies,  242 
Energy 

and  the  divine  will,  67 

and  matter,  94 

and  will,  95 
Entities  in  neo-realism,  300ff. 
Entropy,  93 
Environment 

and  purpose,  115ff. 

must   include   ideals    of   mind, 
117 
Epistemology,  modern,  165ff. 
Error 

and  truth,  168ff.,  180ff. 

as  finite  appearance,  168 

grades  of,  169 

partial  truth,  170 

as  isolation,  171 

in  neo-realism,  305ff. 
Eternity     and      temporality      of 

Christianity,  25 
Eucken,  17,   105,  267ff. 

on  life,  124 

on  naturalistic  evolution,  227 

compared  with  Bergson,  243 

on  pragmatism,  243 

on  spiritual  life,  267 

on  life,  its  depth  and  compass, 
268 


Index 


321 


E  ucken — Continued . 

on  life  in  its  self-presence,  269 

on  life  and  the  thinkers,  269 

and  intellectualism,  270 

on  intuition,  270 

logical  elements   needed,  271 

on  thought  and  life,  272 

on  criticism,  272ff. 

on  creative  movement  of 
thought,  273ff. 

on  spiritual  work,  274 

on  the  kingdom  of  the  act,  275 

and  the  tasks  of  life,  275 

inter-relation  of  creation,  crit- 
icism and  work,  276 

his  activism,  277 

on  spiritual  and  cultural  move- 
ments, 277 

on  religion,  277 ff. 

on  universal  religion,  278 

on  historical  religions,  278ff. 

seeks  inwardness  of  life,  279 

his  "  Weltanschauung,"  279 

as  anti-intellectual,  280 

on  life  as  super-human,  280ff. 

on  religion  as  above  man  and 
divine,  281 

and  spiritual  reality,  282 

puts  religion  above  culture,  283 

on  religion  as  above  the  inter- 
ests of  society,  283ff. 

on  personality,  284  ff. 

and  impersonalism,  285 

and  definite  standards  of 
truth,  285  ff. 

a  romanticist,  286 

on  authority,  286 

places  philosophy  above  reli- 
gion, 287 

on  Christianity,  288ff. 

denies  finality  of  Christianity, 
288ff. 

on  the  Church,  289  ff. 

criticism  of  the  Church,  290ff. 

on  dogmas,  290 

on  Catholicism  and  Protestant- 
ism, 291 

on  evil,  292ff. 

on  atonement,  293 

on  anthropomorphic  elements 
in  the  atonement,  294 

on  Jesus,  295 


Eucken — Continued. 

doubts  Godhead  of  Jesus,  296 

cannot  find  divinity  in  one  per- 
son, 296,  297 

his  Christ  not  that  of  Christi- 
anity, 298 
Euchd,  30 
Evidence,  78 
Evil 

and  good  in  absolutism,  181  ff. 

according   to   Eucken,   292ff. 
Evolution 

and  teleology,  108ff. 

and  progress,  109 

and  co-ordination,  113 

and  mimicry,  113ff. 

and  instinct,  114 

and  Christianity,  120ff. 

and  a  personal  God,  122 

and  creation,  122 

and  spiritual  Me,  122ff. 

and  man's   spirit,   124 

and  pragmatism,  199 

as  eternal,  258 
Experience,  21,  41,  59,  78ff. 

completed  as  truth,   172 

in  truth,  214 
Eye,  the,  in  evolution,   110 

Facts  and  reasoning,  46 
Facts  and  induction,  48 
Faith 

and  mathematics,  29 

in  psychology  of  religion,  130 
Fechner,  formula  of,  37,  126 
Finalism  and  purpose,  266 
Finding  of  truth,  16,  163ff. 
Finite  lost  in  infinite,  177 
Fichte  and  the  ego,  101 
Fleming,  189,  190 
Force,  see  Energy 
Fortuitousness,,  110 
Fox,  22 
Freedom 

and  pragmatism,  223 

in  neo-realism,  308 

Galileo,  47 

Galloway, 

relation  of  art  and  religion,  10 
religion  needs  cognitive  aspect, 
260 


322 


Index 


Galton  calculated  regression,  110 
Geo-centric  idea,   145 
Geometry, 

and  thought,  30 

non-Euclidean,  37ff. 

of  four  dimensions,  38 
God 

proofs  for,  33 

Christian  conception  of,  74 

and  energy,  95 

and  evolution,  122 

personality   not   guaranteed   in 
absolutism,  167 

His  personality  denied,  176 

as  reality,  177 

as  the  One  in  mysticism,  187 

of  mysticism,  193     - 

as  personality,  225 

and  the  finite  self,  226 

guarantees  virtues,  233 

finite  in  pragmatism,  235 

as  self-limiting,  236ff. 

as  limited,  237 ff. 

the,  of  pragmatism,  241 

the,  of  Bergson,  256,  263 

in  time  and  movement,  258 

as  life  and  action  in  Berg-son, 
264 

and  neo- realism,  310 
Gods  of  wild  tribes,  134 
Goethe,  149 
Good     and    evil    in    absolutism, 

181  ff. 
Goodness  of  God  and  nature,  65 
Goodness  as  relative,  182 

Harmony    as    asserted    by    abso- 
lutists, 172 
Hartman,  von,  95 
Hegel,  146,  152 

on  mathematical  formulas,  42 

and  analogy,  69 

and  idealism,  101  ff. 

and  the  absolute,  102 

and  Christian  truths,  167ff. 
Hegelianism  and  sin,  167 
Herbart,  127 
Heredity,  118ff. 

and  Christianity,  120 
History, 

general,  and  history  of  Christi- 
anity, 70 


History — Continued. 

theories  of,  146 

and  economics,  146 

philosophy   of,    and    Christian- 
ity, 158ff. 

and  personality,  159 

and  incarnation,   159 
Hobhouse,  Professor,  108 

on  religion  as  deductive,  57 

on  assumptions,  80 

on  organic  structure,  91 

denial  of  purposive  causation, 
92 

on  entropy,  93 

on  evolution  and  purpose,  109 
Hoeffding,  139 
Homogeneity  and  hetereogeneitv, 

92 
Howison,  121 

evolution,  man's  question,  117 

opposed    to    cosmic    conscious- 
ness, 122 
Humanism,  211 
Hume,   139 

and  scepticism,  101 

definition  of  causes,  107 

and  functional  psychology,  126 

stimulates   Kant,   165 
Huxley,  138 

re-formulates    final   cause,    106 

on  epi-phenomenon,  136 
Hypothesis,  79  ff. 

requirements   of,  83ff. 

and  certainty,  85 

in  religion,  85ff. 

mental  character  of,  86ff. 


Idea  and  meaning,  172 
Idealism 

and  Christianity,  97 
its  danger  to  Christianity,  102, 
136 
Identity,  law  of,  61 
Immanence,    injures    a    personal 

God,   102 
Immediate,     the,     in     mysticism, 

187 
Immortality 

and  absolutism,  178 
personal,  and  the  universe,  179 
Impersonalism,  68 


Index 


323 


Incarnation 

in  philosophy  of  history,  159ff. 

and  absolutism,   179ff. 

not    explicable    as    appearance 
and  reality,  180 
Individual,    the,    in    Christianity, 

157ff. 
Individualism,  148ff. 

in  religion,  22 

naturalistic,  149 
Individuality 

as  the  Universe,  175ff. 

in  Bergson,  262 
Induction 

and  the  sciences,  48 

methods  of,  49  ff. 

its  constant,  50ff. 

materialistic   interpretation,   52 
Inductive  claim,  46ff. 
Inductive  science  and  Christian- 
ity, 53 
Inductive  thinking,  13 
Industrial  revolution,  147 
Industrial  conditions,  favor  soci- 
ology, 147ff. 
Infinite,  and  God,  174 
Instinct  and  evolution,  114 
Intellect 

in  truth,  16 

in  Bergson's  philosophy,  248ff. 

and  space,  249 

its  systems,  250 
Intellectual  ideal  and  Christian- 
ity, 174 
Intellectualism  in  Eucken,  270 
Intuition 

and  truth,  190 

in  Bergson's  philosophy,  248 

its  danger,  259ff. 

in  Eucken,  270 

its  insufficiency,  270ff. 
Intuitionism  and  Christian  truth, 
260 


James,  Professor  William,  127, 
128,  139 

on  the  will  to  believe,  141,  221 

on  mystical  states  as  knowl- 
edge, 184 

on  origin  of  pragmatism,  196 

on  leading,  208 ff. 


James,  Professor — Continued. 

on  pragmatism  as  consequence, 
209 

on  satisfaction,  210 

on  truth  as,  verification,  210 

on    "  the    true "    as    expedient, 
212 

on  practical  value  of  theologi- 
cal ideas,  213 

on  finite  God,  235 ff. 
Jesus, 

no  social  program,  156 

according  to  Eucken,  295 

divine   character    doubted,    296 
St.  John 

and  mysticism,  190 

Gospel  of,  and  Bergson's  idea 
of  life,  250 
Joachim, 

on  nature  of  truth,  170ff. 

his  insoluble  problem,  171 
Judgment 

analytic,  30 

synthetic,  30 

in  pragmatism,  206 

Kant, 

treatment  of  mathematics,  30ff. 

and  ontological  proof,  33 

on     purpose     in     the     organic 
world,  70 

produces    new   wave   of   ideal- 
ism, 101 

and  good  will,  141 

formulates  problem  of  knowl- 
edge, 165 

finds   truth  through  logic,   165 
Kelvin,   Lord,   94 
Kepler,  47 
Kingdom  of  God 

and   the  social   point   of  view, 
155ff. 

the  individual  in  the,  158 
Knowing  and  the  knower,  186 
Knowledge 

in  Bergson's  philosophy,  248ff. 

and  neo-realism,  301,  302 

and  life,  314 

Ladd,    Professor,   on   knowledge, 

314 
Lamarck,  116 


324 


Index 


Lamprecht,  146 

Leading,  process  of,  in  pragma- 
tism, 208  ff. 
Leibniz,  34,  145 

on  thinking  centers,   165 
Lessing,  34 
Life, 

philosophy  of,  17 

and  secondary  causes,  105 

and  evolution,  123 

and  Christianity,  125 

needs  a  purposive  God,  240 

its  new  philosophy,  242ff. 

as  mobility,  244 

and  knowledge,  248 

Christian  idea,  251 

its  depth  and  fullness,  268 

and  the  thinkers,  269 

in  its  exaltedness,  269 

its  tasks,  275 
Logic 

as  limiting  psychology,  208 

in  Eucken's  philosophy,  271  ff. 
Logical  ideas,  12 
Lyell,  48 


Maeterlinck,  his  pantheism,  193 

Magic,  73 

Malthus,  62 

Mansel,  44 

Man's  place  in  the  universe,  145 

Marx,  148 

Mathematics 

and  modern  sciences,  37 
and  experience,  39ff. 

Mathematical  continuity,  39 

Mathematical    method    of    think- 
ing, 29  ff. 

Matter   in   Bergson's   philosophy, 
247 

Mayer,  Dr.  Robert,  on  transfer- 
ence of  energy,  62 

McTaggart,   on   personal   immor- 
tality, 178 

Mechanical    and    chemical    view, 
90 

Mechanical   conception,   14 

Mechanical  demand,  90ff. 

Mechanical  view,  its  static  char- 
acter, 92 


Mechanism 
and  cause,  91 
and  material  sequence,  91 
and  living  organisms,  91 
a  complex  assumption,  94 
and  purpose,  96ff. 
usable  by  Christianity,  97,  99, 

103 
and  final  purpose,  97 
and  mind,  97 
its  elimination,  98 
Memory,    in    Bergson's    philoso- 
phy, 247 
Mendel's  law,  118 
Merz,  discussion  of  Kant,  31  ff. 
Mill,  John   Stuart,  46ff. 
and  causes,  107 

on  God  as  not  omnipotent,  235 
Mimicry  and  evolution,  113 
Mind, 

its  immanence  in  the  world,  97 
according  to  neo-realism,  303 
and  environment,  304,  307 
Modes  of  thinking,  12ff. 
Montaigne,   145 
Moore, 

truth  as  desire  and  effort,  214 
on  purpose  in  change,  239 
Moral  proofs  for  God,  33ff. 
Mystic  absorption,  184ff. 
Mysticism,  19 

its  noetic  quality,  184ff. 

and  reflection,  185 

merges    reason    into    intuition, 

185 
as  inner  experience,  186 
finds  truth  in  the  soul,  186 
essence  of,  as  Being,  186 
and  God,  187 
and  quietism,  187 
and  the  Immediate,  187 
and  Christianity,   187ff. 
and  St.  Paul,  i89 
and  St.  John,  190 
how  far  approved  of  by  Chris- 
tianity,  190ff. 
and    Christianity,    on    the    soul, 

191 
as  inner  revelation,  191 
its  subjectivism,  192 
and  inner  intuition,  192 
untrue  to  the  individual,  192ff. 


Index 


325 


Mysticism — Continued. 

and     materialistic     pantheism, 
193 

and  God,  193 

and  passivity,  194 
Mythologism,  294 

Natural  selection 
and  purpose,  HOff. 
and  pragmatism,  201  ff. 
Natural  theology,  35 
Naturalism  in  neo-realism,  304ff. 
Neo-platonism,  99,   101 
Neo-realism,  299ff. 

its    relation    to    other    philoso- 
phies, 300 
as  world  of  manifold  entities. 

300ff. 
as  pragmatic,  301 
opposes     idealistic     theory     of 

knowledge,  301 
its  explanation  of  mind,  303 
its  naturalism,  304ff. 
its  theory  of  truth  and  error, 

305  ff. 
on  brain  states  and  conscious- 
ness, 306 
materialistic      in      theory      of 

truth  and  mind,  307 
and  Christianity,  307ff. 
and  freedom,  308 
has  no  place  for  the  spirit,  309 
and  morals,  309 ff. 
and  religion,  309ff. 
and  moral  values,  310ff. 
and  morality,  31  Iff. 
Neo-vitalism,  242 
Newton,  47,  94 
Nietzsche, 

his  cyclical  universe,  93 
on  brute  force,  95 
against  Christianity,  119 
and  heredity,  119 
Nineteenth     Century     as     social, 

145 
Non-Euclidean,  see  Geometry 
Non-resistance,   ideal   of,   75 

Old  Testament,  71  ff. 
Ontological  proof,  33 
Original  sin,  66ff. 
Origin  of  religion,  133ff. 


Origin  and  the  Darwinian  inter- 
pretation, 134 

Orr,  Professor  James,  compares 
Hume  and  James,  126ff. 

Ostwald,  94 

O'Sullivan,  Dr.  J.  M. 

on   Euclidean  and  non-Euclid- 
ean geometry,  38 
on  satisfaction  in  pragmatism, 
210 

Paley,  106 

on  the  notion  of  species,  108 
Pantheism,  materialistic,  193 
Parallelism    in    psychology,    137, 

138 
Particulars  in  reasoning,  46 
Patten,  Professor 

economic  idea  of   Christianity, 
152ff. 
Paul,  St. 

on  slavery,  156 

and  mysticism,  189 
Passivity  in  mysticism,  194 
Peirce,  Charles,*  196 
Perry,  205 

on    pragmatism    as    bio-centric 
philosophy,  204 

on  neo-realism,  300 

on   mind   and   nervous    system, 
304 

on  mind  and  environment,  307 

on  freedom,  308 

on  morals,  309  ff. 

on  religion,  309  ff. 

on  morality,  311 

and  relativism,  311 
"Personal  idealism,"  224 
Personalism,  198 
Personality,  225 

and  God,  68 

its   ultimates,  88 

in  Bergson,  253 

as  continually  created,  255 

and  Eucken/284 
Philosophy  and  religion,  287 
Physico-theological      proof,      see 

Design,  Purpose 
Physics,  and  the  Unseen,  86 
Pitkin,    Professor,    on    geometry, 

40 
Plato  and  induction,  46 


326 


Index 


Plato's   idealism    and   mathemat- 
ics, 31 
Platonism,  99 

in  Bergson,  263 
Poincare,  Professor,,  H.  L. 

on   principles   of  geometry,   37 

mathematics  as  definitions,  40 
Positivism  and  mathematics,  36 
Postulates 

in  mathematics,  41 

and  the  soul,  42 
Practicability   and   moral   postu- 
lates, 232ff. 
Pragmatic   program,    196ff. 
Pragmatism,  17,  164 

objects  to  epistemology,   1 65 ff. 

principle  of,  196ff. 

how  to  explain  its  vogue,  197 

its    real   explanation,    198ff. 

and   evolution,   199 

and   variation,   201 

and   natural   selection,   201  ff. 

and     survival     of     the     fittest, 
202ff. 

and  adaptation,  203ff. 

fundamentally  biological,  204ff. 

as   psychological,   205 ff.,   217ff. 

has  no  place  for  logic,  205  ff. 

as   leading,   208 

looking  to  consequences,  209 

as    satisfaction,   209 ff. 

and  utility,  212,  213 

and  experience,  214 

its  results,  215ff. 

its     bearing     on     Christianity, 
216ff. 

and  spiritual  life,  218 

and  doctrine  of  values,  221  ff., 
222,  231 

and   freedom,  223 

and  pluralism,  224 

too  biological,   227ff. 

its   psychology   material,  228 

its     undervaluation     of     ideas, 
229 

and     workableness     of     truth, 
229  ff. 

as  agnostic,  231 

and  a  finite  God,  234ff. 

denies  power  of  determination 
in  God,  238 

and  purpose,  239 


Pragmatism — Continued. 

and    Darwinian    accidentalism, 
240ff. 

its  God,  241 

as  related  to  vitalism,  243 
Pratt,    on    psychological    nature 

of  pragmatism,  208 
Predestination,  66,  22\ 
Probability,  77,  78 
Progress    and    Christianity,    24ff. 
Progress   and  evolution,   109 
Proofs   for  God,  33 
Protestantism        according        to 

Eucken,  291 
Providence,  66,  79 
Psychological   investigation,    127 
Psychological  point  of  view,  14 
Psychological   solution,    126ff. 
Psychological    test     in     pragma- 
tism, 217ff. 
Psychology 

and  the   Unseen,  87 

and  management,   128 

and  social  life,  128 

width  of  application,  128 

and  materialism,  136,  138 

as  parellelistic,  137,  138,  139 

its       physiological       character, 
137 

and  ethical  concepts,  142 

and  logic,  142 

and  knowledge,  166 

and  pragmatism,  206ff. 
Psychology  of  religion,  128 

its  value,   129  ff. 

and  origin  of  religion,  133 

subjective,    134ff. 

and  theology,  143 
Purpose 

and  analogy,  69 

and   mechanism,   96 

in  things,  97 

and  life,  105 

and  biology,  106,  109 

and  evolution,    108 

and  freedom,  116 

and  heredity,  118 

and  meaning,  172 

and  pragmatism,  239 ff. 

in  Bergson's  philosophy,  264 ff. 

and  God,  265 
Purposive  cause,  92 


Index 


327 


Pythagoras,  31 

Quantitative  idea,   and   theology, 

43ff. 
Quantitative  thinking,  13 

Ranke,  146 
Rashdall 

on  personality,  225 

on  God  as  limited,  237 
Rational   basis   of  religion,   32 
Rationalism,   22 
Real,  the,  greater  than  the  good, 

183 
Realism,  the  new,  18 
Realist  realm,  299ff. 
Reality,  16 

in   appearance,    172 

degrees  of,  177 

as  God,  177 
Reformers 

against  Aristotle,  58 

as  nominalists,  58 
Religion 

rational  basis   of,  32 

within  the  limits  of  reason,  34 

its  constant,  52 

comparative,  72ff. 

not  illusion,   129 

not      fundamentally      subcon- 
scious, 132 

origin  of,  133ff. 

as   fear,  139 

reduced     to    material     antece- 
dent, 140 

and  social  viewpoint,  149ff. 

and  authority,  233ff. 

universal,  278 

historic,  278ff. 

as  new  content  of  divine  life, 
281 

above  culture,  283 

above  the  interests  of  society, 
283ff. 

and  philosophy,  287 
Results   of  pragmatism,  216ff. 
Revelation,  inner,  191 
Rosetta  Stone,  63 
Rousseau,  144 
Rowland,  Eleanor,  142 
Royce,  172 


Royce — Continued. 

social    explanation    of    Christi- 
anity,  150ff. 

finds    truth    in    completed    ex- 
perience, 171 

on  the  mystic   and  knowledge, 
185 

on  essence  of  mysticism,  186 
Russell,  Bertrand, 

on  mathematical  entities,  41 

his  theory  of  knowledge,  302ff. 

Salvation  and  nature,  66 
Satisfaction 

in  pragmatism,  209 if. 

and  Christianity,  219ff. 
Schelling  and  identity,  101 
Schiller, 

and   humanism,   198 

on     evolutionism     in     thought, 
200 

on  selection  in  knowledge,  202 

as   against  pure  thought,  205 

truth  as  human,  211 

truth  as   ambiguous,  211,  232 

on  finite  God,  235 

on     an     indeterminate     world, 
238 
Schleiermacher,  139 

Christianity     and     other     reli- 
gions, 72 
Schopenhauer,  95,  172 
Science  and  the  spiritual  process, 

282 
Scriptures,  59 

Selection    and    Christianity,   217 
Self  deception  and   religious  ex- 
perience, 129 
Self,  the,  as  enduring,  253 
Sense-content,    how    it    becomes 

logical,    208 
Similarity,  61 

Simplicity  of  hypothesis,  83 
Sin,  denned  by  Prof.  Patten,  152 
Slavery,  St.  Paul  on,  156 
Socialism,   148 

and  Christianity,   153ff. 
Social    reform    and    Christianity, 

154 
Social  viewpoint,  15 

and  religion,  149 

and  kingdom  of  God,  155 


328 


Index 


Social  trend,  the,  144ff. 
Society, 

forces  of  mind  in,  87ff. 

and  religious  interests,  283  if. 
Sociology,  its  use  explained,   147 
Socrates,  46 
Soul 

truth  found  in,  186 

the  real  self,  186 

in  Christianity  and  mysticism, 
191 

in  Bergson,  254,  262 
Sovereignty,  divine,  59 
Spencer,  44,  73 
Spinoza,  138 

and  the  mathematical  method, 
31 

the  father  of  parallelism,  100 

depersonalized   thinking,    165 

his  idea  of  personality,  176 

identifies   God   and   the   world, 
176 
Spirit  of  man  and  evolution,  124 
Spiritual  experiences  not  mystic, 

189 
Spiritual  life  above  science,  282 
Spiritual  life  not  only  changing, 

257 
Spiritual  sciences,  104 
Starbuck,  Prof.,  128,  139 
Sub-conscious,  the, 

and  religion,  130ff. 

danger  of,  in  religion,  131  if. 
Subjectivism  of  piety,  60 
Subjectivism  in  mysticism,  192 
Sufficiency  of  hypothesis,  84 
Super-personalism,  see  Imperson- 

alism 
Super-personality  and  God,  176 
Survival  of  the  fittest,  115 

and  pragmatism,  202ff. 
System    of    ideas     complete     as 

truth,  172 
System  and  Christian  truth,  175 


Teleological    proof,    see    Design 
and  Purpose 

Theology 

and   quantitative  thinking,  43 
and  psychology  of  religion,  143 

Thought,  common  character  of,  9 


Thought  and  ends,  209 

Time    in     Bergson's    philosophv, 

246 
Transference  of  energy,  its  unity, 

93 
Transmission    of   characters,    115 
Treason,  and  salvation,  151 
Trinitv  as  intellectual  movement, 

167 
Truth 

and  thought,  15  if. 

finding  of,  16,  163ff. 

formal  character  of,   163 

as  absoluteness,  164 

search  after,  164 

the  dilemma  of,  166 

and  error,  168ff„  180if. 

degrees  of,  168 

and  reality,  169 

grades  o£  169 

partial  error,  170 

as  expression  of  universe,  170 

as  connectedness,  170 

as  completeness,  170 

needs  error,  171 

as  complete,  173 

makes  men,  173 

Christian,  and  system,  175 

as  experienced  relation,  197 

made  true  by  events,  210 

as  ambiguous,  211,  232 

as  workableness,  212,  229ff. 

as  useful,  212 

as  within  experience,  214 

as  only  in  situations,  215 

standards  of,  in  Eucken,  285  ff. 

according  to  neo-realism,  305  if. 
Tyndale,  Professor,  use  of  imag- 
ination, 81 


Uniformity  of  nature,  53ff. 

and  religion,  55ff. 
Unity  of  the  race  and  spiritual, 

66flF. 
Universality     and     certainty     in 

mathematics,  32 
Universe,     the,     disregard  ful    of 

personal  immortality,  179 
Unseen,  the,  in  speculation,  87  ff. 
Utilitarianism,  212 
Utility  in  pragmatism,  212ff. 


Index 


329 


Validity    of   thought    and    truth, 

163 
Values,  doctrine  of,  and  pragma- 
tism, 222,  231 
Values,  and  Christianity,  222 
Variation, 

slight  and  slow,  111 

sudden,  111 

along  definite  lines,  114ff. 

in  pragmatism,  201 
Venn  on  induction,  54 
Verification        in        Christianity, 

218ff.,  231 
Vinci,  da,  47 
"Vital  impulse,"  245 
Vitalism,  the  older,  242 
Vitalist  view,  242ff. 
Voluntarist  ideal,  20 


Ward  on  teleological  factors,  108 

Watson,  Professor, 

correlated  variations,  111 
his  constructive  realism,  177 

Weber,  formula  of,  37,  126 

Weissman,  118 

Wilberforce,  Bishop,  attacks  evo- 
lution, 107 

Will  and  energy,  95 

Will  to  believe,  141 

Wolff,  34 

Work,  according  to  Eucken, 
274ff. 

Work,  its  relation  to  creation 
and  criticism,  in  Eucken's 
philosophy,  276 

World-view  and   Christianity,   9 

Wundt,  127 


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